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SUMMARY OF THE THESIS ;
THE GREEK CORPORATION OF INCOME TAX;
SOME ASPECTS OF BUSINESS TAX 
HARMONIZATION
The th e s i s  aims to  access  the  p re s e n t c o rp o ra tio n  income ta x  sy s ­
tem in  Greece, to  c o n s id e r  what changes membership o f  th e  E .E .C . i s  
l i k e l y  to  in v o lv e  and to  e s tim a te  th e  im pacts r e s u l t i n g  from  th e se  
changes upon economic v a r i a b le s .
As a background o f  our d is c u s s io n ,  th e  f i r s t  c h a p te r  d is c u s s e s  the  
r a t io n a le  o f  c o rp o ra tio n  income ta x ,  th e  s h i f t i n g  and in c id e n ce  q ues­
t io n ,  and f i n a l l y  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  co rp o ra te  ta x a t io n  upon th e  economy.
The d is c u s s io n  o f  the  r a t io n a le  i s  m ainly concerned  w ith  the s e p a ra te  
and c o n d u it th e o r ie s  o f  c o rp o ra te  t a x a t io n .  In  a d d i t io n ,  the  a b i l i t y -  
to -p a y  and b e n e f i t  p r in c ip le s  a re  d is c u s se d . D ealing  w ith  the  s h i f t -  
t i n g  q u e s tio n  we d is c u s s  th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  and economic problem s which 
th e  e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  f a c e .  The e f f e c t s  o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n  a re  
d isc u sse d  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  d iv id en d  p o l ic y ,  methods o f  f in a n c in g , 
and re so u rc e  a l lo c a t io n .
C hapter two d iscu sses  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e  c o rp o ra te  ta x  system s from 
b o th  the  dom estic and th e  in te r n a t io n a l  p o in t o f  v iew , i*his d is c u s ­
s io n  s t a r t s  w ith  a  new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e  system s o f  
c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n .  The system s a re  judged under v a r io u s  g o a ls  such 
as  d iv id en d  p o l ic y ,  methods o f  f in a n c in g  in v estm en t programmes, in ­
come d i s t r i b u t io n  and re so u rc e  a l lo c a t io n .  From th e  in te r n a t io n a l  
p o in t  o f  view  we e s ta b l i s h  r u le s  f o r  e f f ic ie n c y  and e q u ity  fo r  each 
system .
In  C hapter th re e  the  d iv id en d  d ed uction  system  i s  d isc u sse d  as i t  
i s  a p p lie d  to  G reece, T his c h a p te r  beg ins w ith  a c r i t i c a l  d is c u s s io n  
o f  th e  o v e r a l l  ta x  s t r u c tu r e  whose th e  main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a re  the  
predom inance o f  i n d i r e c t  ta x e s ,  th e  la c k  o f  a c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x ,  th e  
m inor r o le  o f  th e  w ealth  ta x e s  and the  c o rp o ra te  ta x  fo llow ed  by a 
q ^ ^ e th o ra  o f ta x  in c e n t iv e s .  We c o n s tru c t  a ta x  d is c r im in a to ry  
v a r ia b le  between d iv id en d  and r e te n t io n  to  t e s t  t h e /
“ II-
e x is te n c e  and e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  such d is c r im in a to ry  p o lic y  in  Greece* 
The r o le  o f the  i n t e r n a l  g en era ted  fu n d s, o f  the  banking system  and o f 
th e  p u b lic  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  f in a n c in g  in v estm en t p ro je c ts  
i s  d is c u s se d . Then we go on to  c a lc u la te  ta x  sav in g s  from d e p re c i­
a t io n  and in v estm en t a llow ances in  th e  Greek m anufacturing*
C hapter fo u r c o n ta in s  an econom etric  a n a ly s is  o f  d iv id en d  and 
investm en t b eh av io u r. The d iv id en d  model i s  a  g e n e r a l iz a t io n  o f the  
p rev io u s  d iv id en d  m odels. V arious econom etric  te ch n iq u es  a re  used 
to  e s tim a te  t h i s  m odel. A j o in t  p r o f i t s - a c c e l e r a to r  model i s  used 
to  t e s t  i f  r e ta in e d  p r o f i t s  had any c o n tr ib u tio n  to  fin a n c in g  in v e s t ­
ment p r o je c t s .  The s im u lta n e i ty  and in te rd ep en d en ce  o f  d iv idend  and 
investm en t d e c is io n s  a re  te s te d  u s in g  both  s in g le  eq u a tio n  and s im u l­
taneous eq u a tio n  m odels. F in a l ly ,  a  m odified  n e o - c la s s ic a l  in v e s t ­
ment model i s  used to  t e s t  th e  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  ta x  in c e n t iv e s  in  
G reece.
C hapter f iv e  d e a ls  w ith  th e  problem o f c o rp o ra te  ta x  harm oniz­
a t io n ,  w ith in  th e  E .E .C . We beg in  th e  d is c u s s io n  by s t a t i n g  th e  
o b je c t iv e s  and th e  achievem ents o f  the  Community in  th e  a re a  o f  ta x a ­
t i o n .  The th re e  p ro p o sa ls  which have been made fo r  c o rp o ra te  ta x  
system s h arm on ization  a re  d is c u s s e d . Emphasis i s  g iven  to  th e  l a s t  
p ro p o sa l concern ing  th e  im p u ta tio n  system . In  th e  second p a r t  o f 
t h i s  c h a p te r  th e  causes o f  th e  d iv e rg e n c ie s  between th e  ta x a b le  base 
o f  th e  E .E .C , member s t a t e s  a re  d is c u s s e d . We ex p ress  some p r e l i ­
minary id e a s  how th e se  d is c re p a n c ie s  would be le s s e n e d . F in a l ly ,  a  
th e o r e t ic a l  d is c u s s io n  o f  ta x  r a t e  harm on ization  ta k e s  p la c e .
The f i n a l  ch ap te r o u t l in e s  th e  main changes which membership 
o f  th e  E .E .C . i s  l i k e ly  to  in v o lv e  in  th e  Greek co rp o ra te  ta x  s y s ­
tem , e v a lu a tin g  t h e i r  l i k e l y  e f f e c t s  upon th e  Greek economy in  term s 
o f  e q u ity , e f f ic ie n c y  and grow th. The study uses  a p a r t i a l  e q u i l i ­
brium a n a ly s is  to  e s tim a te  th e s e ‘e f f e c t s  s in c e  bo th  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  
econom etric  model to  c a p tu re  th e  s im u ltaneous feedbacks among th e  
E .E .C , member c o u n tr ie s  and th e  re q u ire d  d a ta  fo r  th e  Greek economy 
a re  n o t a v a i la b le .  The f i n a l  s e c t io n  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  r e - c a p i tu la t e  
th e  main f in d in g s  and methods used by t h i s  t h e s i s .  In  a d d i t io n , 
some in d ic a t io n s  a re  made fo r  f u r th e r  re s e a rc h  in  t h i s  a re a  o f ta x ­
a t io n .
“ IV-
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX
1 .1  In tro d u c tio n
One o f  th e  few changes which have n o t "been 
made to  c o rp o ra tio n  ta x  i s  i t s  a b o l i t io n ,  
(M. K ing, 1977)
The above q u o ta tio n  e x p re sses  the ch a llen g e  o f  th e  C o rp o ra t­
io n  income ta x  (CIT h e r e a f t e r ) .  Two is s u e s  a re  im p l ic i t l y  r a i s e d  by 
t h i s  q u o ta t io n , f i r s t ,  th e  im portance o f  th e  CIT and second, th e  la c k  
o f  consensus among. econom ists abou t i t s  in c id en ce  and i t s  e f f e c t s .
In  ev ery  co u n try  the  CIT has been th e  s u b je c t  o f  bo th  academ ic d ebate  
and p o l i t i c a l  e x p e rim en ta tio n . The e x is te n c e  o f  CIT has been defended 
on a v a r i e ty  o f  grounds and t h i s  form o f  ta x a t io n  seems to  be a  perman­
e n t e lem ent o f  most c o u n tr ie s ' ta x  s t r u c tu r e s .  This i s  due to  the  inv\- 
o v a tio n  in  p u b lic  p o l ic y  tow ards c o rp o ra tio n s  to  in f lu e n c e  t h e i r  be­
h a v io u r . The in c re a s in g  dominance o f  the  c o rp o ra te  forms o f  e n t e r p r i ­
se has le d  to  th e  s e p a ra te  ta x a t io n  o f companies and t h i s  k ind  o f  ta x ­
a t io n  i s  seen  as a m ajor elem ent in  any c o -o rd in a te d  government p o lic y  
to  s t im u la te  investm en t and r a i s e  th e  r a te  o f economic grow th. How­
e v e r , th e  in c id en ce  o f CIT and i t s  e f f e c t s  upon economic a re a s  such 
as grow th, s t a b i l i t y  and income d i s t r ib u t io n  have le d  to  a g re a t  deal 
o f  in t e l e c tu a l  d isp u te  and d isagreem ent among eco n o m ists . This le d  to  
re p e a te d  and v a r io u s  su g g e s tio n s  fo r  re fo rm ing  th e  system  o f c o rp o ra te  
ta x a t io n .
In  a d d i t io n , th e  i n t e r e s t  in  CIT has been n o t o n ly  c o n c e n tra t­
ed a t  dom estic c o n s id e r a t io n s , The in c re a s in g  economic in te rd ep en d en ce  
between the  n a t io n s ,  m ain ly  th rough  d i r e c t  investm en t ab ro ad , has r a i s e d  
the  problem o f  harm onizing  the CIT system s, a s  a  means o f  red u c in g  i n ­
e f f i c i e n c ie s  and in e q u i t i e s  a t  an in te r n a t io n a l  l e v e l .  This ta s k  has 
been un d ertak en  by both  O.E.C.D and th e  E .E .C . The fo rm er by p ro v id ­
in g  ta x  t r e a ty  m odels, whereas the  l a t t e r  by d r a f t  d i r e c t iv e s  fo r  i t s  
member s t a t e s .
The r o le  o f  CIT in  a d ev e lo p in g  co u n try  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im por­
t a n t  s in c e  i t  i s  u sed , m ain ly , a s  a  means o f  prom oting growth th rough  
th e  u se  o f  ta x  in c e n t iv e s .  In  a  d ev e lo p in g  and g ro w th -o rie n ted  econ­
omy such as th e  Greek, th e  need to  tak e  th e  maximum o f  c a p i t a l  fo r  
developm ent p u ts  a  d i f f e r e n t  em phasis on the  c o rp o ra te  income ta x  de­
velopm ent. Greece had e x c lu s iv e ly  used  CIT as one o f  the  main i n s t r u ­
ments f o r  economic developm ent. On in te r n a t io n a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s , th e  
r o le  o f  CIT was to  a t t r a c t  fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  fo r  su p p o rtin g  th e  f in a n c ­
in g  o f  economic developm ent. However, b o th  th e  s t r u c tu r e  and r a t e s  o f 
CIT have been s ta b le  f o r  a  lo n g  p e r io d , use  was made o f  th e  investm en t 
in c e n tiv e s  to  s t im u la te  in v es tm en t. Greece w i l l  become soon th e  te n th  
member o f  the E .E .C . Thus, th e  r o le  o f  CIT w i l l  become more s i g n i f i ­
c a n t .  Not o n ly , i t - w i l l  have a r o le  to p la y  w ith in  th e  Greek economy
b u t i t  w i l l  have a lso  to  conform the  E.E .C  ru le s  f o r  ta x  h a rm o n iza tio n . 
T his r a i s e s  th e  need to  re c o n s id e r  the whole s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  CIT in
Greece w ith in  th e  new c irc u m stan c es . T here fo re  the  aim o f  t h i s  th e s i s
i s  th re e fo ld :
a . To a s s e s s  the  p re s e n t  c o rp o ra tio n  income ta x  system 
in  G reece.
b . To c o n s id e r  what changes membership in  the  E .E .C . i s  
l i k e l y  to  in v o lv e  and ,
c . To e s tim a te  th e  im pacts r e s u l t in g  from th e se  changes 
upon economic v a r ia b le s .
The s u b je c t ,  im p o rtan t enough a t  any tim e , i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  im­
p o rta n c e  now fo r  two re a so n s . F i r s t ,  th e  Greek economy i s  in  a  t r a n s i ­
t io n a l  s ta g e , when e f f o r t s  a re  b e in g  ch an n e lled  tow ards th e  ra p id  econo­
mic developm ent o f  th e  c o u n try . Second, Greece w i l l  become the  te n th  
member o f  th e  E .E .C . on 1 s t  Jan u a ry , 1981. Thus, th e  need , i f  any, fo r  
a ta x  re fo rm , i s  n o t o n ly  as a  s te p  towards improvement o f th e  ta x  sy s ­
tem i t s e l f  b u t a lso  as a s te p  tow ards harm o n iza tio n .
The f i r s t  is s u e  which must be faced  i s  the  p la c e  o f  CIT in  th e  
n a t io n a l  ta x  system , e s p e c ia l ly  th e  p ro p e r r e l a t i o n  between c o rp o ra te  
and p e rso n a l income ta x e s , ' In  the  U .S.A . th e  case o f f u l l  in te g r a t io n  
o r th e  p ro v is io n  o f  d iv id en d  r e l i e f  u s u a l ly  depends on th e  accep tan ce  
o f  th e  con d u it th e o ry  o f  th e  c o rp o ra tio n .
In  Europe, th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  ta x  c r e d i t  system s was meant to
reduce th e  ta x  burden on d iv id e n d s , b u t i t  d id  n o t r e f l e c t  any r e s e r ­
v a tio n s  about th e  s e p a ra te  economic r e a l i t y  o f  c o rp o ra te  e n t i t i e s  (G. 
G ourev itch , 1977)* W ith in  th e  E.E.C the  th re e  su g g e s tio n s  which have 
been made, adopt th re e  d i f f e r e n t  views re g a rd in g  th i s  r e l a t i o n ,  Greece 
i s  unique in  th a t  r e s p e c t ,  i t  has a  system  o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n  which 
i s  n o t u sed  by any  o th e r  c o u n try .
The q u e s tio n  o f  in c id e n ce  and s h i f t i n g  o f  CIT i s  im p o rtan t be­
cause perhaps one o f th e  most r e le v a n t  is su e s  in  e s tim a tin g  th e  e f f e c t  
o f  b u s in e ss  ta x a t io n  on th e  economy in  g e n e ra l , and on th e  p r iv a te  s e c ­
t o r ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i s  the  in c id e n c e  and s h i f t i n g  o f  th e  CIT. At the  
b eg in n in g  o f  the l a s t  decade th e  s tu d y  o f  in c id e n ce  and s h i f t i n g  q ues­
t io n  fo llow ed  new d i r e c t io n s  when e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  a ttem p ted  to  g iv e  
a q u a n ta tiv e  answ er to  th i s  q u e s tio n . These s tu d ie s  prom oted u n d e r­
s ta n d in g  o f  th e  th e o r e t i c a l  mechanisms o f  in c id en ce  and s h i f t i n g  b u t ,  
u n fo r tu n a te ly ,  t h e i r  e m p ir ic a l r e s u l t s  were c o n tra d ic to ry  and incon ­
c lu s iv e .  I t  has been argued t h a t  the  a n a ly s is  o f  s h i f t i n g  i s  bo th  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  im p o ssib le  and e m p ir ic a l ly  d i f f i c u l t  sim ply  because th e re  
i s  n e i th e r  a common base n o r a uniform  m ethodology f o r  e m p ir ic a l s tu d ­
ie s  (Thurow, 1967» Sahni and Mathew, 1977)» A s im p l i f ie d ,  bu t f o r  f i r s t  
tiwe
Ain th e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  a ttem p t i s  made in  th e  p re s e n t  s tu d y  to  t e s t  the  
s h i f t i n g  h y p o th esis  in  G reece. Our purpose h e re  i s  n o t to  so lv e  t h i s  
problem  bu t sim ply  to  g ive  some ev idence  ab o u t the  in d ic a t io n s  o f  ta x  
s h i f t i n g  in  G reece.
A th i r d  s e t  o f  is s u e s  has to  do w ith  th e  e f f e c t s  o f CIT upon 
the  c o rp o ra te  s e c to r  and th e  economy in  g e n e ra l .  The e f f e c t  o f GIT 
th rough  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in  fav o u r o f  o r a g a in s t  d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  p ro ­
f i t s  has been e x te n s iv e ly  d isc u sse d  and q u e s tio n s  about th e  amount and 
q u a l i ty  o f  investm en t r e s u l t in g  from  th i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  have e x te n ­
ded the  c o n tro v e rsy . The e f f e c t iv e n e s s  and d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  d is c r im in ­
a to ry  ta x a t io n  o f  d iv id en d s have been q u e s tio n ed . The m a jo r ity  o f  th e  
em p iric a l s tu d ie s  ag ree  t h a t  d is c r im in a to ry  ta x a t io n  o f  d iv id en d s has 
decreased  the  p ro p o r tio n  o f  p r o f i t s  th a t  i s  d i s t r ib u te d  as d iv id e n d s . 
However, the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  q u e s tio n  i s  more d eb a tab le  s in c e  t h i s  p o l­
ic y  h e lp s  e x is t in g  f irm s  b u t d isco u rag es  new firm s th a t  must go to  the  
m arket f o r  funds. The most e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  o f  d iv idend  p o lic y
adopt an ad hoc s p e c i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  d iv idend  model which i s  t e s t e d ,  
l i s t i n g  a l l  th e  f a c to r s  w hich may in f lu e n c e  d iv id en d  beh av io u r and e s ­
ta b l i s h in g  an fu n c tio n a l  d iv id en d  e q u a tio n . The p re s e n t  s tu d y  w i l l  
a tte m p t to  p rov ide  a  p r i o r i  th e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  based  upon th e  
n a tu re  o f the  Greek economy, fo r  th e  cho ice  o f  th e  e x p lan a to ry  v a r i ­
a b le s  in  s e t t i n g  up i t s  s to A -^ s t ic  model. I t  goes on th e n , to  t e s t  
th e  in te rd ep en d en ce  assum ption  betw een d iv id en d  and investm en t d e c i­
s io n s .
The main d is c u s s io n  on th e  e f f e c t  o f  CIT upon f i r m 's  f in a n c ia l  
p o lic y  has c o n ce n tra te d  on th e  d is c r im in a tio n  between i n t e r e s t  pay­
ments and d iv idend  payments in  com puting ta x ab le  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s .  
This d is c r im in a tio n  fav o u rs  d eb t f in a n c e  o v e r e q u ity  f in a n c e . The 
d isagreem ent about t h i s  q u e s tio n  i s  concerned w ith  d i f f e r e n t  assump­
tio n s  about th e  c a p i t a l  m ark e t, the beh av io u r o f  th e  in v e s to r s  and 
t h e i r  c e r t a in t y  as to  th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f fu tu re  investm en t prog­
rammes. U n fo r tu n a te ly , th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  whole ta x  system  upon the  
f in a n c ia l  d e c is io n s  o f  the  f irm  has been n e g le c te d . A few t h e o r e t i ­
c a l  s tu d ie s  have in c o rp o ra te d  in  t h e i r  a n a ly s is  n o t o n ly  the  CIT bu t 
th e  whole ta x  s t r u c tu r e  (K ing , 1974» 1977 and S t i g l i t z ,  19&9» 1973» 
1974) .  The Greek CIT system  t r e a t s  b o th  d iv id en d  and i n t e r e s t  pay­
ments e q u a lly . However, the  whole ta x  s t r u c tu r e  d is c r im in a te s  b e t ­
ween d eb t and e q u ity  f in a n c e .
The e f f e c t  o f  CIT upon re so u rc e  a l lo c a t io n  i s  r e l a t e d  to  the 
lo n g -ru n  in c id e n ce  o f  th e  CIT. In  the lo n g -ru n  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  fo r  
c a p i t a l  to  le av e  th e  taxed s e c to r  and to  move to  th e  n o n -tax ed  se c ­
t o r ,  which r e s u l t s  in  an e q u a l iz a t io n  o f  th e  n e t  r a t e  o f r e tu r n  on 
c a p i t a l  between th e  two s e c to r s .  This i s  the view adopted  by H ar- 
b e rg e r  ( 1962) who concluded th a t  t h i s  flow  o f  c a p i t a l  from  one sec ­
to r  to  the  o th e r  c r e a te s  an e f f ic ie n c y  lo s s  f o r  th e  whole economy. 
King and S t i g l i t z  have q u e s tio n ed  th e se  r e s u l t s  a rg u in g  th a t  the CIT 
does n o t induce c a p i t a l  to  move from cne sec to r to the o th e r .  The d i f ­
f e r e n t  outcomes reached  by th e s e  s tu d ie s  a re  due to  th e  d i f f e r e n t  
assum ptions adopted  by th e  r e s e a r c h e r s ,  H arb erg er, f o r  example, 
assumes th a t  a l l  investm en t i s  e q u ity  f in a n c e d , whereas King and 
S t i g l i t z  assume a l l  inwednmt i s  d eb t f in a n c e d . Greece fa c e s  a s ig -
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n i f l e a n t  re so u rce  a l lo c a t io n  problem . This s tu d y  a tte m p ts  an a s s e s s ­
ment o f  th e  ro le  o f CIT in  a l l e v i a t i n g  t h i s  problem . F in a l ly ,  t h i s  
d i s s e r t a t i o n  w i l l  a tte m p t to  answ er to  what e x te n t i s  c o rp o ra te  ta x  
h arm on ization  n e c e s sa ry  w ith in  th e  EEC a n a ly s in g  i t s  f i n a l  p ro p o sa l 
fo r  h a rm o n izatio n  th e  CIT system s and ex p re ss in g  some p re lim in a ry  id e a s  
how to  harm onize th e  tax  b ase . Then, i t  p roceeds to o u t l in e  th e  main 
changes which membership o f  th e  E .E .C  i s  l i k e l y  to  in v o lv e  in  the  Greek 
CIT system , e v a lu a tin g  t h e i r  l i k e l y  e f f e c t s  upon the  Greek economy in  
term s o f e q u ity , e f f ic ie n c y  and grow th.
At l e a s t  two im p o rtan t c o n s t r a in t s  a re  the main o b s ta c le s  to  
th i s  d i s s e r t a t io n ;  f i r s t ,  th e  absence o f r e l a t e d  background s tu d ie s  
fo r  th e  Greek economy (KEPE, 1976, & EEC, 1976); and second , th e  in -  
adequecy and d o u b tfu l r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  e x is t in g  d a ta .  The absence o f  
background s tu d ie s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e rc e p tib le  when we e v a lu a te  th e  im­
p a c t o f h a rm o n iza tio n . T h e re fo re , the  aim o f t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  i s  to  
cover a p a r t  o f  t h i s  gap and to  s t im u la te  f u r th e r  re s e a rc h  in  th i s  
im p o rtan t a re a .
The d e ta i le d  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  th e s i s  i s  a s  fo llo w s : As a back­
ground o f  our d is c u s s io n , th i s  opening c h a p te r  d is c u s se s  th e  r a t io n a le  
o f  CIT, th e  s h i f t i n g  and in c id e n ce  q u e s tio n , and f i n a l l y  the e f f e c t s  
o f  CIT upon the economy.
C hapter two d is c u s s e s  the  a l t e r n a t iv e  CIT system s from b o th  th e  
dom estic and the  in te r n a t io n a l  p o in t  o f v iew . These system s a re  ju d ­
ged under v a r io u s  goa ls  such as  d iv id en d  p o l ic y ,  methods o f f in a n c in g , 
income d i s t r ib u t io n  and re so u rc e  a l lo c a t io n .  From the  in te r n a t io n a l  
p o in t o f view  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e  system s a re  judged acco rd in g  to  t h e i r  
c o n tr ib u tio n  to  in te r n a t io n a l  e f f ic ie n c y  and e q u ity . However, our 
main i n t e r e s t  l i e s  on th e  d iv id e n d  d ed u ctio n  system  ( c u r r e n t ly  employ­
ed by Greece) and the  im p u ta tio n  system  (proposed  by the  EEC).
In  c h a p te r  th re e  the  d iv id en d  ded u ctio n  system  i s  d iscu ssed  as 
i t  i s  a p p lie d  to  G reece. In tro d u c in g  t h i s  d is c u s s io n  a c r i t i c a l  d e s­
c r ip t io n  o f  the whole Greek ta x  s t r u c tu r e  i s  a ttem p ted . The c h ap te r  
looks a t  how f a r  th e  a v a i la b le  ev idence b ea rs  o u t the  t h e o r i t i c a l  ex­
p e c ta t io n  about the  in f lu e n c e  o f d iv id en d  d ed uction  system  on v a r io u s  
economic v a r ia b le s .  We c o n s tru c t  a  ta x  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r ia b le  b e t ­
ween r e te n t io n  and d iv id en d  to  d isc u ss  the  e f f e c t  o f  CIT upon d i v i ­
dend p o lic y . The e f f e c t  o f  CIT upon methods o f  fin a n c e  i s  co n fin ed  
on ly  on q u a l i t a t iv e  d is c u s s io n  s in c e  the a v a i la b le  d a ta  do n o t a llow  
an econom etric  t e s t .  F in a l ly ,  th e  tax  sav in g s  from d e p re c ia t io n  and 
investm en t a llow ances a re  c a lc u la te d .
C hapter f o u r  c o n ta in s  an econom etric  a n a ly s is  o f d iv id en d  and 
investm en t b eh av io u r. We t e s t  how ta x a t io n  a f f e c t s  d iv id en d  p o lic y  
by d is c r im in a tin g  between d iv idend  and r e te n t io n .  The s im u lta n e i ty  . 
and in te rd ep en d en ce  o f  d iv id en d  and investm en t d e c is io n s  i s  a lso  t e s ­
ted  u s in g  b o th  s in g le  eq u a tio n s  and sim ultaneous equationsm odels . Us­
in g  th e  ta x  sav in g s  v a r ia b le s  c a lc u la te d  in  th e  p rev io u s  c h a p te r  we 
t e s t  th e  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  th e  ta x  in c e n t iv e  upon investm en t expend i­
tu r e s ,  F in a l ly ,  we u se  th e se  models to  t e s t  th e  s h i f t i n g  and in c id ­
ence o f  GIT ilh th e  Greek m an u fac tu rin g .
C hapter f iv e  d e a ls  w ith  the  problem  o f  CIT h arm o n iza tio n  w ith ­
in  th e  EEC. The l a s t  EEC p ro p o sa l f o r  harm onizing the  system  o f  CIT i s  
ev a lu a te d  and c o n tra s te d  w ith  th e  e x is t in g  im p u ta tio n  system s w ith in  
the  EEC. Some p re lim in a ry  id e a s  fo r  ta x  base  harm o n iza tio n  a re  sugg­
e s te d  in  th e  second p a r t  o f t h i s  c h a p te r .
The s ix th  c h a p te r  o u t l in e s  th e  main changes which membership 
o f  th e  EEC i s  l i k e l y  to  in v o lv e  in  th e  Greek CIT system  e v a lu a tin g  
t h e i r  l i k e l y  e f f e c t s  upon th e  Greek Economy in  term s o f e q u ity , e f ­
f ic ie n c y  and grow th. This s tu d y  u ses  a  p a r t i a l  e q u ilib r iu m  a n a ly s is  
to  e s tim a te  th e se  e f f e c t s  s in c e  b o th  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  econom etric  mod­
e l  to  c a p tu re  th e  s im u ltaneous feedbacks among the  member c o u n tr ie s  
and th e  re q u ire d  d a ta  fo r  th e  Greek economy a re  n o t a v a i l a b l e .
1 .2  THE RATIONALE OF CORPORATE TAXATION
1 .2 .1  In tro d u c tio n
The e x is te n c e  o f  CIT p e r  se and i t s  re la t io n s h o p  to  th e  p e r ­
so n a l income tax  a re  two q u e s tio n s  which have produced a g re a t  d eal 
o f  d is c u s s io n  between the  ta x  ex p erts^  The e x is te n c e  o f  CIT has been 
defended on a v a r i e ty  o f grounds d e s p i te  th e  c o n s id e ra b le  in e f f ic ie n c y  
i t  in tro d u c e s , th i s  form o f  ta x  seems to be a  perm anent elem ent o f 
most c o u n tr ie s ' ta x  s t r u c tu r e .  As i s  w e ll s t a t e d  by Mus grave:
" T re a su r ie s  l i k e  th e  GIT because i t  i s  a  conven­
i e n t  way to  g e t rev en u e . Labour unions l ik e  i t  
because th ey  th in k  i t  f a l l s  on p r o f i t s  and makes 
th e  tax  s t r u c tu r e  more p ro g re s s iv e . B usinesses 
do n o t mind i t  because th ey  ten d  to  b e l ie v e  th a t  
the  ta x  i s  p assed  on, and c o n s id e r  i t  o b je c t io n ­
a b le  on ly  when/
management d e c is io n s  a re  in te r f e r e d  w ith .
P roponents o f  e q u ity  f e e l  th a t  in  an im p e rfec t 
world the  ta x  i s  a p p ro p r ia te  as an o f f s e t  to  the  
la ck  o f c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x a t io n .  O th e rs , n o t so 
e q u ity  minded, f e a r  t h a t  in te g r a t io n  would open 
the door to  the ta x a t io n  o f  u n re a l iz e d  c a p i t a l  
g a in s  and p r e f e r  to  s ta y  w ith  th e  a b so lu te  c o r­
p o ra t io n  ta x . S t i l l  o th e rs  view  i t  as  an i n s t ­
rument o f  economic p o l ic y " ,  and he co n c lu d es ,
"For th e se  and o th e r  rea so n s  an a b so lu te  c o rp o r­
a t io n  ta x  has rem ained p o p u la r and co n tin u es  to  
re c e iv e  su p p o rt from bo th  l i b e r a l  and c o n se r­
v a tiv e  c i r c l e s ,  b u t a l l  t h i s ,  a l a s ,  i s  an ex­
p la n a t io n ,  n o t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  such a ta x " .
(R, nus g rav  e , 197 0)
The c o n tro v e r s ia l  is s u e  in  the  d ebate  i s  th e  q u e s tio n ; Are the  c o r­
p o ra t io n  and i t s  sh a re h o ld e rs  r e a l l y  synonymousï On th is  q u e s tio n , 
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  econom ists and businessm en a l ik e  d i f f e r  among them selv es . 
The law p ro v id e s  th e  c o rp o ra tio n  w ith  a  le g a l  p e r s o n a l i ty .  However, 
does the co rp o ra te  income belong  to  the c o rp o ra tio n  o r  to  the s h a re ­
h o ld e rs?  I f  i t  belongs to  th e  form er then  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  a sep ­
a r a te  ta x  on c o rp o ra tio n  e x i s t s ;  b u t i f  to  the l a t t e r ,  th en  th e re  i s  
no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  i t s  e x is te n c e .  Two d ia m e tr ic a l ly  o p p o s ite  views 
have been ex p ressed  re g a rd in g  t h i s  q u e s tio n , and d i f f e r e n t  argum ents 
have been used  by each s id e  to  su p p o rt i t s  view , A b r i e f  survey  o f 
th ese  fo llo w s .
1 .2 .2  The C onduit and S ep a ra te  Approaches
The f i r s t  schoo l o f  th o u g h t, the s e p a ra te  approach , i s  in  l in e  
w ith  the law , which r e a l i z e s  the c o rp o ra tio n  as a le g a l  e n t i t y ,  s e p a r­
a te  from i t s  sh a re h o ld e rs . T h erefo re  the e x is te n c e  o f CIT i s  j u s t i f i e d  
on i t s  own m e rits  and hence should  n o t be c lo s e ly  in te g r a te d  w ith  the 
p e rso n a l income ta x . in  P ro fe s s o r  van  den Tempel*s w ords,
"Modern i n d u s t r i a l  developm ent has meant th a t  
n o ta b ly  the  p u b lic  sh a re  compahy o f which the  
sh a res  a re  quoted on the s to c k  exchange, when 
seen from an economic and s o c ia l  p o in t  o f  
view  has an e x is te n c e  o f i t s  own, independent 
o f  th a t  of the  sh a re h o ld e rs " (v a n  den Tempel,
1970) .
This school o f thought a c c e p ts  t h a t  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f a c o rp o ra tio n  
i s  to  be found in  the  sphere  o f  p ro d u c tio n  and th a t  i t  may no t c o in -
e id e  w ith  th e  s h a re h o ld e rs ' i n t e r e s t .  I t  r e j e c t s  th e  id e a  th a t  th e  
sh a re  company i s  a  form o f c o n tr a c tu a l  c o -o p e ra tio n  b u t i t  a c c e p ts  
th a t  i t  i s  the  sh a re  company which has th e  s ta tu s  o f  e n tre p re n e u r  and 
which competes w ith  th e  e n te r p r i s e s  o f n a tu r a l  p e rso n s . F in a l ly ,  i t  
co n c lu d es; th a t  the  income o f  a c o rp o ra tio n  cannot e x c lu s iv e ly  be 
seen as p a r t l y  a lre a d y  d i s t r ib u te d  and p a r t l y  n o t y e t  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  
d iv id e n d s ; and th a t  s in c e  c o rp o ra tio n s  and sh a re h o ld e rs  a re  s e p a r­
a te  fo r  most p u rp o se s , th e re  i s  no need to  in te g r a te  them f o r  ta x  
p u rp o ses.
On th e  o th e r  hand, the  co n d u it approach  views the c o rp o ra tio n  as  no 
more th an  a le g a l  in te rm e d ia ry  between the sh a re h o ld e r  and the incom e-  
c r e a t in g  p ro d u c tio n  p r o c è s ^  A c o rp o ra t io n , in  com parison w ith  o th e r  
forms o f e n te r p r i s e ,  i s  c o n s id e re d  as the  form a d eq u a te ly  equipped  to 
s u s ta in  th e  in c re a s in g ly  la rg e  s c a le  o f o p e ra tio n s  demanded by chang­
in g  te c h n o lo g ic a l and economic c o n d itio n s  and i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  b u s in ­
e sse s  would have been c o n s tra in e d  in  t h e i r  a tte m p ts  to  r a i s e  c a p i t a l  
and in  the  e x te n t o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  i f  th e  c o rp o ra te  form had n o t 
been d e v ise d . The law p ro v id e s  a  c o rp o ra tio n  w ith  a l e g a l  p e rs o n a l­
i t y  s e p a ra te  from th a t  o f i t s  s h a re h o ld e rs . However, i t  rem ains an 
a r t i f i c i a l  c re a t io n  and even though sh a re h o ld e rs  may have on ly  l im i ­
te d  c o n tro l over t h e i r  c o rp o ra t io n , they  a re  the  u l t im a te  r e c ip ie n t s  
o f  the  income and the  ones who have th e  ta x a b le  c a p a c i ty .  T h e re fo re , 
the  e x is te n c e  o f  a s e p a ra te  ta x  on c o rp o ra te  income and th e  absence 
o f  any l in k  between th e  p e rso n a l and c o rp o ra te  ta x es  a re  u n j u s t i f i e d .  
P ro fe s s o r  Musgrave say s :
"A ll ta x es  a re  u l t im a te ly  p a id  by p e o p le , and 
e q u ity  d e a ls  w ith  the d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  th e  tax  
b i l l  among in d iv id u a ls  o r f a m i l ie s .  C o rp o ra t­
io n s  as such cannot b e a r the  u l t im a te  burden .
They a re  im p o rtan t le g a l  e n t i t i e s  and pow erfu l 
d e c is io n  making u n i t s ,  bu t th e y  do n o t have a 
ta x a b le  c a p a c ity  o f  t h e i r  own." (R .Musgrave 1970)
These e q u ity  c o n s id e ra t io n s  a re  d e a l t  w ith  in  the  n e x t s e c t io n  
under the  p r in c ip le  o f  b e n e f i t  and a b i l i ty - to - p a y  ta x a t io n .
1 .2 .3  B en e fit and A b il i ty - to -n a y  P r in c ip le s
The f i r s t  q u e s tio n  concerns the p r in c ip le  on which the  CIT should  
be b ased . S p e c i f ic a l ly ,  i s  i t  a case  fo r  ap p ly in g  the  b e n e f i t  p r in ­
c ip le  o r  the a b i l i t y  to pay one? The p roponen ts o f  th e  s e p a ra te
approach argue th a t  a c o rp o ra tio n  en joys s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  and ben­
e f i t s ,  on the one hand, b u t i t  p roduces e x te r n a l  d iseconom ies on the 
o th e r .  The c o rp o ra te  form o f making b u s in e ss  en ab le s  a  c o rp o ra tio n  
to  assem ble a la rg e  sura o f  c a p i t a l ,  which may le a d  to h ig h e r  r a t e s  o f  
p r o f i t s .  These p r o f i t s  ro u g h ly  m easure th e  b e n e f i t  the  firm  g e ts  
from in c o rp o ra t io n . However, the  co u n te r argument say s  t h a t  i f  a 
s e p a ra te  ta x  on p r o f i t s  i s  j u s t i f i e d  on th e se  grounds then  th is  ta x  
should  be imposed on " in c rem en ta l e a rn in g s" , th a t  i s ,  th e  amount o f - 
p r o f i t s  which a c o rp o ra tio n  ea rn s  above what i t  cou ld  have earn ed  
u n der any o th e r  le g a l  form o f do ing  b u s in e s s .  However, such a  ta x  
would be co m ple te ly  im p ra c tic a b le . I t  i s  t r u e , t o o ,  t h a t  a c o rp o ra t­
ion  en joys some b e n e f i t s  p ro v id ed  by the governm ent. However, th e se  
b e n e f i ts  a re  p ro v id ed  no t o n ly  to  a c o rp o ra tio n  but to o th e r  forms o f 
b u s in e s s , and to p r o f i t a b l e  and u n p ro f i ta b le  e n te r p r i s e s  a l i k e .  The 
co n n ec tio n , th e r e f o r e ,  o f  th e se  b e n e f i t s  to s p e c i f i c a l l y  c o rp o ra te  
p r o f i t s  seems im p la u s ib le , f i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  argued  th a t  th e  CIT i s  
j u s t i f i e d  as a payment fo r  s o c ia l  c o s ts  produced by a c o rp o ra t io n , 
f o r  exam ple, p o l lu t io n  c o s ts .  P ro fe s s o r  H arb erg er, r e j e c t i n g  t h i s  
argum ent, say s:
"The on ly  sense  th a t  can be made o f t h i s  a rg u ­
ment i f  i t  i s  re g a rd ed  as j u s t i f y in g  the  ta x  
from a s o c ia l  w e lfa re  p o in t o f  view -  i s  t h a t  
c o rp o ra tio n s  engender e x te r n a l  diseconom ies in  
amounts which a re  p ro p o r t io n a l  to  t h e i r  p r o f i t s -  
c l e a r ly  an absu rd  c o n te n tio n ^  Indeed , i t  i s  h ig h ­
ly  l i k e l y  th a t  the  use o f  c a p i t a l  in  th e  c o rp o r­
a te  s e c to r ,  f a r  from p roducing  d iseconom ies, gen­
e r a te s  e x te r n a l  b e n e f i ts  on a s c a le  f a r  su rp a ss ­
in g  th a t  o f  o th e r  u se s  o f c a p i t a l " , (A ,H arb e rg er,
1968),
As such b e n e f i ts  he c o n s id e rs  the  assem bling  o f la rg e  sums o f c a p i­
t a l ,  th e  e x p lo i ta t io n  o f economies o f s c a le ,  and th e  f o s te r in g  o f the  
developm ent o f th e  c a p i t a l  m arket in  e q u i t i e s .  P ro fe s s o r  R.Musgrave 
c o n tin u e s ,
"but th e re  is  no reaso n  why such a tax  shou ld  be 
imposed on c o rp o ra tio n s  o n l y  nor why the  tax  
base should  be d e fin e d  in  term s o f  p r o f i t s  r a th e r  
th a n , say , v a lu e  added. Beyond th i s  the v a lu e  
o f  in c o rp o ra tio n  as such i s  a b e n e f it( ,n o t a  c o s t j  
to  the  economy and n o t a p ro p e r o b je c t o f  bene­
f i t  ta x a t io n " ,  (R .M usgrave, 197u)
The ’c o n d u it ' t h e o r i s t s ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, argue th a t  the  
GIT i s  sim ply one elem ent in  th e  whole system  o f  a b i l i ty - to - p a y  
ta x a t io n ,  emd a s  su ch , should  be c a r e f u l ly  merged w ith  th e  o th e r  
p a r t s  w ith o u t s i ^ i f i c a n t  gaps o r  o v e r la p s . They a cc e p t th a t  
in  th e  absence o f  a s e p a ra te  c o rp o ra te  ta x  in d iv id u a ls  would a c ­
cum ulate income in  c o rp o ra tio n  and th en  r e a l i z e  i t  in  th e  form 
o f  c a p i t a l  ga in s a t  a  low o r  zero  r a t e  o f  ta x .  The problem , then  
i s  n e i th e r  to  p e n a liz e  the  c o rp o ra te  form o f doing  b u s in e s s , n o r 
to  p e rm it i t  to  se rv e  as a ta x  s h e l t e r  f o r  i t s  ow ners. There­
f o r e ,  from an e q u ity  p o in t  o f  view  i t  can be argued  th a t  firm s 
should  be re q u ire d  to  d i s t r i b u t e  a l l  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  and r a i s e  cap­
i t a l  th rough  the c a p i t a l  m arke t. A gainst th e  'c o n d u i t ' th e o ry , 
on th e  o th e r  hand, i t  has been argued th a t  bo th  d i s t r ib u te d  and 
u n d is t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  be lo n g  to  s h a re h o ld e rs , b u t th ey  a re  n o t 
e q u iv a le n t to  each o th e r  s in c e  th e  l a t t e r  belong  to  sh a re h o ld e rs  
in  a  te c h n ic a l  and r e s t r i c t e d  sen se  on ly  (C .Sandford  , 1978)*
1 . 2 . A A Tool f o r  Economic P o lic y
A nother argument in  fav o u r o f  a  s e p a ra te  CIT concerns the  
e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  n a t io n a l  economic and f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s .  The gover­
nment may use the  GIT as a  means o f  c h a n n e llin g  re so u rc e s  and in ­
f lu e n c in g  f in a n c ia l  flow s; P o lic y  -  makers have an in s tru m e n t to  
c o n tro l s h o r t- te rm  f lu c tu a t io n s  in  ag g reg a te  demand. Consumption 
spending  depends p r im a r i ly  on disposaUe income which i s  r e l a t e d  to  
c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  th rough  th e  d iv id en d  p a id  o u t .  T h e re fo re , th e  
e x te n t to  which CIT can be used  as  an in s tru m en t f o r  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
p o l ic y ,  depends on th e  amount o f  d iv id en d s p a id  o u t in  r e l a t io n  
to  th e  g ro ss  n a t io n a l  income. D evices such as a c c e le r a te d  d ep re ­
c ia t io n ,  ta x  c r e d i t ,  ta x  r a t e  ch anges, and the  l ik e  a re  a lso  u sed , 
to  c o n tro l s h o r t- te rm  f lu c tu a t io n s  in  c o rp o ra te  in v estm en t.
1,2*5 The Pragmatic or Cynical Apx)roach
The f i n a l  argum ent in  fav o u r o f  th e  CIT i s  a p u re ly  p rag ­
m atic  o r  c y n ic a l one. I t s  a b i l i t y  to  r a i s e  revenue makes CIT 
a t t r a c t i v e  to  b o th  econom ists and p o l i t i c i a n s .  The form er p re ­
f e r  CIT because i t  i s  easy  to  a d m in is te r  and p ro v id es  them w ith  
h ig h  y ie ld s  a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  low c o s t .  The l a t t e r  p r e f e r  GIT be­
cause th e re  i s  no o th e r  ta x  which p rov ide  them w ith  so h igh  
y ie ld s  w hile  making so few v o te r s  angry ,
1 ,2 ,6  C onclusion
The C a r te r  R eport s t a t e s :
E q u ity  and n e u t r a l i t y  cou ld  b e s t  be ach ieved  under 
a ta x  system  in  which th e re  were no tax es  on o rgan­
iz a t io n s  as such and a l l  in d iv id u a ls  and fa m ilie s  
h o ld in g  i n t e r e s t  in  o rg a n iz a tio n s  were taxed  on the 
accrued  n e t  income from such i n t e r e s t s  on th e  same 
b a s is  as a l l  o th e r  n e t  g a in s  (C a r te r  R ep o rt, I 967 ) ,
U n fo r tu n a te ly , i t  co n c lu d es , th a t  even were i t  n o t d e s i r ­
a b le  we should  have a ta x  on companies because i t  i s  p r a c t i ­
c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  to  ta x  acc ru ed  c a p i t a l  g a in s .
In  the  l i g h t  o f  th e  above d is c u s s io n  we cou ld  argue th a t  w hile  
i t  i s  im p o rtan t fo r  a group o f  people  who form a company to  en­
jo y  freedom o f  a c t io n  i t  i s  a lso  n e ce ssa ry  to  acknowledge th e  f a c t  
t h a t  th e  g ra n tin g  o f  le g a l  p e r s o n a l i ty  to  th e  company may g ive  
r i s e  to  problem s o f  an e s s e n t i a l l y  economic k in d . Looking a t  th e  
c o rp o ra tio n  as a  decis io n -m ak in g  u n i t , i t  may be t ru e  t h a t  i t s  
in te r e s  is do n o t c o in c id e  w ith  th e  sh a re h o ld e rs ' i n t e r e s t s .  However, 
is  th a t  a s u f f i c i e n t  reaso n  to  j u s t i f y  a charge on ta x  on th e  com­
pany? The /
a p p lic a t io n  o f th e  b e n e f i t  p r in c ip le  to  c o rp o ra te  income seems hard  
to  defend in  view  o f the  v a r io u s  o r i f  isms made. T h e re fo re , the  
a p p l ic a t io n  o f  the  a b i l i ty - t o - p a y  p r in c ip le  seems to be th e  l e s s  v u l­
n e ra b le  o f  th e  two to  c r i t i s m .  The above d e sc rib e d  p h ilo so p h ie s  a re  
r e f l e c te d  in  th e  cho ice  o f  the  system  o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n .  Three 
system s, th e  c l a s s i c a l  o r s e p a ra te ,  th e  im p u ta tio n , and th e  tw o -ra te  
system  a re  th é  most common nowadays. These system s p lu s  o th e r  
a l t e r n a t iv e  system s a re  f u l l y  d isc u sse d  in  c h a p te r  two,
1 ,5  IHGIDMCE AND SHIFTING OF THE CIT
1 , 5 .1  T h e o re tic a l  C o n sid e ra tio n s
"So much has been w r i t te n  about the  resp o n se  o f 
firm s to  changes in  CIT, and so l i t t l e  re s o lv e d , 
th a t  one e n te r s  th i s  f i e l d  w ith  g re a t  h e s i t a t i o n " .
(K .C o u tts , W, Gbdley and V, K ordhaus, 1977)*
The economic r e la t io n s h ip s  between th e  members o f  a  s o c ie ty  may 
g ive  r i s e  to  the p o s s i b i l i t y ,  fo r  a ta x p a y e r , o f  t r y in g  to s h i f t  the 
ta x  burden to  o th e r  members o f the  s o c ie ty .  The d is c u s s io n  o f the 
in c id en ce  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  income ta x es  and o f the e x c is e  ta x es  on 
s p e c i f ic  com m odities has le d ,  a t  l e a s t ,  to  "a re a so n a b le  presum ption" 
re g a rd in g  th e  economic e f f e c t s  o f  a ta x  change. In  c o n t r a s t ,  th e re  i s  
no unanimous agreem ent as to  w hether o r n o t the CIT i s  s h i f te d .  Some 
s tu d e n ts  o f ta x a t io n  argue th a t  the  f a c t  th a t  no g e n e ra l ly  accep ted  
th eo ry  has been developed , i s  due to  the  f a c t  th a t  th is  s tu d y  i s  r e ­
la te d  to  p r ic e  and wages d e te rm in a tio n , two s u b je c ts  on which th e re  
i s  no unanimous consensus among econom ists . Some o th e rs  argue  th a t  
th e  inadequacy o f  methods o f  t e s t i n g  th e  th eo ry  i s  the  o b s ta c le  to  
re a ch in g  d e f in i t e  c o n c lu s io n s .
A n a ly sis  o f  the  CIT depends c r i t i c a l l y  on th e  assum ptions made 
concern ing  th e  behav iou r o f the  f irm . The t r a d i t i o n a l  argum ent i s  
th a t  the CIT cannot be s h i f te d  in  the s h o r t- ru n  under bo th  c o m p e tit­
iv e  and m o n o p o lis tic  c o n d it io n s . T his i s  because in  th e  s h o r t- ru n  
the  im p o s itio n  o f  the GIT changes n e i th e r  the  m arg ina l revenue nor 
the m arg inal c o s t ,  which im p lie s  th a t  th e re  w il l  be no change in  the 
p re - ta x  p r o f i t  m axim ization com bination  o f p r ic e  and o u tp u t. On th e  
o th e r  hand, n o n -p ro f i t  m axim ization  th e o r ie s  a cc e p t a degree o f 
s h i f t i n g .  The Bsumol s a le s  revenue m axim ization h y p o th es is  a llow s
f o r  s h i f t i n g  up to  100 p e r^ o e n t o f  th e  CIT (W.BaiAmol, 1955j* I t  
depends on how th e  im p o s itio n  o f CIT a f f e c t s  the  r e l a t i o n  between 
r e a l i s e d  p r o f i t s  and th e  minimum a c c e p ta b le  le v e l  o f p r o f i t s .  Under 
th e  t a r g e t  r a t e  o f r e tu r n  o r  f u l l - c o s t  p r ic in g  h y p o th e s is  the firm  
aims to  ach iev e  a t a r g e t  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  on employed c a p i t a l ,  th u s , 
i t  s e t s  p r ic e  so as to  cover average t o t a l  c o s t a t  some s ta n d a rd  
v a lu e  o f s a l e s ,  p lu s  a "custom ary" p r o f i t  m argin. F urtherm ore , th i s  
m argin i s  l i k e l y  to  be c a lc u la te d  n e t  o f  ta x , so t h a t  the  CIT m ight 
be view ed as an elem ent o f  average  c o s t  and co n seq u en tly  added to  
p r i c e .
While th e se  s tu d ie s  y ie ld  u s e f u l  p re lim in a ry  in s ig h t s ,  th ey  have 
been c r i t i c i s e d  on v a r io u s  g ro u n d ^  F i r s t  none o f th e  above th e o r ie s  
g e ts  o u ts id e  th e  C onfines o f  p a r t i a l  e q u ilib r iu m  a n a ly s is .  There i s  
no doubt th a t  p a r t i a l  ad ju stm en ts  a re  im p o rtan t e lem en ts o f th e  g en er­
a l  change, b u t th a t  i s  a l l .  P a r t i a l  e q u ilib r iu m  a n a ly s is  i s  n o t d es­
igned  to  cope w ith  th e  o v e r a l l  changes induced  by the  CIT, A g en e r­
a l  e q u ilib r iu m  framework i s  c o n s id e re d  more e f f i c i e n t  f o r  c a p tu r in g  
the  i n t r i c a c i e s  o f th e  in te rd ep en d en ce  among m arkets in  o rd e r  to  
an a ly ze  th e  f i n a l  outcome o f  ta x  s h i f t i n g .  Second, th e se  s tu d ie s  
were unab le  to  i s o l a t e  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  CIT and to  g ive  answ ers to  
q u e s tio n s  such as what i s  meant by d i f f e r e n t  d eg rees o f  s h i f t i n g ,  in ­
d ic a to r s  o f s h i f t i n g ,  and the measurement o f s h i f t i n g ,  u s in g  econometrfc- 
te c h n iq u e s . This was l e f t  to  a s e r i e s  o f  subéequent s tu d ie s ,  u t i l i z ­
in g  econom etric  m odels, b eg in n in g  in  th e  e a r ly  i 9 6 0 ' s .
1 , 5 . 2 ,  E m p ir ic a l  E v id en ce
Two approaches have been fo llow ed  to  s tu d y  em p ica lly  the  ta x  in ­
c idence  q u e s tio n , the  r a t e  o f r e tu r n  approach and th e  f a c to r - s h a r e  
approach . The form er approach  u ses  m u lti v a r i a t e  re g re s s io n  te c h ­
n iq u es  and t r i e s  to i s o l a t e  th e  c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n  e f f e c t  from o th e r  
v a r ia b le s  which in f lu e n c e  th e  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n .  The K rzyzaniak  and 
Musgrave (K - M h e r e a f te r )  s tu d y  in  I 965 i s  c o n s id e re d  r e p r e s e n ta t ­
iv e  o f th i s  approach  and a landm ark in  the  econom etric  s tu d y  o f  in ­
c id en c e , The f a c to r  sh a re  approach i s  based on the  assum ption  th a t
i f ,  c e te r i s  p a r ib u s , the  b e fo re - ta x  sh a re  o f p r o f i t s  in  income o r ig ­
in a t in g  in  the c o rp o ra te  s e c to r  in c re a s e s  fo llo w in g  an in c re a se  in  ■
c o rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e ,  s h i f t i n g  has o c cu r red .  On the  o th e r  hand, i f  the  
p r e - t a x  p r o f i t  share  does n o t  in c re a s e  the ta x  i s  n o t  s h i f t e d ,  i r r e s ­
p e c t iv e  o f  what th e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  i n d i c a t e s .  This approach i s  r e p ­
r e s e n te d  by s tu d ie s  made by H a l l  and Torek, ( J .H a l l ,  I 964 and J .T u re k ,
1970) .
I t  i s  no t the purpose o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  to  o f f e r  a  f u l l  review  o f  f 
the  s u b je c t .  In s te a d  we d is c u s s  the  reaso n s  why e m p ir ic a l  work has 
f a i l e d  to  re a ch  an unanimous, accep ted  co n c lu s io n . The k-M s tu d y ,  
d e s p i t e  the  m ethodolog ica l drawbacks and th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  co n c lu s ­
ions  reached  a re  n o t  a cc e p ted  by th e  whole body of s tu d e n ts  o f  in ­
c idence  i s  im portan t because i t  l a i d  the  fo u nda tion  o f  a new type  o f  
s tu d y  o f  in c id e n c e .  I t  can th e r e f o r e  be used  to dem onstrate  im port-
c
an t  problems o f  econom etric  a n a ly s i s  in  th i s  f i e l d .
The e s s e n t i a l  id e a  u n d e r ly in g  the K-M a n a ly s is  i s  as fo l lo w s :  
i f  c o rp o ra te  t a x a t io n  i s  borne by f i r m s ,  changes in  the  ta x  r a t e  have 
no e f f e c t  on the  g ross  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  on c o rp o ra te  c a p i t a l .  In  con­
t r a s t ,  i f  the  CIT i s  s h i f t e d  forward then  the  g ross  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  
in c re a s e s  to recoup the  t a x  in  o rd e r  to keep the  n e t  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  
c o n s ta n t .  K - M  r e l a t e d  th e  g ross  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  on c o rp o ra te  c a p i t ­
a l  f i r s t  to the  r a t i o  o f  in v e n to ry  to  s a le s  in  m anufac tu r ing , w ith  a 
l a g  of one year ;  second, to  th e  change in  the r a t i o  o f  consumption 
to GNP, w ith  a l a g  o f  one y e a r ;  t h i r d ,  to the  c u r r e n t  y e a r ' s  r a t i o  
o f  non c o rp o ra te  ta x  a c c ru a ls  to GNP l e s s  t r a n s f e r  payments; and, 
f i n a l l y ,  to  the  CIT as a p e rcen tag e  o f  the  co rp o ra te  c a p i t a l  s to ck ,
K - M  reached  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  the c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  th e  l a s t  v a r i a b l e  
was equal to  154 p e r  c e n t ,  which means t h a t  the  uIT i s  n o t  only  p a s ­
sed  on to  consumers but passed  on by more than  hundred p e r  c e n t ;  t h a t  
i s ,  the im p o s it io n  o f  the  ClT in c re a s e d  th e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on c a p i t a l .
Like every p io n e e r in g  work, the K-M s tu d y  has been s e v e re ly  c r i t -  
iz ed  on v a r io u s  grounds. This criticism can be e la b o ra te d  in  terms o f  
fo u r  s p e c i f i c  p o in t s .  F i r s t  the  s e l e c t i n g ,  d e f in in g  and m easuring o f  
the v a r i a b le s  to be in c lu d ed  in  the  model, K-M admit th a t  they r e a ­
ched t h e i r  fo rm u la t io n  o f  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a f t e r  a g r e a t  d e a l  
o f  e x p er im en ta t io n .  D esp ite  the  f a c t  t h a t  they p o s tu l a t e  an e ig h t  
equa tion  macro model from which th ey  supposedly draw t h e i r  v a r i a b l e s  ,
t h e i r  approach i s  c o n s id e re d  an ad hoc s in g le  eq u a t io n  one. This 
i s  so because th e re  i s  no t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  v a r i a b l e s  
inc lu d ed ;  i t  seems r a t h e r  t h a t  th e  in c lu s io n  o f  the  v a r i a b l e s  was 
based on p u re ly  s t a t i s t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s .  S l i t o r  and Goode, com­
p l a i n  about th e  im p rec is io n  o f  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  v a r i a b l e  used  
to measure th e  e f f e c t i v e  ta x  r a t e s  . ( R . S l i t o r ,  I 9 6 6 , and R .G oode,I966 ) . 
They argue t h a t ,  in c lu d in g  excess p r o f i t s  tax es  in  i t s  num erator and 
lo s s e s  o f  the  d e f i c i t  companies in  the  denom inator, the  ta x  v a r i a b l e  
f a i l s  to  i s o l a t e  th e  r a t e  changes t h a t  can l o g i c a l l y  be expec ted  to 
induce c o rp o ra te  a t te m p ts  a t  tax  s h i f t i n g .  In  a d d i t io n ,  Goode has 
p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on co rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  i s  s u b je c t  
to l a rg e  e r r o r s  o f  measurement. He su g g es ts  t h a t  the r e l e v a n t  c a p i ­
t a l  base i s  the  average  o f  th e  y e a r s  in s te a d  o f  c a p i t a l  a t  the  b eg in ­
n in g  o f  the  y e a r  as s p e c i f i e d  by K -  M,
The second major c r i t i c i s m  o f  the  K - M  s tu d y  i s  r e l a t e d  to  the  
s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  v a r i a b l e s  o m itted  from t h e i r  model. Krupp emphasized 
t h a t  we must ask  which consequences fo llow  from a m is s p e c i f i c a t io n  
o f  the  b a s ic  e q u a t io n  (J -H . Krupp, I 969 ) . The ex c lu s io n  o f  a  number 
o f  endogenous v a r i a b l e s  such as p r i c e s ,  wages and c o s ts  o f  raw m ate r­
i a l s ,  from th e  reduced  form e q u a tio n  may r a i s e ,  a t  l e a s t ,  two p rob­
lems. F i r s t ,  the  model may f a i l  to  ex p la in  r e a l i t y  and second, the 
e s t im a te s  o f  the  pa ram ete rs  a re  bo th  b ia sed  and i n c o n s i s t e n t .  In  
a d d i t io n  to  t h a t ,  the  in c lu d e d  v a r i a b l e s  a c t  as  a proxy f o r  th o se  ex­
c luded , y e t  the  e s t im a te d  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a lso  c o n ta in  the  in f lu e n c e  
o f  th e se  o m itted  v a r i a b l e s .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  the  in c lu s io n  o f  the  om­
i t t e d  v a r i a b l e s  would c r e a te  o th e r  problem s. The c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
the  e x p lan a to ry  v a r i a b l e s  r a i s e s  the  problem of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  
which makes the  p a ram ete r  e s t im a te s  lo se  t h e i r  p r e c i s i o n .  C le a r ly ,  
th e re  i s  a t r a d e - o f f  between the above two problem s. Two s tu d ie s  
t r i e d  to  overcome th e se  problem s. The f i r s t ,  by Gragg, H arb erg er ,  
and Miesbowski (K-H-M), in tro d u ce d  a  ' c y c l i c a l  v a r i a b l e '  in  the  form 
o f  the  employment r a t e  and a  ' dummy v a r ia b le *  to  r e p r e s e n t  wartime 
m o b i l iz a t io n  f o r  w a r - r e l a t e d  y ears  (J .G rag g , A ,H arberger & P.Mieskow- 
s k i ,  1967 , 1970 ) .  The second, by S l i t o r ,  added as independent v a r i a b l e  
the  r a t i o  o f  ' a c t u a l  to  p o t e n t i a l  GNP ( R , a l i t o r  I 966) ,  Both th e se  
s tu d ie s  reached  r e s u l t s  which a re  no t in  agreement w ith those  found 
o f  K-M. The e x i s t i n g  econom etric  d i f f i c u l t i e s  made G-H-M r e a l i s e  
th a t  even t h e i r  m o d if ic a t io n  on K-M model i s  inadequa te  to  p rov ide
r e l i a b l e  r e s u l t s ,  S l i t o r  concluded t h a t  " th e  i s s u e  o f  s h i f t i n g  and 
in c id en ce  o f  the  c o rp o ra te  ta x  rem ains in  a h ig h ly  u n s e t t l e d  s t a t e "  
( R . S l i t o r ,  1965).
A t h i r d  c r i t id s w o f  the  K -  M[is r e l a t e d  to the  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  the  
s in g le  e q u a tio n  model and o f  the  estiina ,tion  method used .  The s i n g l e ­
eq u a tio n  model f a i l s  ( i )  to take  account o f  a l l  v a r i a b l e s ,  which a re  
h ig h ly  c o r r e l a t e d  w ith  th e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n ,  ( i i )  to  in c lu d e  on ly  the  
ex p lan a to ry  V a r ia b le s ,  which a re  n o t  c o r r e la t e d  w ith  each o th e r ,  
and l i i i )  to  t e s t  an e q u a t io n ,  which c o n ta in s  on ly  one dependent 
v a r i a b le  (A gap itos ,  1974). These problems a re  s e r io u s  i f  the  s in g le  
equ a tio n  may be p a r t  o f  a  l a r g e r  in te rd ep en d en t  system. T h e re fo re ,  
what i s  needed i s  a  m u l t i - e q u a t io n  model which e x p l i c i t l y  s p e c i f i e s  
the  j o i n t l y  dependent n a tu re  o f  the  CIT burden, the  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  
on c a p i t a l ,  the payment o f  la b o u r ,  and the  p r i c e  l e v e l ,  as th e  key 
economic v a r i a b l e s ,  K - M  some y ea rs  a f t e r  the  appearance o f  t h e i r  
work r e a l i z e d  t h a t  "our i n i t i a l  e f f o r t  should  e v e n tu a l ly  come to  
be re p la ce d  by a more complex approach , in v o lv in g  a s t r u c t u r a l  
model in  which p r i c e ,  wage and s h i f t i n g  behav iour a re  s p e c i f i e d  and 
a l l  eq ua tions  a re  i d e n t i f i e d "  (K -  M, I 967 ) ,
The K -M  s tu d y  a l s o  s u f f e r s  from the  l im i t a t i o n s  o f  the  e s t im a­
t io n  method. They use  the  in s t ru m e n ta l  v a r i a b l e  te ch n iq u e , which 
r a i s e s  the  problem o f  the  choice  o f  in s tru m en t,  Gordon ^1967) has 
dem onstrated  the  in accu racy  o f  the  K -M  technique by r e p la c in g  the  
use o f  in s t ru m e n ta l  v a r i a b l e  techn ique  by n o n - l in e a r  e s t im a t io n  
te c h n iq u e s .
F in a l ly ,  Agap&os (1974) has r a i s e d  the q u es t io n  o f  ag g re g a t io n  
b ia s  in  the  s t a t i s t i c a l  e s t im a te s .  He co n s id e rs  t h a t  the  a g g re g a t­
ion  e r r o r  in  the  K -M  model may be s e r io u s  s in ce  K -  M, do no t r e f e r  
to the  i n d u s t r y - l e v e l  s t a t i s t i c s  bu t to  the n a t io n a l  a g g re g a te .
Concluding, during the la s t  decades in terest in the incidence 
o f CIT question has been great despite the fact that the various 
stud ies l e f t  u nsettled  the actual d irection  of such incidence.
With th is  background we proceed to study the e f fe c ts  o f CIT upon 
various economic d ecision s.
1 .4  DIVIDEND POLICY MB CORPORATE TAXATION
1 .4 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
"An u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  the  fo r c e s  t h a t  in f lu e n c e  c o rp o ra te  d i v i ­
dend d e c is io n s  i s  im p o r tan t  to econom ists  fo r  s e v e ra l  r e a s o n s ,"
( P .D a r l i n g ,1957 ) .  Dividend p o l ic y ^ h a s  im portan t consequences fo r  
both  the  whole economy and the  b u s in e s s  s e c to r .  Changes in  d iv id en d  
p o l ic y  have an impact on th e  l e v e l  o f  g ross  n a t io n a l  p ro d u c t  and i t s  
components. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  d iv id en d  p o l i c y  can be used  as a means o f  
prom oting growth, s t a b i l i z i n g  the  economy and a f f e c t i n g  th e  d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n  o f  income. The growth o f  the  economy i s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  r e l a t e d  to  
investm ent^ s in c e ,  f o r  g iven  p r o f i t s ,  sm alle r  d iv idends  invo lve  g r e a t e r  
c o rp o ra te  s a v in g s ,  t h a t  i s ,  more a v a i l a b le  funds f o r  f in a n c in g  i n v e s t ­
ment programmes, i t  i s  a r g u e d , th a t  t h i s  i s  a way in  which d iv id en d  p o l ­
ic y  a f f e c t s  growth. At the  same time changes in  d iv id en d  payments a f ­
f e c t  ag g reg a te  demand so t h a t  t h e i r  c o n t ro l  may a f f o r d  as a  means o f  
s t a b i l i z i n g  the  economy. I t  has a lso  been argued t h a t  a s h i f t  from 
d iv idends  to  r e t a in e d  ea rn in g s  may le a d  to an ap p a ren t  change in  the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f income even though p o s t - t a x  p r o f i t s  and the  under­
ly in g  r e a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  have rem ained unchanged (M.King, 1977).
1 . 4.2  The Modigliani -  M iller Theorem
I t  i s  conven ien t to  begin  our d is c u s s io n  of d iv id en d  p o l ic y  w ith  
the  n e o c l a s s i c a l  view ex p ressed  by M odig lian i and M i l l e r  (M -  M),
(E, M od ig lian i and M. M i l l e r ,  1961, I 967) .  T he ir  theorem i s  based 
upon the assum ptions o f  p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  m arke ts ,  r a t i o n a l  beh av io u r  
and p e r f e c t  c e r t a i n t y .  In  p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  markets th e re  a re  no b roke­
rage  f e e s ,  and t r a n s a c t io n s  c o s ts  when s e c u r i t i e s  a re  bought, so ld  o r  
i s su e d  and th e re  a re  no ta x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  e i t h e r  between d i s t r i b u t e d  
and u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  or between d iv id en d s  and c a p i t a l  g a in s .  
R a t io n a l  behav iour r e q u i r e s  i n v e s to r s  to be i n d i f f e r e n t  between d i v i ­
dend payments and c a p i t a l  g a in s ,  F i n a l ly ,  complete c e r t a i n t y  on the 
p a r t  o f  in v e s to r s  as to the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  fu tu r e  investm ent prog­
rammes means t h a t  they need no t  d i s t i n g u i s h  between s tock  and bonds
as sources of funds. Under such circumstances they conclude that 
„. , n . . . . , Share price________  .firm  s v a lu a t io n  r a t i o  t e a rn in g s  p a r  share  ) w i l l  be independent o f  
d iv idend  pay -ou t r a t i o .  This i s  so because o th e rw ise ,  h o ld e rs  o f  low-* 
r e tu r n  (h ig h -p r ic e d )  sh a res  cou ld  in c re a se  t h e i r  w ealth  by s e l l i n g
th e se  sh ares  and in v e s t in g  the  p roceeds in  sh a res  o f f e r in g  a h ig h e r  
r a t e  o f  r e t u r n .  This p ro cess  would te n d  to  d r iv e  down the p r i c e s  o f  
th e  lo w -re tu m  sh a re s  and d r iv e  up th e  p r i c e s  o f  h ig h - r e tu r n  sh a res  
u h t i l  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  in  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  had been e l im in a te d .  I f  
the in v e s to r  needs income in  some f u tu r e  time p e r io d  he can s e l l  
some o f  h i s  sh a res  to  r e a l i z e  c a p i t a l  g a in s .  F in a l ly ,  they  conclude 
t h a t  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  r a t h e r  than d iv idends  a re  the  p rim ary  d e c is io n  
v a r i a b le  and they  re g a rd  the  d e c is io n  in  q u e s t io n  s im ply  a s  an i n v e s t ­
ment d e c is io n .
The M -  M assum ptions have been c r i t i z e d  on v a r io u s  grounds. The 
p resence  o f  t a x a t io n  in  g e n e r a l ,  d i s c r im in a t io n  between d i s t r i b u t e d  and 
u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  and between d iv idends  and c a p i t a l  g a in s  in  p a r ­
t i c u l a r ,  p lu s  the  p re sence  o f  t r a n s a c t io n s  c o s t ,  a re  th e  r u le  and no t 
the  exemption in  any economic s o c ie ty .  T h e re fo re ,  the  i n t r o d u c t io n  of 
t a x a t io n  and t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s  may mean t h a t  th e re  w i l l  be an optimum 
d iv idend  p o l i c y  f o r  the  f irm ; d i s t r i b u t i o n  p o l ic y  w i l l  no lo n g e r  be 
u n im portan t.  These e lem ents and o th e r s  which a re  d iscu ssed  below 
make d iv idend  p o l ic y  a m a t te r  o f  c o n s id e ra b le  com plex ity . In  p ra c ­
t i c e  th e re  a re  co m p lica t io n s  which should  be taken  in to  a cc o u n t.  We 
would put th e se  under two broad  head ings ; f i r s t ,  ta x  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
b o th  f o r  firm s and fo r  t h e i r  sh a re h o ld e rs ;  and, second, the  i%»or- 
tance  which sh a reh o ld e rs  and firm s a t t a c h  to  d iv id en d s .  We proceed  
f i r s t  to d iscu ss  the n o n -tax  c o n s id e ra t io n s  which may a f f e c t  d i v i ­
dend p o l ic y .
1 . 4 .5  Non-Tax F a c to rs  A ffec tin g  Dividend F o l icy
A c o rp o ra t io n  has a c h o ice  w hether to  d i s t r i b u t e  i t s  ea rn in g s  to 
sh a reh o ld e rs  as d iv id e n d s ,  to  r e t a i n  them f o r  f in a n c in g  investm ent 
programmes o r to adopt some com bination o f  the  two p o l i c i e s ,  'ihe 
q u e s t io n  i s ;  what f a c to r s  in f lu e n c e  the  f irm  in  making i t s  d e c i s ­
ion? V arious th e o r ie s  have been developed concern ing  th ese  f a c t o r s .  
Some b e l ie v e  t h a t  d iv idends  a re  the "prim ary  and a c t i v e  d e c is io n  
v a r i a b le  in  most s i t u a t i o n s "  and t h e i r  s t a b l e  d iv idends  a re  c o n s is ­
t e n t  w ith  the goa l o f  maximizing v a lu e  p e r  sh a re  ( J .L i n t n e r ,  1956).
O thers b e l ie v e  t h a t  d iv id en d s  p lay  a p a ss iv e  r o le  and t h a t  d iv id en d  
p o l ic y  i s  a by p roduc t of investm ent and f in a n c in g  d e c is io n s , (E  ,.Lemer 
a n d lÆ.£2arleton 196^. F i n a l l y , some o th e rs  b e l ie v e  t h a t  d iv idend  p o l ic y
has a d irect e f fe c t  upon the value o f the firm (M.Gordon, 1962),
The purpose of th is  d isser ta tio n  i s  to d iscu ss, on ly, the tax 
factors which a f fe c t  dividend p o licy . However, a b r ie f  d iscussion  of 
the non-tax factors may help us to understand b etter  the whole spect­
rum of dividend p o licy . A ll these factors may lead in one d irection  
but they most frequently lead to c o n flic t in g  o b jectiv es . These ob­
je c t iv e s  co n stitu te  the d esires o f three groups, the owners, the 
firm s, and the government. Unfortunately, the body of the sharehold­
ers i s  far  from homogenous in  respect o f these various o b jec tiv es .
This g ives r is e  to two problems: f i r s t ,  the c o lle c t io n  o f informat­
ion about th eir  preferences, and second, the reco n c ilia tio n  of th eir  
c o n flic t in g  o b jec tiv es .
1 .4 . 5 .1  The Owners
Shareholders may belong to d iffer en t income c la sse s . Those who 
belong to low income c la sse s  may prefer a higher percentage of prof­
i t s  to be d istrib u ted  or they may prefer to maintain the e x is t in g  pay­
out r a tio . On the other hand, shareholders vho belong to higher in ­
come and personal income tax c la s s e s , may prefer lower dividend pay­
ments. The choice between high and low dividend payments is  a choice  
o f the form in which shareholders want th eir  income, that i s ,  dividends 
or ca p ita l gains,
A secon d ,factor , which may be re la ted  to the f i r s t ,  i s  the p o s it ­
ion o f shareholders as far  as r isk  i s  concerned. I f  they are r isk  
averters they may prefer the maximum income con sisten t with sa fe ty , 
that i s ,  prefer current dividends to future cap ita l gains. I f  they 
are r isk -tak ers they hold shares prim arily for ca p ita l gains, and 
therefore, prefer low dividend payments to high.
Income from other sources may also a ffe c t  shareholders' desire to 
receive dividend or not. S ince, firms supposedly work for th eir  
shareholders b en e fit , i t  i s  lo g ic a l to argue that th eir  dividend p ol­
icy  would be influenced by the need of shareholders for income. The
extent to which th is  need of shareholders would a f fe c t  corporation’s 
dividend p olicy  is  a matter of the pattern of ownership, that i s ,  
whether i t  i s  a c lo se ly  or p u b lic ly  held company, the homogeneity
of shareholders and the a ttitu d e  o f d irec to rs.
The o p p o r tu n i t i e s  a v a i l a b le  to  sh a re h o ld e rs  to in v e s t  o u ts id e  
the  c o rp o ra t io n  may a f f e c t  t h e i r  cho ice  re g a rd in g  d iv id en d  p o l ic y .
I t  i s  supposed t h a t  d i r e c t o r s  p ro p e r ly  r e t a i n  e a rn in g s  and r e in v e s t  
them as long a s  the  r e t u r n  i s  as g r e a t  as the  sh a reh o ld e rs  cou ld  earn  
in  a l t e r n a t i v e  u ses  o f  the  fu n d s .  However, i t  i s  no t always t ru e  t h a t  
d i r e c t o r s  g ive any c o n s id e ra t io n  to t h i s  p o in t ,  e i t h e r  because they  
do no t know what a l t e r n a t i v e s  a re  open to s h a reh o ld e rs  o r  because 
they  p u t  t h e i r  p e rso n a l  i n t e r e s t  above shareho lders*  i n t e r e s t s .
F in a l ly ,  tax  c o n s id e ra t io n s  f o r  th e  sh a reh o ld e rs  may a lso  a f f e c t  
the  c o r p o r a t i o n 's  d iv idend  p o l i c y .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  between a c lo s e ly  
and p u b l i c ly  h e ld  c o rp o ra t io n  i s  e s s e n t i a l .  In  a  c lo s e ly  h e ld  c o r ­
p o ra t io n ,  d iv idend  p o l ic y  i s  l i k e l y  to  be much more determ ined  by the 
p r in c i p a l  owners. I f  the  l a t t e r  have income from o th e r  so u rc es ,  
which may flu c tu q ite  from y e a r  to year; they could  a rran g e  a d iv idend  
p o l ic y  in  such a way a s  to minimize t h e i r  t o t a l  tax  b i l l .  The d i f ­
f e r e n t i a l  t re a tm e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  g a in s  and c u r r e n t  income may a lso  be 
used  f o r  the  b e n e f i t  o f  s h a re h o ld e r s .  In  a p u b l i c ly  h e ld  c o rp o ra t io n  
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to a s c e r t a i n  what d iv id en d  p o l ic y  would be in  the in ­
t e r e s t s  o f  the  whole body o f  sh a reh o ld e rs  s in ce  i t  i s  f a r  from homo­
geneous bu t two dev ices  which have been used  to reduce ta x  l i a b i l i t y  
may be mentioned, namely, the p r a c t i c e  o f  p e rm i t t in g  sh a re h o ld e rs  to 
re c e iv e  p r o f i t s  in  th e  form o f  s to c k  s p l i t s  o r  in  the  form o f  s to ck  
d iv id en d s .
1*4 .5 .2  The C o rpo ra tion
The c o rp o ra t io n  can u se  e i t h e r  e x te r n a l  or i n t e r n a l  funds f o r  
f in a n c in g  i t s  investm ent programmes. In  a  p e r io d  o f  f a s t  growth and 
l im i te d  e x te r n a l  funds i t  may f in a n c e  i t s  programmes a t  the  expense 
o f  d iv id e n d s ,  in  c o n t r a s t ,  i f  th e r e  a re  no more p r o f i t a b l e  oppor­
t u n i t i e s  fo r  expansion  the  f i rm  i s  l i k e l y  to adopt a  h igh payout 
r a t i o  f o r  two re a so n s .  E i t h e r ,  to  g ive sh areh o ld e rs  a chance to in ­
v e s t  e lsewhere or to a llow  them to in c re a s e  t h e i r  comsumption.
C orpora tions  a re  n o t  e n t i r e l y  f r e e  to determ ine t h e i r  d iv idend  
p o l ic y .  As we saw in  the p rev io u s  s e c t io n ,  t h e i r  p o l i c y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in  c lo s e ly  h e ld  c o rp o ra t io n s ,  i s  a f f e c t e d  by sh a re h o ld e rs .  In  a d d i t ­
io n ,  the  co rp o ra te  c h a r t e r  o r  the law may p u t some r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
t h e i r  p o l ic y .  However, i t  should  be r e a l i z e d  t h a t  none o f  th e se  r e -
s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  so severe  as to  d ep r iv e  freedom from the  f irm  to de­
term ine i t s  p o l ic y .
Most f irm s a re  s u b je c t  to some f lu c tu a t io n s  in  t h e i r  p r o f i t a ­
b i l i t y  du rin g  the  s e v e ra l  phases  o f  th e  b u s in ess  c y c le .  The f l u c t u ­
a t io n s  in  p r o f i t s  induce f irm s to  fo llow  a s t a b l e  d iv idend  p o l ic y ,  
t h a t  i s ,  to r e t a i n  d u r in g  boom p e r io d s  an amount o f  p r o f i t s  f o r  d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  d u r in g  slump p e r io d s ,  s u f f i c i e n t  to  keep t h e i r  s h a r e h o ld e r s ’ 
income, on av erag e ,  a t  the  same l e v e l .
The managers o f  a c o rp o ra t io n  may be a f f e c t e d  in  t h e i r  d e c is io n  
to  d i s t r i b u t e  p r o f i t s  in  the  form o f  d iv idends by the  t h r e a t  o f  ta k e ­
over b id s .  These a c t i v i t i e s  may le a d  managers to d i s t r i b u t e  a h ig h e r  
l e v e l  o f  p r o f i t s  in  o rd e r  to d r iv e  away takeover through a h ig h e r  
l e v e l  o f  d iv id en d . This h y p o th e s is  has been developed by M arr is  in
1964.
Concluding, we could say  th a t  th e  board o f  d i r e c t o r s  should take 
in to  accouht a l l  the  above f a c t o r s  in  o rd e r  to fo rm ulate  a d iv idend  
p o l ic y  th a t  i s  in  the  b e s t  i n t e r e s t  o f  both  firm  and sh a re h o ld e rs ,
A change in  d iv idend  p o l ic y  a t t r a c t s ,  the most a t t e n t i o n  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  
They want to  be su re  t h a t  th e  de te rm in in g  f a c to r s  w arran t the  change,
1 , 4 . 3 .5 The Government
We mentioned in  a p rev io u s  s e c t io n  t h a t  changes in  d iv id en d  p o l ic y  
have an impact on the l e v e l  o f  g ross  n a t io n a l  p roduc t and i t s  compon­
e n t s ,  The government may wish to  in f lu e n c e  d iv idend  p o l ic y  f o r  s e v e r ­
a l  re a so n s .  F i r s t ,  With a g iven  amount o f  p r o f i t s  any change in  d i v i ­
dends invo lves  an e q u iv a le n t  change in  r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s .  The l a t t e r  
change may a f f e c t  the  l e v e l  o f  c o rp o ra te  investm ent and t h i s  may a f f e c t  
the  growth o f  the  economy. In  a l a t e r  s e c t io n  we w i l l  d is c u s s  under 
what c ircum stances  t h i s  i s  the  c a s e ,  becond, i t  has been argued th a t  a 
change in  d iv idend  p o l ic y  has im portan t consequences f o r  the  d i s t r ­
ib u t io n  o f  income. I t  i s  added th a t  d iv idend  p o l ic y  n o t  on ly  a f f e c t s  
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income bu t the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w ealth  as w e l l .  
T h ird , in  c e r t a i n  c ircum stances  d iv idend  p o l ic y  ma^ r be used as a 
means o f  combating i n f l a t i o n .  There i s ,  however, no unanimous con­
sensus among economists re g a rd in g  i t s  e f f e c t iv e n e s s ,  Home b e l i e v e ,  
th a t  th e re  i s  a c o r r e l a t i o n  between d iv idend  p o l ic y  and the consum­
p t io n  o f  sh a re h o ld e rs ;  o th e r s  deny th e  e x is te n c e  o f  such a c o r r e l ­
a t io n  b u t  argue t h a t  the  purchase  o f  c a p i t a l  goods p e r  se i s  an in ­
f l a t i o n a r y  f a c t o r  in  the  same way as the  purchase o f  consumer goods 
by the  s h a re h o ld e r s .  F in a l ly ,  i f  c o rp o ra te  sav ing  does n o t  a f f e c t  
s h o r t - r u n  investm ent bu t d iv idends  in f lu e n c e  consumption, a s t a b i l i ­
z a t io n  dev ice  may be p rov ided  to the  government as a  means of a f f e c t ­
in g  demand in  boom and slump p e r io d s ,
1 , 4 .4  A p p ro p ria t io n  o f  F r o f i t s  and T axes .
We have seen th a t  government may a f f e c t  the  a p p ro p r ia t io n  o f  
p r o f i t s  through t a x a t io n  and l e g a l  r e s t r a i n t s .  S ince  th e  l a t t e r  meth­
od i s  l e s s  im portan t than  o th e r  methods used  by the  government to  i n ­
f lu en ce  the  a p p ro p r ia t io n  o f  p r o f i t s  and no t v e ry  common, we concen­
t r a t e  our d is c u s s io n  upon the  form er.
T axation  may a f f e c t  d iv id en d  p o l ic y  in  v a r io u s  ways. The tax  
system p e r  se may a f f e c t  d iv idend  p o l ic y .  As we w i l l  see in  the  d i s ­
cu ss io n  o f  the e x i s t i n g  c o rp o ra te  ta x  system s, the i n t e r a c t i o n  between 
c o rp o ra te  and p e rso n a l  ta x es  in v o lv es  the  s o - c a l le d  double t a x a t io n  o f  
d iv id e n d s .  The s e p a ra te  e n t i t y  system , f o r  example, im p lie s  f u l l  
double t a x a t io n  o f  d iv id e n d s ,  whereas the  p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  systems 
a ttem p t to  a l l e v i a t e  i t .
The former system may encourage firm s to  r e t a i n . t h e i r  p r o f i t s  in ­
s te a d  o f d i s t r i b u t i n g  them to sh a reh o ld e rs  as a means o f  av o id in g  
double t a x a t io n .  This i s  the  s o - c a l l e d  " lo c k - in " , e f f e c t .
The tax  r a t e  may be used to  a f f e c t  d iv idend  p o l i c y ,  to o ,  through 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  t re a tm e n t  between d iv idends  and c a p i t a l  g a in s  and between 
d iv idends  and r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s .  Some governments tax  c a p i t a l  ga in s  
a t  a lower ta x  r a t e  than  d iv idends  and others exclude them from t h e i r  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  income. This d i f f e r e n t i a l  t re a tm en t may encourage 
sh a reh o ld e rs  to w a it  f o r  c a p i t a l  ga ins  which a re  taxed  a t  a lower 
r a t e .  The second type o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between d iv idends  and r e ­
ta in e d  earn ings  a f f e c t s  the  o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t  o f  r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s .
I t  i s  expressed  in  terms o f  th e  n e t  d iv idend  foregone by sh a reh o ld e rs  
as a r e s u l t  o f  r e t a i n i n g  e a rn in g s .  This type o f  p r o f i t s - t a x  d i f f e r ­
e n t i a l  p lay s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  in  d iv idend  behav iou r .  The r a t i o n ­
a le  behind t h i s  d is c r im in a to ry  t r e a tm e n t ' . i s u th a t  tax  payment from 
r e ta in e d  ea rn in g s  i s  a t  th e  expense o f  t o t a l  sav ings  whereas tax
payment from dividend Income is  at the expense of consumption and 
saving o f the dividend rec ip ien ts  •
The flu c ta tio n  of p r o f its  provides managers with another device 
for reducing the to ta l amount of tax paid, through dividend p o licy . 
This is  to esta b lish  a sta b le  dividend p o licy  instead of d is tr ib u t­
ing the to ta l amount o f p r o f its  or a fixed  proportion o f  p r o f its  each 
year. The resu lt of such a p o licy  i s  to transfer shareholders' income 
from higher to lower brackets according to the le v e l  of p r o f it s .  This 
im plies that the to ta l personal income tax b i l l  i s  l e s s ,  since the 
average tax rate applied to th is  d istr ib u tio n  o f income i s  lower.
The questions which ar ise  are: how e ffe c t iv e  i s  th is d iscrim i­
natory tax p o licy  in in fluencing dividend p olicy  and what are i t s  
consequences for the economy as a whole and for the business sector  
particu larly?
1 .4 .5  The E f fe c t iv e n e s s  of Tax r o l i c v  upon Dividend P o l ic y
The above questions have produced a great debate between tax ex­
p erts . Both th eo retica l and em pirical stud ies have attempted to an­
swer these questions. Home doubts have been raised as to the d esir­
a b i l i ty  of a ffec tin g  dividend p o licy  and the e ffec tiv en ess  o f attempts 
to do so.
The supporters o f discrim inatory tax p o licy  between retained  
earnings and dividends argue that more retained earnings lead to 
higher investment. On the other hand, i t  i s  argued, the object of 
corporate saving may be tw ofold. F ir s t , to finance investment prog­
rammes in tern a lly  and second, to build up a reserve which can be used 
to even out the payment o f dividends. I f  the second i s  the reason for 
reta in in g  earnings then tax p o licy  does not achieve the desired re­
s u lt ,  that i s ,  to increase investm ent. Suppose that the f i r s t  mo­
tiv e  i s  the case, then more corporate savings lead to higher in v est­
ment, This ra ise s  the resource a llo ca tio n  question. I t  has been 
argued that a great dependence on in ternal funds i s  open to serious  
objections. I f  the decision  to finance investment programmes throu^  
in ternal funds is  based on p r o f ita b il ity  c r ite r ia  and i t  i s  not a re­
su lt  o f  tax-avoidance or the pursuit o f personal sa tis fa c t io n  by 
managers, then these investments s a t is fy  the t e s t  of the cap ita l
m arke t.  Otherwise th e  q u a l i t y  of new investm ent i s  q u e s t io n a b le .
I t  has a l s o  been argued t h a t  the  d i s c r im in a t io n  o f  ta x  p o l ic y  
in  fav o u r  o f  r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s  favours  the e x i s t i n g  f irm s  and d i s ­
courages new firm s t h a t  need funds from the  c a p i t a l  m arket. By do­
ing  so ,  t h i s  d i s c r im in a t io n  r e s u l t s  in  a d i s t o r t i o n  o p e ra t in g  ag­
a i n s t  e x te r n a l  finance*
Any a t tem p ts  to  p rov ide  an answer concern ing  th e  d i r e c t i o n  and 
magnitude o f  changes in  n a t i o n a l  income r e s u l t i n g  from a change in  
d iv id en d  p o l ic y  r e q u i r e s  us to  ta k e  in to  account some o th e r  f a c t o r s  
which have been assumed c o n s ta n t ,  so f a r .  Does th e  change in  ques­
t io n  a f f e c t  the  p ro p e n s i ty  to  spend o f  c o rp o ra t io n s ,  in d iv id u a ls  
and government? Any change in  p r o f i t s  may have an e f f e c t  upon the 
share  o f  each group. How does t h i s  change a f f e c t  the p ro p e n s i ty  to  
consume? Any change has an e f f e c t  upon the  economy through the 
m u l t i p l i e r .  I f  the  investm en t m u l t i p l i e r  i s  h ig h e r  than  the consump­
t i o n  m u l t i p l i e r  then  à tax  p o l i c y  in  favour o f  r e t a i n e d  e a rn in g s  i s  
p r e f e r a b le  to  one which favours  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  i f  the  goal i s  to  
promote expansion .
Corporate  sav ing  can be used  as a means o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  the 
economy through t h e i r  e f f e c t  upon investm ent and consumption, A 
ta x  induced change in  c o rp o ra te  sav in g  may a f f e c t  investm ent in  a 
d e s i r a b le  d i r e c t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  to in c re a s e  investm ent in  p e r io d  o f 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  ag g reg a te  demand o r  to  d ec rease  them in  p e r io d  o f  excess 
ag g rega te  demand. Some doubts have a r i s e n  concern ing  the e f f e c t i v e  
ness  o f  th i s  p o l ic y  s in ce  i t  has been found th a t  investm ent r e a c t s  
to  changes in  co rp o ra te  sav ing  a f t e r  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  lag?  In c o n t r a s t ,  
in  a p e r io d  o f  h ig h e r  p r o f i t s ,  r e t a in e d  earn ings  tend to  in c r e a s e ,  
however, comsumption r i s e s  by l e s s  than  i f  a l l  p r o f i t s  had been d i s ­
t r i b u t e d ,  whereas when p r o f i t s  a re  f a l l i n g ,  the d iv id en d s  r e c e iv e d  
by sh a reh o ld e rs  may be h e ld  c o n s ta n t  by drawing from re s e rv e s  and 
so consumption f a l l s  l e s s  than  i f  no re s e rv e s  were a v a i l a b l e ,
1 , 4 .6  E m p irica l  Evidence
E m pir ica l  s tu d ie s  a t te m p t  to answer the  fo l low ing  th re e  ques­
t io n s :  (1) Does the tax  d is c r im in a to ry  p o l ic y  a f f e c t  the  approp­
r i a t i o n  o f  p r o f i t s ?  (2) Does more c o rp o ra te  sav ings  le a d  to h ig h e r  
l e v e l s  of investm ent?  ( j >)  i f  the answer in  the second q u es t io n  is  
y e s ,  a re  c o rp o ra te  sav ings  in v e s te d  in  p r o f i t a b l e  investm ent p ro g -
r  amine s?
Three approaches have been used  to s tu d y  d iv idend  b eh av io u r .
The f i r s t ,  the ad hoc e m p ir ic a l  approach , l i s t s  a l l  the  f a c t o r s  which 
may in f lu e n c e  on d iv idend  behav iour and e s t a b l i s h e s  a  fu n c t io n a l  d i v i ­
dend e q u a t io n .  To t h i s  approach belong s tu d ie s  made by B r i t t a i n  
( 1964 , 1966) ,  Fama and Babiak ( I 968) P e ld s te in  ( I 9 6 7 , 1970), F is h e r ,  
( 1970) and King (1974). The second, the  income model approach, 
assumes t h a t  d iv id en d s  a re  a  s t a b l e  fu n c t io n  o f  c o rp o ra te  income.
In  t h i s  approach be long  s tu d ie s  made by Tinbergen (1959), M o d ig lian i-  
(1949), Bobrovsky ( I 95I ; ,  L in tn e r  (1956) and F is h e r  (1957). F in a l l y  
the  u t i l i t y  m axim ization approach assumes th a t  the d iv idend  b ehav iou r  
i s  the outcome of an e x p l i c i t  o p t im iz a t io n  p rocess  where the o b je c t ­
iv e  f u n c t io n ,  the  m anageria l u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n ,  has as arguements the 
l e v e l  o f  d iv idends  and r e t e n t io n s  (M.King, 1977). This u t i l i t y  fun ­
c t i o n  i s  maximized s u b je c t  to a p r e - t a x  p r o f i t s  c o n s t r a i n t ,  where 
t h i s  p r e - t a x  p r o f i t s  a re  n e c e s sa ry  to  f in an ce  r e t a in e d  ea rn in g s  and 
d iv id e n d s .  I t  i s  worth m entioning  th e  main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  some 
o f  th e se  studies®
L in tn e r  developed the  fo l lo w in g  p a r t i a l  ad justm en t model which 
r e l a t e s  ag g reg a te  d iv id en d s  to  the  l a s t  y e a r ' s  d iv id en d s  and a f t e r ­
ta x  c u r re n t  y e a r ' s  p r o f i t s :
= a + crPj.. + (1 - c  ) 4- U .
where,
B't = c u r r e n t  y e a r ' s  d iv idends
= l a s t  y e a r ' s  d iv id en d s .
= c u r r e n t  a f t e r - t a x  p r o f i t s  
r  = the  t a r g e t  payout r a t i o  and 
a and 0 a re  c o n s ta n ts ,  a r e f l e c t s  the  re lu c ta n c e  
o f  managers to c u t  d iv id e n d s ,  whereas c i s  the  sp eed -o f-ad ju s tm en t 
f a c t o r ,  i t  tak es  v a lu es  in  the  i n t e r v a l  zero and one, i f  c = o 
d iv idends  w i l l  equal a  + , t h a t  i s ,  w i l l  change independent of
p r o f i t s  by an amount o f  a , i f  o «1 d iv idends w i l l  equal to a  + rP ,  
The va lue  o f  c depends on c o n s id e ra t io n s  such as the  need f o r  i n t e r ­
n a l  f in a n c e ,  the  f e e l i n g  o f  management about the changes in  p r o f i t s  
e t c .
Lintner based h is model on interview s which he made with finan­
c ia l  managers and i t s  ra tion a le  i s  that dividend depends d ir ec tly  
on both current net p r o fits  and la s t  year's dividends. He con­
cluded that dividends are the primary and active  factor  in  making 
the appropriation o f p r o fits  d ec ision ,
B ritta in  showed that the above model predicts b etter  when cash 
flow rather than p r o fits  i s  used as the p ro fits  v a r ia b le . He de­
fin es  cash flow  as the sum o f a fte r -ta x  p r o fits  plus depreciation  
allowances. The rationale  o f th is  approach i s  that the a b i l i ty  to 
pay dividends depends on gross p r o fits  rather than net p r o f its ,  
B ritta in  argues that net p r o f its  are a m isleading ind icator o f  
p r o f ita b il i ty .  His model a lso  provides a rela tionsh ip  between d iv i­
dends and the individual income tax rates and i t  t r ie s  to explain how 
changes in the la t t e r  a f fe c t  the dividend payout r a t io . He f in a l ly ,  
concluded that the introduction o f corporation tax v ia  i t s  e f fe c t  on 
a fter -ta x  p r o fits  made the tax structure a ffe c t  dividend p o licy  sub­
s ta n t ia lly .
F eld ste in  used a model which in King's words i s  a considerable ad­
vance in scope and id e n tif ic a tio n  despite i t s  inadequate s p e c if ic a t ­
ion , He generalized the Lintner model and using various advanced 
econometrics techniques concluded that d iffe r e n t ia l taxation sub­
s ta n t ia lly  influences dividend p o licy . He added in L intner's model 
a tax discrim inatory variab le which represents the opportunity cost  
of retained earnings in terms of net dividend foregone. He found 
that the equilibrium  e la s t ic i t y  o f dividends with respect to the tax 
discrim inatory variab le is  equal to U.9 which means that a one per 
cent increase in  the opportunity cost o f retained earnings re su lts  
a u .9 per cent increase in dividendsP
fish e r  (1970) using data for the same time period but using an 
adaptive expectation model reached the same conclusion, that i s ,  the 
d iffe r e n t ia l p r o fits  tax on d istr ib u ted  earnings plays a s ig n if ica n t  
ro le  in dividend p o licy . He assumed that taxation in fluences d iv i­
dend p o licy  in two ways. F ir s t , by changing the r e la t iv e  cost of 
d istr ib u tion  and second, by a ffe c tin g  the amount o f p r o fits  a v a il­
able for d istr ib u tio n . He concluded that the second e f fe c t  i s  pred­
ominant in contrast to F eld ste in  who found that the f i r s t  e f fe c t  is
more im p o rtan t .  He f i n a l l y  argues t h a t  " c l e a r ly ,  more r e s e a rc h  i s  
needed b e fo re  d e f i n i t e  co n c lu s io n s  may be e s ta b l i s h e d ' '^
F e ld s te in  and Fane (M .F e ld s te in  and G.Fane, 1973) a ttem p ted  to  
g ive  an answer to the second q u e s t io n ,  t h a t  i s ,  whether h ig h e r  c o r ­
p o ra te  sav ings  le ad  to  h ig h e r  inv es tm en t.  They examine i f  changes 
in  c o rp o ra te  sav in g  have an e f f e c t  on c a p i t a l  fo rm ation  through 
changes in  p e rso n a l  s av in g s .  They argue  t h a t  even though th e  e f f e c t  
o f  ta x  d i f f e r e n t i o n  upon d iv id en d  p o l ic y  i s  c l e a r  the  e f f e c t  o f  a 
change in  the l a t t e r  upon c a p i t a l  fo rm ation  i s  ambiguous. They 
su g g es t  t h a t  the  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  e f f e c t  r e q u i r e s  two s e p a r ­
a te  q u e s t io n s .  F i r s t ,  does an in c re a s e  in  c o rp o ra te  sav in g s  induce 
f irm  to d ecrease  e x te r n a l  f in a n c e  so t h a t  investm ent remains un­
changed? F e ld s te in  and Flemming in  a n o th e r  s tudy  found th a t  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  one hundred pounds o f  r e t a in e d  earn ings  in c re a s e  i n v e s t ­
ment by about t h i r t y  pounds. Second, does any c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
c o rp o ra te  and p e rso n a l  sav in g  e x i s t  and i f  the answer i s  y e s ,  how 
s t ro n g  i s  th a t?  They found t h a t  a r i s e  in  company sav ing  i s  no t  o f f ­
s e t  by a decrease  in  p e rso n a l  s av in g  and an a d d i t i o n a l  pound o f  r e ­
ta in e d  ea rn in g s  may in c re a s e  t o t a l  sav ing  by l e s s  than U.50  pounds 
( M ,F e ld s te in  and J,Flem m ing, 1975).
F in a l ly  the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  investm ent undertaken  w ith  th ese  
funds was s tu d ie d  by a n o th e r  group o f  r e s e a r c h e r s .  L i t t l e  i s  the
f i r s t  who r a i s e d  the  q u e s t io n  w hether r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s  le ad  to h igh ­
e r  ea rn in g  fo r  the company (I. . L i t t l e ,  1962), In  o th e r  words, he 
r a i s e d  the  q u e s t io n  whether r e t a i n e d  earn ings  a re  w ise ly  in v e s te d .
He concluded t h a t  "ploughback appears  to  have no e f f e c t  on growth".
Baumol e t  a l  c o n s id e r in g  the same q u es t io n  found th a t  the  r a t e  
o f  r e t u r n  on new e q u i ty  c a p i t a l  i s  v e ry  much h ig h e r  than  the r a t e  o f
r e tu r n  on e i t h e r  ploughback o r new deb ts  (Baumol e t  a l l ,  1970).
W h it t in g to n , u s in g  a d i f f e r e n t  methodology from Baum ol's , w ith  U.K. 
d a ta  reached  the same c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  r e ta in e d  e a rn in g s  seem to be 
l e s s  p r o f i t a b l e  than e x te r n a l  f in an ce  (G. W h itt in g to n ,  1972).
To summarize, d iv idend  p o l ic y  i s  a m a tte r  o f  g r e a t  com plexity . 
C o n f l ic t in g  o b je c t iv e s  re n d e r  th i s  p o l ic y  d i f f i c u l t  in  p r a c t i c e .
This p o l ic y  has s ig n i f ic a n t ,  impacts upon o th e r  c o rp o ra te  m a t te r s .
H igher d iv idends  in v o lv e  l e s s  r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s ,  however, l e s s  funds 
a v a i l a b le  f o r  f in a n c in g  investm ent programmes. This impact has im­
p o r t a n t  consequences f o r  th e  f i r m 's  f i n a n c i a l  p o l ic y  to which we 
tu rn  in  the  n ex t s e c t io n .
1 .5  CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY AND TAXATION
1 , 5 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
Three a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  open to  a f i rm  f o r  f in a n c in g  investm ent 
programmes. F i r s t ,  th rough p loughing  back r e t a in e d  e a r n in g s ,  second, 
th rough  i s s u in g  new sh a res  and f i n a l l y ,  through d e b t .  Each of th e se  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  has i t s  m e r i ts  and d e m er i ts .  E qu ity  f in a n c e - r e q u i r e s  
d iv idend  payments whereas d eb t  f in a n c e  re q u i r e s  i n t e r e s t  paymehts and 
f i n a l l y  the  repayment o f  the  p r i n c i p a l .  Dividend payments a re  no t 
n e c e s s a ry ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the  absence o f  p r o f i t s ,  whereas i n t e r e s t  
payments a r e ,  r e g a r d le s s  o f  the  e x is te n c e  o f  p r o f i t s .  The q u e s t io n  
i s  which method o r  com bination o f  them c o n s t i t u t e s  the  op tim al f in a n ­
c i a l  p o l ic y  f o r  the  f irm ,
M odig lian i and M i l le r  argue t h a t  in  the absence o f  tax es  and 
t r a n s a c t io n  c o s ts  in  a p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  market the  f i rm  i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  
to th e  method o f  f in a n c in g  i t s  investm en t programmes s in ce  th e  c o s t  
o f  c a p i t a l  i s  i n v a r i a n t  w ith  the  method o f  f in a n c e  (M ,M odigliani and 
M ,M ille r ,  1956» 19&5). The b a s ic  r a t i o n a l e  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t io n  i s  
t h a t  a p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  market p ro v id es  a l l  th e  f i r m s ,  which belong
to  th e  same r i s k  c l a s s ,  w ith  the same o p p o r tu n i t i e s .  T h e re fo re ,  any
d is c r e p a n c ie s  between th e se  f i rm s  in  t h e i r  market v a lu e s  can be e l im ­
in a te d  through a r b i t r a g e  o p e ra t io n s  by s h a re h o ld e r s .  As we saw in  the 
p rev io u s  s e c t io n  the assum ption o f  the M odig lian i - M i l l e r  theorem 
has been c r i t i c i z e d  on d i f f e r e n t  grounds and f i r s t  o f  a l l  the  i n t r o d ­
u c t io n  o f  ta x e s  changes* the above p r o p o s i t io n ,
1*5.2 T axation  and the Cost o f  C a p i ta l
"The way in  which t a x a t io n  a f f e c t s  c o rp o ra te  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  and 
the  l e v e l  o f  investm ent through  the s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  c o s t  of c a p i t a l ,  
i s  s t i l l  a  bone o f  c o n te n t io n "  (King, 1974» p . 2 1 ) ,  In  t h i s  s e c t io n  
we s h a l l  analyze  the e f f e c t  o f  t a x a t io n  upon the f i r m 's  cho ice  o f
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  In  o rd e r  to  i s o l a t e  t h i s  e f f e c t  we assume a 
world w ithou t bankruptcy?^nd t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s .  We a l s o  assume 
a s im p l i f i e d  ta x  s t r u c t u r e  c o n s i s t i n g  of th e  fo l lo w in g  c h a r a c t e r i ­
s t i c s .  A p e rs o n a l  income ta x  ( t p j  on income from sh a re s  and lo a n s ,  
a c a p i t a l  ga in  tax  ( tg )  and a t a x  on c o rp o ra te  income ( t o ) . A d i s c r ­
im in a t io n  e x i s t s  between d iv id en d  payments and i n t e r e s t  payments.
In  o rd e r  to  a r r i v e  a t  ta x a b le  p r o f i t s  i n t e r e s t  payments a re  c o n s id e r ­
ed as c o s ts  and a re  d e d u c t ib le .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  d iv id en d  payments a re  
n o t .  In  a d d i t io n  whereas d iv idends  a r e  ta^ed  as p e rso n a l  income 
and a re  thus s u b je c t  to v e r y  h igh  ta x  r a t e s  f o r  in d iv id u a ls  in  
h ig h e r  income b ra c k e ts ,  most c o u n t r ie s  do not t r e a t  c a p i t a l  ga ins 
as p e rso n a l  income and tax  them a t  c o n s id e ra b le  lower r a t e s .  F in ­
a l l y ,  a  heavy GIT may d i r e c t  funds to  go to the  u n in c o rp o ra te d  
r a t h e r  th an  to  the  in c o rp o ra te d  s e c to r  of the  economy. To com­
p l e t e  our d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  the  s im p l i f i e d  tax  s t r u c t u r e  we d e f in e  the
o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t  o f  r e t a i n i n g  p r o f i t s  in  terms o f  n e t  d iv idends
13foregone (deno ted  b y © ) .  This v a r i a b l e  0 measures the  degree o f  
d i s c r im in a t io n  between d iv id en d s  and r e t e n t i o n s .  I t  i s  t h i s  d i s ­
c r im in a t io n  which makes 1 d r  in  the  hands o f  th e  f i rm  no t  e q u iv a le n t  
to  1 d r  in  the  hands o f  th e  s h a r e h o ld e r s .  Then 1 -  0 i s  th e  a d d i t ­
io n a l  to  CIT ta x  on d iv id en d s .
For s im p l i c i t y  o f  e x p o s i t io n  we w i l l  examine f in a n c i a l  p o l ic y  in  
terms o f  th re e  two-way comparisons o f  the  methods o f  f in a n c e  open to 
th e  f irm , we beg in  w ith the comparison between r e t e n t i o n  and i s s u e  
o f  new s h a re s ,  i f  tg p ^ l  - 0 ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  the  c a p i t a l  g a in  ta x  r a t e  
i s  g r e a t e r  than  the a d d i t i o n a l  tax  p a id  on d iv id en d s  then the p r e f e r ­
ab le  method o f  f in a n c in g  investm ent i s  the  i s su e  of new s h a r e s .  The 
i n t u i t i o n  behind t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  c l e a r .  Since the  tax  on c a p i t a l  
ga in s  i s  g r e a t e r  th an  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  ta x  on d iv id e n d s ,  th e re  i s  an 
in c e n t iv e  to  sp read  the  c a p i t a l  ga in s  over the  g r e a t e r  number o f  sh a res  
by i s s u in g  more s h a re s  and paying  out h ig h e r  c u r r e n t  d iv id e n d s .  On 
the  o th e r  hand, i f  th e  i n e q u a l i t y  ho lds  w ith r e v e r se  s ig n ,  t h a t  i s ,  
t g ^  1 - 0  , then the p r e f e r a b le  method of f in a n c in g  investm ent i s  by 
r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s .  Again the  reaso n  i s  obvious, by f in a n c in g  out of 
r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  th e  e x t r a  d iv idends  which would have been p a id  ou t 
i f  sh a res  were is su e d ,  a re  in s te a d  p a id  out now in  the form o f  c a p i -  
ten  g a in s .  The q u e s t io n  which a r i s e s  i s :  which case  i s  th e  most 
p robab le  in  p r a c t i c e ?  I t  seems t h a t  the  second c a s e ,  t h a t  i s ,  
t g C l  -  0 i s  the case  f o r  a ty p ic a l  ta x  s t r u c t u r e .  T h e re fo re ,  we
may conclude th a t  r e t e n t i o n  r a t h e r  than  the  i s s u e  o f  new sh are  i s  the 
p r e f e r a b le  way o f  f in a n c in g  investm en t programmes.
We tu rn  now to the  second way o f  comparison, t h a t  i s ,  between 
borrowing and i s s u in g  s h a r e s .  I f  1 -  t p C 0 ( l  -  t o )  then  the p r e f e r ­
a b le  method o f f in an ce  i s  new s h a re s  r a t h e r  than borrow ing. The sh a re ­
h o ld e r  su b sc r ib e s  to  an i s s u e  o f  new sh ares  in s te a d  o f  len d in g  h is  
sav in g s  a t  the  market r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  The above in e q u a l i t y  says t h a t  
the  amount o f  n e t  i n t e r e s t  payments which the sh a re h o ld e r  g iv e s  up i s  
l e s s  than  the  amount o f  n e t  d iv idends  which he r e c e iv e s .  On the  o th e r  
hand, i f  1 -  tp  0 ( l  -  t c )  then  the  s u p e r io r  method o f  f in a n c e  i s  
borrowing s in c e  th e  f irm  borrow ing and u ses  i t s  own income to  pay o f f  
the  i n t e r e s t  and th e  p r i n c i p a l .  King (1977» P*54) has proved t h a t  
the  va lu e  of B  shou ld  obey th e  fo l lo w in g  c o n s t r a in t :
e  £  1
1 -  to
o r 1 -  tp  >  0 ( 1  -  t o ) . Since the  l a t t e r  in e q u a l i t y  i s  always 
sa t is f ied  then  borrowing i s  the  p r e f e r a b l e  method o f  f in a n c e ,  r a t h e r  
than the  is su e  o f  s h a re s .
F in a l ly  th e  t h i r d  comparison i s  between f in a n c in g  investm en t by 
r e t a in e d  ea rn in g s  or by borrow ing. I f  (1 -  t p ) >  ( l  -  tg ;  (1 -  t c )  
th en  the  p r e f e r a b le  method i s  d e b t .  The i n t u i t i o n  o f  t h i s  c o n d i t io n  
i s  t h a t  by u s in g  r e t e n t i o n s  in s te a d  o f  deb t a s h a re h o ld e r  g iv es  up 
(1 -  tp) u n i t s  o f  n e t  i n t e r e s t  payments, th e  e f f e c t i v e  c o s t  o f  
which to th e  company i s  (1 -  t c ) ,  and re c e iv e s  an amount (1 -  tg )
(1 -  t c )  in  the  form o f c a p i t a l  g a in s .  (King 1977).
1.5o5 Optimal F in a n c ia l  P o l i c y
We are ready to draw together the above r e su lts  in order to des­
cribe the optimal f in a n c ia l p o licy  of the firm . Since the above two- 
way comparison showed that the method o f financing by issu in g  new 
shares i s  never the preferable one, the optimal fin a n c ia l p o licy  
should be looked for between reten tion  and debt. The contrast bet­
ween these two methods revealed that i f
tpZ>to + tg  (1 - t . 'c )  
then  the  p r e f e r a b le  way o f  f in a n c e  i s  by u s in g  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s ,  
o th e rw ise  by borrowing. From t h i s  in e q u a l i t y  we see  t h a t  i f  th e  va lue  
o f  p e rso n a l  income ta x  tp  i s  above a c r i t i c a l  v a lue  K = tc  + t g  ( l - t c )
the  p r e f e r a b le  method o f  f in a n c e  i s  by u s in g  r e t e n t i o n s .  This c r i t -  
c a l  v a lu e  K depends on the  r a t e  o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x  to  and the  r a t e  o f  
c a p i t a l  ga in s  t a x  tg .  The tre a tm e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x  can tak e  
th re e  d i f f e r e n t  form s. F i r s t ,  some c o u n t r ie s  exclude from t h e i r  de- 
f i n i t i o j i s  o f  income c a p i t a l  g a in s ,  t h a t  i s  tg  = 0 .  This im p lie s  
t h a t  the  c r i t i c a l  v a lu e  o f  K .depends o n ly  on the  r a t e  o f  c o rp o ra te  
t a x .  T h e re fo re ,  i f  t p > t c  r e t e n t i o n s  a re  p r e f e r r e d  to d e b t .  Second, 
c a p i t a l  ga in s  may be tax ed  l i k e  th e  o th e r  k ind o f  income, t h a t  i s ,  
tp  » tg .  This im p lie s  t h a t  tp -C tc  + ( t c  -  tp  to )  which im p lie s  t h a t  
d eb t f in a n c e  i s  always p r e f e r r e d  to r e t e n t i o n  f in a n c e .  F in a l ly ,  the  
c a p i t a l  ga ins  tax  may take  a v a lu e  between zero  and tp .  That i s ,  
c a p i t a l  g a in s  en joy  a p r e f e r e n t i a l  t re a tm e n t  over the  o th e r  income.
In  th e  g e n e ra l  case  where t g  » t p ,  r e t e n t io n s  a re  p r e f e r r e d  to  deb t 
when tp  ;>
(1 - U  - o)
The above d is c u s s io n  was based on th e  assumption o f  a  world 
w ithou t bank rup tcy . This assum ption  p lu s  th e  i n t e r e s t  d e d u c t i b i l i t y  
made deb t f in a n c e  to be p r e f e r r e d  th a n  new share  f in a n c e .  However, 
i t  i s  more r e a l i s t i c  to r e l a t e  th e  r a t e  a t  which th e  f irm  borrow to  
i t s  d e b t - e q u i ty  r a t i o  a lo n g  f i n a n c i a l  f r o n t i e r .  This means t h a t  the  
nominal r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  which th e  f i rm  must pay on i t s  borrowing 
w i l l  in c re a s e  as  th e  amount o f  borrowing in c r e a s e s .  T h e re fo re ,  the 
removal o f  th e  above assum ption l i m i t s  the  f i r m ’ s dependence on debt 
and c r e a te s  a p o s s ib le  r o l e  o f  new sh ares  i s s u e .
Long-term deb t i s  the  a p p ro p r ia te  method o f  c o rp o ra te  f in a n c in g  
i f  the  e a rn in g s  base has a proven re c o rd  o f  s t a b i l i t y  which guaran­
t e e s ,  up to c e r t a i n  e x te n t  the  payment o f  the  deb t s e r v ic e  o b l i g a t ­
io n s ,  F a i lu r e  to  meet t h i s  c la im  as i t  f a l l s  due w i l l  le a d  the  f irm  
i n to  bankrup tcy . The g r e a t e r  th e  d eb t f in a n c e  the  l a r g e r  i n t e r e s t  
payments in  the f u t u r e .  This bankrup tcy  r i s k s  w i l l  ensu re  t h a t ,  a f t e r  
a c e r t a i n  l e v e l ,  the  c o s ts  o f  d eb t  w i l l  be r i s i n g  a t  the  margin f a s t  
enough to  o f f s e t  any tax  advan tages . C le a r ly ,  th e r e  i s  a  t r a d e - o f f  
between cheaper deb t f in a n c e  and th e  r i s k  o f  d e f a u l t .  The g r e a t e r  
the  d eb t  the  g r e a t e r  the  r i s k  o f  d e f a u l t  f o r  the  company.
1.6  RESOURCE ALLOCATION MD CORPORATE TAXATION
1 .6 .1  I n t r o d u c t io n
I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  CIT through i t s  d i s c r im in a to ry  n a tu re  a f f ­
e c t s  economic d e c is io n s  r e g a rd in g  re so u rce  a l l o c a t i o n s  w ith in  the  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  o f  th e  economy. However, in  o rd e r  to  be a b le  to  reach  
some conclus ions  re g a rd in g  the  a l l o c a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  the  CIT one has 
to know how i t  a f f e c t s  the b ehav iou r  o f  the  owners o f  r e s o u rc e s .
This i s  the  rea so n  why th e  a l l o c a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  CIT a re  a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  the  s h i f t i n g  and in c id e n ce  p ro c e s s .
The CIT can d i s c r im in a te  a g a in s t  th e  c o rp o ra te  s e c t o r ,  a g a in s t  
c a p i t a l  in t e n s iv e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a g a in s t  e q u i ty  f in a n c in g  and, f i n a l l y ,  
d is c r im in a te s  between r e t a i n e d  and d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s .  The f i r s t  
two k inds  o f  d i s c r im in a t io n  have an a l l o c a t i v e  e f f e c t  between the  
c o rp o ra te  ( tax ed )  s e c to r  and the  u n in co rp o ra te d  (un ta x ed ) s e c to r ,  
whereas the  o th e r  two k in d s  o f  d i s c r im in a t io n  a f f e c t  the  a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  c a p i t a l  w ith in  the  c o rp o ra te  s e c t o r .  The l a t t e r  s u b j e c t ,  which 
c o n s t i t u t e s  the  European concern  about re so u rce  m is a l lo c a t io n  was 
d e a l t  w ith  in  the  two p rev io u s  s e c t io n s ,  under the  head ings  ’ d i v i ­
dend p o l i c y ’ and 'C o rp o ra te  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y ' .  We tu rn  now to  the 
f i r s t  q u e s t io n ,  t h a t  i s ,  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  between the c o r ­
p o ra te  and u n in c o rp o ra te d  s e c t o r s ,  which i s  the  main concern o f  U.S 
W r i t t e r s  about re so u rce  m is a l lo c a t io n  (C.McLure, 1979)*
When one examines the  e f f e c t  o f  CIT upon the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  c a p i ­
t a l  re so u rce s  i t  i s  n e c e s sa ry  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between e f f e c t s  in  the  
s h o r t - r u n  and in  the  lo n g - ru n .  We assume f i r s t  t h a t  the  CIT i s  s h i f ­
ted  in  the s h o r t - r u n .  The p r i c e s  o f  c o rp o ra te  produced goods w i l l  
be h ig h e r  and consumers w i l l  buy l e s s  o f  th e se  goods, so t h a t  the  
o u tp u t  o f  the  c o rp o ra te  s e c to r  w i l l  be reduced . S ince p r o f i t s  w i l l  
f a l l  in  the  c o rp o ra te  s e c t o r ,  i f  we assume they  were maximized i n i ­
t i a l l y ,  re so u rce s  w i l l  tend to  be r e a l lo c a t e d  frcm t h i s  s e c to r  to  the  un­
taxed  s e c to r .  T h e re fo re ,  even i f  the  CIT were s h i f t e d  forw ard , a 
r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  re so u rce s  o c cu rs ,
>Ve r e la x  now the  assum ption o f  s h o r t - r u n  s h i f t i n g  and assume th a t  
the  GIT i s  no t  s h i f t e d  in  the  s h o r t - r u n .  S ince in  the  s h o r t - r u n  
c a p i t a l  i s  unab le  to  leave  the  taxed  s e c to r  i t  th e r e f o r e  bears  the
burden o f  the  ta x .  I f  t h i s  i s  so a  d is e q u i l ib r iu m  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
c r e a te d  in  the  c a p i t a l  m arke t. However, in  the  lo n g -ru n  c a p i t a l  may 
flow  out of th e  taxed  s e c to r  in to  the untaxed s e c t o r .  This flow o f  
c a p i t a l  r e s u l t s  in  changes in  th e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  o f  p ro d u c ts ,  and 
in  th e  r e l a t i v e  r e tu r n s  to  f a c to r s  o f  p ro d u c t io n .  Then th e  d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n  o f  the  ta x  burden depends on a number o f  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  in c lu d ­
in g  the m o b i l i ty  o f  bo th  taxed  and un taxed  f a c to r s  o f  p ro d u c t io n ,  the 
n a tu re  o f  p ro d u c t io n  fu n c t io n s ,  the  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  be­
tween the f a c t o r s  o f  p ro d u c t io n  in  the  two s e c to r s  and th e  e l a s t i c i t y  
o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  between th e  two s e c to r s  o u tp u ts  in  consumption. To 
take  account o f  a l l  th e se  c o n s id e ra t io n s  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  in c id en ce  
a n a ly s i s  must go beyond the  t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r t i a l  e q u i l ib r iu m  s e t t i n g .  
The c l a s s i c  model, which d e a l s  w ith  the lo n g -ru n  in c id en ce  o f  CIT 
i s  the  g en e ra l  e q u i l ib r iu m  model developed by H arberger i n  1962,
1 .6 .2  The H arberger  Model
H arberger ,  u s in g  a two-good, two s e c to r  com parative  s t a t i c  gen­
e r a l  e q u i l ib r iu m  model, concludes t h a t  in  th e  lo n g -ru n  the  d i f f e r e n ­
t i a l  CIT i s  a lm ost e n t i r e l y  borne by c a p i t a l .
He assumes two f a c t o r s  o f  p ro d u c t io n ,  c a p i t a l  and la b o u r ,  which 
a re  su p p lie d  in  f ix e d  q u a n t i t i e s .  These f a c to r s  a re  c h a r a c te r iz e d  by 
p e r f e c t  m o b i l i ty .  The im p l ic a t io n  o f  t h i s  assum ption i s  the  e q u a l i ­
z a t io n  o f  n e t - o f - t a x  r a t e s  o f  r e tu r n  f o r  each f a c t o r .  Both m arke ts ,  
f o r  f a c to r s  o f  p ro d u c t io n  and f o r  p ro d u c ts  a re  p e r f e c t l y  c o m p e t i t iv e .  
The p ro d u c tio n  fu n c t io n s  a re  l i n e a r  and homogenous; t h a t  i s  th e re  
a re  no economies o r  d iseconom ies o f  s c a l e .  I t  i s  f u r t h e r  assumed 
t h a t  the  government spends a l l  the  tax  revenue in  some com bination 
on the  two s e c to r s .  The im p l ic a t io n  o f  t h i s  assum ption i s  t h a t  th e re  
i s  no need to  s tu d y  the  e f f e c t  o f  ta x  upon agg reg a te  demand. F i n a l l y ,  
he assumes th e  same m arg inal p r o p e n s i t i e s  to consume good in  a l l  
c l a s s e s  o f  the  p o p u la t io n .  This eliminates the impact o f  income r e d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  on the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  re s o u rce s  in  the p r i v a t e  s e c to r .  He 
s t a r t s  w ith  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  P a re to  optimum in  the absence o f  t a x a t io n .
He assumes th a t  the government imposes a c o rp o ra t io n  income ta x  
which i s  no t s h i f t e d  in  the  s h o r t - r u n .  This produces d is e q u i l ib r iu m  
in  the  c a p i t a l  m arket. S ince  i t  has been assumed t h a t  i n  the  s h o r t -  
run  c a p i t a l  does n o t le av e  the  taxed s e c to r  to  seek o th e r  employment
i t  i s  involved that the tax i s  borne by ca p ita l. This decreases 
the n et-ra te  o f return o f ca p ita l in the corporate s e c to r , where­
as i t  leaves the net rate o f return of ca p ita l unchanged in  the un­
incorporated sec to r . The unequal ra te  o f  return on ca p ita l in the 
two sectors produces an in cen tive for cap ita l to seek employment in 
the untaxed sec to r , Harberger, eventhough he recognises two mechan­
isms in the adjustment process, that i s ,  the ca p ita l flow  between 
the two sectors and the reduction in new cap ita l formation, argues 
that the la t t e r  kind of adjustment is  in s ig n if ic a n t;  however, he 
confines the e ff ic ie n c y  cost a r is in g  from the f i r s t  kind o f adjust­
ment.
The ca p ita l flow from the corporate sector to the unincorporated 
sector  produces a ser ie s  o f changes. Since ca p ita l leaves the cor­
porate sector th is  means that le s s  ca p ita l i s  employed in  that se c ­
tor , which im plies le s s  production and higher p rices for corporate 
sector  goods. The price increase ra ises  the gross rate of return of 
ca p ita l in the corporate sec to r . Therefore, a part o f GIT is  s h if ­
ted to consumers through higher p r ices . Un the other hand the unin­
corporated sector  has a larger amount of cap ita l now and th is leads  
to higher output and lower p r ices . This decreases the net rate of 
return on ca p ita l in the unincorporated sector . The flow of cap ita l 
from taxed sector  to untaxed w il l  cease when the n e t-o f-ta x  rate of 
return for both sectors are equal.
To save space we present the u ltim ate resu lts  obtained under the 
various assumptions concerning the production functions in the two 
sec to rs , in table 1 ,1 ,Some explanations are required to make clear  
these r e s u lts . In case 2 , i t  is  c lear  that whatever reduction in  
output X may occur in industry X, the two factors o f production w ill  
be released  to industry Y in equal amounts. This im plies that there 
w ill  be no change o f marginal products of e ith er  factor in p h ysica l 
terms. The price of Y w ill  have to f a l l ,  in order to create an in ­
creased demand for i t .  Since the marginal physical p ro d u ctiv ities  of 
cap ita l and labour are unchanged, th is  f a l l  in price o f Y w ill  induce 
a proportionate f a l l  in the price of each factor . In case 3 the 
taxed sector X re lea ses  labour in su b sta n tia lly  larger amounts than 
the untaxed sector Ï can absorb at the pre-tax wage rate; The wage
TABLE 1 .1
HARBERGER’S R e s u l t s  Under V arious  Assumptions Concexïüng 
The P ro d u c t io n  F u n c tio n s  In  The Two S e c to r s
CORPORATE SECTOR RON-CORPORATE SECTOR RESULT
1, X -i Lx^
2. X 1 min (Kx, Lx;
5. X -  min /  Kx/
4. X = min/ Lx, Kx /
2
1 1 
5. X « Kx^ Lx^
X = Kx^ Lx^
7. X m Kx' Lx^
Y = Ky® Ly^
Y = Ky^ Ly^
Y -  Ky2 Ly'^ '
Y = Ky  ^ Ly^
Y = MinCKy,Ly;
mih/, ^  Ly
• 2 '1/
Y = min /  Ky, L% , 
2
C a p i ta l  b ea rs  the  
whole burden*
Both c a p i t a l  and 
lab o u r  b ear  the  b u r ­
den in  p ro p o r t io n  to  
t h e i r  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  
n a t io n a l  income.
Labour b e a rs  more t a x ,  
r e l a t i v e  to  i t s  sh are  
in  the  n a t io n a l  income.
C a p i ta l '  bears-  more tax  
r e l a t i v e  to  i t s  sh are  
in  the  n a t io n a l  income.
Labour en joys  an ab­
s o lu te  in c re a s e  in  i t s  
r e a l  income.
As in case (5) but the 
increase i s  even 
la rg er .
As in  cases  (5) and 
bu t the  in c re a s e  i s  in  
between th ese  two 
c a se s .
NOTES: 1. Lx and Ly r e p r e s e n ts  th e  amount o f  la b o u r  used in  p roduc t
X and Y and Kx and Ky the co rrespond ing  amounts o f  c a p i t a l ,  
* Labour I n te n s iv e
** ^Capital in t e n s iv e .
ra te , therefore, has to f a l l  before the untaxed sector  can absorb 
a l l  the workers. F in a lly , in  cases 5» 6, 7» the r e su lts  are ex­
plained as follow s: the nature o f the production function  in  the
untaxed sector requires not only the flow o f ca p ita l from the taxed 
sector  to the untaxed but the flow of labour as well* Since the a- 
mount o f national income spent on the taxed sector i s  given and since  
the Cobb-Douglas production function determines that the share of 
th is  fraction  going to labour i s  f ix e d , i t  follow s that the amount 
of labour used in the taxed sector  w ill  carry with i t  r is e  in  the 
case o f labour.
Harberger (1966) has a lso  ca lcu lated  the e f f ic ie n c y  costs of 
the CIT. This can be i l lu s tr a te d  by using the fo llow in g  fig u re .
Rate o f  R etu rn
M.E.C M.E.C
C orpora te  C a p i ta lNoncorporate  . Yi
C a p i ta l
F ig .  1 .1
The r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  on c a p i t a l  i s  measured on the v e r t i c a l  a x i s ,  
the  c a p i t a l  s to ck  on the h o r i z o n ta l  a x i s .  Before the  im p o s i t io n  o f  
the  CIT, the  c a p i t a l  market i s  in  e q u i l ib r iu m  and the  common r a t e  o f  
r e tu r n  to both s e c to r s  i s  equal to  r ^ . Q u a n t i t ie s  Kx  ^ and o f  
c a p i t a l  a re  employed in  the  in c o rp o ra te d  and u n in c o rp o ra te d  s e c to r  
r e s p e c t iv e ly .  Suppose t h a t  the  government imposes th e  CIT. This w i l l  
cause a flow o f  c a p i t a l  from the  co rp o ra te d  to  the u n - in c o rp o ra te d  
s e c to r ;  t h a t  i s ,  the  new c a p i t a l  s tock  in  the  c o rp o ra te  s e c to r  i s  Kx^ 
and the  g ross  r a t e  of r e t u r n  i s  r ^ . On the o th e r  hand, in  the u n in ­
co rp o ra te d  s e c to r  the  c a p i t a l  s to ck  equals  Ky^ and th e  n e t  and g ro ss  
r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  i s  equa l to  ry,, i n  e q u i l ib r iu m , where th e re  i s  no 
c a p i t a l  flow between the two s e c t o r s ,  the  g ross  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  minus
the tax in  the incorporated sector  should be equal to the (net) rate  
o f return in  the unincorporated sec to r . Ihe f in a l consequence for  
the economy as a whole i s  the appearance o f a lo s s ,  the so -ca lled  
dead-weight lo s s  which comes from ra is in g  revenue by taxing the 
corporate income. The ra tion a le  of i t  i s  that the tax-induced cap­
i t a l  flow moves ca p ita l from the higher productive sector to the
lower one. Harberger estim ated th is  lo ss  which is  equal to
L = (rg -  r„) (Kx  ^ -  Kx )^
or in  diagrammatic form is  equal to the sum of the two triangu lar, that
i s ,  1 -  ABC + BEF, Concluding, Harberger argues, that in  the long- 
run the tax burden i s  spread between ca p ita l invested in both secto rs, 
however, in  the long run there i s  a s h if t  of CIT from the corporate 
to the unincorporated secto r ,
1 .6 ,2 .1  Critique of the harberger Model
During the la s t  decade i t  has been widely accepted that the ap­
propriate method to deal with tax changes i s  the general equilibrium  
15one. Despite i t s  com plexity, i t  i s  argued i t  enables us to study the 
e f fe c ts  of a tax change upon the whole economy, i t s  disadvantage is  
that i t  requires cert&in sim p lify in g  assumptions which do not r e f le c t  
the rea l world. The general equilibrium  model developed by Harberger 
did not avoid th is  trap and i t  has been criti^zed on various grounds, 
Several stu d ies attempted to improve i t  through removal of some of 
i t s  r e s tr ic t iv e  assumptions"^?
Harberger assumes fixed  aggregate labour and ca p ita l supply.
This im plies that there is  no need to study the e f fe c ts  o f GIT upon 
the w ork-leisure choice and upon saving and investment. I t  is  a com­
parative s ta t ic  an alysis since we compare the before tax equilibrium  
p o sitio n  of the economy with that a fte r  the im position of the tax.
This an a lysis  does not allow us to d iscuss any re la tion sh ip  between 
the supply o f labour and c a p ita l. However, in a growing economy these 
two supplies are strongly  rela ted  to each other. Therefore, a dynamic 
incidence an a lysis  i s  the apnropriate method of studying the e f fe c ts  
o f a tax change upon the le v e l o f saving and growth^?
Harberger assumes p erfect factor m obility  and ignores non-tax 
considerations. However, tax considerations are not the only factors
which determine the le g a l form o f operation. Non-tax factors have 
a s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c t  upon the d ecision  to incorporate. The ex­
isten ce  o f barriers to free movement of cap ita l and labour should be 
taken in to  consideration. F in a lly , the ex istence o f transaction costs  
may render th is  movement u n lik e ly .
The assumption o f p e r fec tly  com petitive markets i s  questionable 
as w e ll. We argued in the d iscu ssion  of short-run incidence that 
d ifferen t assumptions concerning the type of the market lead to d i f ­
ferent answers to the question: who bears the CIT?
Harberger assumes that at the margin the debt-equity ra tio  is  
lim ited  and new investment programmes are financed by increasing  
equity ca p ita l. This assumption ru les out any response in corporate 
fin an cia l p o licy  to the tax change. We discussed in the previous 
section  how a firm responds to a tax change through fin a n c ia l p o licy . 
King and S t ig l i t z  have cr it ih e d  th is  assumption, 'They introduce in  
th e ir  d iscussion  tax allow ances, that i s ,  in ter est payment deducta- 
b i l i t y  and depreciation, assuming, in contrast to Harberger, that 
investment programmes are financed by debt. They conclude that the 
CIT, from an e ffic ie n c y  point of view , is  n eutral, and does not cause 
cap ita l flow between the taxed and the untaxed sector .
Harberger accepts that the im position o f the CIT on p ro fits  
causes two kinds o f adjustment. F ir s t , an a ltered  flow o f cap ita l 
between the two sectors and second, an a ltered  le v e l  o f saving, 
which in tum  a ffe c ts  the le v e l of new cap ita l formation. However, 
he concentrates h is study on the f i r s t  impact and he assumes that the 
second i s  n i l ,  Krzyzaniak dealing with th is model characterizes i t  
as a medium-run and argues that a l l  groups in the economy share the 
burden o f the CIT because the economy moves away from the Pareto 
frontier, assuming lik e  Harberger that i t  was there before the imposi- 
tion  o f the CIT. He a lso  argues that in the long-run the burden of  
the GIT is  larger and more spread among the d ifferen t groups. The 
reason for these re su lts  i s  the add itional e f fe c t  of the tax on new 
cap ita l formation. The d ifferen ce between Harberger's and Krzyzaniak’s 
r e su lts  l i e s  in the d ifferen t d e fin itio n s  of the tax burden,
Krzyzaniak defines i t  as any tax-induced lo ss  of rea l income and he
includes in i t  any excess burden o f a tax due to increased in e ff ic ien c y . 
On the other hand, Harberger includes in his d e fin it io n  the burden 
which comes throu^  resource rea llo ca tio n  only,
1*7 nummary and C onclusions
The above an alysis showed the s ig n ifica n ce  of CIT regarding the 
m obilization of resources, equity , s ta b iliz a t io n  and growth.
I t  i s  o ften  argued that the CIT has a negative e f fe c t  on aggre­
gate investment expenditures in the economy. Regardless of the in ­
cidence o f  CIT, i t  is  argued, i t  retards investment. I t  does so by 
a ffe c tin g  the d esire and the a b il i ty  to in v est. An unshifted  CIT 
reduces the rate o f return on c a p ita l ,  and discourages investment.
A sh ifted  CIT leads to the same re su lts  through a reduction o f con­
sumer’s disposable rea l income which leads to le s s  aggregate demand.
I t  a lso  lessen s the a ttra c tiv en ess  of equity investment through the 
so -ca lled  double taxation of dividend income. The CiT weakens the 
a b il i ty  to in vest since fewer funds are available to the firm for  
investment a fter  the im position o f CIT,
Despite these impacts no d e f in ite  conclusions can be reached re­
garding the e f fe c t  o f CIT upon aggregate investmento Important provi­
sions have been used as a means o f  reducing or n eu tra liz in g  the re­
tardation e f fe c t  o f the CIT on investment. The most popular forms of 
these provisions are investment reserve allowance and depreciation  
investment allowances. Both kinds of allowances reduce the nominal 
burden o f taxation by excluding a portion of p ro fits  for tax purposes.
In other words, the purpose of these allowances i s  to reduce the 
e f fe c t iv e  tax burden in d ir e c tly  rather than by a reduction in tax 
ra tes.
In addition to the above e f fe c t  o f the CIT upon the lev e l of in ­
vestment i t  may a ffe c t  the a llo ca tio n  o f them as w e ll. Since the 
CIT applies d if fe r e n t ia l ly  to earnings from corporate and unincor­
porated sector th is  im plies a ca p ita l flow from "discrim inated” to 
"favoured" sector . Within the corporate sector i t  d iscrim inates  
between in ternal and external finance, we saw that CIT influences
th is  choice in  three ways. F ir s t ,  i t  reduces the le v e l  of p r o f its  
second, by in fluencing dividend p o licy  and f in a l ly  by in fluencing  
the cost of ca p ita l through in te r e st  payment d e d u c tib ility . A 
lower tax on ca p ita l gains is  used to o f fs e t  the d isto r tio n  against 
equity financing.
On equity grounds no d e f in ite  conclusion can be drawn. Under the 
assumption that the CIT i s  not sh if te d , i t  is  argued, that i t  prodde- 
ée equity between the shareholding c la ss  as a whole and the re s t  
of the community by taxing undistributed p r o f it s .  Un the other hand, 
i t  is  argued, that the CIT produces inequity between rich  and poor, 
shareholders sin ce i t  v io la te s  both v e r t ic a l and horizontal princip­
l e s .  However, both the th eo retica l treatment and the em pirical evid­
ence o f the sh if t in g  question provided evidence which i s  c o n flic t in g .  
I f  the CIT is  sh ifted  then the above argument lo  ses th eir  v a lid ity  and 
CIT i s  sim ilar to a d if fe r e n t ia l  s a le s  tax. Therefore, i t s  reg ress i-  
v ity  remains an u n settled  matter in the liter a tu re  of tax incidence.
F in a lly , regarding i t s  s ta b iliz a t io n  p o licy  im p lication s, we 
found that CIT i s  a modest b u ilt - in  s ta b il iz e r .  An automatic s ta b i­
l iz e r  i s  characterized by i t s  immediate e f fe c t  upon consumption and 
investment. Empirical stu d ies have shown that investment responds 
to change o f the CIT with a lag . This weakens i t s  a b i l i ty  to be 
used as a means of s ta b iliz in g  the economy by in fluencing investment 
d ecision s. On the other hand, the e f fe c t  upon consumption i s  am­
biguous. I t  depends upon d ifferen t considerations, including the 
e f fe c t  on the le v e ls  o f  dividends d istrib u ted  to shareholders, the 
structure o f income tax r a te , the re la tio n  between cap ita l gains and 
consumption.
With th is  background concerning the CIT we proceed to d iscuss the 
various systems o f CIT, The d iscu ssion  w ill  include both domestic 
and in ternational considerations. Our main in ter e st  in th is  d iscu s­
sion  concerns the imputation system and the dividend paid deduction 
system. The la t te r  is  the e x is t in g  system in Greece, whereas the 
former, i s  l ik e ly ,  as we w il l  see la te r  on, to be i t s  successor, when 
Greece jo in s the E.E.C, At the same time we take the opportunity to 
discuss some a ltern a tiv e  CIT systems.
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NOTES: CHAPTER ONE
1 For a d iscussion  of the rationale  of. CIT - see G.  Break, (1969).
2 For a d iscussion  of the conduit view see NcLure (1975) and
R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave (1973) p .291-301.
3 See for im plications drawn from th is  model by M. Levy.
4 For a d iscussion  see M. Krzaniak (1966).
5 For some conceptual problems arisin g  in an econometric study of
tax incidence - see II-J. Krupp (1969).
6 For a coverage of the p ractica l aspects of dividend policy - 
see A Wood (1975) .
7 Even though some authors have expressed some scepticism  about 
th is ,r e la t io n sh ip .
8 For evidence on these matters see the following sectio n .
9 See Eisner and Strontz (1963), S.  Almon (1965 and R. Eisner (1967).
10 Our cr itic ism  on th is  model takes place in chapter four.
11 G. Fisher (1970), p .177.
12 This assumption w ill  be relaxed la ter  on.
13 The derivation of takes place in chapter four.
14 For a mathematical treatment of th is  subject see King (1974), (1977)
15 An important contribution by R. Musgrave in th is  area is  concerned
with the d elin ation  of three a ltern ative  concepts of tax incidence, 
sp e c if ic , d iffe r e n t ia l and balance-budget incidence -
16 See C. McLure (1975a) P. Mieskowiski (1967) and (1969) and Brown 
and Jackson (1978).
17 See M. F eldstein  (1972) (1974), Dosser (1961).
18 See N. Krzysaniak (1967), (1968).
19 . . .The problem of m u ltico llin ea r ity  is  p articu larly  important in 
the case between the corporate tax rate i t s e l f  and the government 
expenditures va r ia b les. This leads to exaggeration of the tax 
c o e ff ic ie n t  by the e f fe c t  of government expenditure. Since th is  
e ffe c t  cannot be separated out the tax c o e ffic ie n t  measures not 
only the absolute tax incidence but the budget incidence as w e ll.
In other words a change in corporate tax is  accompanied by changes 
in other components of the budget. It has been suggested that a 
Solution to th is  problem is  the sub stitu tion  of budget surplus ^
OT d e f i c i t  fo r  the  government ex p en d itu re  and n o n -co rp o ra te  tax  
v a r i a b l e s .
-  4 1 a
19 (conU’d)
As far as the case of Greece is  concerned these considerations  
are not important at the present stage since revenue from corporate 
tax is  very low. However, these considerations w ill  become 
crucia l when revenue from CIT becomes greater.
20 This inequality  is  based on the constraint that the tax
system does not allow a company to d istr ib u te  income to i t s
shareholders on terras more favourable than would be the case for an
unincorporated business, which im plies that the tax burden on 
d istr ib u tion s must be no le s s  than the shareholder's rate of tax.
If a company earns an extra unit of taxable p ro fits  the amount
that the shareholders can receive in dividends a fter  payment of a l l
taxes is  0 (1 - t c) .
CHAPTER T y i O
A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE 
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF BUSINESS TAXATION
2 .1  INTRODUCTION
We mentioned in  the  p rev io u s  c h a p te r ,  t h a t  v a r io u s  systems a re  em­
ployed  to  ta x  c o rp o ra te  income. We proceed  to d is c u s s  th e se  systems 
in  d e t a i l  from bo th  th e  domestic and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o in t  o f  view.
We w i l l  do so a t  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  l e v e l ,  t h a t  i s ,  w ith  re fe re n c e  to  no 
p a r t i c u l a r  type o f  system . However, some ex cep tio n s  to  t h i s  r u l e  w i l l  
appear where re q u i r e d .  A comparison o f  the e x i s t i n g  im p u ta t io n  systems 
in  the E.E.C. member s t a t e s  w ith  t h a t  proposed by the E.E.C. commiss­
ion  in  1975 w i l l  ta k e  p la c e  in  c h a p te r  f i v e .  T h e re fo re ,  the  f i r s t  
p a r t  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  d e a ls  w ith  th e  domestic consequences o f  th e  a l t e r ­
n a t iv e  systems o f  t a x in g  c o rp o ra te -so u rc e  income whereas the  second 
focuses  on th e  e f f i c i e n c y  and e q u i ty  c r i t e r i a  r e q u i re d  from n a t io n a l  
and in t e r n a t i o n a l  p o in t  o f  view .
Before p roceed ing  to  d e a l  w ith  th e se  m atte is  f o r  the  sake o f  b e t ­
t e r  u n d e rs tan d in g  and convenience, we f i r s t  draw the  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t ­
ween economic double t a x a t io n  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n  and 
second, we c l a s s i f y  th e  e x i s t i n g  c o rp o ra t io n  income ta x  systems acco rd ­
in g  to  v a r io u s  c r i t e r i a ,
2 .2  ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
The im p o s it io n  o f  two ta x e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e  CIT and the  p e rso n a l  i n ­
come ta x ,  on c o rp o ra te  income c r e a te s  the s o - c a l l e d  phenomenon o f  
double t a x a t io n .  I f  c o rp o ra te  income remains in  the  coun try  o f  o r ig i n  
i t  i s  taxed  tw ice by the  same dom estic  ta x  system, i t  i s  tax ed  f i r s t  
under the c o rp o ra te  tax  law in  th e  hands o f  the c o rp o ra t io n  and, in  
tu rn ,  the  d i s t r i b u t e d  p a r t  o f  c o rp o ra te  income i s  taxed  under the  p e r ­
sonal income ta x  law in  th e  hands o f  the r e c i p i e n t  s h a re h o ld e rs .  There­
fo r e ,  the d i s t r i b u t e d  p a r t  o f  c o rp o ra te  income i s  taxed  tw ic e .  This 
phenomenon i s  c a l l e d  economic double t a x a t io n  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  from 
in t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n .  The l a t t e r  a r i s e s  i f  the  c o rp o ra t io n  
and the  r e c i p i e n t  s h a re h o ld e r  do not l i v e  in  the  same c o u n try .  In  
t h a t  case  the  co rp o ra te  income i s  taxed  under the  system both  o f  the 
o r ig i n  and o f  the  d e s t i n a t io n  co u n try .
The e x is te n c e  o f  double t a x a t io n  may have u n d e s i r a b le  e f f e c t s  upon 
e q u i ty  and e f f i c i e n c y  from bo th  th e  domestic and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o in ts  o f  view. However, as f a r  as the economic double t a x a t io n  i s  
concerned, the  government ta k in g  in to  account o th e r  c o n s id e ra t io n s  as
w e ll ,  chooses the  t a x  system which e i t h e r  does n o t  a f f e c t ,  a l l e v i a t e  
o r  e l im in a te  economic double t a x a t io n .  The s u b je c t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
double t a x a t io n  i s  d e a l t  e i t h e r  by u n i l a t e r a l  p ro v is io n s  by each govern­
ment s e p a r a te ly  o r  by b i l a t e r a l  p ro v is io n s  between two governments.
I t  i s  worth m entioning  the  c u r r e n t  tendency which d e a ls  w ith  the  a l l e v ­
i a t i o n  o f  th e  economic double t a x a t io n  n o t  by th e  dom estic  government 
p ro v is io n s  only  bu t by e x ten s io n  o f  th e  d iv idend  tax  c r e d i t  by the  
fo re ig n  government under the  im p u ta t io n  system,
2 ,5  A NEW CLASSIFICATION OF THE CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS
V arious approaches have been used  f o r  c l a s s i f y i n g  company ta x  sy s ­
tems, The most common which has been adopted by O.E.C.D. r e f e r s  to  the  
t rea tm en t o f  d i s t r i b u t e d  and u n d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  (Q.E.C.L. 1975)*
O ther approaches c l a s s i f y  them in  terms o f th e  t re a tm en t o f  co rp o ra te  
and n o n -c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s ,  o r  in  terms o f  h o r iz o n ta l  e q u i ty  between 
domestic and fo re ig n  companies. In  our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  we fo l lo w  the 
c r i t e r i a n  adopted  by the  G.E.G.D, b u t we a r r iv e  a t  a  d i f f e r e n t  type o f  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  from t h a t  which th e  U.E.C.D, adop ted . This i s  so be­
cause our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  avo ids  th e  confus ion  between "degree o f  i n ­
te g r a t io n "  and "degree o f  d iv idend  r e l i e f * .
Chaft 2 ,1  i l l u s t r a t e s  in  a  c l a s s i f i e d  way the  v a r io u s  e x i s t i n g  
systems acco rd in g  to the  degree o f  i n t e g r a t io n  between the  c o rp o ra te  
and p e rso n a l  income ta x e s ,  Reading the upper p a r t  o f  the  c h a r t  from 
l e f t  to r i g h t  we s ee  th r e e  d i f f e r e n t  degrees o f  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  under 
the  f i r s t  approach , zero  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  th e re  i s  no c o -o p e ra t io n  a t  a l l  
between th e  two tax es  l e v ie d  on c o rp o ra te  income. This i s  the so- 
c a l l e d  c l a s s i c a l  o r  s e p a ra te  system, in  p r a c t i c e  i t  appears  in  th re e  
forms, under the  f i r s t  no d iv id en d  r e l i e f  a t  a l l  i s  p rov ided  whereas 
under the  o th e r  two forms a d iv idend  r e l i e f  i s  p rov ided  e i t h e r  a t  the  
sh a reh o ld e r  l e v e l  o r  a t  the  company l e v e l .  The U.S.A. and Canada, 
when the l a t t e r  used t h i s  system , f o r  example, p rov ided  t h i s  r e l i e f .
At the  o th e r  extrem e, the  f u l l  i n t e g r a t io n  approach im p lie s  the 
f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  c o rp o ra te  and p e rso n a l  income ta x e s .  This system 
r e s u l t s  in  ta x in g  the t o t a l  c o rp o ra te  income, i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  whether 
the l a t t e r  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  or n o t ,  a t  the  s h a re h o ld e rs '  m arg ina l tax  
r a t e s .  In  o th e r  words, under t h i s  approach th e re  i s  no r e a l  c o rp o r­


































This approach was su g g es ted  by th e  C a r te r  Commission in  Canada in  I 967 
and i t  was d is cu s sed  in  Germany e a r ly  in  1970 but no co u n try  has 
in tro d u ce d  i t  so f a r .  The 0 ,E,C,D , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  d i s t in g u i s h e s  two 
cases  as f a r  as  the  l e v e l  a t  which the f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  tak es  p la ce  
i s  concerned. Under the  f i r s t ,  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  tak es  p la c e  a t  the  com­
pany l e v e l  whereas under the  second i t  takes  p la c e  a t  the  sh a reh o ld e r  
l e v e l .  We agree  w ith  the  second case  bu t we d is a g re e  w ith  the  f i r s t  Î
c ase .  The O.E.G.U c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  under t h a t  case  subsumes th e  d i v i ­
dend p a id  d eduction  system ( i t  i s  duscussed  in  s e c t io n  2 ,3 * 4 )•  io. our 
o p in io n ,  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  wrong because we have f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  
between c o rp o ra te  and p e rso n a l  income tax es  b u t  only  fo r  the  d i s t r i b u t e d  
p a r t  of c o rp o ra te  income. In  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  case  where a l l  c o rp o ra te  
income i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  th e  U.E.C.D, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  r i g h t  o th e rw ise ,  
as we w i l l  see below, the d iv idend  p a id  deduction  system should  be 
c l a s s i f i e d  under the  head ing  of p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n .
The approach which l i e s  in  between th ese  two ex trem es, p a r t i a l  i n ­
t e g r a t i o n ,  a t tem p ts  to  f in d  a second b e s t  s o lu t io n .  Under t h a t  approach 
i n t e g r a t i o n  tak es  p la ce  o n ly  f o r  th e  d i s t r i b u t e d  p a r t  o f  c o rp o ra te  in ­
come, Two systems a re  employed to  b r in g  forward t h i s  g o a l:  the  im­
p u ta t io n  system, under which i n t e g r a t i o n  tak es  p la ce  a t  the  sh a re ­
h o ld e r  l e v e l ,  and the tw o -ra te  system , under which i n t e g r a t i o n  takes  
p la ce  a t  the  company l e v e l .  These two systems have t h e i r  lo g i c a l  ex­
te n s io n s ,  The im pu ta tion  system r e s u l t s  in  f u l l  im p u ta tion  o f  the  c o r ­
p o ra te  income ta x  which corresponds to the d i s t r i b u t e d  p a r t  o f  co rp o r­
a te  income, whereas th e  l o g i c a l  ex ten s io n  of th e  tw o -ra te  system i s  the  
d iv idend  p a id  deduction  system where the r a t e  o f  CIT on d i s t r i b u t e d  
p r o f i t s  i s  z e ro ,
Reading now the  low p a r t  o f  the  diagram from l e f t  to r i g h t  we can 
see the  degree o f  a l l e v i a t i o n  o f  economic double t a x a t io n  under each 
approach . We can d i s t i n g u i s h  th re e  c a se s .  Under th e  f i r s t ,  the  
s t r i c t  v e r s io n  o f c l a s s i c a l  system, the  degree o f  a l l e v i a t i o n  i s  z e ro .  
Under the second, c l a s s i c a l  system w ith  r e l i e f ,  im pu ta tion  and two- 
r a t e  systems we have p a r t i a l  a l l e v i a t i o n ;  and f i n a l l y ,  under the  t h i r d ,  
f u l l  im p u ta t io n ,  d iv idend  p a id  dedu c tio n  and f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  we have 
t o t a l  a l l e v i a t i o n  o f  economic double t a x a t io n .
Before p roceed ing  i t  i s  worth r a i s i n g  two p o in t s .  The f i r s t  i s  
concerned w ith  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  and f u l l  im-
p u ta t io n .  Both th e se  systems seek the  same r e s u l t ,  i . e .  a l l e v i a t i o n  
o f  economic double t a x a t io n ,  b u t in  d i f f e r e n t  r e s p e c t s .  The f i r s t  
approach d e a ls  w ith  the i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  both  d i s t r i b u t e d  and u n d i s t r i b ­
u te d  p r o f i t s  whereas the  second d e a ls  w ith  the  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  the  d i s ­
t r i b u t e d  p a r t  o f  p r o f i t s  on ly .  The second p o in t  concerns a new approach 
o f  p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  which i s  a com bination o f bo th  f u l l  im pu ta t io n  
and s p l i t - r a t e  system s. This approach has been r e c e n t ly  in tro d u ced  in  
Germany ( t h i s  system i s  d is c u s se d  in  c h ap te r  f i v e ) .
2 .3 .1  THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM
The c l a s s i c a l  o r  s e p a ra te  system owes i t s  name f i r s t  to  the  f a c t  
t h a t  i t  was the  p re v a le n t  company tax  system in  W,Europe a f t e r  the  
second World War and, second, to  th e  l e g a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  c o r ­
p o ra te  p e r s o n a l i t y  as  a d i s t i n c t  s e p a ra te  e n t i t y  from th e  s h a re h o ld e r s .  
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  in  c o n t r a s t  to  the  so c a l l e d  Tconduit" theo ry  
acco rd ing  to  which the c o rp o ra t io n  i s  no th in g  more than  the ag g reg a te  
o f  the  s h a re h o ld e rs .
I t  has been argued t h a t  t h i s  system  o f  t a x a t io n  i s  based on p rag ­
matism r a t h e r  than upon b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e s .  That i s ,  the  p re fe re n c e  f o r  
the  system r e s t s  on the  easy  c o l l e c t i o n  of a  g r e a t  amount o f  revenue 
(C,McLure, 1975)* This seems to  be t r u e ,  a t  l e a s t ,  f o r  some c a s e s ,  
fo r  example, the  governments o f  th e  N etherlands  and Luxembourg h e s i ­
t a t e d  in  r e p la c in g  t h e i r  c l a s s i c a l  ta x  systems because t h i s  would in ­
vo lve  a c o n s id e ra b le  drop in  the  n a t io n a l  revenue (European T axa tion , 
1968 ) .  The p ragm atic  approach i s  enhanced i f  we take  in to  account 
t h a t  some c o u n t r ie s  as  U .S .A .,  Canada, I t a l y ,  and Denmark when they  
used  th i s  system allow ed m i t ig a t io n  o f  economic double t a x a t io n  
p ro v id in g  some r e l i e f .  The l a t t e r  p r a c t i c e  s tan d s  in  c o n t r a s t  to the  
s e p a ra te  approach which i s  adopted  by the  su p p o r te rs  o f  t h i s  system.
In  a d d i t io n  to the  l e g a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the c o rp o ra te  e n t i t y  
the  su p p o r te rs  o f  t h i s  system emphasize i t s  s im p l i c i t y  in  many r e s ­
p e c t s .  i t s  a d m in is t r a t iv e  s im p l i c i t y  l i e s  on the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  con­
s i s t s  o f  one f l a t  r a t e  on a l l  p r o f i t s  o f  c o rp o ra t io n  and the  d i s t r i b ­
u te d  p a r t  o f  p r o f i t s  i s  taxed  under the  p e rso n a l  income ta x  w ithout 
p ro v id in g  any r e l i e f .  There i s  no need fo r  the  e x is te n c e  o f  w ith ­
h o ld in g  ta x ,  bu t  i f  i t  e x i s t s  i t  i s  due to a d m in is t r a t iv e  c o n s id e r ­
a t io n s .
On the o th e r  hand, i t s  opponents argue t h a t  t h i s  system invo lves  
in e q u i ty  and more in e f f i c i e n c y  in  the  economy th#,n the  o th e r  systems
do. They emphasize t h a t  th e  main d isadvan tage  of t h i s  system i s  the 
economic double t a x a t io n  of d iv id e n d s ,  and they  t r y  to  m i t ig a te  i t  
th rough the  p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  approach ,
2 ,3 .2  THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM
Under the  p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  approach a r e l i e f  i s  g ra n te d  e i t h e r  
a t  the  s h a re h o ld e r  l e v e l  o r  a t  the  c o rp o ra te  l e v e l .  In  the  form er casé  
th e  system i s  c a l l e d  im p u ta tion  and owes i t s  name to  the  f a c t  t h a t  p a r t  
o r  a l l  o f  the CIT pa id  by the  c o rp o ra t io n  r e l a t e d  to  the  d i s t r i b u t e d  
p a r t  o f  p r o f i t s  i s  a s c r ib e d  o r  imputed to s h a re h o ld e r s .  I f  the  r e ­
l i e f  i s  g iven a t  the  co rp o ra te  l e v e l ,  i t  i s  p rov ided  in  the  form o f  a 
lower o r  zero  ta x  r a t e  on the amount o f  p r o f i t s  which id  d i s t r i b u t e d .
The main q u e s t io n  which a r i s e s  i s :  why adopt p a r t i a l  and no t f u l l  
i n t e g r a t i o n ,  which r e s u l t s  in  p a r t i a l ,  and no t t o t a l ,  a l l e v i a t i o n  of 
economic double ta x a t io n ?  S ev e ra l  c o n s id e ra t io n s  may e x p la in  t h i s  
approach . F i r s t ,  t h i s  system i s  u sed  as a means o f  a c h ie v in g  s p e c i ­
f i c  o b je c t iv e s  which i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  o r  im poss ib le  to ach ieve  
by o th e r  methods. For example, France u ses  i t  as  a  means o f  promot­
in g  the  fu n c t io n in g  o f  the  c a p i t a l  m arket, Canada a l s o  uses  t h a t  as 
a means o f  making sh are  ownership a t t r a c t i v e .  F in a l ly ,  American 
economists see  i t  as a  c r u c i a l  p a r t  o f  the  condu it  th eo ry .  Second, 
from a p o l i t i c a l  p o in t  o f  view , t h i s  system c o n s t i t u t e s  a  compromise 
between the two extreme views o f  i n t e g r a t i o n .  T h ird , f u l l  i n t e g r a t io n
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would r e s u l t  i n  a  g r e a t e r  drop o f  government revenue! F in a l ly ,  the 
p a r t i a l  e l im in a t io n  of economic double t a x a t io n  may r e f l e c t  u n c e r­
t a i n t y  re g a rd in g  the in c id en ce  and s h i f t i n g  o f  the  GIT, At l e a s t ,  
in  the  case  o f  Canada, i t  i s  con fessed  t h a t ,  in  the  words o f  the 
White Paper "we c o n s id e r  i t  l i k e l y  t h a t  some l e v e l  o f  CIT i s  s h i f t e d  
to consumers in  the  p r i c e  which they  change f o r  t h e i r  goods and s e r ­
v ic e s "  (White P ape r ,  1971). T h e re fo re ,  t h i s  i s  one reason  why the 
proposed tax  c r e d i t  i s  s e t  a t  50 p e r  cen t r a t h e r  than  100 p e r  c e n t ,
2 ,5 .2 ,1  The Gross-up and C re d i t  Mechanism
Under the  im pu ta tion  system the c o rp o ra t io n  i s  tax ed , as under 
the  c l a s s i c a l  system , a t  a f l a t  ta x  r a t e  f o r  the  t o t a l  amount o f  p ro ­
f i t s  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  whether they  a re  r e t a in e d  o r  d i s t r i b u t e d .  The 
g ross-up  and c r e d i t  mechanism works a t  the  sh a reh o ld e r  l e v e l  and i t  
tak es  p la ce  in  two s t a g e s .  In  th e  f i r s t ,  the sh a re h o ld e r  in c lu d e s  in  
h is  income ta x  d e c la r a t io n  n o t  on ly  the  n e t  amount o f  d iv id en d  which
he re c e iv e d  b u t t h i s  amount p lu s  the  amount o f  c r e d i t  re c e iv e d .  At 
the  second s ta g e  th e  c r e d i t  i s  s e t  o f f  a g a in s t  the  f i n a l  ta x  l i a b i l ­
i t y  o f  th e  s h a re h o ld e r .  The r e s u l t  i s  th a t  the  s h a re h o ld e r  i s  taxed  
a t  the  p ro g re s s iv e  p e rso n a l  income ta x  r a t e  as f a r  as the  d i s t r i b u t e d  
p a r t  o f  p r o f i t s  i s  concerned. In  o th e r  words the  c r e d i t  p ro v id ed , in  
e f f e c t ,  re fu n d s  to  sh a reh o ld e r  a  p o r t io n  or a l l  o f  the  CIT a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  from which d iv id en d  was p a id .  S ince the  c r e d i t  
a c t s  l i k e  a  w ith ho ld ing  ta x  th e re  i s  no need fo r  in t ro d u c in g  a  w ith ­
ho ld in g  ta x  in  the system? The fo l lo w in g  examples show how the g ro s s -  
up and c f e d i t  mechanism work in  p r a c t i c e .
Suppose t h a t  a c o rp o ra t io n  has p r o f i t s  equal tolOODrsand t h a t  the  
c o rp o ra t io n  t a x  r a t e  i s  equa l to 50 p e r  c e n t .  I t  d i s t r i b u t e s  a l l  p ro ­
f i t s  a f t e r  c o rp o ra te  ta x  and the  sh a reh o ld e r  i s  g iven  a c r e d i t  equal 
some p e rc en ta g e ,  say  50 p e r  c e n t ,  o f  the  n e t  dividend^which he r e ­
ce ived  and he i s  taxed  a t  40 p e r  cen t p e rso n a l  income ta x  r a t e
C o rpo ra tion
Taxable p r o f i t s  100
CIT a t  50 p e r  cen t 50
D is t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  50
S hareho lde r
Dividend re c e iv e d  50
C re d i t  50^ o f  50 25
Deemed d iv idend  75
P e rso n a l  Income tax
a t  40^ 30
Less C re d i t  25
Tax due 5
From now on we c a l l  t h i s  k ind  o f  c r e d i t  "d iv idend  c r e d i t "  to  
d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  from the  c r e d i t  p rov ided  by the  d e s t i n a t i o n  coun try  f o r  
tax es  p a id  to  the o r ig i n  co u n try  as  a  means o f  a l l e v i a t i n g  the  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  double t a x a t io n ,
2 .3 .2 .2  Who i s  e n t i t l e d  to  the  Dividend C red it?
A n e cessa ry  c o n d i t io n  f o r  any im p u ta tion  system to work i s  t h a t  a l l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  to sh a reh o ld e rs  s h a l l  c a r r y  w ith  them the d iv idend  c r e d i t .  
U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  t h i s  c o n d i t io n  r a i s e s  a  number o f  q u e s t io n s  concern ing , 
f o r  example, the  t re a tm en t o f  tax-exem pt o r g a n i s a t io n s ,  the  t re a tm e n t  o f  
fo re ig n  s h a re h o ld e r s ,  the  t re a tm e n t  o f  r e s id e n t  s h a reh o ld e rs  who re c e iv e
income from abroad and f i n a l l y  the  tre a tm e n t  o f  i n t e r c o r p o r a te  d iv idends , 
This s e c t io n  d e a ls  w ith  th e  trea tm e n t  o f  tax-exempt o rg a n iz a t io n s  o n ly ,  
whereas the  o th e r  cases  w i l l  be d e a l t  in  the a p p ro p r ia te  s e c t io n s  l a t e r  
on.
As f a r  as the  t re a tm e n t  o f  tax-exem pt o rg a n iz a t io n s  i s  concerned, 
the  q u e s t io n  i s  whether d i s t r i b u t i o n s  made by th e se  o rg a n is a t io n s  c a r ry  
w ith  them the d iv idend  c r e d i t  o r  n o t .  Two approaches a re  fo llow ed  in  
p r a c t i c e .  Some c o u n t r ie s  l i k e  Canada, Belgium, I r e l a n d  and I t a l y ,  a l ­
low d i s t r i b u t e d  un taxed  p r o f i t s  to  c a r r y  w ith  them th e  d iv idend  c r e d i t .  
The purpose o f  t h i s  approach i s  to p rov ide  an in c e n t iv e  fo r  in v e s t in g  
in  e q u i t i e s ?  The o th e r  approach  i s  based on pragmatism. Since the  
main purpose o f  the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  i s  to a l l e v i a t e  economic double 
t a x a t io n  i t  should  be p ro v id ed  only  to  d iv idends which a re  p a id  ou t o f  
p r o f i t s  which have borne th e  CIT. T h e re fo re ,  the  p r o v is io n  o f the  
d iv idend  c r e d i t  to  d iv id en d s  which a re  p a id  out o f  t a x - f r e e  p r o f i t s  
i s  u n ju s t i f i e d *  P rance , Germany and the  U.K. have in tro d u ce d  measures 
to ensure  t h a t  t h e i r  Exchequers were n o t  in  a  p o s i t i o n  o f  hav ing  to  r e ­
pay to s h a re h o ld e r s ,  ta x  which they  had in  f a c t  n ev er  re c e iv e d .
There a re  two ways to l i m i t  th e  b e n e f i t  of d iv idend  c r e d i t  to  
those  d iv id e n d s ,  which a re  p a id  out o f  p r o f i t s  which have been taxed . 
Under th e  f i r s t  way the c o rp o ra t io n  i s  asked to pay the  CIT which co r­
responds to  any d i s t r i b u t i o n  which tak es  p lace  whereas under the  s e c ­
ond the ta x  a u t h o r i t y  d en ies  the  p ro v is io n  o f  d iv id en d  c r e d i t  to  d i v i ­
dends d i s t r i b u t e d  by tax-exem pt c o rp o ra t io n s .  S ince we have accep ted  
as n ecessa ry  c o n d i t io n  f o r  any im p u ta t io n  system to  work the  a l l  d i s ­
t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  must c a r ry  w ith  them the  d iv idend  c r e d i t ,  th e  f i r s t  
way i s  a p p ro p r ia te .  Prance a p p l ie s  a  compensatory tax^ the s o - c a l l e d  
précom pté , a t  the l e v e l  o f  the  c o rp o ra t io n  when the  l a t t e r  d i s t r i b u t e s  
un taxed  p r o f i t s  or taxed  p r o f i t s  which were earned  more than f iv e  y ea rs  
ago. On the o th e r  hand, the  U.K. l e v i e s  an advance c o rp o ra t io n  tax  
(AuT) a t  th e  l e v e l  o f  c o rp o ra t io n  when the  l a t t e r  d i s t r i b u t e s  p r o f i t s  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  whether they  have been taxed  o r n o t .  The two methods 
d i f f e r  from a te c h n ic a l  p o in t  o f  view but they have th e  same aim, xhe 
d i f f e r e n t  tech n iq u e  which i s  fo llow ed by each method makes them no t 
always e q u iv a le n t .  Only i f  a l l  income were tax-exem pt would the  French 
and the B r i t i s h  systems be e q u iv a le n t .  The précompté i s  c r e d i t e d  by 
the  in d iv id u a l  s h a re h o ld e r  a g a in s t  h i s  f i n a l  p e rso n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y
whereas the  ACT i s  c r e d i t e d  a g a in s t  the  c o r p o r a t io n ’ s f i n a l  CIT l i a ­
b i l i t y ,  and a g a in s t  s h a r e h o ld e r s ’ p e rs o n a l  income ta x .
2 .3 .3  THE TWO-RATE S.ISTEM
This system owes i t s  name to the  f a c t  th a t  two d i f f e r e n t  ta x  r a t e s  
a re  a p p l ie d  to  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s .  One, the  h i ^ e r ,  a p p l ie s  to the  r e ­
ta in e d  p r o f i t s  and the  o th e r ,  the  low er, to the  d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s .  
However, th e  m i t ig a t io n  o f  economic double t a x a t io n  tak es  p la ce  a t  the  
c o rp o ra te  l e v e l ,  which c o n s t i t u t e s  the  main d i f f e r e n c e  from the  im­
p u ta t io n  system where th e  m i t ig a t io n  tak es  p la ce  a t  th e  sh a reh o ld e r  
l e v e l .  The two system s, under c e r t a i n  c ircu m stan ces ,  a re  e q u iv a le n t  
and in  the words o f  Chown "we a re  no t  r e a l l y  be ing  asked to  d is c u s s  a 
cho ice  between two system s, but between two names f o r  the  same system ", 
(J.uhown, 1971 ) .
This system was employed in  Germany fo r  a long p e r io d  ^1953-1976) 
and was r e c e n t ly  r e p la c e d  by a combined system o f  f u l l  im p u ta t io n  and 
tw o -ra te  system s. I t  was in tro d u ce d  in  1953 as  a means o f  s t r e n g th e n ­
in g  the  c a p i t a l  market th rough  a  b ia s  in  favour o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and o f 
o b ta in in g  a more e q u i ta b le  trea tm en t between the  v a r io u s  l e g a l  forms o f  
doing b u s in ess  (European T ax a tio n , I 968 ) .  On the o th e r  hand, the  r e a ­
sons why Germany re p la c e d  i t  a r e  f i r s t ,  i t s  d e s i r e  to f u l l y  a l l e v i a t e  
economic double t a x a t io n  o f  d iv idend  and second, to  o b ta in  a  s t r o n g e r  
b a rg a in in g  power in  i t s  n e g o t i a t io n s  w ith  o th e r  c o u n t r ie s  as f a r  as in ­
t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n  i s  concerned (European T axa tion , 1976).
The e x is te n c e  o f  two d i f f e r e n t  t a x  r a t e s  a p p l ie d  to c o rp o ra te  in ­
come c r e a te s  the  s o - c a l l e d  "shadow e f f e c t " .  This im p lie s  t h a t  in  the 
case  in  which a l l  p r o f i t s  were d i s t r i b u t e d  they  would be taxed  n o t  a t  
the  nominal ta x  r a t e  bu t a t  th e  e f f e c t i v e  tax  r a t e ,  which i s  h ig h e r .  
This i s  so because the  tax  p a id  on the  d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  i s  deemed to  
be p a id  from r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  which b e a r  a h ig h e r  ta x  r a t e .  For ex­
ample, in  Germany the  nominal tax  r a t e  on the  d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  was
715 p e r  c e n t ,  whereas the  e f f e c t i v e  r a t e  was 23 ,44  p e r  c e n t .
Under t h i s  system th e r e  i s  need fo r  a w ith ho ld ing  ta x  s in c e  the  
r e l i e f  i s  g ran ted  a t  the  c o rp o ra te  l e v e l  and th e re fo re  i t  cannot be 
used as w ith h o ld in g  tax  as  in  the case  o f  the im p u ta t io n  system. I f  
the  s h a r e h o ld e r 's  m arg ina l tax  r a t e  i s  h ig h e r  than the CIT r a t e  on 
d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s ,  the  s h a re h o ld e r  has an in c e n t iv e  n o t  to in c o r ­
p o ra te  d iv idend  income w ith  h is  r e s t  income. T h ere fo re ,  the w ith -
h o ld in g  ta x  may induce him t o  in c o rp o ra te  d iv idend  income with h i s  
r e s t  income,
2 . 3 . 4  THE DiVim ND fA ID  lEDCrCTIOK SYSTEM
This system i s  c o n s id e red  as th e  lo g ic a l  ex ten s io n  o f  the  two- 
r a t e  system. I t s  main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i s  the  t o t a l  a l l e v i a t i o n  o f  eco­
nomic double t a x a t io n .  This i s  done by a llo w in g  the c o rp o ra t io n  to 
deduct d iv idend  p a id  in  computing ta x ab le  income; t h a t  i s ,  th e  CIT 
r a t e  on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  i s  z e ro .  The r e c i p i e n t  sh a reh o ld e r  in ­
c lu d es  t h i s  income to g e th e r  w ith  h i s  income from o th e r  sou rces  and 
a l t o g e th e r  i s  taxed  a t  h i s  m arg ina l ta x  r a t e .  T h e re fo re ,  th e  c o rp o r­
a te  p r o f i t s ,  whether r e t a in e d  o r  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  a re  taxed only  a t  one 
r a t e ,  the  r e t a in e d  p a r t  a t  the GIT r a t e ,  the  d i s t r i b u t e d  a t  the  
m arg inal p e rso n a l  ta x  r a t e .  In  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  case  where a l l  p r o f ­
i t s  a re  d i s t r i b u t e d  th e re  i s  no CIT. This makes the  i n t r o d u c t io n  o f  
a w ith h o ld in g  ta x  n e c e s sa ry  as  a means o f  av o id in g  tax  evas io n .
This system enhances the  advantages  o f  the  im p u ta t io n  and two- 
r a t e  systems on grounds o f  e q u i ty  and supply o f  e q u i t i e s  but i t s  
main drawback i s  the  revenue l o s s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  from n o n - re s id e n t  
s h a re h o ld e rs .  I t  i s  c u r r e n t ly  a p p l ie d  in  Greece.
2 . 3 . 5  THE MLL INTEGRATION SYSTEM
What has n o t been ach ieved  by the  two p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t io n  system s, 
as f a r  as the  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  p e rso n a l  and c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n  i s  
concerned , i s  ach ieved  by s o - c a l l e d  “conduit"  approach . This system , 
l i k e  the  f u l l  im p u ta tion  and d iv id en d  paid  d eduction  system, f u l l y  
a l l e v i a t e s  the economic double t a x a t io n  o f  d iv id e n d s .  This system 
i s  co n s id e red  as the  dream o f  the  i d e a l i s t s  who see the  c o rp o ra t io n  
as no th in g  more o r  l e s s  than  i t s  s h a re h o ld e rs .
The mechanism o f  t h i s  system i s  the  same as t h a t  o f  the  im ou ta tion  
system. The c o rp o ra t io n  i s  taxed  a t  a f l a t  r a t e  f o r  the t o t a l  amount 
o f  p r o f i t s  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  whether they a re  d i s t r i b u t e d  o r  r e t a in e d .  
The sh a reh o ld e r  in c lu d e s  in  h i s  p e rso n a l  tax  d e c la r a t io n  an amouht 
which i s  equal to  the  sum o f  cash  d iv idend  rece iv ed  p lu s  h is  share  o f  
r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  and t h i s  sum i s  g rossed  up by the  amount o f  CIT 
which has been p a id  on the  t o t a l  amount. T h e re fo re ,  the sh a re h o ld e r  
i s  taxed fo r  h i s  t o t a l  sh are  in  p r o f i t s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of whether the  
l a t t e r  a re  d i s t r i b u t e d  or n o t ,  a t  the  m arginal p e rso n a l  ta x  r a t e  and 
he s e t s  o f f  a g a in s t  h i s  f i n a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y  the  amount o f  GlT pa id  
by t h e ■c o rp o ra t io n  f o r  h is  s h a r e s ,  in  o th e r  words, t h i s  system 
transfo rm s the  ClT to  a w ith h o ld in g  tax .
The e x p lan a tio n  f o r  t h a t  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  i s  t h a t  th e  r e a l  b e n e f ic ia r y  
o f  c o rp o ra te  income i s  the  sh a re h o ld e r  and the  tax  should  be imposed 
a t  h is  p e rso n a l  r a t e  s t r u c t u r e .
This approach i s  defended by i t s  p roponents  on grouhds o f  e q u i ty  
and e f f i c i e n c y  s in c e  i t  i s  n e u t r a l  in  many r e s p e c t s .  On the  o th e r  
hand, a d m in is t r a t iv e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  absence o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  t h r o u ^  
the  weakness o f  v a r io u s  economic to o ls  such as  investm en t ta x  c r e d i t ,  
d e p re c ia t io n  p ro v is io n s  e t c ,  lo s s  o f  revenue c o n s t i t u t e  the main draw­
backs in  the  minds o f  i t s  opponents. I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  the in t r o d u c t io n  
o f  t h i s  approach would r e q u i r e  a  c o n s id e ra b le  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  o f  the  
t o t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t a x a t io n .  For example, the  revenue loss^ from  the  
a b o l i t i o n  o f  the  UIT. would r e q u i r e  th e se  revenue to  be c o l l e c te d  
through an in c re a s e  o f  o th e r  tax es  o r  s in c e  t h i s  system taxes  c a p i t a l  
g a in s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to r e t e n t i o n  a t  f u l l  p e rso n a l  tax  r a t e ,  e q u i ty  con­
s id e r a t i o n s  would r e q u i r e  a l l  c a p i t a l  g a in s  to  be taxed .
For the  sake o f  b e t t e r  u n d e rs tan d in g  o f  the  o p e ra t io n  o f  the  a l ­
t e r n a t i v e  GIT systems d e sc r ib e d  above we prov ide  the  fo l lo w in g  two 
t a b le s  which show how th ese  systems o p e ra te  under v a r io u s  a ssum ptions . 
Table 2 .1  makes a comparison o f  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  systems showing the 
ta x  r a t e s  f o r  a g iven amount o f  revenue whereas Table 2 .2 ,  making a 
comparison o f  the  same system s, shows the  tax  revenues f o r  a g iven  
tax  r a t e .
2 .4  P r in c i p a l  Goals
The choice  between the d e sc r ib e d  system i s  a m a tte r  o f  the  e x p l i c i t  
goa ls  which the  government t r i e s  to ach ieve . I n e v i t a b ly ,  o th e r  f a c t o r s  
come in  and they  may a f f e c t  t h i s  ch o ice .  These f a c t o r s  may r e p r e s e n t  
the  c o l l a t e r a l  goa ls  of th e  government and the f i n a l  cho ice  i s  a com­
promise between the p r i n c i p a l  and the c o l l a t e r a l  g o a ls .  The l a t t e r  
may inc lude  a d m in is t r a t iv e  s im p l i c i t y ,  tax  evasion  and avo idance , tax  
s h i f t i n g ,  f l e x i b i l i t y  f o r  the  government f o r  e x e r c i s in g  i t s  c o u n te r ­
c y c l i c a l  p o l ic y  and revenue p o l ic y .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  th e se  g o a ls  a r e  
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n s i s t e n t  no r do th e y  fo llow  com patib le  p a th s .
This s e c t io n  d e a ls  on ly  w ith  the  p r in c ip a l  goa ls  o f  the  govern­
ment, which may be ach ieved  by choosing the  a p p ro p r ia te  tax  system . 
These goa ls  a re  d e f in ed  to  be f i r m 's  d i s t r i b u t i o n  p o l ic y ,  c o rp o ra te  
in ves tm en t,  e q u i ty  and income r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  and f i n a l l y ,  a l l o c a t i v e  
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2 ,4 .4  Pay-ou t R a t io
I f  the  v a r io u s  tax  systems r e a l l y  a f f e c t  the  payout r a t i o  in  d i f f e r ­
e n t  ways then  the  government has a v a i l a b le  one more means o f  a ch ie v in g  
v a r io u s  o b j e c t i v e s ,  f o r  example, to  improve income d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  by 
in t ro d u c in g  the  a p p ro p r ia te  ta x  system . Investm ent d e c is io n s  may a lso  
be a f f e c t e d , i n  two ways by changing the  t a x a t io n  system . F i r s t ,  i f  the  
system favours r e t e n t i o n  then more funds a re  a v a i l a b le  in  the  co rp o r­
a t io n  f o r  f in a n c in g  investm en t programmes. Second, economic double 
t a x a t io n  o f  d iv idends  d isco u rag e s  investm ent in  e q u i t i e s ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  
the  v a r io u s  systems have a d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t  upon such investm ent de­
pending  on the  degree o f  economic double t a x a t io n ,  in  a d d i t io n  to 
th e se  e f f e c t s ,  changes in  th e  p ay -o u t  r a t i o  have an e f f e c t  on income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  F i r s t ,  the h ig h e r  the  degree o f  economic double t a x a t ­
ion  the  g r e a t e r  the  p ro g re s s iv i t j^ ^ o f  the  ta x  s t r u c t u r e  and second, 
the  h ig h e r  the pay-ou t r a t i o  the  g r e a t e r  h o r iz o n ta l  e q u i ty  i s  ach ieved .
Table 2 ,5  p ro v id es  us w ith v a r io u s  to o ls  f o r  ju d g ing  the a l t e r ­
n a t iv e  CIT system s. B efore  p roceed ing  to d iscu ss  t h i s  t a b le  we p rov ide  
a key to  symbols used  in  t h i s  t a b l e :
T = t o t a l  CIT p a id  by the  c o rp o ra t io n  on r e t a in e d  and d i s t r i b u t e d
p r o f i t s ,
L = t o t a l  ta x  on c o rp o ra te  income p a id  by th e  c o rp o ra t io n  (T)
p lu s  t h a t  p a id  by the  sh a re h o ld e rs ,
R = n e t  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  ta x  and d iv id en d s ,
t r  = e f f e c t i v e  r a t e  o f  CIT r e t e n t i o n ,
td  = e f f e c t i v e  r a t e  o f  CIT on d iv id en d .
11t d / t r  == the co n v en tio n a l  measure o f  economic double t a x a t io n .
{ ' b L / ' b D )  = A d d it io n a l  tax  burden by in c re a s in g  d iv idends  by one u n i t .
There i s  no c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x .
(b 1 / 1 ) 1 ) ) As IiL/IB  bu t th e r e  i s  a c a p i t a l  gains ta x .  
bT/bU = A d d it io n a l  tax burden p a id  on ly  by the  c o rp o ra t io n ,
t c  = tax  r a t e  a p p l ie d  to a l l  p r o f i t s  un ifo rm ely .
P = p r o f i t s .
tp  = p e rso n a l  income ta x  r a t e .
Cu = uIT r a t e  on u n d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  under the  tw o -ra te  system
and the d iv idend  d eduction  system.
Cd = CIT r a t e  on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  under th e  tw o -ra te  system
(under the  d iv id en d  deduction  system i s  equal to z e r o ) .
D = the amount o f  cash  d iv idends  under a l l  systems excep t the
im p u ta tion  system ,
G = the amount o f  g rossed -up  d iv id en d  under the  im p u ta tion
system,
S = the  r a t e  o f  d iv id en d  tax  c r e d i t  as a p e rcen tag e  o f  G .
Line 5 shows the  range o f  td  which l i e s  between zero  and t c ,  where
the  l a t t e r  r e p r e s e n ts  the  tax  r a t e  a p p l ie d  to a l l  p r o f i t s  u n ifo rm ly .
Under the  f u l l  i n t e g r a t io n  and the  d iv idend  p a id  dedu c tio n  system the
e f f e c t i v e  tax  r a t e  o f  CIT on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s ,  t d ,  i s  z e ro .  On the
o th e r  extreme the  c l a s s i c a l  system a p p l ie s  the  same r a t e  to  both d i s -
12t r i b u t ed and r e t a i n e d  p r o f i t s .  T h e re fo re ,  the c l a s s i c a l  system  i s  
n e u t r a l  in  t h a t  r e s p e c t .  The two p a r t i a l  in t e g r a t i o n  systems l i e  in  
between th e se  two extrem es.
L ine 6 shows the degree o f  economic double t a x a t io n  o f  d iv id en d s .  
The r e s u l t s  a re  the  same as in  the  p rev ious  l i n e .  The f u l l  i n t e g r a t ­
ion  and the  d iv idend  p a id  d eduction  system s impose zero  economic double 
ta x a t io n  on d iv id en d , whereas the c l a s s i c a l  system r e s u l t s  in  f u l l  eco­
nomic double t a x a t io n .  T h e re fo re ,  the  p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  systems im­
pose a  degree o f  economic double t a x a t io n  which l i e s  in  between.
Line 7 shows the a d d i t i o n a l  tax  burden by in c re a s in g  d iv idend  under 
the  assum ption t h a t  th e re  is  no c a p i t a l  ga ins tax  and t h a t  the  manage­
ment i s  concerned no t on ly  with the  c o rp o ra te  ta x  l i a b i l i t y  bu t  f o r  the  
l a t t e r  p lu s  the  s h a re h o ld e r  ta x  l i a b i l i t y .  The f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  tax  
system r e t a in s  i t s  n e u t r a l i t y  whereas the  c l a s s i c a l  system c o n s ta n t ly  
in v o lv es  an amount o f  a d d i t io n a l  ta x  burden equal to t p ,  the  m arginal 
p e rso n a l  tax  r a t e .  The c l a s s i c a l  system  would be n e u t r a l  i f  tp  was 
equal to  z e r o . f o r  a l l  s h a re h o ld e r s .  This may be th e  case  f o r  sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  who re c e iv e  exemption such as  c h a r i t i e s  and pension  funds.
The o th e r  th re e  systems invo lve  a l e s s e r  amount o f  a d d i t io n a l  tax  b u r­
den than t h a t  im plied  by the  c l a s s i c a l  system. These systems would be 
e q u iv a le n t  i f  (Cu-Cd) « S = Cu, where Cu i s  the  ta x  r a t e  on u n d i s t r i ­
bu ted  p r o f i t s  under the  tw o -ra te  and d iv idend  p a id  deduction  system s,
Cd i s  the  tax  r a t e  on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  under the  tw o -ra te  system 
and b i s  the  r a t e  o f  d iv id en d  c r e d i t  under the  im pu ta tion  system .
This e q u a l i ty  says t h a t  the  th re e  systems would be e q u iv a le n t  i f  the  
r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  (Cu-Cd) u nder  the  tw o -ra te  system i s  equal to  the  
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equal to the  ta x  r a t e  on u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  under the  d iv idend  pa id  
deduction  system. These systems would be e q u iv a len t  to the f u l l  i n t e ­
g r a t io n  system , t h a t  i s ,  would be n e u t r a l  between r e t e n t io n s  and d i v i ­
dends i f  the  fo l lo w in g  e q u a l i t i e s  h e ld  fo r  the  th re e  systems c o r r e s ­
ponding ly :
tp  = Cu -  Cd (2 .1 )
tp  = y (2 .2 )
tp  = Cu (2 .3 )
T h ere fo re ,  th e se  systems p rov ide  the c o rp o ra t io n  w ith  a p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
d e te rm in in g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  acco rd in g  to  the m arginal p e rso n a l  ta x  r a t e  
o f  the  sh a re h o ld e r .  For example, in  the  case  o f  the  d iv id en d  p a id  
deduction  system , i f  the tp  i s  g r e a t e r  than Cu then th e  g r e a t e r  the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  the g r e a t e r  the  a d d i t i o n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y .  T h e re fo re ,  the 
c o rp o ra t io n  has an in c e n t iv e  to  reduce d i s t r i b u t i o n  in  o rd e r  to reduce 
the  t o t a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y .  On the o th e r  hand, i f  tp  i s  l e s s  than  Cu 
then the c o rp o ra t io n  has an in c e n t iv e  now to in c re a se  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s in c e  
the  p a r t i a l  d e r iv a t iv e  has a  n e g a t iv e  s ig n  now, which means t h a t
by in c re a s in g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  we d ecrease  th e  t o t a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y .
We now in tro d u ce  a  c a p i t a l  ga in s  ta x  on gains  in  the p r ic e  o f
s h a r e s , and assume t h a t  th e y  a re  taxed  as they  acc ru e  under the  p e rso n -  
13a l  income ta x .  Line 8 shows the a d d i t io n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  by in c r e a s ­
ing  d iv id en d . The f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system s t i l l  remains n e u t r a l  bu t 
now i t  i s  no t the  only  n e u t r a l  system , th e  c l a s s i c a l  system o b ta in ed  
t h i s  p ro p e r ty  as w e l l .  The o th e r  th re e  systems c l e a r l y  now show t h e i r  
p re fe re n c e  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s in c e  a l l  t h e i r  p a r t i a l  d e r iv a t iv e s  have 
a n eg a tiv e  s ig n .
F in a l ly ,  l i n e  9 shows the same d e r iv a t iv e s  under the  assumption 
t h a t  the  management does n o t  concern i t s e l f  w ith  the  t o t a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  
bu t  on ly  w ith  the  c o rp o ra te  tax  l i a b i l i t y .  Three systems a re  now neu­
t r a l ,  the  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  the  c l a s s i c a l  and the  im p u ta t io n .  The d i v i ­
dend p a id  deduction  system remains in  favour of d i s t r i b u t i o n  whereas in  
the  case  o f  tw o -ra te  system i t  depends on the  s ig n  o f  the d i f f e r e n c e  
Cd-Cu. I f  Cd i s  g r e a t e r  than  Cu, which i s  no t the  case  in  p r a c t i c e ,  
then  the  system i s  in  favou r o f  r e t e n t i o n .  I f  Cd=Cu the system i s
n e u t r a l ,  but i t  a c t u a l l y  i s  n o t  a tw o -ra te  system and f i n a l l y ,  i f  Cd
i s  l e s s  than  Cu, which i s  the  case  in  p r a c t i c e ,  the  system favours  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .
In  co n c lu s io n ,  in  th eo ry  the  f u l l  i n t e g r a t io n  system c o n s ta n t ly  
remains n e u t r a l  under the  v a r io u s  c ircu m stan ces ,  the  c l a s s i c a l  system
discrim inates against d istr ib u tio n  in the absence of cap ita l gains 
tax and becomes neutral when i t  i s  introduced. The other three sys­
tems leave a lo t  of room fo r  maneouvre in  order to arrange the f in a l  
tax l i a b i l i t y  and they are c lea r ly  in  favour o f d istr ib u tio n  when 
ca p ita l gains tax was introduced in the an alysis .
2 .4 .2  Corporate Financial P o licy  under the A lternative Tax-Systems.
In the previous section  we discussed one o f the channels through 
which the tax system may a f fe c t  investment d ecision s, namely, the 
a v a ila b ility  o f funds. The second channel co n stitu tes  the d ifferen -  
ta tio n  o f the cost of ca p ita l for the v a r io u s.fin a n cia l media through 
the a ltern ative  systems o f corporate taxation .
In  c h ap te r  one, we e s t a b l i s h e d  r u l e s  f o r  o p t im a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o l ic y  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  th e  system o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n .  In  t h i s  s e c t io n  we 
w i l l  exp lore  th e  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  th e se  r e s u l t s  f o r  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
ta x  system s. A ll the  systems o f  c o rp o ra te  tax  fo llow  the  same p o l ic y  
as  f a r  as i n t e r e s t  d e d u c t i b i l i t y  i s  concerned whereas they  d i f f e r  as 
d iv idend  payments i s  concerned . This d i f f e r e n c e  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  the 
va lu e  o f  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r i a b le  0 .  Table 2 .4  shows the  va lu e  of 
© under  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  ta x  system s.
TABLE 2 .4  Value o f©  under the a ltern ative  tax system..14
System 9
C lassica l 1 -  tg
Imputation 1 - tg /1  -  S
Two-Rate 1. — tg /1  + Cd—Cu
Dividend-paid-Leduction 1 - tg /1  - Cu
Full in tegration 1
Note: tp = personal income tax rate
tg = ca p ita l gain tax rate
Cd » GIT rate on d istrib u ted  p ro fits
Cu = CIT rate on undistributed p r o fits
Ü = rate o f dividend tax cred it as a percentage 
o f gross-up dividends.
We saw in chapter one that i f  the inequality
t g C  1 -9  (2 ,4 ;
holds then retentions are preferred to new share finance. Substi­
tu tin g  the value o f 6 for each corporate system into the above in ­
e q u a l i ty  we o b ta in  the  c o n d i t io n s  under which r e t e n t io n s  a re  p r e f ­
e r re d  to  new sh a re s  f in a n c e  f o r  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  system s. Table 2 ,5  
shows th e se  c o n d i t io n s .
Table 2 .5
' Conditions under which R e ten tio n s  a re  P r e f e r r e d  to  New
Share I s s u e s .
System C ondition
C la s s i c a l tp tg
Im putation tp tg  + S ( l - t g j
Two-Rate tp tg  + (Cd-Cu) ( tg -1 )
D ividend-paid-deduc t i o n tp uu + tg  (1-Uu)
I t  i s  obvious from the above t a b l e  th a t  the  method o f  f in an ce  de­
pends on the  m arg ina l r a t e  o f  income tax  o f  the  sh a reh o ld e r  and th e re  
may be a c o n f l i c t  between the  i n t e r e s t  o f  the  s h a re h o ld e r s .  This 
r a i s e s  the  q u es t io n  about the focus of co rp o ra te  dec is ion -m ak ing , 
th a t  i s ,  the  f irm  as an economic i n s t i t u t i o n .  However, f o r  the  sake 
o f  convenience we assume t h a t  sh a reh o ld e rs  face  the  same marginal 
r a t e  o f  income ta x .
We have a lso  seen th a t  i f  th e  in e q u a l i ty
1 - t p ( u  - tg) (1 -  to )  (2.5)
holds then r e t e n t io n s  a re  p r e f e r r e d  to  deb t f in a n c e .  T h e re fo re ,  u s in g  
t h i s  i n e q u a l i ty  p lu s  the  above e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n d it io n s  ( t a b l e  2 .5 )  we 
c o n s t r u c t  th e  fo l lo w in g  t a b l e ,  which shows under what c o n d i t io n s  r e ­
te n t io n s  a re  p r e f e r r e d  bo th  to  new sh a res  and debt f in a n c e .
Table 2 ,6
Conditions under which R e ten t io n s  a re  th e  . 'P re fe rab le  
method o f  Finance
System C onditions
C la s s ic a l t p  :?» tg  + to (1 - tg )
Im puta tion tp tc  + tg  (1 -  to)
Two-Hate tp z ^ C u  + tg  (1 -  Cu)
D iv id end-pa id -deduc tion tp Cu + tg  (1 -  Cu)
Suppose now t h a t  th e  government wishes to have a n e u t r a l  ta x  system 
re g a rd in g  th e  cho ice  o f  th e  method o f  f in a n c in g  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  the  
name o f  the  system. The n e ce ssa ry  c o n d it io n s  a re  o b ta in ed  i f  the
above i n e q u a l i t i e s  (2 ,4 )  and 2 .5 )  h o ld  as e q u a l i t i e s ,  t h a t  i s ,
t g  + 9 = 1 (2 .6 )
1 -  tp  = ( l- tgX '3?^(2 .7 )
The d i f f e r e n t  t re a tm en t between r e t e n t io n s  and d iv id e n d s ,  on the  
one hand, and the  in c lu s io n  or ex c lu s io n  o f  i n t e r e s t  and d iv idend  pay­
ments, on th e  o th e r ,  c r e a te  n o n - n e u t r a l i t i e s .  The c l a s s i c a l  system 
w i l l  be n e u t r a l  under th e  fo l lo w in g  two c o n d i t io n s :
tp  = tg  (2 .8 )
1 -  to  = 1 (2 .9 )
The f i r s t  c o n d i t io n  r e q u i r e s  c a p i t a l  g a in s ,  should  be taxed  as  
income, whereas no d e d u c t i b i l i t y  p ro v is io n  extended to  i n t e r e s t  payments. 
The im pu ta tion  system becomes n e u t r a l  in  the  case  which th e  two con­
d i t i o n s  become,
1 — tp / 1 — tg  » 1 — B (2 . 10)
1 -  to  = 1 -  S (2 .11)
The f i r s t  e q u a tio n  says t h a t  th e  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  the  im p u ta t io n  sys­
tem between r e t e n t i o n  and d iv idend  depends on the  v a lu e s  o f  tp  and 
S. U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  as we saw e a r l i e r ,  the v a lu e  o f  tp and tg  d i f f e r  
from one s h a re h o ld e r  to  a n o th e r ,  whereas the v a lu e  o f  8 i s  common
f o r  every  s h a re h o ld e r .  This makes the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  above con­
d i t i o n  d i f f i c u l t  i f  n o t  im p o ss ib le .  The second c o n d i t io n  r e q u i r e s  pay­
ments to be d e d u c t ib le  n o t  a g a in s t  tc  bu t  a g a in s t  the  r a t e  o f  t a x  used  
to  d e f in e  the  r a t e  o f  im p u ta t io n .
Under the  tw o -ra te  system the above c o n d i t io n s  became,
1 -  tp = 1 -  t g  (2 .12)
1 + Cd-Cu
(1 -  tc )  = 1 -  (Cu -  C é )  ( 2 . 15 )
Again as  in  the  case  o f  im p u ta t io n  system the f i r s t  c o n d i t io n  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  be s a t i s f i e d .  The second co n d i t io n  r e q u i r e s  i n t e r e s t  pay­
ments to  be d e d u c t ib le  n o t  a g a in s t  Cu but a g a in s t  the  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l .
Under th e  d iv id e n d -p a id -d e d u c t io n  system the above c o n d i t io n s  be­
came ,
— ' = 1 -  t g  ( 2 . 14 )
1 -  Cu
(1 -  to )  = (1  -  Cu) ( 2 . 15 ;
Once ag a in ,  the  f i r s t  c o n d it io n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to s a t i s f y .  The
second c o n d i t io n  says t h a t  i n t e r e s t  d e d u c t i b i l i t y  should  be remained 
and be d e d u c t ib le  a g a in s t  Cu.
F in a l ly ,  under th e  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system th ese  c o n d i t io n s  be­
come ,
tg  = 0 (2 .1 5 ;
1 -  tp = 1 - t c  ( 2 , l 6 j
The f i r s t  c o n d i t io n  i s  s a t i s f i e d  i f  c a p i t a l  g a in s  tax  i s  not 
charged on g a in s  a r i s i n g  out o f  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s .  This i s  so because 
under t h i s  system c a p i t a l  ga ins  r e s u l t i n g  from r e t e n t i o n  have been a l ­
ready  charged to  income ta x .  The second c o n d i t io n  r e q u i r e s  i n t e r e s t  
payments to  be allow ed as deduction  f o r  ta x  purposes.
2 .4 .3  E q u ity  and xncome D i s t r i b u t io n
This s e c t io n  a t tem p ts  a judgement o f  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  systems un­
d e r  the h o r iz o n ta l  and v e r t i c a l  e q u i ty  p r i n c i p l e s .  The f i r s t ,  r e ­
q u i re s  the  "equals  should  be t r e a t e d  e q u a lly "  whereas the second r e ­
q u ire s  the  p ro p e r  d iv i s io n  o f  the  ta x  share  among in d iv id u a ls  w ith  
d i f f e r e n t  economic c a p a c i ty ,  as a  means o f  c o n t r ib u t in g  to a more 
e q u i ta b le  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f income* Of c o u rse ,  the assum ption about the 
in c id en ce  and s h i f t i n g  o f  the  CIT i s  c r u c i a l  and the  e x is te n c e  or n o t 
o f  c a p i t a l  gains ta x  p lay s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e .
We have seen elsew here t h a t ,  under the  assumption t h a t  the  
CIT i s  n o t  s h i f t e d ,  i t  produces e q u i ty  between the sh a reh o ld in g  c la s s  
as  a whole and the  r e s t  o f  the community by tax in g  u n d i s t r ib u te d  
p r o f i t s ,  on the one hand, and i t  produces in e q u i ty  between r i c h  and 
poor s h a re h o ld e rs ,  s in c e  i t  v i o l a t e s  the v e r t i c a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  on th e  
o th e r  hand. We begin  w ith  the  c l a s s i c a l  system, fo r  example, suppose 
two sh a reh o ld e rs  , the f i r s t ,  w ith  low m arginal p e rso n a l  tax  r a t e
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tp  and the  second w ith  h ig h  tp .  Since the  a b i l i t y  to  pay o f  the 
sh a reh o ld e r  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  the  sum o f  d iv idends and r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s ,  
the t o t a l  f i n a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y  does no t conform to the  v e r t i c a l  e q u i ty  
p r i n c i p l e .  Under the  c l a s s i c a l  system the f i n a l  tax  r a t e  a p p l ie d  to 
bo th  r e t a in e d  and d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  i s  f a r  the  poor sh a reh o ld e r  
t^  = tc  + tp  (1 -  to) and f o r  the  r i c h  t^  = tc  + tp  (1 -  t c ) .
From th e se  two r e l a t i o n s h i p s  we see the  co rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e ,  t c ,  i s  the
o j -
same f o r  bo th  sh a reh o ld e rs  d e s p i t e  the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  economic capac­
i t y  i s  d i f f e r e n t .  In  o th e r  words, we have the  same tre a tm en t o f  un­
e q u a ls ,  namely, a v i o l a t i o n  o f  the  v e r t i c a l  e q u i ty  p r i n c i p l e .  From the 
above tax  l i a b i l i t y  formulas we a lso  see  t h a t  the  in t ro d u c t io n  o f CIT 
imposes an e x t r a  tax  r a t e  which i s  p roportionally  g r e a t e r  f o r  the low 
income sh a reh o ld e r  than  on the  h i ^  income sh a reh o ld e r .  This can be 
seen i f  we compare the  combined c o rp o ra te  and in d iv id u a l  ta x  now 
pa id  w ith  the  ta x  which would be p a id  i f  on ly  the  income ta x  were ap­
p l i e d ,  These d ifferences^^are  to  (1 -  tp )  and to  (1 -  tp )  fo r  th e  low 
and h igh income sh a re h o ld e r  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  and the  former i s  g r e a t e r  
than the  l a t t e r .  T h e re fo re ,  the c l a s s i c a l  system v i o l a t e s  the v e r t i ­
c a l  e q u i ty  p r i n c i p l e .
In  a d d i t io n  to  t h a t ,  in  the  absence o f  c a p i t a l  ga in s  ta x  the 
c l a s s i c a l  system prov ides  h igh  income sh areh o ld e rs  w ith  an in c e n t iv e  
to  r e t a i n  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  a t  the  c o rp o ra t io n  as a  means o f  avo id ing  
h igh  m arginal p e rso n a l  ta x  r a t e .
We saw e a r l i e r  t h a t  the  p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t io n  systems favour d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  r e l a t i v e  to the  c l a s s i c a l  system ( f o r  a given revenue),  
which invo lves  t h a t  a h ig h e r  amount o f  p r o f i t  i s  taxed  under the  p rog­
r e s s iv e  p e rso n a l  ta x  s c a l e .  In  t h a t  r e s p e c t  these  systems a re  l e s s  
r e g r e s s iv e  than  the  c l a s s i c a l  system , s in ce  they  c o n t r ib u te  to a 
f a i r e r  tax  s t r u c t u r e .  As f a r  as the r e t a in e d  amount o f  p r o f i t s  is  
concerned the  same ho lds  as in  the  c l a s s i c a l  system. Therefore  th ese  
systems conform w ith  v e r t i c a l  and h o r iz o n ta l  e q u i ty  but only  f o r  d i s ­
t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s .  On the  o th e r  hand, the  p ro v is io n  of the d iv idend  
r e l i e f  c r e a te s  two k inds o f in e q u i ty .  F i r s t ,  i f  the  owners o f  sh a res  
be long to high income c la s s e s  the p ro v is io n  o f the  r e l i e f  r e s u l t s  in  
a s p e c ia l  re d u c t io n  in  d iv idend  ta x a t io n  which may be conside red  un­
d e s i r a b le  from the p o in t  o f  view o f  e q u i ty ,  Second, s in c e  the  r e ­
l i e f  d is c r im in a te s  a g a in s t  r e t e n t i o n  a c o n f l i c t  may a r i s e  between 
h igh  income and low income sh a reh o ld e rs  because the l a t t e r  p r e f e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  to  r e t e n t i o n .
The f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system improves e q u i ty  from two p o in ts  of 
view. F i r s t ,  a l l  the c o rp o ra te  income o f the sh a re h o ld e rs  w i l l  be 
taxed  under the  p ro g re s s iv e  p e rso n a l  income ta x ,  l i k e  the  income o f  
o th e r  tax p ay e rs .  T h e re fo re ,  t h e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n t  t re a tm en t b e t ­
ween sh areh o ld e rs  and n o n -sh a re h o ld e rs .  Second, the in e q u i t i e s
which arose under the previous tax systems e ith er  from d ifferen t  
treatment between retention  and dividend or between high and low in ­
come shareholders are eliminated* Under th is  system there i s  only 
one tax base for a l l  kinds o f  income and only one tax with prog­
ressiv e  rates is  applied. Therefore, th is  system accords with hori­
zontal and v e r t ic a l equity p r in c ip les .
F in a lly , the dividend-paid-deduction system provides p a ra lle l 
r e su lts  with p a rtia l in tegration  systems. I t  puts under the prog­
ressiv e  personal tax rate only the d istrib u ted  part of p r o f it s . I t  
would achieve the same resu lts  as a f u l l  in tegration  system i f  a l l  
p r o fits  were d istrib u ted  and taxed under the personal income tax ra te .
We assume now that the GIT i s  sh ifted  and that the management, 
in making price d ec is io n s, takes in to  account the to ta l tax l i a b i l i t y ,  
namely, taxes paid by both the corporation and the shareholders.
Under the c la s s ic a l  system these assumptions resu lt in elim inating  
the economic double taxation of dividends. Under the p a rtia l in teg ­
ration systems n eith er the corporation nor the shareholders pay any 
taxes. Instead the shareholders receive a dividend tax cred it for  
a lle v ia tin g  non-existen t economic double taxation . Under the f u l l  
in tegration  approach the case i s  even worse, since the dividend tax  
cred it given is  higher. The question here i s  what amount of tax the 
management s h if t s ,  since the CIT paid by the firm is  not a rea l GIT 
but a withholding tax which i s  completely set o f f  against the person­
a l income tax l i a b i l i t y .  F in a lly , under the dividend-paid-deduction  
system the shareholders would enjoy a tax-free income and would be in  
a b etter  p osition  than in te r e st  income tax payers.
F in a lly , i t  has been argued th at, moving from the c la s s ic a l  sys­
tem to a p a rtia l or f u l l  in tegration  system, the b en efit of in teg­
ration , i w  the case o f sh if t in g , accrues to consumers and workers 
through a reduction of p rices and increases in the wage ra te . The 
reasoning behind th is  argument is  that under the sa les  maximization 
or ta rg et-ra te -o f return hypotheses the CIT is  sh ifted  in short-run. 
Therefore, the management w ill  be able to continue achieving i t s  tar­
gets of sale maximization and target-ra te-o f-retu rn  as he did before 
in tegration  so that to be able to reduce p rices or to increase wages, 
in Mieskowski' s words "th is version  of the sh ift in g  process, as in ­
complete as i t  i s ,  strongly suggests that a sh ifted  tax w ill  be un-
s h i f t e d  upon the in tr o d u c t io n  o f  in te g r a t io n "  (P .M ieskow ski, 1972-73)•
2 . 4 . 4  A llo c a t iv e  E f f ic ie n c y  
%-
In  P a r e t i a n  world the  t a x  system should be n e u t r a l  between r e t e n ­
t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  on th e  one hand, and between the  c o rp o ra te  and 
n o n -co rp o ra te  s e c t o r s ,  on the  o th e r .  The f i r s t  kind o f  n e u t r a l i t y  i s  
concerned w ith  the  co m p e ti t iv en ess  o f  th e  c a p i t a l  market whereas th e  
second i s  concerned w ith  the  a l l o c a t i o n  of c a p i t a l  w i th in  the  econ­
omy. T h ere fo re ,  our d is c u s s io n  o f  the  e f f e c t s  o f  the  v a r io u s  systems 
w i l l  be d i s t in g u is h e d  in  th e se  two a s p e c t s .
The c l a s s i c a l  system in  the  absence o f  a  c a p i t a l  ga ins  ta x  p ro ­
v id e s  an in c e n t iv e  f o r  r e t e n t i o n .  This means t h a t  l e s s  money e x i s t s  
in  th e  m arket, which im p lie s  l e s s  co m p etit io n  between sh areh o ld e rs  
to buy new sh a re s .  I f  r e t a i n e d  e a rn in g s  a re  p r o f i t a b l y  in v e s te d  the  
problem i s  no t so sev e re ,  bu t i f  th ey  a r e  no t and t h e i r  purpose is  to 
avoid  economic double t a x a t io n  they  r e s u l t  in  d e p r iv in g  o th e r  f irm s  
which have p r o f i t a b l e  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  in ves tm en t.  T h e re fo re ,  a 
system o f c o rp o ra te  t a x a t io n  which would induce d i s t r i b u t i o n  seems 
to  enhance the  c o m p e ti t iv n ess  o f  the c a p i t a l  m arket. The re a so n in g  
behind t h i s  argument is  t h a t  by encouraging  d i s t r i b u t i o n  re in v es tm en t 
i s  p laced  under market c o n t ro l  which f a c i l i t a t e s  a b e t t e r  a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  r e s o u rc e s .  The p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  systems seem to  f u l f i l  t h i s  
purpose . Un the o th e r  hand, i t  i s  a rgued, t h a t  more d i s t r i b u t i o n  le ad s  
to  l e s s  sav ing  f o r  the  economy as a  whole.
F in a l ly ,  th e  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system leaves  the  o p e ra t io n  o f  the  
c a p i t a l  market untouched s in c e  i t  i s  n e u t r a l  between r e t e n t i o n  and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  T h e re fo re ,  f irm s s e t  a l l  th e  investm ent o p p o r tu n i t ­
i e s  e i t h e r  by themsebm o r  by tbeir sh a reh o ld e rs  under the  same circum­
s ta n c e s .
The d is c u s s io n  o f  the  second e f f e c t  i s  r e l a t e d  to  our f a m i l i a r  
H arberger long-run  s h i f t i n g  h y p o th es is  o f  UiT. The d i f f e r e n t  t a x a t ­
ion t re a tm en t between the c o rp o ra te  and n o n -co rp o ra te  s e c to r s  a f f e c t s  
the r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  in  the  two s e c to r s .  Since the e q u a l i z a t io n  o f  r a t e  
o f  r e t u r n  induces c a p i t a l  to  move to the  no n -co rp o ra te  s e c to r  t h i s  i n ­
v o lves  an i n e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l .  The presumed s o lu t io n  
i s  to  ta x  a l l  c a p i t a l  income under th e  same tax  system. This i s  
ach ieved  only by the  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system. T h e o r e t i c a l ly  i t
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/ ;  could  be ach ieved  under the  d iv idend  p a id  deduction  system as w e ll ;  
t h a t  i s ,  where a l l  p r o f i t s  a re  d i s t r ib u te d *  The p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t io n  
systems a re  p re fe ra b le  to  the  c l a s s i c a l  system s in c e  g r e a t e r  amount 
of c o rp o ra te  income and income from o th e r  sources a re  p u t  on more 
equal fo o t in g ,  th a t  i s ,  i s  taxed  under the  p e rso n a l  income tax  s c a le .
2 ,5  Conclusions
Prom our d is c u s s io n  so f a r  i t  can be seen th a t  no system of 
company ta x a t io n  i s  s u p e r io r  to  the r e s t  in  a l l  r e s p e c t s .  T h e re fo re ,  
the cho ice  between the one o r  th e  o th e r  system i s  a d i f f i c u l t  ta sk .
I t  should be based on which system c lo s e ly  approxim ates our p r in c ip a l  
o b je c t iv e s .  C a p i ta l  g a in s  t a x a t io n  and the inc idence  o f the  CIT a re  
s t ro n g ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the  choice  o f  one o r an o th e r  system. I t  i s  
n o t  s u r p r i s in g  to  mention t h a t  in  p r a c t i c e  d i f f e r e n t  systems have been 
used  in  an a ttem pt to  ach ieve  the  same goals* For example, in  I 965 
the U.K. in tro d u ced  the c l a s s i c a l  system-.; f o r  encouraging investm ent. 
In  the  same y e a r  France a b o l ish ed  t h i s  system in  o rd e r  to in tro d u ce  
the  im pu ta tion  system f o r  ach ie v in g  the  same g o a ls .  This may r e f l e c t  
th e  r e a c t io n  o f  th e  economic u n i t s  to  v a r io u s  p o l ic y  in s tru m en ts  to 
s t im u la te  investm ent and th e  d i f f e r e n t  c ircum stances  in  one economy 
from a n o th e r .  C le a r ly ,  th e re  i s  no p e r f e c t  system o f  company t a x a t ­
ion a p p ro p r ia te  fo r  every  coun try  in  any period*
The company ta x a t io n  system of a c o u n try  no t only  a f f e c t s  the 
domestic economy; i t  a f f e c t s  fo re ig n  economies as w e l l .  T here fo re , 
the f i n a l  choice  should  be based no t on ly  on domestic c o n s id e ra t io n s  
but fo re ig n  c o n s id e ra t io n s  shbuld  be taken in to  account as  w e l l .
We proceed  to  d is cu s s  th e se  c o n s id e ra t io n s  in  the  n ex t s e c t io n .
2 .6 . ,  INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2 .6 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
Moving from a c lo se d  economy to an open one the  problem of choice 
between the systems o f company t a x a t io n  becomes more com plica ted . In 
a d d i t io n  to domestic co m p lex it ie s  which were d e sc r ib ed  in  the  p rev ious  
s e c t io n s ,  o th e r  f a c to r s  a re  added which should be taken  in to  c o n s id e r ­
a t io n .  Systems, which would p rov ide  the  same r e s u l t s  under c e r t a in  
c ircum stances  on a  p u re ly  dom estic  l e v e l ,  f a i l  to do so now. Such 
f a c to r s  may concern q u es t io n s  r e g a rd in g  the s iz e  and the form of cap­
i t a l  t r a n s a c t io n s  between c o u n t r i e s ,  the government sh a re  o f  such 
t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  the  e f f e c t  tjpon t r a d in g  lo c a t io n  e t c .  A ll th e se  e f f e c t s  
depend upon the  e x is te n c e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  systems o f company t a x a t io n  in  
the  c o u n t r ie s  in  q u e s t io n  and th e  a s s o c ia te d  p r i n c i p l e s  fo llow ed by 
th e se  c o u n t r ie s .
In  a domestic economy th e  g o a ls  o f  e q u i ty  and e f f i c i e n c y  were the  
p rim ary  o b je c t iv e s  f o r  each government; now th e se  goa ls  have been 
extended to  cover i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The concept o f  
n a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  accompanied by the  concept o f  w orld  e f f i c i e n c y ,  
whereas the concept o f  i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  e q u i ty  i s  accompanied by the  
concept o f  i n t e r n a t i o n  equity*  In  a d d i t io n  to economic double t a x a t ­
ion  the phenomenon o f  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n  ap p ea rs .  We 
saw in  the  p rev io u s  s e c t io n s  how the  government u s in g  v a r io u s  ways 
a l l e v i a t e s  economic double t a x a t io n .  In  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  the  
ta x  system p e r  se i s  inadequa te  to  so lve  the  problem o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
double t a x a t io n .  T h e re fo re ,  t r e a t i e s  between governments a re  c a l l e d  
f o r  ach iev in g  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e .
The s tu d y  o f  a l l  th e se  m a t te rs  r e q u i r e s  the d i s c u s s io n  of the  
l e g a l  environment in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  new 
concepts  in v o lved , and f i n a l l y  th e  d is c u s s io n  o f  how the v a r io u s  sy s ­
tems o f  company t a x a t io n  work w i th in  t h i s  l e g a l  environment^^
2 .6 .2  LEGAL ENVIROMENT
2 ,6 .2 ,1  Residence and Source P r in c ip le
The f a c t  t h a t  the  c a p i t a l  owner and h is  c a p i t a l ' s  s e r v ic e s  do no t 
always fu n c t io n  in  th e  same l o c a l i t y  c r e a te s  tax  j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  prob­
lems. In  a d d i t io n  to  t h a t ,  the v a r io u s  types o f  i n v e s t o r s ,  such as i n ­
d iv id u a ls  o r  c o rp o ra t io n s ,  the  l a t t e r  e i t h e r  in  th e  form o f  a branch 
o r  s u b s id ia r y  or p o r t f o l i o  i n v e s t o r s ,  make the  problem more complic­
a te d ,  Each coun try  fa c e s  two q u e s t io n s  r e l a t e d  to  t h a t  problem.
F i r s t ,  how should  i t  tax  the  income which i s  earned in  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  
by fo r e ig n e r s  and second, how should i t  tax  the income which i s  earned  
abroad by i t s  r e s i d e n t s r
In  p r a c t i c e  two p r in c ip l e s  a re  fo llow ed; the source  and the  r e ­
s id en c e ,  Under th e  f i r s t ,  each co u n try  tax es  only income which i s  
earned  in  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  by b o th  i t s  r e s id e n t s  and f o r e ig n e r s .  That 
i s ,  under th a t  p r in c ip l e  th e  t a x  i s  based no t on the  r e c i p i e n t  o f  i n ­
— O  b ”
come bu t on the income flow* I t  i s  a sch e d u la r  type t a x a t io n  and i s  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  the  a b i l i t y  to  pay p r i n c i p l e .  I t s  main advantage 
i s  t h a t  i f  a l l  c o u n t r ie s  fo llow ed  t h i s  p r in c i p l e  then  no i n t e r n a t i o n ­
a l  double t a x a t io n  would e x i s t .  This  p r in c i p l e  i s  fo l lo w ed , f o r  ex­
ample , in  France where companies a re  no rm ally  taxed  on French income 
b u t  may op t to  pay ta x ,o n  worldwide income.
Under the r e s id e n c e  p r in c i p l e  the  co u n try  ta x es  income in  a 
g lo b a l  sen se ,  namely, the  tax  base  i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by the  worldwide 
income of th e  i n d iv id u a l .  T h e re fo re ,  t h i s  approach i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
w ith  the  a b i l i t y  to pay p r i n c i p l e .  The e l im in a t io n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
double t a x a t io n  under t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  ta s k  and c a l l s  
f o r  supplem entary  a c t i o n s .  Another d i f f i c u l t y  r e l a t e d  to  t h a t  p r i n ­
c i p l e  i s  the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r e s id e n c e .  As f a r  as c o rp o ra t io n  i s  con­
cerned  two approaches a re  fo llow ed . Under the  f i r s t ,  the  p lace  o f  
in c o rp o ra t io n  t e s t , a  c o rp o ra t io n  i s  co n s id e red  as: r e s i d e n t  on ly  in  
the  p la c e  o f  i t s  in c o r p o r a t io n .  Under th e  second approach , the  s e a t  
o f  management t e s t , a  c o rp o ra t io n  i s  co n s id e red  as r e s i d e n t  o f  t h a t  
co un try  where i t s  h e a d q u a r te r  has been e s t a b l i s h e d .  The U .K .,
Germany and the  N e th e r lan d s  f o r  example, fo llow  the r e s id e n c e p r in ­
c ip le*
A s u b s id ia r y  i s  c o n s id e red  as a l e g a l  e n t i t y  s e p a ra te  from i t s  
p a r e n t .  I t  i s  t r e a t e d  l i k e  a dom estic  c o rp o ra t io n  bu t n o t  a l l  the  
tax  systems t r e a t  t h a t  s i m i l a r l y .  For example, under the tw o - ra te  
system the s u b s id ia r y  enjoys th e  lower tax  r a t e  a p p l ie d  to d i s t r i b u t e d  
p r o f i t s *  On the o th e r  hand, under th e  im p u ta t io n  system the d iv idend  
c r e d i t  i s  n o t a v a i l a b le  f o r  p a re n t  companies abroad in  r e s p e c t  of 
d iv id en d s  p a id  by t h e i r  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  I r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  what ta x  s y s ­
tem a p p l ie s  a s u b s id ia r y  pays two k in d s  o f  t a x e s .  I t  pays the  o r ig i n  
co u n try  c o rp o ra t io n  income ta x  f o r  i t s  p r o f i t s  and second , when i t  
d i s t r i b u t e s  a l l  o r  p a r t  o f  th e se  to i t s  p a re n t  i t  pays a  w ith h o ld in g  
ta x  l e v ie d  on the  d i s t r i b u t e d  amount. This type o f  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  
d i f f e r s  from t h a t  l e v ie d  on dom estic  c o rp o ra t io n s  and i s  s e t  o f f  
a g a in s t  th e  f i n a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y .  The w ithho ld ing  tax  i s  le v ie d  on a 
f o r e ig n  s u b s id ia r y  by the  o r i g i n  c o u n try  i s  a f i n a l  tax  and i t  i s  no t 
s e t  o f f  a g a in s t  s u b s i d i a r y ’s f i n a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y ,
A branch i s  n o t  c o n s id e red  as l e g a l  e n t i t y  s e p a ra te  from i t s  
p a re n t  bu t " i t  i s  a p a r t  o f  a t r e e  (one le g a l  e n t i t y )  which has i t s
-  69”
r o o ts  (h e a d -o f f ic e )  e lsew h ere" .  Both the tw o -ra te  and the  im p u ta t io n  
systems deny p ro v id in g  a b ranch  w ith  the  d iv idend  c r e d i t .  Some coun­
t r i e s  lev y  no w ith h o ld in g  ta x  on d iv id en d  d i s t r i b u t e d  by branch to 
i t s  p a re n t .
2*6 .2 .2  A l le v ia t io n  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Double T axation
In  g e n e ra l ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  what p r in c ip l e s  a re  fo llow ed  by the 
17source  and re s id en c e  co u n try ,  i t  i s  v e ry  l i k e l y  t h a t  ov e rseas  income 
w i l l  b ea r  tax  in  two c o u n t r i e s .  A ll  th e se  te c h n ic a l  c o m p lex it ie s  
make the problem o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n  too com plica ted .
In  the  absence o f  r e l i e f  a g a in s t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n  fo u r  
charges  a r i s e  in  a s u b s id ia r y - p a r e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  F i r s t ,  the  sub­
s i d i a r y  i s  l i a b l e  to CIT in  the  o r i g i n  s t a t e  o f  i t s  t r a d in g  p r o f i t s .  
Second, when the  s u b s id ia r y  pays d iv idend  to  i t s  p a re n t  those  d i v i ­
dends a r e  l i a b l e  to ta x  in  the  o r ig i n  cou n try .  T h ird ,  th e  p a re n t  i s  
l i a b l e  to CIT in  d e s t i n a t io n  c o u n try  on the  d iv idend  re c e iv e d  by i t s  
s u b s id ia r y  and fo u r th ,  the  d iv id en d  pa id  by the  p a re n t  out o f  t h i s  
income i s  s u b je c t  to  d e s t i n a t io n  c o u n try  p e rso n a l  income tax  in  the  
hands o f  the r e c i p i e n t  s h a r e h o ld e r s .
In  p r a c t i c e  th re e  ways a re  used  to a l l e v i a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
double t a x a t io n .  F i r s t ,  each c o u n try  by i t s e l f  th rough u n i l a t e r a l  
p ro v is io n s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  w hether any r e c ip r o c a l  p ro v is io n s  a re  
g ra n te d  by any o th e r  c o u n try ,  a t tem p ts  to  reach  t h i s  g o a l .  Second, 
two c o u n t r ie s  come in to  an agreement to  fo llow  th e  same p o l ic y  r e ­
g a rd ing  th i s  problem. F in a l ly ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  l i k e  
O.E.C.I), and E.E.??, th rough  m u l t i l a t e r a l  ta x  t r e a t i e s  a t tem p t to r e ­
l i e v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n .
The r e l i e f  i s  p rov ided  in  two form s, e i t h e r  in  th e  way which the  
d e s t i n a t i o n  co u n try  t r e a t s  income earned  abroad , namely, i t  adopts  
the  exemption, c r e d i t  o r  dedu c tio n  method o r  the  o r ig i n  co u n try  l e v i e s  
a  low r a t e  of w ith h o ld in g  ta x .  I t  i s  worth m entioning  t h a t  a l l  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  double t a x a t io n  t r e a t i e s  reduce the  r a t e  o f  w ith h o ld in g  tax  
r a t h e r  than the  r a t e  o f  CIT, The tendency o f  our nowadays
h a s  t h i s  purpose through  the e x te n s io n  of the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  to  
fo re ig n  sh a re h o ld e rs .
Under the exemption method, income earned abroad i s  exempt from 
corporate taxation at home. However, three taxes are lev ied  on that
Income, namely, the CIT and th e  w ith h o ld in g  t a x  o f  th e  o r ig i n  coun try  
and p e rso n a l  income ta x  o f  th e  d e s t i n a t i o n  co u n try .  I t  i s  obvious 
t h a t  t h i s  method does n o t  f u l l y  a l l e v i a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x ­
a t io n  s in c e ,  as we saw e a r l i e t ,  th e  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  l e v ie d  by the  
source  co un try  i s  a f i n a l  t a x .  This method v i o l a t e s  the  a b i l i t y  to 
pay p r in c i p l e  s in ce  i t  i s  based on a  t e r r i t o r i a l  b a s is  and i t  i s  con­
s i s t e n t  n e i t h e r  w ith  i n t e r n a t i o n  nor n a t io n a l  e q u i ty .  I t  i s  on ly  con­
s i s t e n t  w ith  c a p i t a l - im p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y ,  a  concept which i s  d iscu ssed  
be low o
Under the  second method, the  c r e d i t  method, income i s  tax ed  on a 
worldwide b a s is  bu t a c r e d i t  i s  g ra n te d  f o r  taxes  p a id  ab road . The 
r a t io n a le  o f  t h i s  method i s  d e r iv e d  from the p u b l ic  f in a n c e  p r in c ip l e  
o f  h o r i z o n ta l  e q u i ty .  To th e  c o n t ra ry  to  the p rev io u s  method i t  i s  
c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  the  a b i l i t y  to  pay approach and t r e a t s  e q u a l ly  in d iv ­
id u a ls  under th e  c ircum stances  on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a s i s ,  namely, i t  
ach ieves  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e q u i ty .  In  a d d i t io n  to t h a t  th e  p ro v is io n  o f 
the  c r e d i t  method se c u re s  equal t re a tm e n t  between investm ent a t  home 
and abroad , i . e .  i t  ach iev es  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y ,  a  concept 
which i s  a lso  exp la in ed  below.
F in a l ly ,  under the  t h i r d  approach , the  deduc tion  method, income 
i s  taxed  on a worldwide b a s i s  bu t tax es  p a id  abroad a re  co n s id e red  
as expenses and a re  deducted from th e  tax  base as such . This method 
in v o lv es  eq u a l  t re a tm e n t  o f  in d iv id u a ls  in  a domestic l e v e l ,  namely, 
i t  a ch ieves  n a t io n a l  e q u i ty ,
Summerizing, we see from th e  fo l lo w in g  diagram t h a t  the  c r e d i t  
method may be co n s id e red  as s u p e r io r  to  the  o th e r  two, p a r t i c u l a r l y  
from i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o in t  o f  view , s in c e  i t  i s  more c lo se  in  a ch iev ­
ing  e q u i ty  and n e u t r a l i t y .
C H A R T  : 2.2
METHDDS OF ALLEVIATING INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION.
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U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  the  c r e d i t  method does not ach ieve  f u l l  n e u t r a l i t y  
s in c e  the  r e l i e f  f o r  f o r e ig n  ta x es  i s  l im i te d  to the tax es  o the rw ise  
due in  th e  re s id e n c e  co u n try .  This im p lies  t h a t  income earned  abroad 
i s  taxed  a t  the  h ig h e r  ta x  r a t e  which ho lds e i t h e r  in  the re s id en c e  o r  
source  co u n try .
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2 .6 .2 .5  Tax T r e a t ie s
The above d e sc r ib e d  methods a re  u n i l a t e r a l y  a p p l ie d  by the  r e ­
s idence  co un try  to p rov ide  a  r e l i e f  i n  the  absence o f  a  t r e a t y .  The 
l a t t e r  t r e a t s  the  problem o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n  on a b i ­
l a t e r a l  b a s i s .  The o b je c t iv e s  o f  a  ta x  t r e a t y  may be c l a s s i f i e d  
under v a r io u s  head ings:
F i r s t ,  a t r e a t y  aims to  ach ieve  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y  and in ­
t e r n a t io n  e q u i ty .  The fo rm er aim may be achieved  by e l im in a t in g  in ­
t e r n a t i o n a l  double t a x a t io n ,  t h a t  i s ,  by c r e a t in g  n e u t r a l  c o n d i t io n s  
to  f a c i l i t a t e  the  flow  o f  c a p i t a l  between two o r  more c o u n t r i e s .  The 
w ith h o ld in g  ta x  i s  used  as a dev ice  o f  ach iev in g  t h i s  pu rpose . The 
aim o f  i n t e r n a t io n  e q u i ty  i s  ach ieved  by d e f in in g  th e  tax  base as  a 
means o f  av o id in g  d is c r im in a to ry  p r a c t i c e s  between th e  c o n t r a c t i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  Second, a  tax  t r e a t y  may enhance the  f i g h t  a g a in s t  tax  
evas ion  and avoidance by the  c o n t r a c t in g  c o u n t r ie s .  The co -o p e r­
a t io n  o f  th e se  c o u n t r ie s  would r e s t r i c t  a c t io n s  such  a s ,  f o r  example, 
t r a n s f e r  p r i c e s  which le a d  to  tax  evas ion  and avoidance. F i n a l l y ,  a 
ta x  t r e a t y  e n fo rces  the  c r e d i t a b i l i t y  o f  a coun try  by red u c in g  the 
r i s k  invo lved  in  fo re ig n  in v es tm en t.  This i s  ach ieved  f i r s t ,  by 
s t a b i l i z i n g  the  tax  r u l e s  a p p l ic a b le  to fo re ig n  investm ent and second, 
by re d u c in g  d is p u te  between the  c o n t r a c t in g  c o u n t r i e s .  For example, 
Greece, e a r ly  in  1953, enac ted  such r u l e s  as a  means o f  a t t r a c t i n g  
fo re ig n  c a p i t a l .
U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  s in c e  a  ta x  t r e a t y  i s  based on a b i l a t e r a l  b a s is  
i t s  c o n t r ib u t io n  f o r  a ch iev in g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e q u i ty  and e f f i c i e n c y  
may be n o t co n s id e red  as  ad eq u a te .  Moreover, the  achievement o f  th e se  
goa ls  c a l l s  f o r  a m u l t in a t io n a l  b a s i s  t r e a t y ,  in  o th e r  words, t h i s  
r e q u i r e s  the  c o -o p e ra t io n  n o t  only  two c o u n t r ie s  bu t as many as pos­
s i b l e .  This i s  the  s u b je c t  o f  c h a p te r  f iv e  under the  head ing  o f  tax  
harm onization  w i th in  the  E.E .C . We proceed  now to d e f in e  th e  economic 
concep ts  of e q u i ty  and e f f i c i e n c y  which th e  ex ten s io n  o f  ta x  j u r i s d i c ­
t io n  beyond a c o u n t ry 's  b o rd e rs  in v o lv e s ,
2 ,6 .3  E qu ity  and E f f i c i e n c y  in  an I n t e r n a t io n a l  S e t t in g
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  t a x a t io n  in v o lv es  the  e x ten s io n  o f  our f a m i l i a r  con­
cep ts  o f  e q u i ty  and e f f i c i e n c y  f o r  a c lo se d  economy to  a p p ly  in  an in ­
t e r n a t i o n a l  s e t t i n g .  E f f ic ie n c y  c o n s id e ra t io n s  now r e q u i r e  t h i s  
concept to apply  n o t  on ly  in  th e  dom estic  economy but in  the  world-
wide economy as w e ll, S im ilarly , equity considerations demand not 
only equity between ind ividuals who are residents of the same country 
but i f  they are residents o f d ifferen t countries as w e ll. In addi­
tion  to that equity considerations apply now between the nations 
themselves* We proceed to d iscuss world e ff ic ie n c y  f i r s t ,
2 .6 .3.1  World E ffic ien cy
Under the heading World E ffic ien cy  we have in mind the a llo c a t ­
ion aspects of in ternation al taxation . In a world with cap ita l mov­
ing from one couhtry to another tax d iffe r e n t ia l may introduce in e f­
fic ie n c y  in resource a llo c a tio n . These tax d iffe r e n t ia ls  may resu lt  
e ith er  from the existen ce and overlapping of d ifferen t tax systems 
applied in various cou n tries, the existence o f withholding taxes on 
dividends, the a v a ila b ility  of dividend cred it given on d istr ib u tio n  
and the r e l ie f  provided for a lle v ia t in g  in ternational double taxat­
ion.
In the words o f the Carter Commission "to achieve complete in ter  
national tax n e u tra lity , the tax systems o f a l l  nations would have to 
be so harmonized that each individual would be in d iffe re n t, from a 
tax point of view, about h is c it iz en sh ip , h is  country of residence, 
the location  o f h is property, the location  o f h is business and the 
location  o f h is job" (Carter Report, I967) .
International tax n eu tra lity  may be d istinguished  in to the con­
cept of cap ita l-exp ort n eu tra lity  and that o f capital-im port neutral­
i ty .  I t  has been argued that from the point o f view o f an e f f ic ie n t  
a llo ca tio n  o f revenue under com petitive cond itions, ca p ita l export 
n eu tra lity  is  the relevant concept whereas capital-im port is  not. 
(ît.Mu3grave 1969).
C anital-exnort n eu tra lity  i s  defined as the s itu a tio n  where taxes 
of the residence country's donot a f fe c t  the in v esto r’s choice between 
in vestin g  abroad or at home. In other words, the investor pays to ta l 
tax on h is  income irresp ectiv e  o f where h is investment income comes 
from. This involves that the net o f tax rate o f return at home and 
abroad are the same as gross rate o f return. This r e su lt  can be obtain­
ed through two ways. The f i r s t ,  requires rate equalization  whereas 
the second requires the provision  of f u l l  cred it for foreign taxes. 
However, the f i r s t  apnroach seems to raise more complex questions than 
the second where only the cap ita l exporting country i s  required to take 
action . Since th is  kind o f tax n eu tra lity  is  concerned only with the 
to ta l tax burden of taxpayer, irresp ectiv e  of how the countries share
the tax revenue, i t  is  involved that i t  is  con sisten t with in te r -  
individual equity. Therefore, the cred it  method i s  the appropriate 
instrument for achieving world e f f ic ie n c y , under the assumption that 
f u l l  refund takes p lace.
The second concept o f n eu tra lity , capital-im port n e u tr a lity ^re- 
quires the capital-im porting country to avoid any kind o f d iscrim inat­
ion between investors with d ifferen t n a t io n a lit ie s .  Two methods may 
be used for achieving th is  goal; e ith e r  through an eq u alization  of 
tax rates or because the cap ital-im porting country avoids any d is ­
criminatory p o licy , whereas the cap ita l-exp orting  country app lies the 
exemption method to a lle v ia te  in ternation a l double taxation .
Concluding we can say that only the tax rate equalization  app­
roach is  con sisten t with both cap ita l-exp ort and capital-im port neut­
r a l i ty .  Unfortunately, the price o f th is  approach i s  very high since  
i t  leaves no room to the governments for manipulations as a means of 
expressing th e ir  philosophies in  that area. Therefore, a number of 
students o f in ternational taxation have questioned the d e s ir a b il ity  o f  
achieving in ternation al tax n eu tra lity . P a rticu la r ly , the Carter Com­
mision report wonders i f  th is  tax n eu tra lity  is  desirab le "while 
other in ternational economic barriers e x is t  (such as t a r i f f s ,  im i- 
gration lotsv.s, foreign investment gu id elin es and foreign exchange 
con tro ls)" . I t  continues that a l l  these A r t if ic ia l  barriers may be 
more "harmful than the tax system is" (Carter Report, I967} . in  our 
opinion, the existence o f such barriers i s  not a ju s t if ic a t io n  for  
avoiding a lle v ia t in g  them, in other words, since a f i r s t  best so lu t­
ion i s  d i f f ic u l t  to be obtained we should make any necessary steps  
for achieving a second b est so lu tio n .
From table 2*7 we see the tax burden borne by an individual share­
holder in each of the other cou n tries, i f  a corporation in a given coun­
try  has an income ICO. Numbers shown in each box along the N.W.-S.E 
diagonal show comparative taxes when the investment is  made at home. 
Comparison o f each box on the diagonal with other boxes in the same 
row shows the tax in cen tives and d isin cen tiv es to foreign in v est­
ment facing investors of each country to which the diagonal box ap p lies. 
Comparison of each diagonal box with the other boxes in  the same co l­
umn shows the tax treatment of domestic investors as compared with 
investors from each o f the other countries.
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2 .6 .3 .2  In te r c o u n t r y  E q u ity
I r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  the  c o u n try ’s d e s i r e  re g a rd in g  world or n a t io n a l  
e f f i c i e n c y  i t s  sha re  o f  t o t a l  tax  revenue c o l l e c te d  between the  
c o u n t r ie s  invo lved  i s  a  m a t te r  o f  c r i t i c a l  im portance. Moreover, 
the  in te f c o u n t r y  e q u i ty  concept i s  concerned w ith  the  sh a r in g  o f  the  
" ta x  p ie "  from f o r e ig n  investm ent between the  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t i n g  and 
the c a p i t a l - im p o r t in g  c o u n t r i e s .  Two f a c to r s  make the s o lu t io n  o f  
the  problem complex: f i r s t ,  th e  com plica ted  n a tu re  o f  th e  CIT; and,
second, inadequa te  knowledge o f the  n o n - tax  c o n s id e ra t io n s  a s s o c i a t ­
ed w ith  fo r e ig n  investm ent (S a to  and B ird ,  1975)*
As in  the  case  o f  dom estic  t a x a t io n  we face  here  the same ques­
t io n  re g a rd in g  the a p p l i c a t io n  o f  the  b e n e f i t  o r  th e  a b i l i t y  to pay 
p r i n c i p l e .  I f  the l a t t e r  p r i n c i p l e  i s  the  a p p ro p r ia te  one how should  
we app ly  the h o r i z o n ta l  and v e r t i c a l  p r in c ip l e s  between the n a t io n s Y 
In  an id e a l  world where a l l  c o u n t r ie s  had s im i la r  l e v e l s  o f  p e r  cap­
i t a  income, they  p rov ided  s i m i l a r  l e v e l s  and types  o f  s e r v ic e s  and 
f i n a l l y  no coun try  was a c a p i t a l - im p o r t in g  in te n s iv e  o r  c a p i t a l - e x -  
p o r t i n g  in te n s iv e  then the answer to  the above q u e s t io n s  would be 
e a s i e r  (Sato  and B ird ,  1975). I f  th e  b e n e f i t  p r in c ip l e  o f  c o rp o ra te  
t a x a t io n  a t t r a c t s  a sm all number o f  su p p o r te rs  a t  th e  dom estic  le v e l  
i t  seems to have more su p p o r te rs  a t  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  More­
o v e r ,b o th  b e n e f i t  and n o n -b e n e f i t  c o n s id e ra t io n s  should  be taken  in to  
account when we d is cu s s  the  concept o f  in te r c o u n t ry  e q u i ty .
T r a d i t i o n a l l y  two p r i n c i p l e s  have been used to govern th e  problem 
o f  in te r c o u n t r y  e q u i ty ,  whereas two new c r i t e r i a  were proposed by the 
Musgraves (E .Musgrave and P.Musgrave, 1972). The form er a re  concerned 
w ith  the n o n -d is c r im in a t io n  and r e c i p r o c i t y  p r i n c i p l e s  whereas the 
l a t t e r  a re  concerned w ith  n a t io n a l  r e n t a l  and the  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
c r i t e r i a  (OECD, 1963). However, s in c e  the  b e n e f i t  p r in c ip l e  may be 
u n d e s i r a b le  a t  the  dom estic  l e v e l  i t  may be d i f f i c u l t  to be a p p l ie d  
on the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  because o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  and types 
o f  s e rv ic e s  p rov ided  by a government to a c o rp o ra t io n .
The n o n -d is c r im in a t io n  r u l e  im p lie s  t h a t  the  $ource co u n try  should  
n o t  d is c r im in a te  a g a in s t  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs*  D isc r im in a t io n  in  t h i s  
a re a  g e n e r a l ly  comes from d i f f e r e n t  w ith ho ld ing  r a t e s  o r ,  in  the case 
o f  in t e g r a te d  system s, from denying the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  to  f o r e ig n  in ­
v e s to r s  a cco rd in g  to the  co u n try  where the  p a re n t  i s  in c o rp o ra te d .
However, s in ce  th e  c a p i t a l - im p o r t in g  country  i s  th e  main c la im an t the 
n o n -d is c r im in a t io n  r u l e  aims to p re v e n t  the  lo s s e s  o f  the ex p o r t in g  
country  being  e x ce s s iv e .  The second r u l e ,  r e c i p r o c i t y , supplements 
the f i r s t .  S ince the  most im portan t t r e a t y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a re  l im i ­
t a t i o n s  on w ithho ld ing  ta x e s ,  t h i s  r u l e  r e q u i r e s  an equal r e c ip r o c a l  
w ithho ld ing  ta x  r a t e  between th e  c o n t r a c t i n g  c o u n t r ie s .  However, 
t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  looks only  a t  th e  amount of w ith h o ld in g  ta x  which the 
o r ig i n  coun try  e x t r a c t s  from d iv id en d  p a id  to  fo r e ig n  sh a re h o ld e rs .
This im p lies  t h a t  whatever the  system o f  the  o r ig i n  co un try  i s  t h i s  
c r i t e r i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  I f  th e  co u n try  i s  intemesüsd in  i t s  lo s s  n o t  
only  coming from w ith ho ld ing  taxes  but from the  CIT as w e l l  then  t h i s  
c r i t e r i o n  i s  inadequate  to  secure  in te r c o u n t r y  e q u i ty ,
A new c r i t e r i o n ,  the  e f f e c t i v e  r e c i p r o c i t y , c r i t e r i o n ,  was r e ­
c e n t ly  sugges ted  by Sato and B ird  (1975)• The purpose of t h i s  c r i t e r ­
ion  i s  to e q u a l iz e  th e  e f f e c t i v e  t a x  burden on fo r e ig n  investm en t b e t ­
ween two contracting c o u n t r i e s .  The r a t i o n a l e  o f  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  i s  
t h a t  the  governments design  t h e i r  tax  s t r u c tu r e  p r im a r i ly  in  the 
l i g h t  o f  domestic c o n s id e ra t io n s  and n o t by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n o n -d is ­
c r im in a t io n  c o n s id e ra t io n s  as the  van de Tempel r e p o r t  (1970) a s s ­
umes. S ince t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  r e q u i r e s  co n s id e r in g  the  e n t i r e  (c o rp o ra te  
and w ithho ld ing) tax  burden then i f  th e  c o n t r a c t in g  c o u n t r ie s  employ 
the  same system and more o r  l e s s  th e  same tax  r a t e  au tom atic  r e c ip r o ­
c i t y  i s  ach ieved . I f  t h i s  i s  not so and the country  of source  em­
p loys an in te g r a te d  system the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  r e ­
q u i re s  m an ipu la ting  the  i n t e g r a t i o n  b e n e f i t  ^dividend c r e d i t ) .
The s c e p t i c a l  p o in t  of t h i s  th e o ry  i s  the  knowledge o f th e  e f f e c t iv e  
CIT r a t e  in  each co u n try .
The n a t io n a l  r e n t a l  c r i t e r i o n  looks to economic r e n t  which acc rues  
to  fo r e ig n  in v e s to r s  from in v e s t in g  in  the  coun try  in  q u e s t io n .
The fo re ig n  in v e s to r  should pay a r e n t a l  or r o y a l ty  fo r  th ese  bene­
f i t s .  This c r i t e r i o n  i s  in  l in e  w ith  the  b e n e f i t  p r in c ip l e  bu t i t  
i s  q u es t io n ed  on grounds t h a t  the c a p i t a l - im p o r t in g  coun try  b e n e f i t s  
in  some re s p e c ts  from fo re ig n  investm ent and a lso  on p r a c t i c a l  grounds.
On the o th e r  hand, the  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  c r i t e r i o n , i s  in  l i n e  w ith  the 
a b i l i t y  to pay p r i n c i p l e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  w ith v e r t i c a l  e q u i ty .  In ­
e v i ta b ly  the l a t t e r  p r in c ip l e  a p p l ie s  no t between developed c o u n t r ie s ,  
which more o r  l e s s  have s m a l le r  d i s p a r t i e s  ( s i m i l a r  economic cap ac ity )
bu t between developed and underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s .  The v e r t i c a l  equ­
i t y  p r in c ip l e  r e q u i r e s  a  l a r g e r  sh a re  from the  "pie'* f o r  poor c o u n t r ie s  
than  the  r i c h  c o u n t r ie s ,
2 .7  INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ALTEMATIVE SYSTEMS OF TAXING
CORPORATE-SOUECE INCOME
2 . 7 . 1  In t ro d u c t io n
With t h i s  background we proceed  to  d iscu ss  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  im­
p l i c a t i o n s  o f  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o rp o ra te  tax  system s. U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  
our d is c u s s io n  w i l l  n o t  be ex h au s tiv e  s in c e  such a d is c u s s io n  could 
r e q u i r e  an o th e r  s tudy  i t s e l f .  The f i v e  e x i s t i n g  system s, p a i re d  
w ith  each o th e r ,  c r e a te  twènty f iv e  d i f f e r e n t  c a s e s .  In  a d d i t io n  
to t h a t  th ese  twenty f i v e  cases  should  be d iscu ssed  under the  fo u r  
d i f f e r e n t  types  o f  in v e s tm e n t^  T h e re fo re ,  we w i l l  b r i e f l y  d iscu ss  
th e se  cases  under the c r i t e r i a  o f  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y  and in ­
te r c o u n t ry  e q u i ty .
The e x is te n c e  of d i f f e r e n t  systems between two c o u n t r ie s  in  p a r ­
t i c u l a r ,  and in  the  w o rld ,  in  g e n e r a l ,  c r e a te s  d i s t o r t i o n s  and d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  a t  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  Suppose, f o r  example, co u n try  A 
employs p a r t i a l l y  or f u l l y  in te g r a te d  system . whereas coun try  B has 
a c l a s s i c a l  system. V arious types o f  d is c r im in a t io n  and d i s t o r t i o n s  
a r i s e  i f  no a c t io n s  a r e  taken  to  harmonize th e se  two system s. The 
r e s id e n t  o f  coun try  A who in v e s t s  in  coun try  B has a d isadvan tage  be­
cause he re ce iv ed  no r e l i e f  from economic double t a x a t io n .  On the  
o th e r  hand, i f  a r e s id e n t  o f  country  B in v e s t s  in  co u n try  A and the 
l a t t e r  p rov ides  him with a  r e l i e f  he re c e iv e s  an advantage from in ­
vestm ent abroad; he has an in c e n t iv e  to  in v e s t  abroad r a t h e r  than  in 
h is  own co u n try .  I f  coun try  A does n o t p rov ide  him w ith  the  c r e d i t  
then i t  d is c r im in a te s  between r e s id e n t  and n o n - r e s id e n t  sh a re h o ld e rs .  
S im ila r  c o n s id e ra t io n s  a r i s e  re g a rd in g  the e s tab lish m en t of a su b s id ­
i a r y  in  the same co un try  o r  abroad . We proceed now to  d is c u s s  the  a l ­
t e r n a t iv e  systems under the  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t  c r i t e r i o n .  The l a t t e r  i n ­
vo lves  the  same trea tm en t between r e s id e n t s  who in v e s t  a t  home and 
those who in v e s t  abroad ,
2 . 7 . 2  C la s s ic a l  System; C a p i ta l-E x p o r t  N e u t r a l i t y .
Suppose the  r e s id e n t  coun try  employs th e  c l a s s i c a l  system , then , 
the source country  may employ the c l a s s i c a l  o r  one of th e  o th e r  fo u r
systems. In the case of d irect investment in the form of subsid iary, 
the cap ita l-exp orting  country should follow  the same p o licy  ir r e s ­
p ective of whether the cource country employs a c la s s ic a l ,  imputat­
ion or f u l l  in tegration  system. This p o licy  con sists  o f two step s. 
F ir s t , the cap ita l-exp orting  country taxes foreign p ro fits  but i t  
provides f u l l  cred it for foreign  CIT and withholding taxes. This is  
so because the dividend cred it provided under the imputation and f u l l  
in tegration  systems is  not given to a subaidiar;j^f* which im plies that 
the la t te r  is  treated  s im ila r ly  by the source country irresp ective  
of the CIT system. I f  the source country employs a two-rate or d iv i­
ded paid deduction system the case is  not so easy. The operation o f  
these two systems is  complicated by the question o f re la tin g  d is tr ib ­
ution r e l i e f  to p ro fits  earned, since dividends paid in one account­
ing period are not n ecessa r ily  paid out of p r o fits  o f that period. 
However, the f in a l burden of the foreign CIT is  not determined be­
fore d istr ib u tion  takes p lace. The cap ita l-exporting country then, 
should make an approximation for the foreign CIT and the cred it  
provided by i t ,  f i r s t ,  and adjust these magnitudes to the actual ones 
when the amount o f f in a l d istr ib u tio n  i s  known.
I f  foreign investment takes the form o f a branch, again the p o l­
icy  i s  the same for the three systems, c la s s ic a l ,  imputation and f u l l  
in tegration . The d ifferen ce from the previous case i s  that the cap it­
a l exporting country provides a f u l l  cred it only for the foreign  CIT 
s in ce , branches are not u su a lly  taxed with withholding taxest I f  
the source country employs a two-rate system or a dividend-paid de­
duction system, no adjustment is  required by the cap ita l-exporting  
country. This i s  so because branches under the two-rate system do not 
enjoy the lower tax rate on d istr ib u tio n s whereas under the dividend 
paid deduction system, they are taxed on th eir  to ta l p ro fits  under 
CIT irresp ective  of whether these are d istributed  or not,
buppose now that foreign  investment takes the form o f corporate 
p o rtfo lio  investment. I f  the source country employs a two-rate system 
or divided paid deduction system then the cap ita l-exp orting  country 
follow s the same p o licy  as in the subsidiary case. However, i f  the 
source country employs the imputation or the fu ll  in tegration  system 
the p o licy  applied by the- cap ita l-exporting country depends on the
ex ten s io n  o f d iv idend  c r e d i t  o r  n o t .  I f  i t  i s  extended then  the  cap­
i t a l - e x p o r t i n g  coun try  should  impose an a d d i t io n a l  ta x  to recoup i t  
in  o rd e r  to  e q u a l iz e  th e  dom estic  and th e  fo re ig n  ta x  burden.
F in a l ly ,  i f  fo re ig n  investm ent takes  the  form o f  in d iv id u a l  p o r t ­
f o l i o  in ves tm en t,  the p o l ic y  re q u i re d  to ach ieve  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t  n e u t­
r a l i t y ,  i s  d i f f e r e n t  i f  th e  two c o u n t r ie s  employ the  c l a s s i c a l  sy s ­
tem, F i r s t ,  the  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t i n g  co u n try  a p p l ie s  th e  domestic CIT 
on i n d i v i d u a l ' s  pro  r a t a  share  o f  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  and g ra n ts  a 
f u l l  c r e d i t  f o r  the  f o r e ig n  CIT p a id .  Thmu^ t h i s  way the  c a p i t a l - 
ex p o r t in g  co un try  e l im in a te s  any tax  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between the two 
c o u n t r ie s .  Second, the  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  p a id  abroad i s  s e t  o f f  a g a in s t  
s h a r e h o ld e r ’s p e rso n a l  income ta x .  I f  the co un try  o f  source employs 
the  tw o -ra te  o r  the d iv idend  p a id  deduction  systems the  same p rocess  
i s  fo llow ed bu t  in  a d d i t io n  to t h a t  the ad justm ent mentioned above 
i s  requ ired*  F in a l ly ,  i f  the  source  coun try  employs one of the  
o th e r  system s, i t  i s  à  q u e s t io n  o f  the ex ten s io n  o f  d iv idend  c r e d i t  
o r  n o t .  I f  i t  i s  not ex tended to  fo re ig n  sh a re h o ld e rs ,  th e  c a p i t a l -  
e x p o r t in g  country  fo llow s  the  same p o l ic y  as in  the  case o f  co rp o r­
a te  p o r t f o l i o  investm ent whereas f f  i t  i s  extended th e re  i s  no need 
f o r  an a d d i t io n a l  tax  s in c e  the CIT absorbs  i t .
In  summary, i f  th e  t r a d in g  c o u n t r ie s  employ the  c l a s s i c a l  system 
then  l e s s  a c t io n s  a re  r e q u i r e d  fo r  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y  to be 
ach ieved . The o th e r  systems r e q u i r e  a d d i t io n a l  a c t io n s .  We r e s t r i c t  
th ese  a d d i t io n a l  a c t io n s  i f ,  in  the  case  o f  tw o -ra te  system o r  the 
d iv idend  pa id  deduction  system , the  b e n e f i t  of the  lower r a t e  on 
d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  i s  l im i te d  to  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  ou t o f  c u r re n t  
p r o f i t s ,  and in  the  case  o f  im pu ta tion  o r  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system s, 
the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  i s  no t ex tended to  fo re ig n  in v e s to r s  by the  
source  c o u n try ,  which means t h a t  th e se  systems work l i k e  th e  c l a s s i ­
c a l  system re g a rd in g  fo re ig n  investm en t,
2 . 7 .3  Im puta tion  System; C ap i ta l-E x p o r t  N e u t r a l i ty
The d i f f e r e n c e  between the c l a s s i c a l  system and the im pu ta tion  
system l i e s  in  the p re sen c e ,  in  the  l a t t e r  system, o f  two im portan t 
e lem en ts ,  i . e .  the  p ro v is io n  o f  the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  and the im posi­
t io n  o f  a compensatory tax  (ACT, Précom pté), in  some c a s e s ,  where
the provision o f the dividend cred it i s  undesirable. However, cap it­
al-export n eu tra lity  requires the same treatment of resident ind ivid­
uals who in vest at home and those who invest abroad. The achievement 
of that goal requires that the cap ita l-exporting  country should f o l ­
low the fo llow ing general p o licy .
F ir s t , to tax foreign p r o fits  under the domestic tax law,
providing f u l l  cred it  for foreign corporate and with­
holding taxes.
Second,to  avoid imposing the compensatory tax when the par­
ent corporation red istr ib u tes p ro fits  received from 
abroad to i t s  shareholders.
Third, resident shareholders be granted the f u l l  domestic 
dividend cred it from income received from abroad,
i f  foreign investment takes the form of a subsidiary the above 
described p o licy  should be followed by the cap ita l-exp orting  country 
irresp ectiv e  o f what system i s  employed by the source country. How­
ever, in the case o f a two-rate system or dividend paid deduction sys­
tem in  addition to the above steps subsequent adjustment is  necessary  
in re la tion  to foreign  taxes a ctu a lly  paid as we explained in the 
previous sectio n .
I f  foreign investment takes the form o f a branch then we have the 
same p o licy , as in the case o f a subsidiary except that cred it for 
foreign taxes includes corporate tax only.
I f  the foreign investment takes the form of a corporate port­
fo lio  investment we have the same p o licy  as in the case of a subsid­
iary except i f  the source country employs an imputation system and i t  
extends the dividend cred it to foreign shareholders. In that case a 
forth  action is  required in addition to the three described above,
i . e .  a sp ec ia l tax must be applied to recoup the extended dividend 
cred it.
F in a lly , an individual in vests abroad, the ca p ita l exporting 
country should tax him for his income from abroad as follow s;
F ir s t , h is pro rata share of p ro fits  should be taxed un­
der the domestic CIT with a f u l l  cred it for foreign  
CIT.
Second, the domestic personal income tax applies to that in-
e n ­
corne w ith  a  f u l l  g ro ss-up  and c r e d i t  f o r  fo re ig n  
w ith h o ld in g  ta x  and,
T h i rd , the sh a re h o ld e r  i s  p rov ided  with the  f u l l  domestic 
d iv idend  c r e d i t .
The above d e sc r ib e d  p o l ic y  should be follow ed by th e  c a p i t a l - e x ­
p o r t i n g  co u n try  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  the  ta x  system employed by the source 
co u n try .
2 . 7 . 4  Two-Rate and Dividend Pa id  Deduction System s{C apital Export
N e u t r a l i t y .
I f  the  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t in g  co u n try  employs e i t h e r  the  tw o -ra te  o r  
the d iv idend  p a id  deduction  system , i t  should fo l lo w  the  same p o l ic y  
f o r  ach iev in g  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y  as in  the  case  i f  i t  would em­
p lo y  a c l a s s i c a l  system. However, two p o in ts  deserve  s p e c ia l  a t t e n ­
t i o n .  F i r s t ,  in  the  case  o f  in d iv id u a l  p o r t f o l i o  in v e s to r s  as to  
what e f f e c t i v e  ta x  r a t e  on domestic investm ent i s  fo r  c r e d i t  pu rposes , 
s in c e  t h a t  r a t e  depends on the  payout r a t i o  o f  each c o rp o ra t io n  (Sato  
and B ird ,  1975). Second, i f  the dom estic  CIT r a t e  i s  l e s s  than  th e ,  
fo re ig n  CIT r a t e  then the f u l l  c r e d i t  f o r  the l a t t e r  would invo lve  a 
re fu n d ,
2 . 7 .5  F u l l  I n te g r a t io n ;  C a p i ta l-E x p o r t  N e u t r a l i ty
I f  the  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t i n g  coun try  employs a  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system 
i t  faces  the  same problems as in  the  case  o f  the  im pu ta tion  system.
The f u l l  e l im in a t io n  o f  economic double ta x a t io n  invo lves  a g r e a t e r  
lo s s  f o r  the  c a p i t a l - e x p o r t in g  co u n try  i f  the source  coun try  employs 
a h igh CIT r a t e .  The a b o l i t i o n  o f  the CIT under t h i s  system compli­
c a te s  the  problem o f  e q u a l i s in g  th e  p e rso n a l  tax  burdens between dom­
e s t i c  and fo re ig n  inv es tm en t,  u n le s s  a l l  c o rp o ra te  in v e s to r s  d i s t r i b ­
u te  o r  a l l o c a t e  a l l  fo re ig n  p r o f i t s  to  t h e i r  s h a re h o ld e rs .
2»T,6 In te r c o u n t ry  E qu ity  Under th e  A l te rn a t iv e  Tax Systems
We saw e a r l i e r  t h a t  th r e e  p r in c ip l e s  a re  r e l a t e d  to the concep t of 
in te r c o u n t ry  e q u i ty  i . e . ,  n o n d is c r im in a t io n ,  r e c ip r o c i ty  and e f f e c t i v e  
r e c i p r o c i t y .  The n o n d isc r im in a t io n  p r in c ip l e  r e q u i r e s  the  source  
coun try  to  trea t ',  r e s id e n t  and n o n - r e s id e n t  sh a reh o ld e rs  e q u a l ly .  I f  
a coun try  a p p l ie s  the c l a s s i c a l  system then the n o n - re s id e n t  s h a re ­
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h o ld e r  a u to m a t ic a l ly  r e c e iv e s  equal t re a tm en t w ith  the r e s id e n t  
sh a re h o ld e r .  However, t h i s  i s  n o t  the  case i f  the  so u rce  co un try  
a p p l ie s  a p a r t i a l l y  o r  f u l l y  in te g r a te d  system. This i s  due to  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  th e se  systems p rov ide  a r e l i e f  f o r  economic double t a x a t ­
ion  which means t h a t  i t  i s  to the  d i s c r e t i o n o r y  p o l ic y  o f  th e  govern­
ment to  p rov ide  the n o n - re s id e n t  sh a reh o ld e r  w ith  the  r e l i e f  which the 
r e s id e n t  sh a reh o ld e r  e n jo y s .  For example, the  im pu ta tion  system d i s ­
c r im in a te s  a g a in s t  n o n - r e s id e n t  sh a reh o ld e rs  i f  the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  
i s  g ran te d  on ly  to r e s id e n t  s h a re h o ld e rs .
According to the O.E.C.D. model t r e a t y ,  the  a d d i t io n a l  requ irem ent 
f o r  ach iev in g  in te r c o u n t r y  e q u i ty ,  i s  concerned w ith  an equal r e c i p ­
r o c a l  w ith h o ld in g  tax  in  the  c o n t r a c t i n g  c o u n t r ie s  (Q.E.G.D., I 965 ) .
I f  th e  c o u n t r ie s  in  q u e s t io n  app ly  the  c l a s s i c a l  system and they  
have more o r  l e s s  the same tax  r a t e  then the  goal o f  in te r c o u n t r y  
e q u i ty  i s  achieved under the  two c r i t e r i a .  To the c o n t r a ry ,  i f  the  
o th e r  co u n try  a p p l ie s  one o f  the  o th e r  tax  systems then  the n o n -d is ­
c r im in a t io n  p r in c ip l e  holds on ly  i f  the  source  co u n try  a p p l ie s  the  
same r u le s  o f  ta x in g  n o n - r e s id e n t  sh a re h o ld e rs .  Moreover, i f  the  
c o u n t r ie s  in  q u e s t io n  app ly  an i n te g r a te d  system then  in te r c o u n t ry  
e q u i ty  i s  achieved by m an ip u la t in g  th e  in t e g r a t io n  b e n e f i t .  The 
r e c e n t ly  suggested  c r i t e r i o n  o f  e f f e c t i v e  r e c ip r o c i ty  r e q u i r e s  the 
e q u a l i z a t io n  o f  the  e f f e c t i v e  ta x  burden on fo re ig n  investm ent between 
the  c o n t r a c t in g  c o u n t r ie s .
Suppose, f o r  example, t h a t  co u n try  A a p p l ie s  the  tw o -ra te  system 
and coun try  B has a c l a s s i c a l  system, then s u b s id i a r i e s  o f  coun try  B 
o p e ra t in g  in  co un try  A have an in c e n t iv e  to d i s t r i b u t e  as much p r o f ­
i t s  as they  can to t h e i r  p a re n t  companies in  coun try  B so as to m ini­
mize t h e i r  ta x  l i a b i l i t y  in  co u n try  A. This has f a r - r e a c h in g  e f f e c t s  
upon the d iv i s io n  o f  the  " ta x -p ie "  between country  A and B, There­
fo re  in te r c o u n t r y  e q u i ty  c o n s id e ra t io n s  r e q u ire  the c o u n try  w ith  the 
tw o -ra te  system to in c re a se  i t s  taxes  on investm ent income acc ru in g  
to fo re ig n  in v e s to r s .  There a re  two ways to r e c o n c i le  t h i s  system 
w ith i n t e r n a t i o n a l  needs; e i t h e r  the  c o u n try  which a p p l ie s  t h i s
system can reduce the  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between d i s t r i b u t e d  and r e ­
ta in e d  p r o f i t s ,  o r ,  i t  can in c re a s e  the ap p lied  w ithho ld ing  tax  r a t e ,
Germany, fo r  example, when i t  used t h i s  system, a p p l ie d  a h igh  r a t e
o f  w ith h o ld in g  ta x .  However, U.S.A. has o b je c ted  to Germany's im-
p o s i t i o n  o f  a non-r e c ip r o c a l  w ithho ld ing  tax  as an accompaniment o f  
i t s  tw o -ra te  system a p p ea l in g  to the  s tan d a rd  n o n -d is c r im in a t io n  
r u l e  t h a t  w ithho ld ing  tax  r a t e s  should be the same in  th e  two c o n t ra c ­
t i n g  c o u n t r ie s .
S im ila r  c o n s id e ra t io n s  hold i f  the  source co u n try  a p p l ie s  the  d i v i ­
dend p a id  deduction  system. Since the  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between d i s ­
t r i b u t e d  and u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  i s  h ig h e r  under t h a t  system than 
under the  tw o -ra te  system , the  lo s s  f o r  th e  source coun try  i s  g r e a t ­
e r .  Moreover, in te r c o u n t r y  e q u i ty  c o n s id e ra t io n s  r e q u i r e  the sourse  
coun try  e i t h e r  to app ly  the UIT on bo th  d i s t r i b u t e d  and u n d i s t r ib u te d  
p r o f i t s  or to  impose a v e ry  h igh  w ithho ld ing  tax  r a t e ,  Greece, f o r  
example, fo llow s the second way.
On the  o th e r  hand, i f  the  source  coun try  a p p l ie s  the  im pu ta tion  o r  
the  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  system  then  i t  i s  e a s i e r  fo r  i t  to manage th e  
s i t u a t i o n  by ex tend ing  o r  n o t the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  to  fo re ig n  sh a re ­
h o ld e r s .
Concluding, the n o n -d is c r im in a t io n  and r e c i p r o c i t y  p r in c ip le s  im­
p ly  in te r c o u n t r y  e q u i ty  under the  assum ption t h a t  a l l  c o u n t r ie s  have 
the  c l a s s i c a l  system. These p r i n c i p l e s  a re  inadequate  to dea l w ith  
th e  problem i f  d i f f e r e n t  systems a re  a p p l ie d  in  the  c o n t r a c t in g  coun­
t r i e s .  However, the  e f f e c t i v e  r e c i p r o c i t y  p r in c ip l e  seems to  achieve  
t h i s  goal by m an ipu la ting  the  i n t e g r a t io n  b e n e f i t  and the  w ithho ld ing  
tax  r a t e .  The proponents  o f  t h i s  p r in c i p l e  argue t h a t  i t  has the  s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  advantage o f p ro v id in g  the  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  freedom to app ly  
t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  tax  system s, from a dom estic  p o in t  o f  view, w ithout 
i n t e r f e r i n g  w ith  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  They a lso  argue th a t  
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  d e sp i te  the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  in h e r e n t ly  b i l a t e r a l ,  can 
be extended to be used on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a s is  by in tro d u c in g  a 
s tan d a rd  r a t e  schedule which i s  in h e r e n t ly  r e l a t e d  to the CIT r a t e .
Un the  o th e r  hand, as we s t a t e d  e lsew here , the d o u b tfu l  p o in t  r e ­
g a rd in g  th i s  p r in c i p l e  i s  the  knowledge o f  the  e f f e c t iv e  CIT r a t e  in  
each cou n try ,
2 .8  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In t h i s  c h ap te r  we saw:
a) how the government u ses  one o r  o th e r  of the tax  s:ysterns f o r  
a ch iev in g  v a r io u s  o b je c t iv e s  from a domestic p o in t  o f  view.
The main consideration in  that choice was the in tegration  of 
personal income tax and corporate income tax. With no sur­
p rise  we saw that various governments used d ifferen t systems 
for achieving the same goa ls.
b) how at an in ternational le v e l u n ila tera l and b ila te r a l provi­
sions are used for achieving e ffic ie n c y  and equity . Unfortun­
a te ly , d esp ite  these provisions these goals are far away,
c) how the recent tendency for the foreign government to a lle v ­
ia te  economic double taxation , a task which previously  be­
longed to the domestic government, f a c i l i t a t e s  the achieve­
ment of reaching the above stated  goals in the in ternational 
le v e l .
% ereas the dispute over the merits and demerits of the a ltern a t­
ive corporate tax systems from a domestic point of view in terms of  
equity , investment, a llo ca tio n  of ca p ita l e tc . remains u n settled  the 
c la s s ic a l  system seems to gain a sup eriority  on international consider­
a tion s, This su p eriority  comes from the fa c t that the c la s s ic a l  sys­
tem requires le s s  actions to be taken i . e .  is  the sim plest, as a 
means of achieving e ff ic ie n c y  and equity in tern ation a lly .
The question which a r ise s  is whether d ifferences in the structures  
o f the CIT are more important than d ifferen ces in the systems. The 
plethora of co -ex istin g  taxes p a ra lle l with the CIT may support the 
view that the former d ifferen ces are more important than the la t te r .  
A fter a l l ,  as we saw, the two-rate system can be translated into the 
imputation and the la t te r  into the c la s s ic a l  system, which means that 
we do not have many systems but only one which appears in various forms.
however, s im p lic ity  is  not the only consideration, other factors  
should be taken into accouht in choosing a system o f corporate taxat­
ion , F in a lly , i f  we want to be r e a l i s t i c ,  we should r e a lise  that there 
is  no one system, with only advantages and no disadvantages, which 
would achieve our o b jec tiv es , which some times c o n flic t  each other.
In th is  chapter we d ea lt ’with the dividend-paid-deduction system on a 
th eo retica l le v e l .  We proceed to d iscuss how th is  system is  applied  
in Greece.
NOTES: Chapter Two
1. One could  pu t the c l a s s i c a l  system with d iv idend r e l i e f  under 
the  p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  heading . We p r e f e r  our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
because the  r e l i e f  g iven  i s  not r e l a t e d  to the  co rp o ra te  income 
tax  as i t  i s  under th e  o th e r  system s. That i s  to say , under the 
tw o -ra te  system the CIT r a t e  on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  i s  reduced, 
whereas under th e  im p u ta t io n  system the r e l i e f  i s  a p ro p o r t ­
io n a l  amount of CIT p a id .  The d e te rm ina tion  o f the  r e l i e f  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  th e  r a t e  o f  CIT may r e f l e c t  the purpose of i t s  
p r o v is io n .  That i s ,  th e  r e l i e f  i s  no t g iven as a means o f  
a l l e v i a t i n g  economic double t a x a t io n  but as a  means of making 
sh areh o ld in g  more a t t r a c t i v e .
2 . At l e a s t  in  comparison with the  c l a s s i c a l  systems. See ta b le  
2 .2 ,  page (5 3 ) .
3. This assumes th a t  th e  g ro ss in g -u p  means a h ig h e r  tax  r a t e  than 
the  c l a s s i c a l  system. See ta b le  2 ,1 ,  page (5 4 ) .
4. The d iv idend  tax  c r e d i t  may be g ran ted  in  th re e  forms. F i r s t ,  
as a pe rcen tage  of cash  d iv id e n d s ,  second, as a pe rcen tage  o f 
g rossed  up d iv idend  and t h i r d ,  as a p e rcen tage  o f  CIT which i s  
imposed on t h a t  p a r t  o f  the  p r e - t a x  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  from 
which d iv idend  was p a id ,
5. However, i t  d is c r im in a te s  in  favou r of tax-exem pt o r g a n is a t i o n s .
6. This term has been in tro d u ced  by th e  E.E.C. see the  l a s t  p roposal 
f o r  company tax  harm onization  in  the E .E .C .(1975)• The c o r re sp ­
onding terms in  France and the  U.K. are  ^précompté m o b il ie r"  and 
advance c o rp o ra t io n  income tax  (ACT),
7. Denote T the  t o t a l  c o rp o ra t io n  t a x ,  D d iv idends n e t  of CIT and 
gross  of PIT, Cu = .5 1 ,  the CIT r a t e  on u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  and 
td  = ,15 the CIT r a t e  on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s .  Then, T = . 15D + 
.51  (1-D) = .51  -  ,56D ( 1 ; s in ce  T + D -  1 and T + 1 -  D (2) 
from ( 1 ) and (2) we o b ta in :  1 - D = .51 -  56D which im p lies
D = .7656  ( 5 ) .  S u b s t i tu t i n g  (3) in to  (1) we g e t:  7 = .234. 
T h e re fo re ,  the  f i n a l  ta x  r a t e  on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  i s  23.4 
p e r  c en t  and not 15 p e r  c e n t .  This i s  because the tax  amount
which corresponds to  d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  i s  taxed  as u n d i s t r i b ­
u te d  p r o f i t s  under th e  co rre spond ing  tax  r a t e .
8 . For s im i la r  rea sons  as in  the case  o f  tw o -ra te  system.
9 . At l e a s t  in  comparison w ith  the  c l a s s i c a l  system. See t a b le  2 .2
page (5 4 }.
10. Under the assum ption t h a t  d iv id en d  income is  h ig h ly  co n ce n tra te d  
Goode 1955 has dem onstra ted  t h a t  the  U.S. tax  s t r u c t u r e  i s  more 
p ro g re s s iv e  w ith  CIT than w ithout i t ,  whereas Wagner (1973 } r e ­
j e c t  t h i s  view.
11. 3 , B racew ell-M ilnes (European T axa tion , 1974) wonders i f  t h i s  
r a t i o  i s  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  measure fo r  t h i s  purpose and he sugges ts  
t h a t  the economic double t a x a t io n  o f d iv idend  i s  c o r r e c t l y  meas­
u red  by the d i f f e r e n c e  tp  -  ( t r  -  t d j .
12. We ignore  the e x is te n c e  o f  p e rso n a l  income ta x ,
15 , The c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x  l i a b i l i t y  i s  c a lc u la te d  as the  p roduc t o f  
the  p e rso n a l  income ta x  r a t e  and the  r e s id u a l  amount o f  p r o f i t s  
a f t e r  cash d i s t r i b u t i o n s  and ta x e s .
14 . For th e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  « f o r  the  d iv idend  deduction  system see
our c a lc u la t io n s  in  c h a p te r  th r e e .  For the o th e r  system see King,
1977 .
1 5 . T o ta l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  w ithou t CIT.
* t^  * tp^  (1)
* = tp^  (2)
T o ta l  tax l i a b i l i t y  w ith  CIT. 
tP = to + tp^  ( 1 -  t c )  (3)
t^  = tc  + tp^  (1 -  tc )  ( 4 )
S u b tra c t in g  (1) from (5) and (2) from (4) we have
L * L Lt  -  t  = t c  (1 -  tp-^) (5)
t^  -  t^  = tc  (1 -  tp^) (6)
Since tp^ tp^  im p lie s  t^  t^  t^  -  t ^
1 6 . For an e x c e l le n t  d is c u s s io n  a l l  th ese  m a tte rs  see Sato and B ird ,
1975.
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17* The ^ource  o r  c a p i t a l - im p o r t in g  country  i s  t h a t  where the c a p i t a l  
i s  invested , whereas th e  re s id e n c e  or c a p i t a l - e x p o r t i n g  co u n try  i s  
t h a t  where the c a p i t a l  comes from»
18. That i s ,  s u b s id ia r y ,  b ran ch es ,  c o rp o ra te  p o r t f o l i o  and i n d i v i ­
dual p o r t f o l i o .
1 9 . A s u b s id ia ry  enjoys th e  lower tax  r a t e  a p p l ie d  to d i s t r i b u t e d  
p r o f i t s  under the  tw o -ra te  system bu t  the  d iv idend  c r e d i t  i s  not 
a v a i l a b le  f o r  p a re n t  companies abroad in  r e s p e c t  o f  d iv idends
p a id  by the  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  under the  im pu ta tion  system.
'1
20. Both the  tw o -ra te  system and the im pu ta tion  system deny p ro v id ­
ing  a  branch w ith  th e  d iv id ed  c r e d i t .
CHAPTER 'THREE 
THE GREEK CORPORATION INCOME TAX SYRTEM
5*1 In t ro d u c t io n
In  t h i s  c h ap te r  we tu rn  to  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  CIT as i t  o p e ra te s  
in  Greek economy. We f i r s t  o u t l in e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  Greek tax  
s t r u c t u r e  in  g e n e ra l ,  e x p la in in g  th e  reasons  why the ta x  s t r u c tu r e  
has the  p re s e n t  form. Then we tu rn  to c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  CIT. Three 
main a sp e c ts  we want to c o n s id e r ,  namely, tax  s p l i t t i n g ,  tax  in cen ­
t i v e s  and c o rp o ra te  f in a n c in g  te ch n iq u es .  The d is c u s s io n  o f  ta x  
s p l i t t i n g  r e q u i r e s  th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  a tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r i a b l e  
which measures the degree o f  d i s c r im in a t io n  between d iv idend  and r e ­
te n t io n .  The d i f f i c u l t y  in  c a l c u l a t i n g  th i s  v a r i a b l e  l i e s  on the  
f a c t  t h a t  sh a reh o ld e rs  fa ce  d i f f e r e n t  marginal r a t e s  o f  income ta x .
We overcome th i s  d i f f i c u l t y  by u s in g  a weighted average o f  the  mar­
g in a l  tax  r a t e s .  Then we d is c u s s  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  o f  the  Greek f i rm s ,  
the  ro le  o f  the  banking system , of p u b l ic  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and 
o f  the  c a p i t a l  market a re  d iscu ssed .  The Greek CIT system i s  n e u t­
r a l  between d e^ t and e q u i ty  f in a n c e .  However, the whole tax  s t r u c ­
tu re  d is c r im in a te s  in  fav o u r o f  e q u i ty  f in an ce  due to  the  la c k  o f 
c a p i t a l  ga ins  tax .  Then, we proceed to e s t im a te  the  p re s e n t  v a lue  o f  
ta x  sav ing  from d e p re c ia t io n  and investm ent a llow ances . We see t h a t  
Greek m anufacturing  f irm s en joy  a co n s id e ra b le  amount o f  tax  sav ing . 
In  a s s e s s in g  th ese  in c e n t iv e s  we g ive  a  b r i e f  overview o f  the r o l e  o f  
investm ent in  Greece u s in g  s t a t i s t i c a l  in fo rm ation  to  judge t h e i r  
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  re g a rd in g  the  a l l o c a t i o n  and the q u a l i t y  o f  investm ent. 
In  c h ap te r  fo u r ,  an a ttem pt i s  made to t e s t ,  from econom etric  p o in t  
o f  view, the  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  p o l ic y  between d i v i ­
dend and r e t e n t io n  and to  e s t a b l i s h  a q u a n t i tave e s t im a te  between 
tax  savings and the volume o f  investm ent.
5*2 The Main C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the  Greek Taxation
5 .2 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
In g e n e r a l , f i s c a l  p o l ic y  can be used as a means o f  improving 
income d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  s t a b i l i z i n g  the  economy, promoting growth and
ach ie v in g  re g io n a l  o b je c t iv e s .  F i s c a l  p o l ic y  has p layed  a s i g n i f i ­
can t r o l e  in  Greece s in ce  1955- Both ta x a t io n  and government expen­
d i tu r e s  have been e x te n s iv e ly  used  to ach ieve  c e r t a i n  p o l ic y  o b je c t ­
iv e s ,  F is c a l  p o l ic y  was used  i n c i d e n t a l l y  as a means o f  improving 
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income whereas s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p o l i c y  was a su b s id ­
i a r y  o f  growth p o l ic y .  T h e re fo re ,  the  p r in c ip a l  aim of f i s c a l  p o l ic y  
was to promote economic growth by in c re a s in g  the p ro d u c t iv e  c a p a c i ty  
arid p r o d u c t iv i ty  o f  th e  c o u n try  through investm en t.  The second main 
o b je c t iv e  o f  f i s c a l  p o l ic y  was to reduce re g io n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s .  Firms 
e s t a b l i s h e d  in  c e r t a i n  reg io n s  enjoyed l a r g e r  tax  exemptions. In  
a d d i t io n ,  the  government undertook  a number o f  investm ent p r o j e c t s  
and prov ided  s u b s id ie s  as  a  means o f  in c re a s in g  the income o f th e se  
r e g io n s .
5 .2 ,2  The Greek Tax S t r u c tu r e
"The one simple g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  which can be made about Greek 
ta x a t io n  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  ex trem ely  com plicated" (G,Break and E .Turvey,
1964 ) .
In  g e n e ra l ,  each t a x a t io n  system depends on the  h i s t o r i c a l ,  
s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  and economic enviroment of th e  coun try  b u t the  system 
to  be e f f e c t i v e  must be t a i l o r e d  c a r e f u l l y  to  the p r e c u l i a r  circum­
s tan c e s  and o b je c t iv e s  o f  t h a t  co u n try .  Taxation as th e  p r in c ip a l  
in s trum en t o f  f i s c a l  p o l ic y  had v a r io u s  economic and s o c i a l  o b je c t ­
ives  in  Greece. Under the fo rm er, t a x a t io n  had to  produce enough 
revenue f o r  f in a n c in g  investm ent programmes and to ach ieve  an e f f i c ­
i e n t  re so u rce  a l l o c a t i o n  by prom oting d e s i r a b le  types  of investm ent and 
d isco u rag in g  m is d i re c t io n  o f  funds. Under the  second o b je c t iv e ,  tax ­
a t io n  had to e l im in a te  income i n e q u a l i t i e s  through a p ro g re s s iv e  p e r ­
sona l tax  s t r u c t u r e .
The p re s e n t  tax  s t r u c t u r e  was e s ta b l i s h e d  in  1955. Once the 
means and methods o f t a x a t io n  were e s t a b l i s h e d ,  however, i t  can gener­
a l l y  be s a id  th a t  t a x a t io n  became p r im a r i ly  a q u e s t io n  o f  p e r io d i c a l ly  
in c re a s in g  or d ec rea s in g  the  burden r a t h e r  than  m odifying the b as ic  
s t r u c t u r e .  The main e lem ents  o f  the Greek tax  s t r u c t u r e  a r e ,  the 
predominance o f  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s ,  the absence of a c a p i t a l  g a in s  tax ,  
the  minor c o n t r ib u t io n  of ta x e s  on wealth  and f i n a l l y  the  c o rp o ra t io n
income tax  combined w ith  the u se  o f  tax  in c e n t iv e s .
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the  Greek tax  s t r u c t u r e  
i s  th e  degree o f  r e l i a n c e  p laced  on i n d i r e c t  tax es  to p rov ide  revenue.
Table 5-1 (n ex t  page) shows t h a t  the  share  of i n d i r e c t  taxes  in  t o t ­
a l  government tax  revenue remained a lm ost c o n s ta n t  and ve ry  c lo se  to 
60 pe r  c en t .  This share  had th e  s m a l le s t  c o n t r ib u t io n  du ring  the cu r­
r e n t  decade. I t  took the minimum va lue  (52 p e r  c e n t ) ,  in  1974. This 
i s  due to  the f a c t  t h a t  in  1974 th e  government imposed an e d t r a  income 
tax  to  cover m i l i t a r y  ex p en d itu res  because o f  the Cyprus war.
Various e x p la n a t io n s  may be given to  t h i s  s t r i k i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s ­
t i c  o f  the Greek tax  s t r u c t u r e .  F i r s t ,  the  s t r u c tu r e  o f th e  Greek 
economy, i t  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  l a rg e  number o f  sm all economic u n i t s  which 
would ren d e r  the  c o s t  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  taxes  h ig h , in  comparison w ith  
the  tax  revenue. In  a d d i t io n ,  income from a g r i c u l tu r e  i s  tax  f r e e  
f o r  v a r io u s  h i s t o r i c a l ,  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  re a so n s .  Most im port­
a n t ly  the  government uses  t h i s  in c e n t iv e  as a means o f  a t t r a c t i n g  the 
p o p u la t io n  to  remain in  the p ro v in c e s .  Moreover, the a sse ssm e n t , c o l l ­
e c t io n  e t c .  o f  such a l a rg e  number o f  sm all i n d i v i d u a l ' s  income would 
invo lve  a h igh  c o s t  f o r  the  government. I t  is  b e l ie v e d  th a t  the  
g rad u a l  in c re a s e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  income w i l l  enable  the  government to 
in c re a se  the  share  o f  d i r e c t  taxes  in  the f u tu r e .
The la rg e  e x te n t  o f  ta x  ev as io n  and tax  avoidance i s  th e  second 
reaso n  f o r  the h igh  share  o f  i n d i r e c t  ta x es ,  a r e c e n t  s tudy  made f o r  
the  Centre o f  P lan n in g  and Economic Research reco g n izes  t h a t  an amount 
only  around one t h i r d  o f  income i s  tax ed , whereas the r e s t  escapes  
ta x a t io n  ^KEPE, 1976), This i s  due to  the psychology o f  the  Greek 
tax  p ay er ,  the  predominance o f  sm all u n i t s  and the  i n e f f i c i e n t  o r ­
g a n iz a t io n  and fu n c t io n  o f  the  tax  mechanism. U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  tax  
evasion  and avoidance no t on ly  le a d  to  a h igh share  o f  i n d i r e c t  tax es  
bu t they a ls o  have u n d e s i r a b le  e f f e c t s  on the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income. 
Since more ta x  evas ion  means l e s s  revenue from d i r e c t  tax es  t h i s  i n ­
duces th e  government to  in c re a se  i n d i r e c t  taxes  with the a n t i s o c i a l  
r e s u l t  o f  p re v e n t in g  the  government o f  reduc ing  taxes  l e v ie d  on low- 
income c l a s s e s .  During the  whole p e r io d  under review the  Greek 
a u t h o r i t i e s  made s e r io u s  e f f o r t s  to reduce tax  evas ion  u n s u c c e ss fu l .
A.S the main sources of tax evasion may be con-
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1950 4,860 1,611 5,249 0.66
51 6,040 2,531 3,509 0.58
55 12,430 5,254 7,196 0 .58
60 20,008 7,926 12,082 0.60
65 39,197 15,392 23,805 0 .60
1970 74,511 31,105 43,406 0.58
71 82,877 36,044 46,833 0 ,5 6
72 94,029 41,503 52,526 0 .5 6
73 114,216 49,390 64,826 0,57
74 136,935 65,373 71,562 0 .52
75 107,265 72,027 95,238 0 .57
76 222,217 102,963 119,254 0 .54
77 266,080 113,480 147,600 0.55
Source: National Accounts of Greece, Table 4,
s id e r e d  income from p r o f i t s  and from p ro fe s s io n a l  e a rn in g s  such as  
p h y s ic ian s  and s o l i c i t o r s .
F in a l ly ,  the  tax  s t r u c t u r e  has been bad ly  eroded by o u t r i g h t  
ex c lu s io n s  and p a r t i a l  ta x  exemptions. These in c lu d e  p a r t  o f  the n e t  
income o f  j o u r n a l i s t s ,  a c to r s  and a r t i s t s ,  i n t e r e s t  earned  on bank 
d e p o s i t s  and government bonds e t c .  I t  has been argued t h a t  most o f  
th e se  p ro v is io n s  do no t serve  any economic purpose , in  c o n t r a s t ,  
some of th e se  have u n d e s i r a b le  e f f e c t s ,  f o r  example, the  f a c t  th a t  
d iv idends  a re  taxed  whereas i n t e r e s t  i s  t a x - f r e e  d i s t o r t s  the  c a p i t a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  f i rm s .  Concluding, we should  n o t ic e  t h a t  whereas 
the  p e r  c a p i t a  income in  Greece fo llow s an upward tren d  which l i e s  
between 5 and 10 p e r  cen t a n n u a l ly  the ba lance  between d i r e c t  and in ­
d i r e c t  tax es  over the  p e r io d  has remained almost unchanged,
A second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the  Greek ta x a t io n  i s  the  absence of 
a c a p i t a l  ga ins  ta x ,  Whereas most c o u n t r ie s  c o n s id e r  c a p i t a l  ga ins  
as tax ab le  income, th e  Greek d e f i n i t i o n  o f  income excludes  them.
Only c a n i t a l  g a in s  g en e ra ted  from th e  s a le  o f  goodw ill o r  p a te n t s  
s u b je c t  to c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x .  ^ tax  on t r a n s f e r s  o f  r e a l  p ro p e r ty  
p lay s  th e  ro le  o f  a p a r t i a l  s u b s t i t u t e  of a c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x .  How­
e v e r ,  k ro fe s s o r  hracos  argues  t h a t  th i s  i s  no t a good reason  f o r  the 
absence o f  a c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x ,  f o r  a-number o f  reasons (G.Dracos, 
1976) .  F i r s t l y ,  t h i s  tax  i s  concerned only  w ith  the ta x a t io n  o f  r e a l  
p ro p e r ty  and i t  i s  n o t  le v ie d  upon a l l  the  k inds o f  c a p i t a l  g a in s .  
Second, a lthough  th i s  tax  i s  le v ie d  on the s e l l e r  i t  is  pa id  by the  
buyer. T h ird , as tax  base i s  cons ide red  the  value o f  the  immovable 
p ro p e r ty  and not the c a p i t a l  g a in s ,  t h a t  i s ,  the  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
the p r i c e  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n  and s a le  p r i c e .  The absence o f  a c a p i t a l  - 
gains tax  c o n t r ib u te s  to h ig h e r  ta x  ev as io n , p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  from ga ins  
g en era ted  from immovable p ro p e r ty  and s to ck  sh a re s .  Second, the ex­
c lu s io n  of income g en e ra ted  from c a p i t a l  gains from th e  tax  base and 
s in ce  i t  i s  b e l ie v e d  th a t  the r e c i p i e n t s  o f  these  belong to high in ­
come c l a s s e s ,  ren d e rs  the  income tax  s t r u c t u r e  l e s s  f a i r .
Taxes on w ealth  in  Greece a re  a lso  r e l a t i v e l y  un im p o rtan t ,  
r a i s i n g  under 2 p e r  cent o f  t o t a l  tax  y i e l d .  I n h e r i t a n c e ,  g i f t  and 
dowery d u t ie s  a re  the main form o f  w ealth  t a x a t io n .  The tax  r a t e  
v a r i e s  accord ing  to  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  decendent and the
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r e c i p i e n t ,  the  c lo s e r  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them the lower the
ta x  r a t e .  However, th e se  ta x es  can be avoided by a number o f  l e g a l
(or i l l e g a l )  d e v ic e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  when the v a lu a t io n  o f  a s s e t s  i s  in ­
vo lved . There i s  no annual ta x  on w ealth  in  Greece.
The p e rso n a l  income tax  system i s  s a id  to be p ro g r e s s iv e ,  
t h a t  i s ,  the h ig h e r  the  income re c e iv e d  the  g r e a t e r  the p ro p o r t io n  o f  
th a t  income p a id  in  ta x .  In  1976, the  range o f  m arg ina l ta x  r a t e s  ex­
tends from 3 to  60 p e r  c e n t .  However, a l l  the  f a c to r s  mentioned above 
make the  d e s i r a b le  p r o g r e s s i v i t y  v e ry  v u ln e ra b le .  I t  has been argued 
t h a t  the  e f f e c t i v e  income tax  r a t e s  a re  l e s s  than the nominal income 
ta x  r a t e s ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  ta x  evas ion  combined w ith  the  la ck  o f  c a p i ­
t a l  g a in s  tax  and w ealth  t a x e s .  This has been used a s  an arguement
in  favour o f  red u c in g  the nominal income tax  r a t e  which may le ad  to 
l e s s  tax  evas ion .
On over a l l  the  Greek ta x  system i s  complex but r e l a t i v e l y  
p r im i t i v e .  I t s  main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i s  th e  predominance o f  i n d i r e c t  
t a x e s .  The l im i te d  r o le  o f  d i r e c t  tax es  and the  tax  evas ion  make i t  
no t e q u i ta b le ,
3 ,3 THE GREEK CORPORATION INCOME TAX
3 ,3 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
Greece t r e a t s  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  w ith  a method d i f f e r e n t  to  every  
o th e r  coun try . The CIT i s  l e v ie d  on ly  on r e ta in e d  p r o f i t s  whereas d iv ­
idends a re  taxed  under the  p e rso n a l  income tax  r u l e s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  
Greece, e a r ly  in  195G, s t a r t e d  u s in g  tax  in c e n t iv e s  as a means of 
ach iev in g  and promoting economic growth,
A tax on c o rp o ra te  income was le v ie d  fo r  f i r s t  time in  Greece 
in  1877. The p re s e n t  c o rp o ra t io n  income tax  system was in tro d u ced  in  
1958. Revenue from CIT in  Greece i s  shown in  ta b le  5 .2 .  Corporate 
tax  revenue exp ressed  as a pe rcen tage  o f  g ross  domestic p roduct was 
never h ig h e r  than  one p e r  c en t  during  the  p e r io d  1958-1^75. I t s  con­
t r i b u t i o n  to  the  t o t a l  ta x  revenue ranged from 1 ,9  to 5 .1  p e r  cent 
during  the same p e r io d .  F i r s t  reason  f o r  th is  i s  the  e x is te n c e  o f  ta x  
exemptions, tax  evasion  and sm all co rp o ra te  s e c to r .  In  a developing  
economy, l i k e  the  Greek, where c o rp o ra te  income is  l i k e l y  to become
~ y o -
T A B L E  3. 2
Corporate Tax Revenue in Greece
Year TotalAmount
As a ^ 
of to ta l  
Tax Revenue
As a ^ 
of D irect 
Taxes.
As a ^ 
of GDP,
1958 515,45 2,5 11.3 0 .37
59 246 .1 2 .0 9.7 0 .28
60 250.6 1.9 9*5 0 .2 7
61 328.4 2 . 1 10.1 0 .31
62 368.5 2 .1 10.2 0.53
65 379.9 2 .0 10.5 0 .50
64 478.3 2.2 10.7 0 .34
65 565,6 2 .2 12,5 0.35
66 637.0 2 . 0 11,2 0 .3 6
67 758.0 2 .1 10.2 0.39
68 740 .5 1 .8 8 .5 0 . 3 6
69 720.2 1.5 7.5 0 .31
TO 983.4 1.9 9.0 0 .38
71 1 , 173 .9 2.0 8.9 0 .4 1
72 3 ,005 .7 4.5 19.2 0 .9 1
75 2 , 679,3 3.3 14.2 0.62
74 4 ,943 .0 5.1 17.3 0 .9 6
75 4 ,690 .8 3.8 15.8 0.78
Source: M inistry o f Finance, General Book-keeper's o ffic e ,
o f  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  s ig n i f ic a n c e  in  n a t io n a l  income, the importance 
o f  CIT as revenue source may he expected  to in c re a se  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
in  a b so lu te  terms and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the  Greek case where adm ini­
s t r a t i v e  problems have r e t a r t e d  the development o f  the  p e rso n a l  i n ­
come ta x ,  p robab ly  in  r e l a t i v e  terms as p a r t  o f  d i r e c t  ta x  revenue .
More imp o r tan  t(y than r a i s i n g  revenue, in  Greece, c o rp o ra t io n  
income tax  f u l f i l s  a v i t a l  r o l e  in  the  o b je c t iv e  o f  promoting growth. 
Since th e  Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  p u t  as f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  to promote growth 
du ring  the l a s t  twenty f iv e  y e a rs  they used co rp o ra te  t a x a t io n  as the  
main dev ice  to  ach ieve  t h i s  t a r g e t .  The Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  used c o r ­
p o ra te  ta x e s ,  e i t h e r  f o r  inducing  domestic f irm s to in c re a se  c a p i ­
t a l  form ation  or f o r  a t t r a c t i n g  fo r e ig n e r s  to  c o n t r ib u te  to t h i s  
e f f e c t ,  Greece ach ieved  a v e ry  s a t i s f a c t o r y  r a t e  o f  growth du rin g  
the  p e r io d  under c o n s id e ra t io n .  Moreover, we could p re l im in a ry  say 
t h a t  the  c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  c o rp o ra te  t a x a t io n  to Greek economic growth 
was s a t i s f a c t o r y  as w e l l .
Before d is c u s s in g  the  main s t r u c t u r a l  f e a tu re s  o f  th e  Greek 
co rp o ra te  t a x a t io n  we f in d  u s e f u l  to d iscu ss  the  le g a l  env iron ­
ment w ith in  an e n t e r p r i s e ,  dom estic  o r  fo r e ig n ,  makes b u s in ess  in  
Greece, Emphasis i s  g iven  to  the  tax  trea tm en t o f  the v a r io u s  le g ­
a l  forms o f  e n t e r p r i s e s .
5 . 3.2  The Legal Environment
The le g a l  forms under which b u s in ess  may be o p e ra ted  in  Greece 
range from th e  in d iv id u a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  to one o f  the  s e v e ra l  forms o f  
companies reco g n ised  by law. Business o p e ra t io n s  can m ainly take 
fo u r  le g a l  forms, c o rp o ra t io n ,  l im i te d  l i a b i l i t y  company, gen era l  
(o r  common; p a r te r a h ip  and l im i t e d  p a r tn e rsh ip *
The o rg a n iz a t io n  and o p e ra t io n  o f  a c o rp o ra t io n  in Greece i s  
based on the p ro v is io n s  o f  law 2190/192Ü, a s  amended and supplemented 
by law decree 4257/1962. 'iVo or more p e rso n s ,  Greek o r a l i e n ,  may 
form a c o rp o ra t io n .  The minimum amount of c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e d  i s  
5,000,000 Brs f u l l y  p a id - in  a t  the  time of e s tab lish m en t o f  the c o r ­
p o ra t io n .  The c a p i t a l  i s  d iv id e d  in to  shares  which may be e i t h e r  
t r a n s f e r a b l e  or r e g i s t e r e d .  P r e f e r r e d  shares  may be is su e d  under
c e r t a i n  c o n d i t io n s  as w e l l .  Shares and bonds of Greek c o rp o ra t io n s  
may be l i s t e d  on the  Athens Stock Exchange (A.S.E) i f  c e r t a i n  con­
d i t io n s  a re  s a t i s f i e d .  The c o rp o ra t io n  i s  co n s id e red  by the  law as a 
l e g a l  e n t i t y  d i s t i n c t  a p a r t  from i t s  sh a re h o ld e rs .  The l a t t e r  a re  
s u b je c t  to  l im i te d  l i a b i l i t y  in  an amount equal to t h e i r  c o n t r ib u ­
t io n  c a p i t a l .
The o rg a n iz a t io n  and o p e ra t io n  o f  a  l im i te d  l i a b i l i t y  company 
i s  based on law 319G/1 955  as  amended and supplemented su b seq u en tly .  
Two o r  more p e rso n s ,  Greek o r  a l i e n ,  may form a l im i te d  l i a b i l i t y  
company. The minimum amount o f  c a p i t a l  re q u ire d  is  200,000 D rs . ,  
payable  a t  the  time o f e s ta b l ish m e n t  o f  the company. The t r a n s f e r  
of sh a re s  i s  p e rm is s ib le  on ly  i f  i t  i s  allowed by the  c h a r t e r  and i s  
made only  by a n o t a r i a l  a c t .  F i n a l ly ,  each p a r tn e r  i s  l i a b l e  to the 
e x te n t  o f  h is  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  the c a p i t a l .
The o th e r  two l e g a l  forms o f  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  g en e ra l  o r  l im i te d  
p a r t e r s h ip  a re  governed by both  the  commercial law and the c i v i l  
law . Two o r  more p e rso n s ,  Greek o r a l i e n ,  may form a g e n e ra l  or 
l im i te d  p a r t e r s h i p . The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  th ese  is  the  d i f f e r ­
en t  l i a b i l i t y  o f  the  pe rsons  who c o n s t i t u t e  them. 'The genera l  p a r t ­
n e r  i s  u n l i r a i te d ly  l i a b l e  to th e  f u l l  ex ten t  o:f h is  ^herj p e rso n a l  
p ro p e r ty  fo r  the  d e a l in g s  of the  p a r tn e r s h ip  whereas the  l im i te d  
p a r tn e r  i s  l i a b l e  on ly  to  the e x te n t  o f  h is  (he r)  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  
i t s  c a p i t a l .  There i s  no minimum c a p i t a l  requ irem en t.
From ta x a t io n  p o in t  o f  view the n e t  p r o f i t s  of l im i te d  l i a ­
b i l i t y  companies and p a r tn e r s h ip s  a re  tax ab le  as p e rso n a l  income of 
the p a r tn e r s .  I f  th e se  p r o f i t s  a re  r e in v e s te d  in  the  b u s in ess  and 
f u l f i l  c e r t a in  c o n d i t io n s  they  a re  t a x - f r e e .  However, c o rp o ra te  
income i s  l i a b l e  to  the CiT whose main s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
a re  d iscu ssed  in  the nex t s e c t io n ,
3 . 5 .5  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the G . l .T .
3 . 5 *5 . !  The Tax Base
The Greek CIT f a l l s  on ly  on r e t e n t i o n ,  namely, i t  i s  our 
f a m i l i a r  dividend p a id  deduction  system, d esc ribed  in  the prev ious 
c h a n te r .  The tax ab le  base f o r  a c o rp o ra t io n ,  as f a r  an in d iv id u a l ,
i s  the  sum of i t s  income under seven c a te g o r ie s  -  from b u i ld in g s ,  
la n d , movable c a p i t a l ,  commercial and i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a g r i ­
c u l tu r e ,  employment and l i b e r a l  p ro fe s s io n s  -  a f t e r  the  deductions  o f  
the  expenses which were in c u r re d  in  c r e a t in g  th a t  income, and a f t e r  
the v a r io u s  arrangem ents  fo r  s p e c ia l  c a p i t a l  a llow ances. Among the 
d e d u c t ib le  expenses a re  wages, r e n t ,  i n t e r e s t  p a id ,  the  expense fo r  
the maintenance and r e p a i r  o f  machinery and o f  b u s in es s  i n s t a l l a t ­
io n s ,  the  va lue  o f  raw m a te r i a l s ,  bad d e b ts ,  the d e p r e c ia t io n  f o r  
wear and t e a r  o f  a s s e t s  and m achinery, c e r t a i n  g i f t s  e t c .  D iv i­
dends pa id  to  s h a re h o ld e r s ,  rem uneration  and allow ances o f  members 
o f  board o f  d i r e c t o r s  and e x t r a  payments and allow ances to company 
d i r e c t o r s  and managers a re  d e d u c t ib le  a s  expenses. T h e re fo re ,  r e ­
s id e n t  c o rp o ra t io n s  a re  s u b je c t  to CIT on t h a t  p a r t  of p r o f i t s  which 
i s  n o t  d i s t r i b u t e d  o r  in c lu d ed  in  t a x - f r e e  r e s e rv e s .
At the  same time a number of s i g n i f i c a n t  p ro v is io n s  a re  g ran ­
te d ,  Net o p e ra t in g  lo s s e s  may be s e t  o f f  a g a in s t  p r o f i t s  r e a l i z e d  
by the  c o rp o ra t io n  d u r in g  the subsequent f iv e  years  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  
and mining c o rp o ra t io n s  and two y ears  fo r  commercial and a g r i c u l ­
t u r a l  ones. On the o th e r  hand, c a p i t a l  ga ins  r e a l i z e d  o r n o t  on 
a s s e t s  h e ld  a re  n o t taxed . I n t e r e s t  from d e p o s i t s  ( s i g h t  o r  sav ings)  
p laced  w ith Greek banks o r  b ranches o f  fo re ig n  banks, o r /an d  i n t e r e s t  
from government loads  o r  from loans  is su ed  by p u b lic  e n te r p r i s e s  
(p u b l ic  power c o rp o ra t io n  o r  Greek te lephone o rg a n iz a t io n )  i s  ex­
empt, Intercompany d iv idends a re  tax ab le  income f o r  the  r e c i p i e n t  
c o rp o ra t io n  s in ce  th e re  i s  a w ith h o ld in g  tax  w ithheld  by th e  payer 
c o rp o ra t io n ,  Greece, fo r  the f i r s t  time in  1972, in tro d u ced  incen­
t i v e s  fo r  s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a rc h .  Expenses f o r  re se a rc h  and develop­
ment a re  deducted bu t the amount should no t be h ig h e r  than lu  p e r  
cen t o f  n e t  p r o f i t s  in  a given a d m in is t r a t iv e  p e r io d  du ring  which 
such expenses took p la ce .
Most im p o r tan t ly ,  generous p ro v is io n s  a re  made f o r  c a p i t a l  in  
the  form o f  in c e n t iv e s  and l i b e r a l  d e p re c ia t io n  methods a re  used.
I t  i s  worth drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n  between normal d e p re c ia t io n  and 
a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n .  Under the  former the  allowance cannot ex- 
eed the o r i g i n a l  c o s t  of the  c a p i t a l  a s s e t  and i t  i s  designed 
p r im a r i ly  not to p rov ide  an in c e n t iv e  but to some e x te n t  to provide
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a r e a l i s t i c  measure o f  ta x a b le  income. The l a s t  decades a c c e le ­
r a t e d  d e p re c ia t io n  has been used  as a  f i s c a l  device  e i t h e r  to  s tim u­
l a t e  investm ent in  g en e ra l  o r  to  channel funds to  s p e c i f i c  types  o f  
investm en t.  This a llow s the  tax  w r i t e - o f f  fo r  wearing ou t of a c a p i ­
t a l  a s s e t  in  a p e r io d  s h o r t e r  than the  a c tu a l  p h y s ic a l  wearing ou t o r  
abso lence  o f  the a s s e t .  I t  i s  a ve ry  s t ro n g  device  in  the  hands of 
the  government in  th e  sence th a t  i t  i s  l i k e l y  to s t im u la te  investm ent 
in  two ways. F i r s t ,  i t  a llow s companies to  postpone payment o f  ta x .  
This p rov ides  companies w ith  two b e n e f i t s ,  e i t h e r  they  have the  chance 
to use th e se  funds f o r  o th e r  purposes in  the in te r im  time or to bene­
f i t  in  time o f  i n f l a t i o n  s in ce  the  even tual payment i s  sm a lle r  than 
i f  no a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n  would e x i s t .  Second, a c c e le r a te d  de­
p r e c i a t i o n  may in c re a se  the  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of r i s k y  a s s e t s  s in c e  the 
in v e s to r  i s  ab le  to re c e iv e  h i s  money back soonl
In  Greece, bo th  types o f  d e p re c ia t io n  have been u sed . In the 
p e r io d  1919-1958 companies were allow ed to chose t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  r a t e s  
o f  d e p re c ia t io n .  In 1959, the Greek a u t h o r i t i e s ,  in tro d u ced  c e e l in g s  
o f  d e p re c ia t io n .  F in a l ly ,  in  1971, annual d e p re c ia t io n  became compul­
so ry  and in  1975 , new h ig h e r  d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s  were in tro d u ced .
Under the c u r r e n t  system , th e se  a re  c a lc u la te d  on the h i s t o r i c  
c o s t  of a s s e t s  and the method o f  s t r a i g h t  l in e  d e p re c ia t io n  i s  a p p l i ­
c a b le ,  Since f irm s a re  fo rced  to use h igh d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s  i t  i s  
v e ry  common to have ba lance  sh e e ts  w ith  l a rg e  d e p re c ia t io n  deductions  
and small o r  n eg a t iv e  p r o f i t s .  In  o th e r  words, we have an u n r e a l i s ­
t i c  " ta x ab le  income" as we mentioned e a r l i e r .  In  a d d i t io n  to t h a t  the 
in t r o d u c t io n  of compulsory h igh  d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s  may le ad  to  in cen ­
t i v e  l o s t  u n le ss  i f  the h igh compulsory d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s  a re  accom­
panied  by no s u f f i c i e n t  generous lo s s  c a r ry -o v e rs  p ro v is io n s  to o f f ­
s e t ,  the  above mentioned, c re a te d  p r o f i t s  in  o th e r  y e a r s .  A number of 
tax  in c e n t iv e s  - schemes i s  d iscu ssed  in  the appendix o f  th is  chap­
t e r .
5 .5 ,5 i2  Tax Rates
I t  i s  a common p r a c t i c e  f o r  co rp o ra te  income to be taxed  a t  a 
f l a t  r a t e  on the grounds t h a t  c o rp o ra t io n s  have no " a b i l i t y  to p ay " , 
in  the same sence as in d iv id u a ls  do. The Greek UlT conforms to  t h i s  
g e n e ra l  p r a c t i c e ,  in  t h a t  r a t e  i s  the  same fo r  both la rg e  and sm all
-1 0 1 -
c o r p o r a t io n s , and fo r  l a r g e  and sm all le v e l s  o f  c o rp o ra te  income.
The r a t e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  the  UIT c o n s i s t s  o f  a normal ta x  oh the 
tax ab le  income and a s u r ta x  i s  le v ie d  in  favour o f  th e  fa rm e r 's  soc­
i a l  in su rance  fund, which is  i t s e l f  deducted as  an expense in  the 
y e a r  o f  income. The ta x  r a t e  i s  4u p e r  cen t f o r  c o rp o ra t io n s  whose 
sh ares  a re  n o t l i s t e d  on the  A.S.E and 55 p e r  c en t  f o r  those  whose 
sh ares  a re  l i s t e d  on th e  A .S.E . The s u r ta x  r a t e  i s  15 p e r  cen t o f  
the  above mentioned r a t e s  so th a t  tl% f i n a l  tax  r a t e s  a re  43*40 and 
38,24 p e r  c en t  co rre sp o n d in g ly ?  The d i f f e r e n t i a l  t re a tm en t between 
c o rp o ra t io n s  whose sh a res  a re  l i s t e d  on the A.S.E and those  whose 
sh ares  a re  no t i s  g iven as an in c e n t iv e  to a t t r a c t  the  fam ily  con­
cern  c o rp o ra t io n s  to  the  A.S.E as a source o f  funds .
The tax  i s  p a id  in  s ix  equa l in s ta lm e n ts ,  the f i r s t  to be p a id  
upon submission o f th e  income d e c la r a t io n ,  A d isco u n t 10 per* cen t o f  
ta x  is  p rov ided  i f  th e  t o t a l  amount o f  ta x  i s  p a id  w ith in  the  p e r io d  
the  f i r s t  in s ta lm en t  is  due. The b e n e f i t  from t h i s  ta x  d isco u n t  is  .
t a x - f r e e .  An advance payment f o r  the  ta x  a p p l ie s  to a l l  l e g a l  p e r ­
sons and i s  f ig u re d  on the b a s is  o f  50 p e r  cen t of the CIT p a id  and 
the tax  w ithhe ld  on d iv idend  in  the  p rev ious  y ea r ,  in  the case  of 
overpayment a refund i s  made,
A bus iness  tax  i s  le v ie d  on wages and s a l a r i e s  p a id  by f irm s
o p e ra t in g  in  the d i s t r i c t  o f  A t t i c a  w ith an annual p a y ro l l  o f over
180,000 Drs. There i s  no n e t  w ealth  tax  le v ie d  on c o rp o ra t io n s .  A 
r e a l  e s t a t e  tax  was in tro d u ced  by Law 11/1975 a p p l ic a b le  to  land and 
b u i ld in g  but i t  was ab o lish ed  n ex t  y e a r ,
3 . 3 . 3 .3 Dividend Taxation
As d e sc r ib e d  above d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  a re  n o t  s u b je c t  to CIT 
bu t the company w ithho lds  the  co rrespond ing  in d iv id u a l  income tax  
and g ives  t h a t  to the  government. T here fo re , the only  l i n k  between 
the co rp o ra t io n  and p e rso n a l  income tax  i s  th e  requ irem en t on a c o r ­
p o ra t io n  to a c t  as a w ithho ld ing  agen t f o r  in d iv id u a l  income tax  due 
on d iv idend  and i n t e r e s t  income p a id  the c o rp o ra t io n .  This w ith ­
ho ld ing  tax  i s  used , as we exp la in ed  in  the p rev ious  c h a p te r ,  as a 
means of f i g h t in g  tax  ev as io n .  The s h a reh o ld e r  counts the w ithheld
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amount as a c r e d i t  a g a in s t  h i s  f i n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y *  According to  the 
law 542/1977  the tax  payer i s  e n t i t l e d  to a p e r  company exemption o f  
15,000  Drs. and an o v e r a l l  exemption o f 60,000  D rs . These exemptions 
a re  p rov ided  to  d iv idend  income g en e ra ted  from sh a res  l i s t e d  on the 
A .S .E .,  as a means o f  induc ing  in v e s to r s  to in v e s t  on s tock  sh ares  
l i s t e d  on A.S.E.
The c o rp o ra t io n  w ithho lds  38 p e r  cen t fo r  r e g i s t e r e d  sh ares  
and 41 p e r  c en t  fo r  b e a re r  sh ares  bo th  quoted w ith  the A.S.E whereas 
th e se  r a t e s  a re  co rre sp o n d in g ly  45 and 47 p e r  c e n t  fo r  d iv idends 
from shares  no t quoted w ith  the  A .S.E . For d iv idends  from b e a re r  
sh a res  not quoted w ith  the  A.S.E. the  47 p e r  cen t ta x  r a t e  i s  the 
f i n a l  tax  r a t e  l e v ie d  on them whereas f o r  d iv idends  from the o th e r  
types  of sh ares  the taxpaye r  has the  o p tio n  to in c o rp o ra te  o r  not 
th e se  with h i s  r e s t  income to be taxed  under th e  p ro g re s s iv e  pe rson­
a l  income tax  s c a l e .
The a p p ro p r ia t io n  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s  by the e n te r p r i s e  i s  r e g u l ­
a te d  by the law 219O /I929 , a r t i c l e  45* The g en e ra l  p rocedure  i s  as 
fo llo w s: f i r s t ,  5 p e r  cen t  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s  a re  pu t a s id e  f o r  normal
r e s e r v e s ,  second, an amount o f  p r o f i t s  eq u a l ,  a t  l e a s t ,  to  6 p e r  cent 
o f  the  p a id - in  c a p i t a l ,  i f  th e re  a re  enough p r o f i t s  o r  30 p e r  cen t o f  
the  t o t a l  p r o f i t s  i f  th ey  a re  l a r g e r  than 6 p e r  cen t o f  c a p i t a l  s tock , 
T hird , an amount determ ined  by the g en e ra l  meeting o f  the sh a reh o l­
ders  i s  h e ld  fo r  e x t r a  r e s e r v e s ,  f o u r th ,  an amount fo r  remune^ration 
o f  the board o f  d i r e c to r s  and f i n a l l y ,  a new amount i s  d isposed  as 
a  second d iv idend . The purpose o f  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  to p r o te c t  
the m in o r i ty  o f  the s h a reh o ld e rs  and second to  promote the i n s t i t u - .  
t io n  o f  the c o rp o ra t io n .
In  1974 , the Greek government in troduced  a law by which firm s 
were not allowed to d i s t r i b u t e  a h ig h e r  pe rcen tage  o f t h e i r  p r o f i t s  
than t h a t  s p e c i f ie d  by the law. This measure was a p a r t  o f  the 
a n t i f l a t i o n  p lan  to  reduce the  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  money in  the  m arket.
A few  months l a t e r  the new government ab o lish ed  th i s  law.
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5 .4  M  APPRAISAL OF THE G . l .T .
5 . 4 . 1  In t ro d u c t io n
CIT i s  im portan t to c o rp o ra t io n  in  Greece in  reg a rd  to  two 
d e c i s io n s ,  namely, f i n a n c i a l  and investm ent d e c i s io n s .  Under the  f o r ­
mer we w i l l  d is cu s s  the  impact o f  the  CIT upon tax  s p l i t t i n g  and c o r­
p o ra t io n  f in a n c in g  te chn iques  whereas under the  l a t t e r  the in f lu en c e  
o f  tax  in c e n t iv e s  upon investm ent w i l l  he d e a l t  w ith . The government 
may a f f e c t  investm ent through the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  funds and second, 
through the c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .  The f i r s t  may be ach ieved  by a ta x  d i s ­
c r im in a to ry  p o l ic y  between d i s t r i b u t e d  and u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  
whereas the second by p ro v id in g  v a r io u s  ta x  concess ions  r e l a t e d  to i n ­
vestm ent e x p en d i tu re s .
3 . 4*2 D isc r im in a to ry  Taxation  o f  d i s t r i b u t e d  r r o f i t s
We saw in  a p rev io u s  s e c t io n  how the Greek l e g i s l a t i o n  t r i e s  to  
a f f e c t  the a p p ro p r ia t io n  of p r o f i t s .  Moreover, i t  has been argued 
(G.Dracos, 1976, D .P s i lo s ,  I 964) t h a t  the  Greek CIT system favours  r e ­
te n t io n s  and t h a t  t h i s  se rv es  to in c re a se  investm en t.  On f i r s t  p o in t  
to  da te  th e re  has been no e n n i r i c a l  s tudy  o f  th e  d e te rm in an ts  o f  d i v i ­
dend behav iour in  Greece. One o f  th e  purposes o f  t h i s  dtudy i s  to  
cover t h i s  gap, t h a t  i s ,  to  t e s t  th e  above argument and to show wheth­
e r  the  CIT favours  r e t e n t i o n s .
The government may a f f e c t  th e  a p p ro p r ia t io n  of p r o f i t s  e i t h e r  
through the  ta x  s t r u c t u r e  p e r  se or through  the v a r io u s  p ro v is io n s .
The former case d e a ls  w ith  the  ta x  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between r e t e n t io n  
and d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  the  absence o f  c a p i t a l  gains tax  whereas the l a t t e r  
d e a ls  with tax  exemptions f o r  co v e r in g  fu tu re  lo s s e s ,  d e p re c ia t io n  
allow ances t a x - f r e e  r e s e rv e s  e t c ,  f o r  new investm en t.  This s e c t io n  
d e a ls  w ith  the  f i r s t  case  e .g .  the  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  p o l ic y  between 
div idend  and r e t e n t io n .  I f  r e t e n t io n s  lead  to c a p i t a l  g a in s  then i t  
i s  l i k e l y  the  sh areh o ld e r  w i l l  p r e f e r  lower d iv idends payments s in ce  
the c a p i t a l  gains income i s  t a x - f r e e .  In  a d d i t io n  to th a t  sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  w ith  high m arginal ta x  r a t e s  appears to th in k  o f  r e t e n t io n  
as a tax  s h e l t e r .  The impact of th e se  c o n s id e ra t io n s  seems to  be
s t ro n g e r  in  the case  o f  th e  Greek f irm s  where the  m a jo r i ty  of th ese  
a re  c lo s e ly  h e ld  c o rp o ra t io n s .  The e f f e c t  of the v a r io u s  p ro v is io n s  
mentioned above w i l l  be d is c u s se d  in  the  n ex t  s e c t io n .
We assume t h a t  the Greek f irm  i s  allowed to p u t  a s id e  20 p e r  
c en t  of n e t  p r o f i t s  as t a x - f r e e  r e s e r v e s .  The rem ain ing  80 p e r  c en t  
should be a l lo c a te d  between r e t e n t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The q u e s t ­
ion which a r i s e s  i s  how the  tax  system a f f e c t s  t h i s  a l l o c a t i o n .  In  
o th e r  words, under the  assumption t h a t  th e  CIT i s  n o t  s h i f t e d  how i s  
the  tax  a l lo c a te d  between r e t e n t i o n  and d iv idends?
We de fin e  as d is c r im in a to ry  v a r i a b le  6 the  o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t  o f  
r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s ,  in  terms o f  n e t  d iv idends  fo regone . I f  a co rp o r­
a t io n  d i s t r i b u t e s  1 Drs. then  0 i s  the  amount re c e iv e d  by the  sh a re ­
h o ld e r  and 1 - 6  i s  the  amount which goes to  ta x .  The d is c r im in a ­
to ry  v a r i a b le  might take th re e  s e t s  o f  v a lu e s :  0 equal to one means 
t h a t  the  tax  system i s  n e u t r a l  between r e t e n t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  
t h a t  i s ,  p r o f i t s  can be r e t a in e d  e i t h e r  by the  f irm  o r  by the  sh a re ­
h o ld e r  w ithou t a t t r a c t i n g  a d d i t io n a l  ta x a t io n ;  i f  9 i s  g r e a t e r  than 
one t h i s  means t h a t  the  ta x  system fav o u rs  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and f i n a l l y ,  
6 l e s s  than one means t h a t  the  tax  system favours  r e t e n t i o n s .  The
a d d i t io n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  p e r  u n i t  o f  n e t  d iv idends  i s  equal to 1 - 9  .
0
To e s t a b l i s h  the fo rm ula  f o r  e s t im a tin g  0 we denote by T the 
t o t a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y ,  t c  i s  th e  GIT r a t e ,  P i s  the  amount of p r o f i t s ,  
Gf i s  the  amount o f  d iv idend  b e fo re  the  deduction  of p e rso n a l  income 
ta x  and D the  amount o f  d iv idend a f t e r  payment a l l  ta x e s ,  bo th  c o r ­
p o ra te  and p e r s o n a l .  The t o t a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y  T , in  g e n e r a l ,  i s  
equal to the ta x  on t o t a l  o r o f i t s  p lu s  any a d d i t io n a l  tax  le v ie d  on 
d iv id en d s .  That i s ,
T .  to r  + 1_=_SL 2 (3.1J
Since gross  and n e t  d iv idends  a re  r e l a t e d  to w ith  the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  
D - ( l - t p )  G where tp  i s  the  r a t e  of p e rsona l income tax  of the  
sh a re h o ld e r ,  eq u a tio n  (5 .1 )  can be w r i t t e n  a s ,
T = tcP + ( l  g .y .(.1 -  tp )  .
0
We saw t h a t  th e  Greek ta x  system taxes  d iv idend  on ly  by th e  
p e rso n a l  income tax  r a t e .  Moreover, the t o t a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  i s  equal 
t o ,
T = t c  (P -  G) + tp  G
or. T = top + ( tp  -  t c )  G (3o3)
Both d e f i n i t i o n s  (3*2) and (3 .3 )  of t o t a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t i e s  were 
in tro d u ced  under the  assum ption t h a t  th e re  i s  no c a p i t a l  g a in s  tax  a s  
a p p l ie s  in  Greece*
From e q u a tio n s  (3 .2 )  and 3.5) we o b ta in :  
tp  -  to  .  (1 -  ,0 ) (1 tp)
o r ,  0 -  1 -  to
1 -  tc  (3 .4 )
E quation  (5 .4 )  p ro v id es  us w ith  th e  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r i a b l e  between
r e te n t io n s  and d iv id en d s .  This depends n e g a t iv e ly  on r a t e  of p e rsona l
income tax  and p o s i t i v e l y  on r a t e  o f  c o rp o ra te  income ta x .  We have 0 
equal to one when the  p e rso n a l  income tax  r a t e  i s  equal to co rp o ra te  
tax  r a t e ,  whereas 0 i s  g r e a t e r  th an  one when the l a t t e r  i s  g r e a t e r  
th an  the  former*
The main d i f f i c u l t y  as f a r  as i t s  c a l c u l a t i o n  i s  concerned i s  the
knowledge of p e rso n a l  tax  r a t e ,  tp .  I t  i s  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not im­
p o s s ib le ,  to know i t s  va lu e  f o r  every  s h a reh o ld e r ,  a  s tu d y  fo r  the 
ÏÏ.K, assumes t h a t  tp  i s  equal to the "b as ic  r a t e "  of income (M.Feld- 
s t e i n ,  1970) .  A b e t t e r  approxim ation  can be p rov ided  i f  a weighted 
average of the m arginal tax  r a t e s  i s  used .
The N atio n a l  S t a t i s t i c s  S e rv ice  o f  Greece p u b l ish e s  d a ta  with 
the number of taxpayers  d e c la re d  fam ily  income from each source and 
p e r  range o f  income* From t h i s  t a b le  we re c e iv e  d a ta  f o r  income from 
movable va lues  which in c lu d e s  a l l  th e  kind o f d i s t r i b u t e d  o r o f i t s  o f  
c o rp o ra t io n s  p lus  i n t e r e s t .  S in ce ,  the  l a t t e r  on d e p o s i ts  and bonds 
i s  t a x - f r e e  i t  i s  reaso n ab le  to assume t h a t  a ve ry  sm all percen tage  
o f  the amount o f  movable a s s e t s  r e p re s e n ts  income from i n t e r e s t .
This assumption was v e r i f i e d  in  p e rso n a l  co n v ersa t io n  w ith  Greek
o f f i c i a l s .  From the  t a b le  mentioned above we c o n s t r u c t  the  w eights 
o f  each range which i s  the  p ro p o r t io n  of each share  to  th e  t o t a l  in ­
come from movable v a lu e s .  Each weight was m u l t ip l ie d  by the  c o r r e s ­
ponding income range and the  a d d i t io n  o f  a l l  th ese  p ro d u c ts  give us 
the  weighted average m arg inal tax  r a t e .
Table ( 3 «5) r e p o r t s  the  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r i ­
ab le  '0 f o r  the p e r io d  1959-76. Column 1 prov ides  th e  weighted a v e r ­
age o f  the  m arginal tax  r a t e s  and column 2 the  modal o f  these  mar­
g in a l  tax  r a t e s .  Column 5 p ro v id es  the  CIT r a t e ,  which has remained 
s ta b le  over a long p e r io d ;  only  r e c e n t ly  have the  Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  
in c reased  t h i s  r a t e  from 55 p e r  cen t  to 4C p e r  c e n t .  F i n a l l y ,  u t i ­
l i z i n g  the  a p p ro p r ia te  form o f  9 ,  0 = 1 -  to  we c o n s t r u c t  c o l-
1 -  tc  ’
umns 4 and 5* From column 4 we s e e ,  in  g e n e ra l ,  t h a t  the v a lue  o f  0 
was v e ry  c lo se  to  one, which means t h a t  the  system was a lm ost n e u t r a l  
between r e t e n t i o n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n .  P a r t i c u l a r l y ,  in  10 y ears  out of 
18 the system was in  favour o f  r e t e n t i o n  where in  8 y ea rs  was in  f a v ­
our o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The sample average fo r  the whole p e r io d  was 
equal to 0.980, The movement from a va lue  le s s  than  one to  a h ig h e r  
than one fo r  the  p e r io d  1968-1974 aan be exp la in ed  as a r e s u l t  o f  the 
in t r o d u c t io n  o f Law I 48/ I 967 which gave some p ro v is io n s  as f a r  as  d i v i ­
dend i s  concerned. The purpose of th e se  p ro v is io n s ,  as we saw e a r l i e r ,  
was to support  the development o f  the Greek C a p i ta l  M arket, A c lo s e r  
comparison between the v a lu es  o f  0 above and below one allows us to 
conclude th a t  the  system, in  g e n e ra l ,  was n e u t r a l  between d iv idend  
and r e t e n t i o n .  T h e re fo re ,  the ba lance  between r e t e n t io n  and d iv idend  
was s u f f i c i e n t l y  f irm  th a t  no emphasis was given n e i t h e r  on d iv idend  
nor on r e t e n t io n .
5 . 4 .1*1 C r i t iq u e  o f  T axation  of Dividends
The Greek system of d iv idend  ta x a t io n  can be c r i t i c i s e d  in  
th re e  r e s p e c ts  fo r  la c k  o f  e q u i ty  or e f f i c i e n c y .  F i r s t ,  the d i f f e r ­
en t trea tm en t between r e ta in e d  and d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s ,  as we have 
j u s t  seen , has been v i r t u a l l y  n e u t r a l  between d iv idends  and r e t a in e d  
p r o f i t s ,  but the lack  of c a p i t a l  ga in s  tax  favours  r e t e n t i o n ,  which
■ t u /
T A B L E  3 . 3
Tax D isc r im in a to ry  V ar iab le  0
YEAR
M arginal Tax Corporate  Tax
Rates on Dividend Rate
Tax D isc r im in a to ry  
v a r i a b le  0
Mean Modal Mean Modal
( 1 ) ( 2 ) (5) (4) (5)
1959 58.5 59.0 55.0 0.9461 0.958
60 40 .0 59.0 35.0 0 .9250 0.958
61 58.0 59.0 55.0 0.9558 0.958
62 59.0 39.0 55.0 0.9584 0.958
65 59.5 59.0 55.0 0.9507 0.958
64 59.0 59.0 55.0 0.9584 • 0.938
65 54.0 32.0 55.0 1.0155 1.046
66 56,0 52 ,0  . 55.0 0 .9846 1 ,046
67 37.0 52.0 55.0 0.9692 1.046
68 52 .6 28.0 55.0 1.0369 1.1076
69 54.0 28.0 55.0 1.0155 1.1076
70 54.0 28.0 55.0 1.0155 1.1076
71 33.0 28.0 55.0 1.0307 1.1076
72 52.2 25.0 55.0 1.0450 1.1558
75 52 .0 2 5 .0 55.0 1,0461 I . I 5I 8
74 34.0 25 .0 55.0 1.0123 1.1558
75 45.5 59.0 55.0 0.8384 0.958
76 40 .8 27 .0 40 .0 0,9866 1.216
Source: Column ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) , (4) and (5j our c a l c u l a t i o n s .
Column (3) : Mini s t r y  of F inance,
- l u y
can be used  as  a tax  s h e l t e r .  At b e s t  i f  c o rp o ra te  sav ings a re  r a t ­
i o n a l ly  in v e s te d  then  th e re  i s  a compensation f o r  the  u n d e s i r a b le  e f ­
f e c t s ,  which the  absence of c a p i t a l  g a in s  ta x  c r e a t e s .  This d i s c r im i ­
n a t io n  produces two u n d e s i r a b le  e f f e c t s ;  f i r s t ,  i t  p ro v id e s  the  
dhareho lders  w ith  a tax  s h e l t e r ,  which i s  u n d e s i r a b le ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in  Greece where, as i t  i s  b e l ie v e d ,  income from movable c a p i t a l  i s  
c o n ce n tra te d  in  h igh income c l a s s e s ,  and second, t h i s  d i s c r im in a t io n  
i n t e r f e r e s  in  the  good fu n c t io n in g  o f  the c a p i t a l  m arket. Two p r o v i ­
s io n s  a re  made to  encourage the  development o f  the  c a p i t a l  m arket.
The f i r s t  i s  the exemption o f  15,000 Drs. p e r  firm  and 60,000  Drs. in  
t o t a l .  This p ro v is io n  can be c r i t i c i s e d  on v a r io u s  grounds. We saw 
th a t  th e re  i s  no economic double t a x a t io n  o f  d iv idends  in  Greece. 
T h e re fo re ,  th e re  i s  no reaso n  to a l l e v i a t e  the  ta x  burden on d iv idend  
s in c e  comparimg' t h a t  w ith  o th e r  c o u n t r ie s  i s  n o t h igh . Our a rgu ­
ment becomes s t ro n g e r  i f  we take  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  th a t  the r e c i p ­
i e n t s  o f  th e se  d iv idends belong to the  h ig h e r  income c l a s s e s .  How­
e v e r ,  from e q u i ty  p o in t  o f  view th ese  p ro v is io n s  a re  n o t j u s t i f i e d .
In  a d d i t io n  to  t h a t ,  th e se  p ro v is io n s  a re  g iven  only  to  d iv idend  
from shares  quoted w ith A . S . E . ,  however, they  d is c r im in a te  a g a in s t  
sh a res  not quoted w ith  A . S . E .  The r a t i o n a l e  o f  th e se  p ro v is io n s  i s  
t h a t  they support  the development o f  the  c a p i t a l  m arket. Two p o in ts  
a re  worth m entioning h e re .  F i r s t ,  long time ago many e x p e r t s t h e  
C a p i ta l  Market in  Greece p o in te d  ou t th a t  the weak s ide  o f  th i s  mar­
k e t  i s  n o t  the  demand fo r  sh a res  but the  supply  o f  sh a re s .  The 
Greek p u b l ic  has shown i t s  w i l l in g n e s s ,  as i t  has been o f f i c i a l l y  
v e r i f i e d ,  to  in v e s t  i t s  sav ings  on s tock  shares  as long as no u n d e s i­
r a b le  games a re  p layed  in  the  A . S . E . ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  the s id e  which needs 
to  be s t im u la te d  i s  the supply  of s to ck  share  and no t the demand f o r  
th e se  sh a re s .  Second, the  only  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  which we can see fo r  
th e se  p ro v is io n s  i s  t h a t  th ey  a l l e v i a t e  the d isadvan tage  o f  s tock  
shares  in  comparison w ith  bank d e p o s i t s  and government s e c u r i t i e s  
whose t h e i r  income i s  t a x - f r e e .  I f  t h i s  i s  the case  then the p ro v i ­
s io n s  should be extended to d iv idends  from shares  not l i s t e d  on the 
A . S . E .
The second p ro v is io n  fo r  the  sake o f  the development o f  the  
c a p i t a l  market i s  concerned w ith the d i f f e r e n t  ta x  c o e f f i c i e n t s
a p p ly in g  on d iv idends  from sh a res  quoted o r  n o t  and r e g i s t e r e d  o r  
b e a r e r .  This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  p ro v id es  us with th e  t h i r d  c h a r a c te r ­
i s t i c  o f  the  ta x a t io n  o f d iv id en d . There i s  a d is c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  
sh a reh o ld e rs  who ho ld  b e a re r  sh a res  unquoted with A.S.U, They a re  
n o t  allow ed to in c lu d e  t h e i r  income from these  s h a r e s  w ith in  the  i n ­
come from o th e r  so u rc e s ,  but the  w ithho ld ing  t a x ' i s  th e  f i n a l  tax  
l e v ie d  on th i s  income. I f  the income from o th e r  sources  i s  beyond 
an amount then they  a re  taxed  h e a v ie r  than i f  th ey  were allowed to 
in c lude  a l l  income to g e th e r  to be tax ed  with the p e rso n a l  income tax  
s c a le .  The purpose of t h i s  measure i s  to bea t ta x  evas ion  a t  the  
source  s in ce  the sh a re h o ld e rs  in  q u e s t io n  would avo id  t a x a t io n  through 
a f i c t i t i o u s  d is p e r s io n  o f  t h e i r  b e a re r  shares  to  r e l a t i v e s  o r  f r i e n d s .  
This d is c r im in a t io n  can be avoided on ly  i f  a l l  tax  sh ares  become r e g i ­
s t e r e d ,  bu t th e re  is  f e a r  t h a t  t h i s  would have an u n d e s i r a b le  e f f e c t  
upon the  fu n c t io n in g  o f  the  c a p i t a l  market due to  psychology o f  the 
Greek tax p ay e r .  This measure ( r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  a l l  s h a re s j  was i n ­
troduced in  1951 , and in  f a c t ,  had t h i s  impact and in  tu rn  i t  was 
a b o l ish ed  l a t e r  on in  1955 .
3 . 4 .3  FIHMCING BTYbjSTMENT PROGRAMMES
In t h i s  s e c t io n  we deal w ith sources  o f  investm ent f in a n c e .
I t  i s  im portan t th a t  s p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n  be drawn to the  two main 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  namely, the  sm all s i z e  and fam ily  concern o f  Greek 
e n t e r p r i s e s .  I t  has been recogn ized  th a t  in co rpo ra tions  w ith  a la rg e  
d is p e r s io n  o f t h e i r  s h a re s ,  the  id e a  th a t  c o rp o ra t io n  i s  a d i s t i n c t  
l e g a l  e n t i t y  from sh a reh o ld e rs  and each o f  them is  one of a la rg e  
group p lays  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  ro le  in  making f i n a n c i a l  d e c i s io n s ,  but 
t h i s  i s  n o t  the case fo r  a c lo s e ly  c o n t ro l le d  c o rp o ra t io n  where the 
management who in  the most cases  c o in c id e s  with the owner conceives 
o f  the c o rp o ra t io n  a f f a i r s  as an ex ten s io n  o f  h is  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  b u s in ­
ess  a c t i v i t i e s .
Opposing views have been exp ressed  concern ing  the  o b s ta c le  to the  
a c c e le r a t i o n  in  the  growth o f  c a p i t a l  form ation  in  Greece. Oome a u th ­
o rs  b e l ie v e  t h a t  f in an ce  was the  main c o n s t r a in t  Ooutsoumaris,1976 
G.Yannopoulos, 1978J, whereas o th e r s  b e l ie v e  t h a t  p r o f i t i b i l i t y  was 
the r e s t r a i n i n g  f a c t o r  (K, T s a g r id i s ,  1975, J . kapan ton iou , 1979J. 
a d n a l ly ,  in  the  words o f  the  Governor o f  Bank o f Greece " the r e s u l t
o f  the  e f f o r t s  which have been made f o r  the p ro v is io n  o f  investm ent 
f inance  has no t been e n t i r e l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  not_bgQg,use,the_^-unds 
which have been d isp o sed  were i n s u f f i c i e n t ,  bu t because o f  the  l im i t e d  
demand fo r  p ro d u c tiv e  investm ent^ lX. Z o lo ta s ,  I 964 ; .
The p lough ing  back method o f f in a n c in g  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im portan t 
f o r  developing  c o u n tr ie s  where c a p i t a l  market i s  n o t  w e ll  o rg an ised  
and th e  le v e l  o f  sav in g  i s  v e ry  low. This source o f  f in an ce  i s  how­
ev er  n o t  adequate  to cover a l l  the n e ce ssa ry  amount o f  funds fo r  
f in a n c in g  investm ent p r o j e c t s .
I t  was a major aim o f  the Greek government p o l ic y  to p rov ide  
ample f in an ce  on easy  terms f o r  f ix e d  investm ent in  m anufac tu r ing .
In  1958 , commercial banks were a llow ed , f o r  the f i r s t  tim e , to give 
c r e d i t  to  the p r iv a te  s e c to r  a t  s u b s id is e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  S ince then  
commercial banks have p layed  an e s s e n t i a l  ro le  in  the f in a n c in g  o f  the  
Greek e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and the l a t t e f  have r e l i e d  in c re a s in g ly  on the  
banking system. The enormous in c re a se  in  saving  allow ed banks to be­
come the  middleman between f irm s and p u b l ic .  The banking system p ro ­
v ided  Greek f irm s no t only  with sh o r t - te rm  loans but w ith  long-te rm  
as w e ll ,  Greek commercial banks have in  p r a c t i c e  allowed some firm s 
to  renew sh o r t - te rm  loans  r e p e a te d ly .
Table 3*4 shows t h a t  50 p e r  cen t  of investm ent made by manu­
f a c tu r in g  firm s were f in an ced  by p loughing  back p r o f i t s .  The p a r t i ­
c ip a t io n  o f  d e p re c ia t io n  was s i g n i f i c a n t  du ring  t h i s  p e r io d  and i t  
shows the e f f e c t iv e n e s s  of a c c e la r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n  p o l i c i e s  fo llow ed 
by the  Greek a u t h o r i t i e s .  According to P s i lo s  the  e x p lan a t io n  o f  the  
r e l i a n c e  on r e ta in e d  eam ictgs in  Greece may l i e  on th re e  rea so n s ,  
namely, f i r s t ,  on r e s t r i c t i o n s  on d iv idend  ^see our s e c t io n  on d i v i ­
dend ta x a t io n ;  second, the  tax  company p r o f i t s  and f i n a l l y ,  the  b u s i ­
ness  p sy j^ lo g y  which was developed in  the  pos t-w ar  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p e r ­
io d ,  when fam ily  e n t e r p r i s e s  p r e f e r r e d  to in c re a se  c a p i t a l  v a lu e  of 
t h e i r  investm ent r a t h e r  than  to  in c re a se  t h e i r  income from i t  (I). 
P s i l o s ,  1964; .  I t  has been r e c e n t ly  recogn ised  t h a t  ta x a t io n  p o l ic y  
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  h e lp f u l  in  th a t  r e s p e c t  (P. K ir ia k o p o u lo s , 1975, 
T h .S tra to is , 1976]. S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  law 5213/1955 ( r e s e rv e s  f o r  new 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s ] ,  law 4^02/1959 (New p ro d u c tiv e  in v e s tm en t] ,  law 147/ 
1967 (p ro v is io n s  fo r  new f ix e d  a s s e t s ]  and law 1078/1971 ( ta x  mea­
su re s  in  support  o f  r e g io n a l  development] p rovided  w ith  an in c e n t iv e
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RATIO
(3 ;: (4 ;PROFITS NEPREUiATiUN TOTAL
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1963 3,271 599 800 1,399 42.7 57.1
64 5,724 638 1, 024 1,662 29.0 61.6
65 8,954 760 1, 191 1,951 21.7 61.0
66 5,355 940 1, 490 2,430 45.5 61.3
67 4,895 911 1, 762 2,673 54.6 65.9
68 5,417 1,329 2, 059 3,388 62.5 60.7
69 6,662 2,161 3, 001 5,162 77.4 58.1
1970 11,570 3,578 2, 925 6,501 56.1 44.9
71 14,396 3,333 3, 148 6,481 45.0 48.4
72 19,630 4,819 3, 701 8,520 43.4 43.4
73 21,934 7,055 8, 959 16,614 75,7 53.9
74 37,642 6,597 11, 583 18,180 48.2 63.7
75 35,400 5,110 13 , 029 18,202 51.4 71.9
76 58,726 6,746 22,948 29,694 50.5 77.2
1963-76 50.2 59.2
Source: F ed e ra t io n  o f  Greek i n d u s t r i e s ,  The S ta te  o f  Greek
in d u s t ry ,  annual s e r i e s .
to  fin a n ce  investm ent programmes by in te r n a l funds.
E x te rn a l  f in a n c in g  c o n s t i t u t e d  the  o th e r  h a l f  o f  the  used funds 
f o r  f in a n c in g  investm en t.  O utside sources  o f  f in a n c in g ,  in  Greece, 
a re  the e x i s t in g  v a r io u s  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as commercial 
banks, th e  economic development f in a n c in g  o rg a n iz a t io n ,  th e  c e n t r a l  
bank and the  open c a p i t a l  m arket. The appearance of these  i n s t i t u t ­
ions c o n t r ib u te d  to  the importance o f  deb t c a p i t a l  in  r e l a t i o n  to  
e q u i ty  f in a n c in g .
Table 3*5 shows t h a t  one t h i r d  o f  t o t a l  funds a v a i l a b le  to f irm s 
re p re se n ts  the own c a p i t a l ,  whereas the  rem ain ing  tw o - th i rd s  were b o r­
rowed funds. I t  i s  im portan t to mention t h a t  d e sp i te  the  f a c t  th a t  
the  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  in c re a s e d ,  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between own and borrow­
ed funds remained c o n s ta n t  over the  whole p e r io d  under rev iew .
Table 3 ,6  p ro v id es  us w ith  an id ea  about the  l e v e l  o f  f in a n c in g  
expenses as  a pe rcen tage  e i t h e r  to gen era l  expenses o r  to  t o t a l  b o r­
rowed c a p i t a l .  Such expenses re p re s e n t  the i n t e r e s t  c o s t ,  v a r io u s  fe e s  
and brokerage  charges invo lved . We see t h a t  f in a n c in g  expenses cons­
t i t u t e d  18 p e r  cen t o f  the  t o t a l  expenses during  the  p e r io d  1964-1976 
whereas they c o n s t i t u t e d  a 4 p e r  cen t o f  the  borrowed c a p i t a l  d u r in g  
the  same p e r io d .
As f a r  as the  choice  between debt and e q u i ty  f in a n c in g  i s  con­
cerned the d e d u c t i b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t  payment from c o rp o ra te  ta x  in  
c o n t r a s t  to the  t a x a t io n  o f  d iv idend  under t h i s  tax  favours  debt r a t h ­
e r  than  e q u i ty  f in a n c in g .  However, under the Greek c o rp o ra t io n  tax  
where both  i n t e r e s t  and d iv idend  payments a re  d ed u c t ib le  th e re  i s  no 
such d is c r im in a t io n .  In  th a t  r e s p e c t  the Greek c o rp o ra t io n  income 
tax  i s  n e u t r a l  between the  two sou rces  of f in a n c in g ,  bu t t h i s  n e u t­
r a l i t y  i s  destroyed  by the  absence o f a c a p i t a l  ga in s  tax  on share  
p r ic e s  and the p resence  o f  th e  p ro v is io n  o f o f f - s e t t i n g  c a p i t a l  l o s ­
s e s .  However, s in ce  the Greek GIT i s  in  favour o f  e q u i ty  f in a n c in g  
the  q u es t io n  a r i s e s  why firm s p r e f e r  debt than e q u i ty .  Various 
reasons may ex p la in  the heavy r e l i e n c e  o f  the Greek firm s on debt 
f in a n c e .
F i r s t ,  the la c k  of f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t i s e  makes f irm s slow to 
take  advantage o f  the  tax  i n c e n t iv e s .  As i t  was emphasized to us
















1957 3,428 6,622 10,050 51 .7 34.1 1 :1 .93
58 5,555 7,773 11,328 45.7 31.3 1 :2 .1 8
59 3,71u 8,u08 11,718 46 .3 51.7 1 : 2 .1 5
60 4,403 10,038 14,718 43.8 30.5 1 :2 .2 7
61 4,962 11,708 16,670 42 .3 29 .8 1 :2 .35
62 7 ,u54 14,853 21,907 47 .9 32.2 1:2 .10
63 8,630 17,887 26,517 48.2 52 .6 1 :2 .0 7
64 l l , u l 6 22,657 33,673 48.6 52.7 1 :2 .0 5
65 14,364 29,739 4 4 ,lo 3 48.3 32.6 1 :2 .u7
66 16,628 35,925 52,553 46 .3 31.6 1 :2 .1 6
67 18,099 41,911 60,01u 43,2 30.2 1 : 2 .31
68 20 ,270 47,006 67,556 43 .0 30.1 1 : 2 .32
69 23,748 51,997 75,745 45 .7 31.4 1 : 2 .1 9
7u 29,842 62,684 92,526 47 .6 32.3 1 :2 .10
71 55,108 75,7v9 110,917 4 6 .4 31.7 1 :2 .16
72 45,162 96,383 141,545 46 .9 31.9 1 :2 .13
73 59,503 116,578 176,081 51 . u 33.8 1:1 .96
74 81,165 153,695 234,858 52 .8 34.6 1:1 .89
75 92,441 195,931 288,372 47.2 32 .1 1:2 .12
76
77
12u,481 25u,287 370,768 48.1 32.5 1 : 2 .v8
Source: F e d e ra t io n  o f  Greek i n d u s t r i e s ,  the  S ta te  o f  u reek
in d u s t r y ,  annual s e r i e s .
T A B L E 3. 6 ( I'vi tn .if t io v \ d v s ^
FINANCING EXPENSES TO TOTAL GENERAL EXPENSES AND TO TOTAL^^™ ^™wAJr JL xAxJ#
T o ta l  f in a n c in g F inancing  Expenses
YEAR EXPENSES TO TOTAL EXPENSES TO BORROWED CAP,
1964 923 18.6 4 .0
65 963 15 .6 5.2
66 1,285 16.6 3 .5
67 1 ,751 20.1 4 .1
68 2,021 21.1 4 .2
69 2 ,191 18.1 4 .2
70 2 ,641 18.1 4 .2
71 3,103 19.2 4 .0
72 5,643 18.2 3.7
73 5 ,209 17 .1 4 .4
74 7,401 18.4 4 .8
75 10,494 20.9 5 .4
76 12,865 17 .9 5.1
Average I 964-76 18.4 4 .2
Source: F ed e ra t io n  o f  Greek I n d u s t r i e s ,  the S ta te  o f  Greek
In d u s t ry ,  annual S e r i e s .
the  Greek firm s do no t c o n s id e ra b ly  take in to  account the  c o s t  of 
f in an ce  because i f  th ey  would do so they  would f inance  t h e i r  p r o je c t  
by sh a res  in s te a d  o f  by d e b t .  Second, h igh  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  have 
r e c e n t ly  made deb t f in a n c e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t t r a c t i v e .  T h ird , the new 
e q u i ty  i s s u e s  a re  always uncommon, the  growth o f debt may r e f l e c t  
only the  f a i l u r e  o f  g ross  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  to keep pace with d e s i ­
red  investm ent f in a n c in g .  The amount o f  the in c re a s e  in  the  supply  
o f  e q u i t i e s ,  between o th e r  f a c t o r s ,  a lso  depends on f i r s t ,  the  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  sources  o f  f in a n c in g  and second, the 
a t t i t u d e s  o f  those  who c o n t ro l  f irm s  toward the  d i l u t i o n  o f  e q u i ty  
and p o s s ib le  e f f e c t  on c o n t r o l .  This le ad s  us to  d is c u s s  the  t h i r d  
source o f  funds f o r  th e  Greek f i r m s ,  the c a p i t a l  market.
The e s ta b l ish m e n t  o f  a  w ell o rgan ized  c a p i t a l  market i s  one 
o f  the most d i f f i c u l t  ta sk s  o f  any develop ing  c o u n try . The develo­
pment o f  a c a p i t a l  market depends upon bo th  the aggregate  volume of 
sav ings  and a t r a n s m i t t in g  mechanism to  channel the  a v a i l a b le  funds 
to an e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n .  Greece, in  c o n t r a s t  to  what happens in  
o th e r  developing  c o u n t r i e s ,  enjoys a l a rg e  amount of sav in g s .  Un­
f o r tu n a t e ly ,  the  t r a s m i t t i n g  mechanism does no t work e f f i c i e n t l y .
In  a w ell o rgan ized  c a p i t a l  market the  s to ck  exchange c o n s t i t u t e s  
the  long-run  f in a n c in g  source  whereas banks the s h o r t - r u n .  In  
Greece, because the A.S.E, has an unim portan t c o n t r ib u t io n  to f in a n c ­
ing  p ro d u c tiv e  investm ent the  r o le  of f in a n c in g  both long-te rm  and 
s h o r t - te rm  belongs to  the banks. In  o th e r  words, the  l i n k  between 
p u b l ic  sav ings  and p ro d u c t iv e  investm ent i s  the  banking system and 
n o t  the A.S.E. This i s  d u e , m ain ly , to the  re c e n t  development of 
the l a r g e - s c a l e  in d u s t r y ,  to  the fam ily  concern f e a tu r e  o f  the  Greek 
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and to th e  e x i s t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the c a p i t a l  m arket.
This method of f in a n c in g  has as a main consequence, in  a d d i t io n  to 
the re so u rce  m is a l lo c a t io n ,  the  excess  c o s t  of f in a n c in g  s in ce  banks 
lend money to the firm s on a s h o r t - te rm  base which in  tu rn  i s  r e ­
newed. The f i n a l  b i l l  in c lu d es  i n t e r e s t ,  v a r io u s  commission ex­
pen ses ,  de lays  e t c .  and r e s u l t s  to be very  h igh . This f a c t  makes the  
argument th a t  e q u i ty  c a p i t a l  i s  more expensive than  deb t c a p i t a l  in ­
v a l i d  s in ce  the  above mentioned b i l l  f o r  debt c a p i t a l  i s  h ig h e r  
than the f l o t a t i o n  c o s t  o f  new sh a re s .  However, judg ing  the  p e r ­
formance o f  the  Greek c a p i t a l  market we could say t h a t  i t  i s  not 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  s in ce  bo th  c r i t e r i a  o p e ra t in g  e f f i c i e n c y  and a l i o -
c a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y  e s ta b l i s h e d  by Uuesenberry f o r  a good performance 
o f  a c a p i t a l  market a re  v i o l a t e d .  T h e re fo re ,  i t  i s  an i ro n y ,  fo r  
Greece th e  underdevelopment o f  the A.S.E. A w ell  fu n c t io n in g  s tock  
exchange would f i r s t ,  a t t r a c t  p u b l ic  sav ing  second, would guaran tee  
a r a t i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of th e  a v a i l a b l e  re so u rce s  between the  de­
s i r e d  s e c to r s  o f  the  economy and f i n a l l y ,  would le ad  to  r a t i o n a l  
c a p i t a l  s t r u c tu r e  o f  the e n t e r p r i s e s  s in ce  the l a t t e r  would avo id  
paying  a c o n s ta n t  i n t e r e s t  i r r e s p e c t i v e  on t h e i r  p r o f i t s  and the 
c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  would be lower.
We go on now to  d is cu s s  the  reasons  why th e  A.S.E does no t 
p lay  the d e s i r e d  r o le  in  Greece. This r e q u i r e s  the d is c u s s io n  of 
b o th  s id e s  o f  i t ,  demand and supply . We mentioned t h a t  the  supply  o f  
funds in  the economy as a whole was v e ry  s a t i s f a c t o r y  d u r in g  the  
p e r io d  under rev iew . Com petitive fo rc e s  t r y  to  a t t r a c t  th e se  funds 
such as bank d e n o s i t s ,  government bonds, investm ent in  sh a res  of 
e n t e r p r i s e s  and investm ent in  immovable p ro p e r ty  and b u i ld in g s .
Income from f i r m ’ s sh ares  has to compete w ith income from
government bonds and banks d e p o s i t s  on an unequal b a s is  s in ce  in ­
come from the  l a t t e r  two sources  i s  t a x - f r e e ,  whereas from the f i r s t  
i s  taxed . D esp ite  t h i s  f a c t ,  as i t  has been o f f i c i a l l y  r e a l i s e d ,  
the  Greek p u b l ic  has shown i t s  w i l l in g n e s s  to in v e s t  in  shares  o f  
h e a l th y  e n t e r p r i s e s .  However, the  demand s ide  o f  the  A.S.E has a 
sm all r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i t s  i n e f f i c i e n t  fu n t io n in g .  In c o n t r a s t ,  
the  supply  s id e  has been accused as re sp o n s ib le  f o r  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .
Table 5*7 shows the  new is s u e s  o f  shares  and bonds and the 
c a p i t a l  r a i s e d  through the A.S.E by i n d u s t r i a l  and commercial com­
p a n ie s .  I t  has been argued th a t  even these  sh a res  have been ab­
sorbed  by e x i s t i n g  sh a reh o ld e rs  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  having some a f f i ­
l i a t i o n  with i s s u in g  c o rp o ra t io n  (D. P s i l o s ,  I 964) . This argument 
i s  j u s t i f i e d  lo o k ing  a t  the  ta b le  where i t  is  shown th a t  the  l a r g e r  
amount r a i s e d  from c a p i t a l  p a id  by the  e x i s t i n g  sh a re h o ld e rs .  The 
main reason  f o r  i s s u in g  sh ares  i s  e i t h e r  the  r e v a lu a t io n  o f  f ix e d  
a s s e t s  o r  the  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  of r e s e rv e s  and th ese  shares  a re  o f f e r ­
ed!; to  the e x i s t i n g  sh a reh o ld e rs  and in  the most cases  f r e e .
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demand and supp ly , o f  the  A.S.E. need to he improved. In  the  de­
mand s id e  should  he e s t a b l i s h e d  equal c o n d it io n s  which e x i s t  f o r  
bank d e p o s i t s  and government bonds, th i s  may have a bad s id e  e f ­
f e c t  on bank d e p o s i t s  and government bonds, t h a t  i s ,  these  k inds  of 
investm ent to s top  b e in g  a t t r a c t i v e  and the  savers to  p r e f e r  to keep 
t h e i r  savings in s te a d  o f  in v e s t in g  them in  bank d e p o s i t s  and govern­
ment bonds. Many c o u n t r ie s  fo llow  t h i s  p o l ic y  and s in c e  i t  i t  b e l i e ­
ved th a t  th e se  sav e rs  be long  to  low income c la s s e s  t h i s  p ro v is io n  may 
be cons ide red  as p l a u s i b l e .  On th e  o th e r  hand, investm ent in  s tock  
sh ares  en joys a tax  f r e e  c a p i t a l  g a in s .  T h e re fo re ,  the  r e a l  prob­
lem on the demand s id e  o f  the  A .S.E . i s  no t the  unequal c ircum stances  
from ta x a t io n  p o in t  o f  view which e x i s t  bu t the  h e s i t a t i o n  o f  the 
Greek sav e r  to  go to the A.S.E coming from a su sp ic io n  th a t  u n d e s i­
r a b le  games a re  p layed  in  th e  A.E.E. The tax  measures in tro d u ced  by 
the Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  had as purpose to  improve the demand s id e  o f  
the A.S.E, They had no s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ib u t io n  because the demand 
s id e  o f  A.S.E, s u f f e r s  from a p sy ch o lo g ica l  s ick n ess  and th e se  meas­
u re s  a re  no t  a p p ro p r ia te  enough to  cure  i t .  In  a d d i t io n  to t h a t  s in ce  
the m a jo r i ty  o f  the  new sh a res  i s  addressed  to the  e x i s t i n g  s h a re ­
h o ld e rs  these  tax  p ro v is io n s  p rov ide  them with a r e l i e f  w ithou t 
a t t r a c t i n g  new s a v e rs .  This en fo rces  our argument made e a r l i e r  th a t  
the  tax  p ro v is io n s  to income from shares  l i s t e d  on the A.S.E i s  un­
j u s t i f i e d .  However, the  supply s id e  of the  A.S.E needs more a t t e n ­
t i o n .  The Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  shou ld  r e a l i s e  t h a t  the ta x  p ro v is io n s  
have sm all c o n t r ib u t io n ,  a t  t h a t  s ta g e ,  to  the change e i t h e r  o f  de­
mand o r  supply  s id e .  The whole m a t te r  i s  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  one.
The whole s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  c a p i t a l  market needs to be re c o n s id e re d .
5 .4 .4  GIT; AN INSTRUMENT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In  ch ap te r  one, we mentioned th a t  one o f  the arguments in  
favour o f  a s e p a ra te  tax  on c o rp o ra te  income was the use o f  GIT as 
a to o l  f o r  economic p o l ic y .  S ince revenue from GIT in  Greece was 
v e ry  low, du ring  the p e r io d  under c o n s id e ra t io n ,  i t  i s  p l a u s ib le  to 
exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  GIT was used to  s i g n i f i c a n t  degree . as a 
means o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  the Greek economy o r o f  a f f e c t i n g  income d i s t r i ­
b u tio n .  Greece v i r t u a l l y  e x c lu s iv e ly  used the GIT as a means o f  a f ­
f e c t in g  the s iz e  and the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  investm en t.  The u n d e r ly in g  
r a t i o n a l e  of t h i s  p o l ic y  was t h a t  investm ent i s  one of the  keys to 
economic development.
In  a developing  co u n try  b u s in ess  a c t i v i t i e s  a re  n o t  v e ry  in t e n ­
s iv e  and the  government may use t a x a t io n  to  encourage th e se  a c t i v i t ­
i e s ,  e i t h e r  through support  of new firm s by p ro v id in g  ta x  exemptions 
o r  by a s s i s t i n g  e x i s t i n g  f irm s to  in c re a se  c a p i t a l  fo rm atio n . In  
a d d i t io n  the government in tro d u ce s  import d u t ie s  to p r o t e c t  these  
firm s from fo re ig n  com petition*O f the above th re e  ways, the  second 
has been the main in s tru m en t in  a f f e c t i n g  b u s in ess  a c t i v i t i e s  in  
Greece. F i r s t ,  Greece has w idely  used  the  system of c a p i t a l  a l low ­
ances to encourage investm ent by te m p o ra r i ly  o r  perm anently  reduc­
ing  tax  fo r  b u s in ess  which purchase c a p i t a l  equipment. Both normal 
and supplem entary d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s  a re  p rov ided  by the ta x  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n .  In  a d d i t io n  to  t h a t  Greek ta x  law p rov ides  a comprehensive 
s e r i e s  o f  exemptions and allow ances f o r  expansion . These p ro v is io n s  
helped  f irm s to f in a n c in g  t h e i r  investm ent programmes by t h e i r  own 
money. Second, the Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  in troduced  p ro v is io n  fo r  tax  
exemptions f o r  income earned  on bank d ep o s i ts  as a means o f c r e a t ­
in g  a v a i l a b le  funds fo r  f in a n c in g  investm ent p r o j e c t s .  T h ird , the 
Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  a ttem p ted  to reduce redundant and lu x u r io u s  con­
sumption and channe lled  the  a v a i l a b le  funds to investm ent expendi­
tu r e s ,  F in a l ly ,  s p e c ia l  tax  in c e n t iv e s  were in tro d u ced  in  1953 
(law 2863/ 1953) to encourage the in f low  o f  fo re ig n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t ­
ment, These in c e n t iv e s  in c lu d e  a s t a b l e  ta x  regime on n e t  p r o f i t s  
f o r  a maximum p e r io d  o f  ten  y e a r s ,  duty  f r e e  im ports o f  machinery and 
exemptions from lo c a l  government tax es  and v a r io u s  fees*
We now proceed to c o n s id e r  the e f f e c t  o f  GIT on investm en t.
On t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds the  e f f e c t  o f  GIT upon investm ent i s  exceed­
in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  to a n a ly s e ,  however, em p ir ica l  evidence a re  no t so 
s t ro n g  fo r  two re a so n s .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to i s o l a t e  the 
e f f e c t  o f  an in c e n t iv e  scheme upon investm ent d e c is io n s  and second, 
th ese  schemes a re  changed r e p e a te d ly  and th e re fo re  the time a n a ly s is  
o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  scheme i s  too s h o r t .  T here fo re , on the one s id e ,  
the bu s in ess  world ex p resses  com plain ts  a rgu ing  th a t  the GIT r e ­
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duces both  the a b i l i t y  and th e  w i l l in g n e s s  to i n v e s t .  On the  o th e r  
s id e ,  i t  i s  argued, t h a t  th e re  a re  im portant p ro v is io n s ,  which tend 
to  o f f s e t  or to reduce the  r e t a r d a t io n  e f f e c t s  o f  CIT upon in v e s t ­
ment. We proceed now to  e s t im a te  th e  magnitude o f  the ta x  sav ings t h a t  
f irm s have enjoyed as  a r e s u l t  o f  c a p i t a l  a llow ances e i t h e r  in  the  form 
o f  d e p re c ia t io n  or in  the  form o f  i n i t i a l  and annual c a p i t a l  allow an­
ces ,  I t  i s  worth m entioning th a t  investm ent g ra n ts  a re  n o t widely 
used  in  Greece.
3 .4 .4 .1  Tax Savings from D e p rec ia t io n  Allowances.
As Meyer and Kuh have p o in te d  out d i f f e r e n c e s  in  investm ent 
behaviour a s s o c ia te d  w ith  f l u c tu a t io n s  in the d e p re c ia t io n  v a r ia b le  
a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  because the  e x is te n c e  o r  n o n -ex is ten ce  o f  a casua l 
r e l a t i o n s h ip  between th e se  two v a r i a b le s  i s  c ru .c^ ia l ly  a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  the  g ran t  of a c c e le r a te d  a m o r t iz a t io n  as a means of promoting 
economic growth and s t a b i l i t y .  ( J .  Meyer and E, Kuh, 1959).
The c o r r e c t  assessm ent of tax  savings from d e p re c ia t io n  r e ­
q u ire s  the  use  o f  the d iscoun ted  cash flow tech n iq u e .  The tax  sav­
ings  a re  equal to the  p re sen t  va lue  of the  savings o f  f in an ce  c o s ts  
which w i l l  r e s u l t  from the  deferment o f  s e t t lem e n t  of ta x  l i a b i l i t y .
The p re se n t  va lu e  o f  the ta x  sav ing  p e r  drachmae o f  c a p i t a l  expendi­
tu re  from th ese  concessions  may be approximated a s  fo llow s:
" ■ f f ,
where tc  s tands  f o r  the  CIT r a t e ,  ^ fo r  the p ro p o r t io n  o f  the  va lue  o f  
a s s e t s  which can be w r i t t e n  down p e r  year and r  the  d isco u n t  r a t e .
This method im p l i c i t l y  assumes e i t h e r  t h a t  p r o f i t s  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  to 
absorb the  f u l l  d e p re c ia t io n  allowances in  the  e a r l i e r  y ears  o r  t h a t  
c a r ry -o v e r  o f  lo s se s  i s  p e rm it te d ;  then i t  i s  in  the i n t e r e s t  o f  the 
firm  to  adopt the h ig h e s t  p o s s ib le  d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s .  Formula (5*5) 
i s  based on the d e c l in in g  balance  method of d e p re c ia t io n ,  whereas the 
method fo rm ally  a p p l ic a b le  in  Greece is  the s t r a i g h t  l i n e .  However, 
s in ce  a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n  p ro v is io n s  a re  g ran ted  to the  Greek 
firm s the d e c l in in g  balance  method prov ides  a b e t t e r  approxim ation on 
the  assumption th a t  Greek firm s take advantage of the  h ig h e s t  deprec-
i a t i o n  r a t e s  t h a t  they a re  p e rm it te d  to use in  the  e a r l i e r  y e a rs .
Allowable d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s  v a r ie d  fo r  the  d i f f e r e n t  reg io n s  
and a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im es .  C harts  3*1, 5.2 and 3.3 s e t  out the e f f e c t i v e  
d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  b u i ld in g s  and machinery f o r  the  main 
s u b -d iv is io n  o f  p e r io d  1959-1982. For example, we see t h a t  whereas 
the normal d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e  f o r  machinery f o r  th e  p e r io d  1973-82 
i s  15 p e r  cen t the maximum p e rm it te d  d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e  ( r e g io n  C) i s  
45 p e r  c en t  ( c h a r t  3 .3 ) .  Where p r o f i t s  a re  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  tak e  up 
these  r a t e s  in  f u l l  the  c a r ry -o v e r  o f  lo s s e s  fo r  up to 5 years  i s  
a llowed.
For g iven v a lu e s  o f  t c ,  and r  and assuming th a t  th e  tax  bene­
f i t s  a re  deemed to accrue a t  th e  end of the y e a r  in  which the  expen­
d i tu r e  i s  in c u rre d  we r e - w r i t e  eq u a tio n  (3 .5 )  us:
py -  to  ?
r
which in  t u r n , fo r  convenience may be w r i t t e n  a s ,
py = tc  ( 3 .6 ) .




CHART 5 .1  : PERIOD 1959 -  67
Normal Depr.Rate A ddit.D ept, Rate T o ta l  Rate
Ind . B u ild ings  
Machinery
5fo 17 . 5% 22.9#
42#
ClHART 5.2 : PERIOD I 968 -  1972
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CHART 5,5 : PERIOD 1973 - 1982
Normal Depr.Rate A dd it .D ep t.  Rate T ota l Rate
Ind . B uild ings  
, Machinery
8/0
Reg.A Reg.B Reg.C Reg.A Reg.B Reg.C
1 1 . 29#
iG fo 12%
22.5% 26.2%&




R.D J a n . 1 0 /1 9 5 9  
L.D 2 9 0 1 /1 9 5 4  
L.D 2 1 7 6 /1 9 5 2  
L.D 5 7 6 5 /1 9 5 7  A r t . 11
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Prom eq u a tio n  (3*6) we see t h a t  an in c re a se  in  tc  o r /an d  in  
(3 in c re a s e s  the va lue  o f  ta x  s a v in g s ,  whereas an in c re a s e  in  r  de­
c re a se s  the tax  s av in g s .  The p re s e n t  va lue  o f  tax  sav ings  i s  in d e ­
pendent o f  th e  number of y ea rs  o f  the  p r o j e c t s ’ l i f e  because the  time 
p r o f i l e  o f  the  d e a l in g  ba lance  method of d e p re c ia t io n  i s  i n f i n i t e  a l ­
though in  p r a c t i c e  g iven  the h igh  r a t e s  o f  d e p re c ia t io n  shown in  the 
c h a r t s  most o f  the  v a lu e  o f  th e  a s s e t s  i s  w r i t t e n  down in  the  f i r s t  
few y e a r s .
U t i l i z i n g  the  in fo rm a tio n  g iven  in  the  d e p re c ia t io n  allowance 
c h a r t s  and form ula (3*6) we o b ta in  th e  p re s e n t  va lue  o f  the  ta x  sav ­
ings f o r  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu es  o f  r  , Prom ta b le  3 .8  we see t h a t  a t  a 
r a t e  o f  d isco u n t  o f  10 p e r  c e n t ,  f o r  example, the p re s e n t  va lue  o f  
d e p re c ia t io n  a llow ance i s  e s t im a te d  to be 19 o r  24 p e r  cen t drachmae 
o f  c a p i t a l  ex p en d itu re  on b u i ld in g s  and machinery co rre spond ing ly  
f o r  the  p e r io d  1973 -  82,
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T A B L E  3 . 8
P rese n t  Value Of The Tax Savings P er Drachmae Of C ap i ta l  
E xpenditure  From D e p rec ia t io n  Allowance
Table 3 .8  a ; 1958 -  6?
I n d u s t r i a l  B u ild ings Machinery
?  -  .225 P = .42
r  -  .10 .24 .28
r  * .15 .21 • 26
r  = .20 .19 .24
Table 5 .8 b Î 1968 - 72
I n d u s t r i a l  B u ild ings Machinery
Region A Region B Region 0 Region A Region B Region C
P =.112 P -  .15 P "o225 P .= .21 P .= .28 p = .42
r  = .10 .18 .21 .24 .24 .26 .28 I
r  = .15 .15 • 16 .21 .20 .23 .26
r  -= .20 .13 .15 .19 .18 .20 .24
Table 3 «8 c : 1973 •- 82
I n d u s t r i a l  B uild ings Machinery
Region A Region B Region C Region A Region 3 Region U
P =.12 P .".14 ^'-«.24 P ,= .225 P .a* <,2 6
r  = .10 .19 .20 • 25 .24 •25 • 29
r  = .15 .16 .17 .22 .21 .22 .26
r  = .20 .15 .14 .19 .19 .20 o24
—T25—
5.4*4.2  Tax Havings From Investm ent Allowances
In  a d d i t io n  to  d e p re c ia t io n  allowances a v a r i e t y  of in v e s t ­
ment allowances a re  g iven  to the Greek M anufacturing f i rm s .  The 
r i g h t  to s e t  o f f  c a p i t a l  expen d itu re  a g a in s t  ch argeab le  income 
through investm ent a llowances in  a d d i t io n  to  d e p re c ia t io n  a llow ance, 
j u s t  d is c u s se d ,  means t h a t  f o r  p e rm it te d  c a p i t a l  ex p en d itu re  w r i t ­
i n g - o f f  i s  in  excess of 100 p e r  c e n t .  Charts  3 .4  und 3*5 s e t  out 
the  e f f e c t i v e  investm ent allowance r a t e s  f o r  m anufacturing  f i rm s ,  
e f f e c t i v e  a t  v a r io u s  d a te s .  For example, accord ing  to  Law 289/1976 
of 1976 e n te r p r i s e  e x i s t i n g  o r  be ing  e s ta b l i s h e d  o r moving in to  reg ­
ion  E and r e a l i z i n g  new investm ent a re  e n t i t l e d  to deduct from t h e i r  
n e t  p r o f i t s  an amount equal to 130 p e r  cen t of the va lue  of c a p i t a l  
expend itu re  ( c h a r t  3*5;.
The im p lic a t io n s  of th ese  in c e n t iv e s  fo r  aggregate  untaxed 
p r o f i t s  a re  shown in  ta b le  3.9* Laws 21/6/1952 and 3213/1955 con­
cern  re s e rv e s  a g a in s t  f u tu r e  lo s s e s  and new i n s t a l l a t i o n s  whereas 
the o th e r  Laws concern investm ent allowance in c e n t iv e  schemes. The 
t o t a l  amount of untaxed p r o f i t s  expressed  as a percen tage  o f  the ta x ­
ab le  p r o f i t s  was 12 p e r  c en t  in  1959 , reached i t s  h ig h e s t  v a lu e ,
187.7 p e r  c e n t ,  in  1972 and i t  was h ig h e r  than 100 p e r  cen t r e c e n t ly .
To determ ine the p re se n t  va lue  of the tax  saving  th a t  manufac­
tu r in g  firm s enjoyed as a r e s u l t  o f  these  in c e n t iv e s ,  we assume, as 
we did  f o r  d e p re c ia t io n ,  t h a t  the tax  b e n e f i t s  a re  deemed to accrue 
a t  the  end o f the year  o f  the  expen d itu re  i s  in c u r re d ,  Suppose th a t  
the firm s f o r  each drachmae o f  c a p i t a l  expenditure  i s  e n t i t l e d  to 
deduct from i t s  p r o f i t s  an amount b. The p re sen t  va lue  o f  the  tax  
sav ing  p e r  drachmae o f  c a p i t a l  expend itu re  i s  given by the equation
(5 .7 ) :
PV = tcb  ( 1 + r  ) (3 .7 )
Table 3*10 prov ides  th e  tax saving  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu es  of r .
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Investment Allowance Charts
Chart 3*4: Investm ent Allowance Applied To A ll Firms
Area ■ Law 4U02/1959 Law 147/1967 Law 331/1974
A t t ic a 50% 100% 40%'
Provinces 60% 100% 40%
Is la n d s 90% 100% 40%
Chart 3*5: Investm ent Allowance ,4ppXied To Firms E s t  pin P rov inces
Région Law 1078/1971 Law 1 3 1 2 /1 9 7 2 Law 289/1976
A _
B 50/0 - -
G 100^ - -
D - 100% -
E - -
_ _
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T A B L E  3 . 1 0
P resen t  Value Of The Tax Savings From Investm ent Allowances 
Per Drachmae Of C a p i ta l  Expenditure
Table 3,10 a
Discount Rate Law 4002/1959 Law 147/1967 Law331/1974
A tt ic a  Prov inces Is lands
.10 .16 .19 .29 .32 .15
.15 .15 .18 .28 .30 .14
.20 .14 .17 *28 .29 .13
Table 3,10 b
Discount Rate Law 1 0 1 ’3/1971
- .............. . ....... '■ *
Law 1512/1972 Law 289/1976
Region B Region C Region D Region E
.10 .16 • 32 .32 .55
.15 *15 .30 .30 .52
.20 .14 .29 .29 .50
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Because the r a t e  o f  investm ent allowance d i f f e r s  accord ing  to 
the reg io n  o f  Greece where the investm ent takes  p la c e ,  the  eq u a tio n
(3 .7 )  takes the fo l low ing  form:
Pr = t o [ b ^ a ^  + bg &2 + r j ' l  (3 .8 ;
where,
h i  = the investm ent allowance r a t e  a p p l ic a b le  in  
reg io n  i
d i =■ the p ro p o r t io n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  each r e g io n ’ s 
investm ent to the  t o t a l .
U t i l i z i n g  the in fo rm atio n  given to us by the M in is t ry  o f  Finance 
reg a rd in g  the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of each r e g io n ’s investm ent in  the  t o t a l ,  
and formula (3 .8 )  we have c o n s t ru c te d  ta b le  3.11 showing the p re s e n t  
va lue  o f  ta x  sav ing  from investm ent allowances t h a t  m anufacturing  en­
joyed from th e se  p ro v is io n s ,  on an annual b a s is  over the p e r io d  s in ce
1966 ,
T A B L E  3.11
P re se n t  Value of The Tax Savings P e r  Drachmae o f C ap i ta l  
Expenditure  From Investm ent Allowances*
Year r  " .10 r  = .15  r = .20
1966 .16 . 16 .16
67 .17 .17 ,16
68 .18 .17 .15
69 .25 o24 .24
1970 .29 .28 .28
71 .28 .27 .27
72 .31 .30 .30
75 .31 *30 .30
74 .26 *25 ,26
75 *22 .21 .21
76 .24 .23 ,23
77 .28 .27 .27
73 .29 .28 .28
From the above c o n s t ru c te d  t a b l e  we cannot c o n c lu s iv e ly  compare 
tax  sav ing  from d e p re c ia t io n  and investm ent allowances ex ac tly ,  because 
o f  d i f f e r i n g  b a se s .  However, f o r  the period  1983-72 and fo r  d iscoun t
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r a t e  equal to .10 we can say th a t  the  tax  sav ing  was almost h a l f  o f  
c a p i t a l  outlay*
3*5 The E f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  In c e n t iv e s
The tax  p ro v is io n s ,  j u s t  d iscu ssed , involve both  a b e n e f i t  and 
a c o s t  f o r  the  economy, a b e n e f i t  in  t h a t  investm ent g ives r i s e  to  i n ­
c reased  income in  the  f u tu r e  but a  c o s t  to the government in  the  form 
o f  lower tax  revenues . In  a d d i t io n  to  th a t  they  involve  some r e d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  o f  income w ith in  the  economy to the  u n i t s  a s s i s t e d  and a t  the  
sh o r t - te rm  expense o f  o th e r  u n i t s .  However, th e re  a re  some economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t r a in t s  in  the p ro v is io n  of th ese  in c e n t iv e s  and 
they  a re  j u s t i f i e d  i f  th ey  r e a l l y  prov ide  a s tim ulus  to p r iv a te  i n ­
vestm ent and second i f  the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  makes good use o f  them.
The e v a lu a t io n  of th e se  p ro v is io n s ,  as we p o in ted  out e a r l i e r ,  i s  a 
d i f f i c u l t  ta sk .  P a r t i c u l a r l y ,  f o r  the  case o f  Greece, t h i s  ev a lu a ­
t io n  becomes more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  two a d d i t io n a l  re a so n s .  F i r s t ,  the 
g re a t  e x te n t  o f  tax  evasion  le ad s  to i r r a t i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  incen ­
t iv e s  between the v a r io u s  s e c to r s  o f  the  economy and secondly , th e re  
a re  a l a rg e  number o f  in c e n t iv e s  which tend to c o n t r a d ic t  each o th e r  
(KEPE, 1976) ,  I t  has been argued t h a t  " the  system of in c e n t iv e s  in  
Greece has been c o n s ta n t ly  a d ju s te d  and ex p an d ed .. .  and they a re  main­
ly  based on a p o l ic y  which may be conside red  as be ing  founded on the 
p r in c ip l e  o f  'tatoneraent* " (A. Peacock and G, Hanser, I 964) . The
u n d e r ly in g  r a t i o n a l e  o f  such a p o l ic y  o f  freq u en t  changes, as was 
mentioned to  us by Greek o f f i c i a l s ,  i s  th a t  i f  in c e n t iv e s  have a 
long l i f e  they  loose  t h e i r  p ro p e r ty  to a c t  as such and they  become 
an i n s t i t u t i o n .  Of cource, the  d isadvan tage  of such a p o l ic y  i s  t h a t  
i t  makes d i f f i c u l t  f o r  f irm s to  p lan  in  long-term .
Investm ent, a long  w ith  the  growth o f  the labour fo rce  and the 
advancement of te c h n ic a l  knowledge has been considered  as the  main 
de term inan ts  of the  r a t e  o f  growth o f  a n a t io n .  Both human and phy­
s i c a l  c a p i t a l  r a i s e s  the  agg rega te  p ro d u c tiv e  p o te n t i a l  and promotes 
the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  o f  a co u n try .  However, i t  would no t be r e a l i ­
s t i c  to  s t a t e  c a t e g o r i c a l ly  t h a t  a h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  investm ent in one 
copn try  n e c e s s a r i ly  le ad s  to  a h ig h e r  r a t e  of growth. The a l l o c a ­
t io n  of investm ent between s e c to r s  and reg ions  o f  the  economy and
“ fcJI-
the q u a l i t y  of i t  a re  a l s o  im p o r tan t .  T he re fo re , we proceed now to 
judge ta x  in c e n t iv e s  under th e se  c r i t e r i a ,  namely, the  e x te n t ,  the 
a l l o c a t i o n  and the q u a l i t y  of investm en t,
5 , 5 .1  The Level and A l lo c a t io n  o f  Investment
The evidence o f  a r e c e n t  econom etric  study  seems to  support 
the view th a t  the r a t e  o f  growth o f  the Greek economy i s  r e l a t e d  to 
the e x te n t  of investm ent (N, B a l ta s ,  1975). T h e re fo re ,  i f  t h i s  i s  
t ru e  the  ro le  o f  the  GIT as a means of s t im u la t in g  investm ent becomes 
im p ortan t.
The q u es t io n  which a r i s e s  i s  to what e x te n t  t h i s  l e v e l  of in v e s ­
tment was due to  the p ro v is io n  o f  the  v a r io u s  in c e n t iv e s  p rov ided  by 
the Greek a u t h o r i t i e s .  In  the  n e x t  c h ap te r  we use econom etric  te c h ­
n iques  to  t e s t  the  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  th ese  in c e n t iv e s  upon the  r a t e  o f  
investm en t.  Before doing so , however, we w i l l  g ive  a b r i e f  survey  o f  
the r o l e  o f  investm ent in  the Greek economy, i t s  l e v e l  and i t s  d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  among the v a r io u s  s e c to r s  and re g io n s .
Table $.12 shows the amount o f  investm ent ach ieved  du ring  the 
p e r io d  under c o n s id e ra t io n .  The t o t a l  amount o f  investm ent a t  con­
s t a n t  I 97G p r ic e s  was 25.560  m i l l io n  Drs. in 1958 nnd became 95,000 
m il l io n  Drs. in  1977, t h a t  i s ,  i t  in c re a se d  more than f o u r fo ld  dur­
ing t h i s  p e r io d .  These investm en ts  re p re se n te d  a h igh  p e rcen ta g e ,
2 7 , o f  g ro ss  n a t io n a l  p roduc t a t  the  same p e r io d .  Over th i s  p e r io d  
the  Greek economy reco rded  a h igh  r a t e  o f  growth compared w ith  o th e r  
European c o u n t r ie s  (6 ,5  p e r  cen t f o r  the  p e r io d  1955-62 and 5.6 per 
cen t f o r  the p e r io d  1965-1972).
As reg a rd s  the  s e c to r a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of investm en t,  the Greek 
a u t h o r i t i e s  have a ttem p ted  bo th  by c r e a t in g  the a p p ro p r ia te  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  environment and by e s t a b l i s h in g  v a r io u s  in c e n t iv e s  schemes 
f i r s t ,  to  channel investm ent to the m anufacturing  s e c to r  o f  the  econ­
omy and second, to p rov ide  in c e n t iv e s  to f irm s which a re  e s ta b l i s h e d  
in  the  p ro v in ces  as a means of a more ba lance  re g io n a l  growth.
Table 5,13 shows the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  investm ent among the  d i f ­
f e r e n t  s e c to r s  of the  Greek economy du ring  the p e r io d  1950 -  78.
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T A B L E  3 .1 2
GROSS FIXED ASSET FORMATION AT 1970 PRICES,...... - ..............  fivi.MiAL'oH Jra,
YEAR INVESTMENT G N P RATIO
( 1 ) ( 2 ; (5; ( 2 ; : ( 3)
1958 25,506 121,995 20 .9
59 23 ,619 126,897 18.6
i 960 28,307 151,272 21 .5
61 34,584 146,200 25 .6
62 54,897 147,468 25 .6
63 39,550 162,485 24 .2
64 50,548 174,825 28.9
65 57,840 190,871 30 .3
66 53,182 201,118 26.4
67 54,342 210,760 25 .7
68 60 ,154 223,172 26.9
69 75,395 243,478 30 .9
1970 84,009 263,503 31.8
71 89,275 286,076 31 .2
72 99 ,264 512,226 31.7
75 126,603 339,025 37.3
74 96 ,155 532,085 28.9
75 87,912 347,471 2 5 .3
76 89,755 * 567,520  * 24 .4  *




Source: National Accounts o f  Greece,
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T A B L E  3.15
/p e r c e  wnaqe')
D is t r ib u t io n  of Investm ent Among the Various S ec to rs  o f  the Economy
Year
A gri­





t u r i n g
E l e c t r i ­
c i t y ,
Trans­








1950 11,0 1.0 25 .0 5.0 17.0 30.0 6*0 9.0
55 8,0 1.0 12.0 10.0 9 .0 44.0 2 ,0 14 .0
i 960 17 .0 0,5 10.0 8 ,0 19 .0 29 .0 5.0 15.0
65 12.0 1.0 14.0 10.0 17.0 32 .0 1.5 13.5
1970 11.0 2 .0 14.0 7.0 21.0 28.0 0 .5 16,0
75 10.0 2.0 18,5 8,0 19.0 27 .0 1.0 14 .5
78 9 .5 2 .5 14.0 6,0 2 ,0 31 .0 1.0 16 ,0
1950/
78
11.0 2 .0 14,0 9 .0 16,0 33.0 2 .0 13 .0
Source: N a tiona l Accounts of.G reece ,
Greece i s  unique in  t h a t  the dw elling  s e c to r  absorbs the g r e a t e r
percen tage  o f  t o t a l  investm ent than any o th e r  s e c to r  does. Both econo­
mic and so c ia l -p s y c h o lo g ic a l  reasons  have le d  to t h i s .  I t  has been a r ­
gued th a t  th e re  i s  room fo r  l a r g e  p r o f i t s  from in v e s t in g  in  b u i ld in g ,  
because o f  the absence o f  c a p i t a l  g a in s  tax  and the l im i t e d  ro le  o f  
w ealth  ta x .  Investm ent in m anufacturing  accounted fo r  a more o r  l e s s  
s t a b l e  share  which equals  to  I 4 p e r  c en t .
U n fo r tu n a te ly  and the  second t a r g e t  as f a r  as the  a l l o c a t io n  o f  
investm ent i s  concerned was no t ach ieved . The a ttem pt f o r  d e c e n t r a l i ­
z a t io n  was u n su c c e ss fu l .  I t  is  w idely  accep ted  th a t  the U ity  of Athens 
and the surrounding  a re a  c o n s t i t u t e  the most im portan t po le  o f  a t t r a c ­
t io n  both  p o in ts  of view, demographic (m ig ra t ion )  and economic a c t i v i -
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t y ,  ' (l>, Germ idis, M, D e liv an i  (1975J. In  a d d i t io n  a d m in is t r a t iv e  
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  has encouraged b o th  m ig ra t io n  and economic a c t i v i ty »
Table 5-14 shows the  geograph ic  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
e s ta b l ish m e n t  by in d u s t ry  araont v a r io u s  p a r t s  of Greece f o r  two y e a r s ,  
1958 and I 969 .
Geographic D i s t r i b u t io n  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  E stab lishm en t by Industry*
Athens S a lon ica O ther In d .C e n tre s
1958 1969 1958 1969 1958 1969













T o t .Manu 
fac  tun ­
ing  ,
64.07 25 .54 67.65 52.86 15.86 5.85 17.92 8 .71 20 .07 7.57 14.45 7 .02
Consum­
e r  gds.
65.76 25 .15 66,50 50.51 17.02 5.98 18,62 8.48 17.22 6.06 14.88 6.78
I n t e r ­
mediate
goods.
79.71 14.89 79.95 65.15 10.75 2.00 12,16 9 .61 9 .56 1.79 7.89 -■,6.25
C ap i t­
a l  gds.
67.55 55.56 68.87 59.76 15.52 7.69 16.65 9 .61 17.15 8.49 14.48 8 ,5 6
........j
Key : ^ TIC ♦ percentage o f to ta l of in d u stria l centres [ 8  townsj
% NT = percentage of national to ta l .
Note: For 1958, the in d u stria l centre of loannina is  not included ex­
cept for “to ta l manufacturing industries"!
Sources:
Industria l cencuses 1958, 196$, I 9 6 9 , National S ta t is t ic s  
Service of Greece,
$o5o2 The q u ality  of Investment
The c o n t r ib u t io n  of investm ent to economic growth depends c ru ­
c i a l l y  on i t s  q u a l i ty »  To t e s t  the  q u a l i ty  o f  investm ent in  the  v a r i ­
ous s e c to r s  o f  the economy two c r i t e r i a  w i l l  be adopted . F i r s t ,  the 
in c re m e n ta l" c a p i ta l - o u tp u t  r a t i o "  and second, th e  s iz e  o f  the  Greek 
f irm s w i l l  be d iscu ssed .  vVe c o n s id e r  the  second a sp e c t  because in  a 
developing  economy dominated by sm all fam ily  f irm s i t  is  e s s e n t i a l  fo r
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the  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the  growth p ro cess  t h a t  f irm s take  the  optimum 
s iz e  from te c h n o lo g ic a l  and economic p o in t  of view, which w i l l  a llow  
them to s p e c ia l i z e  which in  tu rn ,  w i l l  allow them to  en joy  economies 
o f  s c a le .  I t  has been r e p e a te d ly  emphasized t h a t  the  b a s ic  weakness 
o f  the Greek economy is  t h a t  development i s  be ing  m ainly done by widen­
in g  the  p ro d u c tiv e  b a s is  w ithou t making the n ecessa ry  s t r u c t u r a l  change 
and q u a l i t a t i v e  improvements (X. Z o lo ta s ,  1976),
3 .5 ,2 .1  The " Increm en ta l  C ap i ta l-O u tp u t  Ratio" IGOR
An inc rem en ta l c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  i s  the  r a t i o  o f  the  in c re a se  
in  f ix e d  c a p i t a l  to  th e  in c re a s e  in  s e c to r a l  p roduc t over th e  same 
p e r io d .  I t  i s  th e  r e c ip r o c a l  o f  the concept o f  marginal p r o d u c t iv i ty ,  
a h igh ICOR implying a low m arg ina l p r o d u c t iv i ty  o f c a p i t a l  and v ic e  
v e rs a .
Table 3 .1$  shows th e se  r a t i o s  f o r  the Greek economy d u r in g  the  
p e r io d  1951 - 75. From t h i s  t a b l e  we see t h a t  the m anufactu ring  sec ­
t o r  was, w ithou t doubt, th e  most p ro d u c t iv e .  The average  va lue  o f  
the  r a t i o  was 2 .41 fo r  the  whole p e r io d .  D esp ite  the  la rg e  volume of 
investm ent which took p la ce  d u r in g  the  decade I 96 I - 7O t h i s  r a t i o  
showed a s i g n i f i c a n t  downward t r e n d ,
,-f 4y .1.. C..C.
D esp ite  the  o p e r a t io n a l  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of ICOR, J.t)\I^'V'olves a 
number o f  s e r io u s  l im i ta t io n s ^  tO:==uaa“-irhat""forydecisions on a l l o c a t i n g  
i n v e s t m e n t F i r s t ,  i t  excludes  the  c o s t  o f  a l l  in p u ts  o th e r  than  th a t  
of c a p i t a l  which may d i f f e r  w idely  between s e c t io n s .  Second, by meas­
u r in g  the  in c re a se  in  o u tp u t  over the  same p e r io d  as  the  ^change o f cap­
i t a l  s to c k ,  i t  n e g le c ts  th e  t im e -p h as in g  of b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  o f  the 
p r o j e c t .  Indeed investm en ts  r e q u i r in g  la rg e  ICORs a re  o f te n  those 
w ith  g r e a t e r  d u r a b i l i t y  than those  w ith  sm a l le r  ICORs. S im i la r ly ,  
investm ents  w ith  low ICORs may re q u i r e  long m a tu ra t io n  p e r io d s  before  
they  become p ro d u c t iv e ,  w hile  those  w ith  h igh ICORs may mature q u ick ­
ly .  T h ird , measurement o f  ICORs can o f te n  be m is lead in g ,  in  the sense 
t h a t  they h ide  changes in  the u t i l i z a t i o n  of r e s o u rc e s .  For th ese  
reasons  they  should be t r e a t e d  as o n ly  ve ry  rough in d ic a to r s  o f  the 
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  investm en t.
i
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T A B L E
THE INCREMENTAL CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO (ICOR)
Total ' A gri­
c u l t u r e .
Manufac­ E l e c t r ­
P e r io d Net Gross tu r in g . i c i t y  
Gas e t c .
Housing
1951-55 2.68 1.78 1.07 2.44 20,77 13.61
1956-60 2.98 2 ,2 4 2.07 2 .60 14.23 16.27
I 96I -65 3.64 2.99 4 .60 2 .31 10.37 16.18
1966-70 5.71 3.09 6,80 1.60 9.93 15.18
1971-75 5.56 4.62 5.76 3.14 10.87 15.18
Average
1951-75 3 .71 2 .9 4 4 .06 2 .41 13.23  
... ... .. .
15.28
Notes: 1, A f iv e  y e a r  p e r io d  may be co n s id e red  s a t i s f a c t o r y  f o r
the com pletion  o f  and r e tu rn  on any k ind  o f  investm en t.
2, An in t e r v a l  o f  one y e a r  was allowed fo r  between the  i n ­
vestm ent and the in c re a se  in  o u tp u t ,  so t h a t  f o r  i n v e s t ­
ment made du ring  1951-55  in c re a s e s  in  ou tpu t du rin g  1952- 
1956 were taken  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n .
5 . The o v e r a l l  r a t i o s  were c a lc u la te d  on the  b a s i s  o f  n e t  
and g ross  investm en t,  w h i l s t  r a t i o s  f o r  the v a r io u s  
branches and s e c to r s  were c a lc u la te d  s o l e l y  on the  b a s is  
o f  g ross  inv es tm en t.
4* Aggregate were c a lc u la te d  a t  1970 p r i c e s .  T o ta l  in v e s t ­
ment does n o t  in c lu d e  the va lue  of sh ip s  bought under 
Greek F lag .
Source: N a tio n a l  Accounts o f  Greece, 1958-75 Athens 1976.
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3.5*3*2 The Size of the  Greek Firms
Investm ent which i s  e f f i c i e n t  w ith  r e s p e c t  to development in ­
vo lves  q u a l i t a t i v e  dimension in  tran sfo rm in g  th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f the ec ­
onomy, Two im portan t f e a tu r e s  c h a r a c te r iz in g  th e  Greek f irm  in  gen­
e r a l  and the i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  in  p a r t i c u l a r  a re  the s m a l l - s c a le  and 
the  fam ily  o rg a n is a t io n  o f  many e n t e r p r i s e s .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  du ring  
the p e r io d  under review  no s u b s t a n t i a l  t re n d  took p lace  f o r  the im­
provement e i t h e r  to l a r g e r - s c a l e  o p e ra t io n  or to a wider than  fam ily  
concern . I t  has been argued th a t  these  f e a tu r e s  a re  r e l a t e d  to each 
o th e r  and the fam ily  concern  i s  considered  to  a la rg e  e x te n t  as the 
cause o f  the  s m a l l - s c a le  f e a t u r e .
We in tro d u ce  two c r i t e r i a  to judge the s iz e  o f  th e  Greek fiirm^ 
The f i r s t ,  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  c r i t e r i o n ,  i s  the number of employees, 
whereas the  second, a q u a l i t a t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  i s  the independent manage­
ment o r  the ow ner-supplied  c a p i t a l .  For the purpose o f  our a n a ly s is  
o f  the impact o f  t a x a t io n  on sm all b u s in es s ,  q u a l i t a t i v e  c o n s id e ra ­
t io n s  a re  more a p p r o p r ia te .  Taxes, f o r  example, may bear more heav­
i l y ,  on a f i rm  because i t  i s  l a r g e ly  dependent upon in t e r n a l  sources 
o f c a p i t a l  to  f inance  i t s  investm ent programmes.
The Greek o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  c l a s s i f y  the  i n d u s t r i a l  f irm s in  
to "sm all s c a le "  and " la rg e  s c a le "  in d u s t ry .  Under the  former head­
in g  a re  put f irm s w ith  a  number o f  employees u n d e r '10, whereas under 
the l a t t e r  f irm s w ith  a number o f  employees above 10 p e rso n s .  Table 
3 .16 shows t h a t  95 pe r  c en t  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  e s ta b l ish m e n ts  employed 
l e s s  than 10 persons in  1958 and t h i s  percen tage  remained c o n s ta n t  
during  the  p e r io d  1958-69, acco rd in g  to the i n d u s t r i a l  censuses of 
1958, 1965 and I 969 . Fron the same ta b le  we see t h a t  sm a l l - s c a le  
in d u s t ry  c o n tr ib u te d  28,3 p e r  c en t  o f  the t o t a l  share  o f i n d u s t r i a l  
s e c to r  to  the  G.D.P in  I 9 6 3 , whereas the l a r g e r - s c a l e  in d u s t ry  71.1 
p e r  c e n t .  These p e rcen tag es  became 22.6 and 76*4 tn  I 969 c o r r e s ­
ponding ly . F in a l ly ,  we see t h a t  the  l a r g e r - s c a l e  in d u s t ry  was 2 .4  
and 5.6  times more p ro d u c tiv e  than  the  sm a l l - s c a le  in d u s t ry  in  the 
years  I 963 and I 969 c o rre sp o n d in g ly .
As f a r  as the  second c r i t e r i o n  i s  concerned, th a t  i s ,  the 
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ion may be obtained looking at the yearbock of Athens Stock Exchange.
I t  has been argued t h a t  Greek co rpo ra tionskeep  t h e i r  fam ily  concern 
even when they  have t h e i r  shares  quoted on the  A.S.E, (G, Dracos, 
1975). In  1951 , lüOO c o rp o ra t io n s  out o f  I 369 had l e s s  than 9 sh a re ­
ho ld e rs  (G, C outsoum aris , I 96 4 , G Dracos, 1975). From the 1974 
yearbook o f  the A.S.a we see t h a t  24 co rp o ra t io n s  out o f  98 had a 
number o f  sh a reh o ld e rs  g r e a t e r  than 1000, 68 g r e a te r  than  100 and 
6 c o rp o ra t io n s  had l e s s  than 10 sh a reh o ld e rs  whereas fo r  the  y ea r  
1977 these  f ig u r e s  were 13, 55 and 17 co rre sp o n d in g ly .  Wince one 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  en tran ce  o f  a co rp o ra t io n  to the A.S.E i s  the 
degree o f  d is p e r s io n  o f  i t s  s h a re s ,  i t  i s  rea so n ab le  to conclude th a t  
the number o f  the sh a reh o ld e rs  in  c o rp o ra t io n s  w ith  sh a res  n o t  quoted 
w ith  A.S.E i s  much sm a l le r  than the  above mentioned numbers.
During the p e r io d  under rev iew  the Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  in t ro d u ­
ced tax  in c e n t iv e s  f o r  th e  promotion o f l a r g e - s c a le  investm ent prog­
rammes (Law IO7I / I 96 I)  and f o r  th e  f a c i l i t a t i o n  o f mergers (Law 1297/ 
1972 and 231/ 1975) ,  however, w ithout s u b s ta n t i a l  r e s u l t s .
These ch a ra cter istics  have s ig n ifica n t impact unon the per­
formance of the Greek Firms, Email s iz e  tends to bring low produc­
t iv i t y  by depriving firms o f economies of scale and enchanced com­
p etitiv en ess  through a reduction of the cost o f production by using  
new techniques, in production and management. F in a lly , another con­
sequence o f these ch a ra cter istics  is  related  to the methods of finan­
cing investment programmes by the Greek firms as we discussed in a 
previous section»
I t  is  very important for the continuation o f the high rate of 
economic growth achieved by the Greek economy during the period under 
review these two ch a ra cter istics  to be elim inated. P articu lar ly , in  
view, o f the f u l l  membership of Greece with the E.E.C th is fa ct be­
comes a matter o f survival for the Greek Firms, since the s ta te  aid 
w ill be lessened.
i t  would be a mistake to s ta te  that small business should stop 
ex ist in g . They have a trad ition  in the Greek economic h istory  and 
there are f ie ld s  where they are more successfu l than large enter-
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p r i s e s ,  L a rg e -sca le  e n t e r p r i s e s  should  be developed where economies 
o f  s c a le  a re  p o s s ib le .  The development o f  r e a l  c o rp o ra t io n s  w ith  a 
l a rg e  d is p e r s io n  o f t h e i r  sh a re s  n o t on ly  would make Greek economy 
more p ro d u c tiv e  and co m p e ti t iv e  bu t  more e q u i ta b le  as w e ll  as s in ce  
the  la rg e  d is p e r s io n  of sh a res  would allow to  l a r g e r  p e rcen tag e  of 
Greek p o p u la t io n  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  the  ea rn in g s  of th e se  co rp o ra t io n s*  
In  o th e r  words, th i s  would le ad  to economic growth w ith  equity*
3*7 Summary and Conclusions
A na lysis  o f  the  Greek tax  s t r u c t u r e  showed t h a t  i t s  main 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a re  the heavy r e l i a n c e  on i n d i r e c t  tax es ,  the absence 
o f  c a p i t a l  ga in s  t a x ,  the  r e l a t i v e  unimportance of tax es  on w ealth  
and the p resence  o f  tax  in c e n t iv e s ,  ihe  absence of c a p i t a l  g a in s  t a x ,  
in  a d d i t io n  to  o th e r  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  had an e f f e c t  upon the  approp­
r i a t i o n  o f  p r o f i t s  through a d i s c r im in a t io n  in favour o f  r e t e n t io n ,  
and upon the method o f  f in a n c in g  d i s c r im in a t in g  in  favour o f  e q u i ty  
f in a n c e .
The ClT was used  as the main dev ice  to  a f f e c t  the  behav iour o f  
the  p r iv a te  s e c to r .  In  o th e r  words, the CIT was used as a  means o f  
s t im u la t in g  investm ent f o r  prom oting growth. The revenue c o n t r ib u t ­
ion  o f  CIT w ith in  the  tax  system was un im portan t.  This i s  due, main­
ly ,  to the  a llowances provided, to  the  low le v e l  o f  c o rp o ra te  income 
and f i n a l l y , t o  ta x  ev as io n . The Greek c o rp o ra te  tax  co n v er ts  the  
ClT in to  one on r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  and i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  the  s im p le s t  meth­
od o f  d e a l in g  w ith  the  double t a x a t io n  o f  d iv id en d s .
The Greek CIT was in  favour  o f  r e ta in e d  p r o f i t s .  This b ia s  
came through th re e  sou rces :
1* The absence o f  c a p i t a l  g a in s  tax .
2o The d is c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  d i s t r i b u t i o n .
3, The p ro v is io n  o f ta x  in c e n t iv e s .
The GIT was used  w ith  no s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s ,  as a means o f  im­
p ro v in g  the fu n c t io n in g  o f  the Greek c a p i t a l  market by d i s c r im in a t in g  
between r e ta in e d  n r o f i t s  o f  f irm s w ith  shares  in  the Athens Stock Ex­
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change and those whose a re  n o t .  The banking system was the  main source 
o f  e x te r n a l  funds during  the  p e r io d  under co n s id e ra t io n *
F in a l ly ,  c a p i t a l  a llow ances e i t h e r  in  the  form o f  d e p re c ia t io n  
allowance or o f  investm ent allowance were widely used as a means of 
s t im u la t in g  investm ent and of c h a n n e l l ih g  these  in to  d e s i r a b le  s e c to r s  
in  the  Greek economy o r f o r  a ch ie v in g  reg io n a l  ba lance  growth. The ex­
t e n t  o f  investm ent was s a t i s f a c t o r y  du ring  the p e r io d  under rev iew  and 
i t  i s  b e l ie v e d ,  th a t  i t  was the main reason f o r  the  achieved  h igh r a t e  
o f  growth. However, the d i s t r i b u t i o n  and the q u a l i t y  o f  investm ent were 
no t s a t i s f a c t o r y .  Both, i n s t i t u t i o n a l  environment and the  p r iv a te  sec ­
to r  a re  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  the  u n su cc e ss fu l  s t r u c t u a l  development o f  the  
Greek economy* I t  i s  worth m entioning t h a t  among o th e r  f a c t o r s ,  the 
la ck  of f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t i s e  makes Greek firm s to be slow to  take  ad­
van tage  of the  tax  in c e n t iv e s .  This i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  tru e  f o r  the 
sm all f irm s and firm s e s t a b l i s h e d  in  th e  p ro v in ces .  This f a c t  c r e a te s  
an in e q u i ty  between f irm s  which en joy  the a v a i l a b le  tax  in c e n t iv e s  
and those  which do not* However, to  what e x te n t  d id  co rn o ra te  ta x ­
a t io n  a f f e c t  th e  achieved l e v e l  of investm en tï  Did t h i s  tax  a f f e c t  
investm ent d ec is io n s  o r  o th e r  f a c to r s  were more im portant?  This im­
p o r ta n t  q u e s t io n ,  from p o l ic y  im p l ic a t io n  p o in t  o f  view , to g e th e r  
w ith  the e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  the  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  p o l ic y  between d i v i ­
dend and r e t e n t io n  a re  t e s t e d  économet r i c a l l y  in  the n ex t ch ap te r  to 
which we oroceed*
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NOTES ; CHAPTER THREE
1# Not from c o s t  p o in t  o f  view bu t from psycJplogical 
p o in t  o f  view*
2* Suppose the  nominal t a x  r a t e  i s  equa l to  35 p e r  c en t  
and th e  su rch arg e  i s  13 p e r  c e n t ,  then  th e  e f f e c t i v e  
r a t e  i s  38*18* The p ro o f  has as  fo llow s:
L et X the  amount o f  su rch arg e  which i s  d e d u c t ib le  from 
the  y e a r ' s  p r o f i t s *  Then we have,
(1 -  X ) ( .33) ( . 15 ) = X
which im p lie s  x = .0490. We s u b t r a c t  i t  from 100 and 
we o b ta in  9 5 .1 .  We ta x  t h a t  a r  r a t e  *35 which i s  equal 
to  33*28* T here fo re  33*28 p lu s  4*90 equal to  38.18*
— — — o o O o o  — — —
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APPENDIX TO CHAPÎTEH THREE
TAX INCENTIVES
Since 1950 the  Greek Government has enac ted  a s e r i e s  of in ­
cen t iv e s  to  s t im u la te  p ro d u c tiv e  investm ent as a  s te p  towards en­
couraging  the c r e a t io n  o f  c o m p e t i t iv e - s iz e d  m anufactu ring  f a c i l i t ­
i e s  and su p p o rt in g  re g io n a l  development. These in c e n t iv e s  took 
the form e i t h e r  o f  tax  exemptions o r  f i n a n c i a l  p ro v is io n s  such as 
exemptions from im port d u ty , su b s id iz e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  e t c .
This appendix d e a ls  w ith  tax  i n c e n t iv e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w ith  
th e se  f o r  which a v a i l a b le  d a ta  e x i s t .  These can be c l a s s i f i e d  
in to  two c a te g o r ie s .  The f i r s t ,  (Law 4002/59» Law 147/6? and 
Law 551/74) r e f e r s  to  f irm s i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  the  p la ce  of e s ta b ­
l ish m en t and has as t a r g e t  to  s t im u la te  new p ro d u c tiv e  investm en t, 
a q u i s i t i o n  o f  new f ix e d  a s s e t s  and f i n a l l y  to  a id  i n d u s t r i a l  
p ro d u c tio n .  The second (Law 1078/71 as was amended and su p p le ­
mented by Laws Degree 1312/72, Law Degree 1357/75 and Law 289/76) 
r e f e r s  to  e n te r p r i s e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  p rov inces  and i s la n d s .
/ law 4002/1959/ " Tax in c e n t iv e s  fo r  new -productive investm en t”
I n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  may, u n t i l  the end o f 1970 ( o r i g i n ­
a l l y  by 1964 bu t i t  was extended by Law Degree 607/ 68) deduct 
from t h e i r  annual p r o f i t s  any expenses in c u rre d  f o r  new in v e s t ­
m ents. The d e d u c t ib le  amount fo r  each accoun ting  p e r io d  has as 
fo llo w s: -
E n te rp r i s e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  the  d i s t r i c t  o f  A t t i c a  a re  allowed 
to  deduct 50^  from the  u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s ,  f o r  p ro v is io n a l  en­
t e r p r i s e s  t h i s  amount i s  equa l to  60)  ^ o f  the u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  
whereas in  the case o f  e n te r p r i s e s  e s ta b l i s h e d  in  the  i s la n d s  
the  amount reaches  90^  o f  the  u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s .
The above deductions  a re  p e rm it te d  as long as f i n a n c i a l  
s ta tem en ts  of the  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  judged as be ing  in  accordance 
w ith  the f a c t s .
These deductions  canno t,  in  any y e a r ,  exceed a sum c o r r e s ­
ponding to  50^  o f  u n d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  o f  the c o rp o ra t io n .
4 4 4 “
/LAW 14-7/1967/ " Tax in c e n t iv e s  f o r  the  a q u i s i t i o n  o f
new f ix e d  a s s e t s "
E n te r p r i s e s  may, u n t i l  the  end o f  1972, he exempt from in ­
come ta x  and any o th e r  concoramitant tax  o r  duty  in c i d e n t a l  t h e r e to ,  
the  t o t a l  annual n e t  p r o f i t s ,  p rov ided  t h a t  t h i s  amount o f  p r o f i t s  
i s  a l l o c a t e d  f o r  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  new f ix e d  a s s e t s ,
Ihe t a x - f r e e  a llow ance i s  g ra n te d  as long as  the  e n t e r p r i s e  
in v e s t  i t s  n e t  p r o f i t s  f o r  the  a q u i s i t i o n  o f  new i n s t a l l a t i o n s .
The advantage s t a r t s  w ith  the  acco u n tin g  p e r io d  when such expen­
d i tu r e  took p la c e  f o r  new i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  As a q u i s i t i o n  d a te  i s  
c ons ide red  as  fo llo w s:
For land  the  d a te  o f  the  f i n a l  c o n t r a c t  i s  ta k en ,  f o r  
b u i ld in g s  th e  d a te  when the  c o n s t r u c t io n  perm it i s  i s su e d  by the 
A r c h i t e c tu r a l  P lann ing  O ff ice  i s  taken  and f i n a l l y  f o r  machinery 
the  d a te  when the  in v o ice  i s  i s su e d  i s  taken ; in  the  case  which 
the  machinery i s  im ported the  d a te  when the in v o ice  which i s  de­
p o s i te d  w ith  th e  in te rv e n in g  bank has been c e r t i f i e d  by the  r e ­
le v a n t  Chamber o f  Commerce,
/LAW 331/74/ " Tax in c e n t iv e s  to  a id  i n d u s t r i a l  p ro d u c t io n "
E n te r p r i s e s  may u n t i l  the  end o f  1975 deduct from t h e i r  
annual p r o f i t s  à f^ o  o f  the  expenses in c u r re d  f o r  th e  purchase  o f  
new m achinery.
This d eduction  i s  g ra n te d  p rov ided  th a t ;
(a) The machinery should  be pu t in  use w i th in  s ix  
months o f  the  d a te  i t  i s  purchased ,
(b) The deductab le  ta x  f r e e  amount must n o t exceed 
509^  o f  the  n e t  p r o f i t s  a n n u a l ly  and on ly  up un­
t i l  31 . 12.77  and,
(c) The ta x  a llow ance i s  e f f e c t i v e  fo r  machinery 
purchased  from 5 . 5 .7 4  u n t i l  31 . 12 . 7 5 .
/LAW 1078/71/ " Tax and o th e r  measures in  support  o f
R egional Development"
As was mentioned above t h i s  law was amended and supplemen­
te d  by the  laws 1312/72, 1337/75 and 289/76 . The l a t t e r  p la c e s  
p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis on the  development o f  bo rder  a re a s  ( r e g io n  E) 
whereas the  o th e r  have d iv id e d  the  co u n try  in  fo u r  (A,B,C,D) re g io n s .
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Law 1078/71 cont;
E nterprises e sta b lish e d  in  reg ion  B may, u n t i l  5 1 .1 2 .8 2 , 
deduct 50^ o f the va lu e  o f the expenses from th e ir  annual p r o f i t s .  
E nterprise e s ta b lish e d  in  reg ion  C may, u n t i l  the end o f  1987, 
deduct 100^ o f  the va lu e  o f  the expenses from th e ir  annual p r o f it s .  
E n terp fise  e s ta b lish e d  in  region  a and making investm ent in  region  
B or C may a lso  deduct or 1009^  correspondingly , o f  th e ir  ex­
penses from th e ir  annual p r o f i t s .  F in a lly , en terp r ise s  e x is t in g  
or being e sta b lish e d  or moving in  region  E and r e a liz in g  new in ­
vestm ent are e n t i t le d  to deduct from th e ir  new p r o f it s  an amount 
equal to  150^ o f  the va lu e o f the expenses.
The above deductions are allow ed provided that;
(a) They are made on n et p r o f it s  a f te r  deducting
p ro v is io n s  for  ordinary r e se r v e s , compulsory 
d is tr ib u tio n  o f  dividends to  shareholders.
(b) They are made on p r o f it s  o f the accounting
year during which the investm ent was made.
(c) They are shown in  separate accounts in  the
books o f  the e n te r p r ise .
These deductions are made from p r o f it s  o f the accounting  
years during which the investm ent was made. I f  no p r o f it s  are 
r e a lise d  during th a t year or i f  th ese r e a liz e d  are in s u f f ic ie n t ,  
the deductions are made e f fe c te d  during the imm ediately fo llo w in g  
su ccessiv e  years u n t i l  the sa id  percentage o f the investm ent value  
are covered, but not la t e r  than 1982(region  B) and 1987(region  C),
CHAPTER FOUR
AN ECONOMiTRIC INVESTIGATION OF DIVIDEND 
AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR
4*1 Introduotion
Policy-m akers are not on ly  concerned w ith the d ir e c t io n a l in ­
flu en ce  o f  one v a r ia b le  upon another but a lso  want to  q u an tify  the 
stren gth  o f  th is  in f lu e n c e . For example, although the tax  d iscrim in ­
atory  p o lic y  theory between r e ten tio n  and dividend may c o r r e c tly  s t a t e  
th at d iscr im in ation  a g a in st d ividends g iv es  inducement to firm s to r e ­
ta in  more p r o f i t s ,  policy-m akers r e a l ly  want to know i f  such a p o lic y  
i s  e f f e c t iv e  or n o t . In a d d itio n , i f  th is  p o lic y  i s  e f f e c t iv e  they  
a lso  want to  know i f  th ese  reta in ed  p r o f it s  are r e - in v e ste d  or not 
s in ce  the r a tio n a le  o f  th is  p o lic y  i s  th a t th ese p r o f it s  are r e in ­
v e s te d . S im ila r ly , governments a lso  u se investm ent allow ances to  
stim u la te  investm ent and an assessm ent o f  th e ir  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  i s  im­
portan t.
The purpose o f  th is  chapter i s  to  t e s t  the e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  
th ese  two kinds o f  in c e n tiv e s  in  Greece, s in ce  as we saw in  the prev­
iou s chapter, the tax d iscrim in atory  v a r ia b le  in  Greece had a value  
va r ied  around u n ity , sometimes above and sometimes below w hile  h i^ i  
l e v e l s  o f investm ent allow ances were granted to the Greek firm s. We 
w i l l  do so by t e s t in g  variou s models o f  dividend and investm ent be­
haviour, s p e c i f ic a l ly  in corp oratin g  the tax d iscrim in atory  v a r ia b le  
0 and the value o f  the investm ent in c e n tiv e s . These models c o n s is t  
o f  equations which are dynamic, because the past h is to r y  o f  the de­
pendent v a r ia b le s  e ith e r  dividend or  investm ent are re lev a n t to th e ir  
current v a lu es . They d i f f e r  from the usual s t a t ic  equations and th e ir  
main c h a r a c te r is t ic  i s  the presence o f  a lagged , e ith e r  independent 
or dependent v a r ia b le  in  th e ir  r ig h t hand s id e . In p a r tic u la r , we 
w il l  use both s in g le  equation and sim ultaneous equation models to  
t e s t  fo r  interdependence in  the dividend and investm ent d e c is io n s .
As a by-product o f  the above o b je c t iv e s , a s im p lif ie d  attem pt w i l l  take 
p lace to t e s t  the s h if t in g  h yp othesis o f  the CIT in  Greece.
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4 .2  DIVIDEND POLICY IN (51EECE
4 .2 .1  Introdu ction
A number o f  cou n tries  have fo llow ed  a d iscrim in atory  p o lic y  b et­
ween d is tr ib u te d  and u n d istr ib u ted  p r o f i t s .  This p o lic y  i s  based on 
the in feren ce , which has been suggested  by both theory and ev id en ce, 
th a t there e x is t s  a r e la t io n sh ip  between reta in ed  p r o f it s  and in v e s t­
ment (m. F e ld s te in , 1970). However, the e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  th is  d is ­
crim inatory p o lic y  has been a very  co n tro v ers ia l is s u e .  D esp ite the 
importance o f  th is  q u estion  l i t t l e  a tte n tio n  has been paid to a s s e s s ­
in g  tax impact by developing a th e o r e t ic a l model to exp la in  the d iv i ­
dend behaviour o f  the firm  (M. F e ld ste in , 1970 and M. King, 1971).
The m ajority o f  the em pirical models which have been te s te d , f a i l  to  
inclu de ta x a tio n . Only in  a few recen t cases has ta x a tio n  been in ­
troduced among the determ inants o f  dividend behaviour. Most o f  the 
em pirical s tu d ies  which deal w ith th is  su b ject use data from U.S.A  
and U.K. To our knowledge there are no em pirical s tu d ies  which have 
used data fo r  developing cou n tries  incorporating e x p l ic i t ly  ta x a t­
ion  amongst the explanatory v a r ia b le s .
The o b jec tiv e  o f  th is  s e c t io n  i s  to  t e s t  économet r ic a l ly  the 
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  various fa c to r s , which in flu en ce dividend p o lic y  in  
the Greek corporate s e c to r . Ve found in  the previous chapter th a t  
the value o f the tax d iscrim in atory  v a r ia b le  0 was d if fe r e n t  than 
u n ity  in  Greece, The e x is te n c e  o f  the in c e n tiv e , however, i s  not 
s u f f ic ie n t  to  e s ta b lis h  the response to i t  by firm s. Our main con­
cern, th ere fo re , i s  to examine whether the d if f e r e n t ia l  p o lic y  in ­
fluenced  the appropriation o f  p r o f it s  between reta in ed  p r o f it s  and 
dividends -  and i f  i t  d id , to what e x te n t. In a d d itio n , as a by­
product o f  our main o b je c t iv e , we attem pt, in  a s im p lif ie d  way, to  
t e s t  the s h if t in g  qu estion  o f  the Greek GIT, by u sin g  the dividend  
model,
4 .2 .2  S p e c if ic a tio n  o f  the Dividend Model
Two main fea tu res  o f  firm 's  dividend d ec is io n  are th at f i r s t l y ,  
fo r  a given s e t  o f  economic circum stances for the firm  we can de-
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f in e  the optimum le v e l  o f  d ividend and second ly , th a t firm s seek year  
to -y ea r  s t a b i l i t y  in  the dividend payout* A tw o-part model i s ,  
th ere fo re , appropriate f i r s t l y  to determine the optimum value o f  d iv i ­
dends, denoted by D , and secon d ly , e s ta b lish in g  the adjustment mech­
anism r e la t in g  the a c tu a l va lu e  o f  d iv id en d s, D, and i t s  optimum value  
D*.
Ve saw in  the previous chapter th at the s iz e  o f  the Greek cor­
poration  i s  sm all and th a t owners, managers, and entrepreneurs are 
ty p ic a l ly  one man or a sm all group o f  men. This sm all group fu rn ish ­
es the corporation  w ith eq u ity  c a p ita l (ow ners), manages the d ay-to -  
dayoperation o f  the en terp r ise  (managers) and f in a l ly ,  i s  the organ­
iz in g  and n o t iy a tin g  force  o f  the en terp r ise  (en trep ren eu rs). In  
other words, in  a d d ition  to r isk -ta k in g  th is  group performs manager­
i a l  and entrepren euria l fu n c tio n s . The corporation i s  id e n t if ie d  with  
and run for  the b e n e fit  o f  owner-operators* They have con tro l over 
dividend and investm ent d e c is io n s  in vo lv in g  them selves d ir e c t ly  as 
owners, managers and r e c ip ie n ts  o f corporate income. The choice o f  
a payout r a tio  in  such corporation  i s  c lo s e ly  bound up w ith personal 
p ro p en s itie s  to consume and aave.
To pose the problem more form ally , we assume th at the Greek 
management has to decide to appropriate p r o f it s  in  such a manner as 
to  maximize i t s  u t i l i t y  su b ject to a budget c o n s tr a in t . Since d iv i ­
dends, D, make resources a v a ila b le  fo r  current consumption w hile  r e ­
te n t io n s , R, through re-in vestm en t, crea te  resources for  fu ture con­
sumption, the management's u t i l i t y  fu n ction  sp e c ify in g  h is  preference  
between re ten tio n  and dividend can be represented in  the standard  
Fisherian  framework, as in  Figure 4 .1 .
Fi g. 4.1 The Income QT\d S u b stitu tion  Effec-t of a  Tax Change
R
u(R,D)
Suppose th a t the management decides to  r e ta in  a l l  p r o f i t s ,
then, the a v a ila b le  p r o f it s  for  r e ten tio n  are equal to  P + UBP which 
i s  the in tercep t o f  R. On the oth er hatnd, i f  he d ecides to d is t r ib ­
u te  a l l  p r o f i t s ,  he w i l l  r e c e iv e  as a shareholder an amount equal to  
P + DEP minus the amount o f  taxes which are le v ie d  on dividend; th a t
i s , 1 -  9 D. The budget co n stra in t fo r  the firm  i s  as shown on the 
0
f ig u r e . For s im p lic ity , we show the con stra in t as l in e a r , although  
the p ro v is io n  o f  tax-exempted d ividends (s e c t io n  3 .3 .3 .5 )  would imply 
a co n stra in t w ith  k in k s. However, the f l a t  ra te  o f  tax i s  c o n s is ten t  
with a lin e a r  c o n str a in t.




■3r P + DSP -  1 - 0
e D
From the above equilibrium  con d ition  we see  th a t the optimum value o f  
*
d iv id end s, D , i s  a fu n ction  o f  n et p r o f i t s ,  o f  d ep recia tion  and o f  
the value o f  tax  d iscrim in atory  v a r ia b le  0 , th a t i s ,
B* -  f  ( P , EBP, 0 ) (4 .1 )
Suppose th a t the government reduces the ra te  o f  CIT, to . This
has two e f f e c t s ;  f i r s t ,  fo r  a given  amount o f  gross p r o f it s  the a -
mount o f  n et p r o f it s  i s  ra ised  and second, the reduction  o f  to a f f e c t s
the value o f  tax d iscrim inatory  0 ( r e c a l l  0 * 1 -  to) which a f f e c t s
1 -  to
the c o s t  o f  reta in ed  earn in gs. The f i r s t  e f f e c t  i s  the conventional 
income e f f e c t  which s h i f t s  the budget con stra in t p a r a l le l ,  The sub­
s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t  between R and D i s  i l lu s t r a t e d  on the fig u re  by the 
move from A to B; a reduction  o f  to leads to a reduction  in  0 which
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lea d s to the s u b s t itu t io n  o f  r e ten tio n  for  d ividend along the in d i f f ­
erence curve TJ. The reason for  t h is  i s  th at the lower the value o f  
0 the la rg er  the d iscr im in a tio n  a g a in st dividend. Therefore, the 
shareholder has an in cen tiv e  to  p refer  le s s  dividend and more reten ­
t io n .
L in ea r is in g , we derive the fo llo w in g  expression  fo r  the optimum 
value o f  d ividends:
* o<o + o(iP^ + c^ 2^ ^ t  ( 4 . 2 )
The constant term o f  the equation i s  g en era lly  assumed to be 
p o s it iv e  because o f  the presumption th at a l l  e ls e  being eq u al, cor­
porations would be g rea ter  r e lu c ta n t to reduce ra th er  than to r a ise  
d iv id en d s.
The most s tu d ie s  o f  dividend behaviour include p r o f it s  among 
the determ inants o f the d ividend p o lic y . In our form ulation they en­
te r  (p o s it iv e ly )  as a determinant o f the p o s it io n  o f  budget con­
s t r a in t ,  Moreover our in terv iew s w ith Greek f in a n c ia l management con­
firm ed th at p r o f it s  are important fo r  determ ining the le v e l  o f  d iv i ­
dends, They in d ic a te  the ca p a c ity  to pay dividends and are termed as 
the " sta r tin g  point" fo r  determ ination o f d iv idends. I t  i s  a lso  
p la u s ib le  that an in crease  in  p r o f it s  does not r e s u lt  in  an eq u iv a l­
ent in crease  in  dividend a t  a l l  le v e l s  o f  p r o f i t s .  Hence equation ( 4 . 
5) rep resen ts an a lte r n a t iv e  dividend model.
*
Po + P i  ^  + P ; BBPt 8 t  (4 .3 )
We expect to be p o s it iv e  whereas to be n eg a tiv e . To our know­
led ge a l l  the previous models r e la te  dividends to p r o f it s  through a 
l in e a r  r e la t io n sh ip . We b e lie v e  th a t higher degree re la t io n sh ip  
should e x is t  between these two v a r ia b le s . The r a tio n a le  o f th is  
argument i s  th a t as p r o f it s  in crease  then a sm aller percentage i s  d i s ­
tr ib u ted  to the sh areh old ers. For the sake o f  s im p lic ity  we in trod ­
uce a quadratic r e la t io n sh ip  between p r o f it s  and d iv id en d s.
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D epreciation  i s  the second component o f  our model. Since i t
i s  a common b e l i e f  th a t d ep recia tion  does not a ccu ra te ly  measure the  
u sin g  up o f  c a p ita l ,  i t s  in trod u ction  in  the dividend equation would 
serve to portray more accu ra te ly  the resources a v a ila b le  to the firm  
fo r  investm ent and dividend o u tla y s , Briteain in clu d es in  h is  model 
d ep recia tion  along w ith  earnings ( i , e  earnings n e t o f  tax p lus de­
p rec ia tio n ) known as cashflow . Our in ter p r e ta tio n  has one more e l e ­
ment than B r it ta in 's  in te r p r e ta tio n . We include d ep rec ia tio n  as a 
separate v a r ia b le  in  ad d ition  to n et earn ings. We do so because 
p r o f it s  and d ep recia tion  not n e c e s s a r ily  have id e n t ic a l  impact on
■jt*
optimum d iv iden ds, D . Further, we introduce th is  v a r ia b le  in  our 
model w ithout any p red ic tio n  as fa r  as i t s  s ign  i s  concerned, A 
p o s it iv e  s ig n  would mean th a t firm s use as p r o f it s  b a s is  the cash  
flow  as B r itta in  argues and as our form ulation o f  budget co n stra in t  
im p lie s . However, an a lte r n a tiv e  p o s s ib i l i t y  may appear, th a t i s ,  a 
n eg a tiv e  s ig n  o f  d ep recia tion  c o e f f ic ie n t  would mean th a t higher de­
p rec ia tio n  p rov ision s may g iv e  the firm  the opportunity to use th ese  
as a tax s h e lte r .  T his, o f  course, assumes th a t firm s are free  to  
manage d ep recia tion  allow ances.
Any corporation in  general and the Greek corporation  in  p a r t ic ­
u la r  needs a dividend p o lic y  because o f  tax co n sid era tio n s . When 
reta in ed  earnings or c a p ita l ga in s are taxed a t a lower ra te  than 
d iv id en d s, the dividend d ec is io n  may a f f e c t  the to t a l  tax l i a b i l i t y ,  
that i s ,  th at o f the corporation  and o f the shareholder. The tax  
v a r ia b le  included in  our models r e f le c ts  the d iscrim in ation  between 
dividends and r e te n tio n . L intner in  h is  p ion eerin g  work does n ot  
e x p l i c i t ly  include any tax v a r ia b le  in  h is  model even though he 
r e a l iz e s  the importance o f taxes in  determ ining dividend p o lic y . In 
h is  words "the r e s u lt s  o f  our s t a t i s t i c a l  work in d ic a te  th a t a llow ­
ance for  tax con sid era tion s a f fe c t in g  dividend p o lic y  i s  properly and 
adequately made sim ply by our use o f  p r o f it s  a f te r  taxes as a key 
v a r ia b le  in  the equation" (p ,1 1 3 ) . However, corporate taxa tion  has 
a dual e f f e c t  upon dividend d e c is io n s . F ir s t ,  i t  reduces the a v a i l ­
able amount o f  p r o f it s  and second i t  changes the r e la t iv e  c o st  o f  
d is tr ib u tio n  and r e te n tio n . L intner, th ere fo re , con fin es h im self
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o n ly , on the f i r s t  e f f e c t ,  F e ld ste in  covers th is  gap in c lu d in g  in  
h is  model the tax  d iscrim in atory  v a r ia b le  0 . .  D esp ite our o b jec tio n  
concerning h is  assumption fo r  co n stru ctin g  0 (as we have already  
s e e n ) , we b e lie v e  th a t F e ld ste in  made a great improvement o f  the  
Lintner model which according to Tarshis c r it ic ism  has no a b i l i t y  
to  exp la in  dividend behaviour, because o f i t s  o v e rs im p lic ity . We 
expect 0 to take a p o s it iv e  c o e f f ic ie n t ,  th at i s ,  the higher the @ , 
the lower d iscr im in ation  a g a in st d iv idends, the h igher the le v e l  o f  
d iv id end s. The underlying r a tio n a le  o f  th is  exp ecta tion  i s  th at  
sin ce  0 i s  determined by both corporate and personal income ta x , 
the d iscr im in ation  aga in st d ividends provides shareholders w ith a 
tax s h e lte r . I f  we take in to  con sid era tion  the fam ily  concern o f  
the Greek corporation  and the absence o f c a p ita l gains tax in  Greece, 
th is  tax sh e lte r  becomes stron ger.
Two a ttr a c t iv e  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  an econometric model i s  sim­
p l i c i t y  and easy o f  in te r p r e ta tio n . Two fu n ctio n a l forms are the 
most common in  econometric s tu d ie s , the lin e a r  and the lo g - l in e a r .
The ch o ice  between variou s fu n ctio n a l forma i t  is  a m atter o f  econ­
omic theory and observed data, F e ld ste in , fo r  example, uses a lo g -  
l in e a r  form. The la t t e r  i s  v ery  popular to econom etricians because 
the s lo p e  c o e f f ic ie n t  may be in terp reted  as the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  de­
pendent v a r ia b le  with resp ect to the independent v a r ia b le . D esp ite  
th is  s im p lic ity  the d ou ble-log  transform ation imposes a p r io r i  
c o n str a in t, namely, i t  assumes th a t the above mentioned e la s t i c i t y  
i s  con stan t. Therefore, our d e f in it io n  o f  optimum dividend re la x ­
es th is  r e s t r ic t iv e  assumption by tak ing a lin e a r  form.
The above con sid era tion s a llow  us to argue th a t our model
( 4 , 3) i s  in  sev era l resp ec ts  a g en era liza tio n  o f  previous m odels.
Previous s tu d ie s  (L in tn er , Kuh, B r it ta in , F e ld ste in , F isher) 
have found evidence th a t firm s ad ju st the ac tu a l dividend payments 
to the optimum le v e l  o f  d ividends w ith  a la g . This la g  i s  due to  
sev era l reason s. F ir s t ,  te c h n ic a l or in s t i t u t io n a l  r i g i d i t i e s  may
prevent the Greek manager from im m ediately e lin in a t in g  the en tir e
*
d ifferen ce  between D. and D .- l ,  As we saw the Greek b u sin ess lawt  t
c tffec ts  to some ex ten t the appropriation o f  p r o f it s .  Second, be­
havioural in e r t ia  may make-f irms re lu cta n t to change the le v e l  o f
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dividend. Third, the need o f  funds for  fin an cin g  investm ent prog­
rammes may be another reason . F in a lly , the r is in g  c o st  o f  rapid
*
change may be an o b sta c le  to e lim in a te  the d ifferen ce  between and 
This delayed response w i l l  be approximated by the p a r t ia l  ad­
justment model:
“ t  -  V i  ■ A [ p ;  -  V i ] , -  (4 .4 )
where stands fo r  dividends o f  the current p eriod , D^-1 for the
previous period and A i s  the adjustment c o e f f ic ie n t  which l i e s  in
the in te r v a l 0:^ 1 , For A equal to zero we have » ^ t-1 *hich
means th a t the p a r t ia l  adjustment mechanism i s  in v a lid  whereas fo r  A
*
equal to one we have D. = Du . which means th a t the gap between
^  U I
and ' i s  covered in  one period*
We su b s titu te  equation (4*4) in to  equation ( 4 . 2 ) and (4 .3 )  and 
we obta in  the reduced form equation to  be estim ated . From (4*2) and
( 4 , 4) we get:
D. -  D. T = Àa + Xa^P. + Ag.OEP, + Xa_0.“  X D  _ + Àu ( 4 . 5 )t  t - 1  o I t  2 t  3 t t - 1  t
or
A c t t  (1 -A )D ^ _ ^  + Au^ ( 4 . 6 )
and from ( 4 . 3 ) and ( 4 . 4 ) we get;
-  V l  = + ^ ^ l^ t  + + AGsCKSPt + -  ^ V l
+ Aw^ ( 4 . 7 )
2
^ ' t  "  **■ ^ ^ l ^ t  + ( l - A ) D t _ i  + Aw^ U
We can estim ate e ith e r  equations (4*5) and (4*7) or equations
( 4 .^^and ( 4 . 8 ) .  Equations (4 .3 )  aud (4*7) comparing to ( 4 .G) and 
(4 . 8 ) lead  to the same c o e f f ic ie n t s  but they d if f e r  in  the value o f
R , We u su a lly  use fo r  th is  study equations (4*0) and (4 . 8 ) ,  A ll
c o e f f ic ie n t s  are ex a c tly  id e n t if ie d .
F in a lly , to our knowledge no previous study o f  dividend p o lic y  
has incorporated in  i t s  a n a ly s is  various hypotheses as fa r  as the in ­
cidence and s h if t in g  o f  the CIT is  concerned. A ll th ese  s tu d ies  have
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assumed zero s h if t in g .  In chapter one we d iscussed  how important i t  
i s  fo r  a p o licy  maker to know who bears the burden o f  the CIT where­
as in  chapter two we developed the reverse  s h if t in g  hyp othesis regard­
in g  the a lte r n a tiv e  corporate tax  system s. T herefore, we adopt three  
hypotheses concerning the in cid en ce and s h if t in g  o f  the Greek CIT. 
F ir s t ,  we assume th a t there i s  no s h i f t in g ,  second, th a t there i s  a 
30 per cen t s h if t in g  and f in a l ly ,  a J O  per cent s h i f t in g .  We in ­
troduce th ese  con sid eration s through the tax  d iscrim in atory  v a r ia b le  
0 . That i s , the la t t e r  i s  given by the formula:
( 4 . 9 )0  = 1 -  tx>
1 — (1 — b )to
where, tp » personal income tax  ra te  
to  -  corporate income tax ra te  
b a degree o f  s h if t in g .
4 . 2 . 3 . Data
I t  i s  not an exagération  to say th a t the most d i f f i c u l t  part o f
A
th is  d is s e r ta t io n  was the c o l le c t io n  o f data. The a v a i la b i l i t y  and 
the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  data are two problems for a researcher who d ea ls  
w ith a developing country. We spend considerab le time in  our e f fo r t  
to c o l le c t  as much as p o ss ib le  and a t the same time r e l ia b le  data .
We resorted  to various sources to achieve our purpose. In f a c t ,  we 
c o lle c te d  from various sou rces, we contrasted  them and f in a l ly  we 
tr ie d  to use as much data as p o ss ib le  from the same source in  order 
to achieve homogeneity o f  th e se . Our main source i s  the N ation al 
S t a t i s t i c s  Serv ice  o f  Greece, We use annual data fo r  corporations  
for  the period 1959-1975. Annual data were used fo r  two reasons. 
F ir s t ,  because dividends are determined on an annual b a s is  a lth ou ^ i 
in terim  dividends are paid , th e ir  amount i s  very  sm all and second, i t  
would be very  d i f f i c u l t  i f  i t  i s  not im p ossib le , to c o l le c t  q u arterly  
data. We s p l i t  our sample in  two subsamples, th a t i s ,  the f i r s t  fo r  
the manufacturing sec to r  and the second with the r e s t  corporate s e c ­
to r  o f  the Greek Economy, We did so fo r  two reasons; f i r s t ,  because 
th ese  two samples are not homogeneous sin ce  d if fe r e n t fa c to r s  are
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taken in to  con sid eration  making dividend d ec is io n s  and second because 
we need the manufacturing sec to r  sep a ra te ly  fo r  fu tu re purposes.
Some problems a r ise  as fa r  as the measurement o f  p r o f it s  are 
concerned. Various d e f in it io n s  have been suggested  in  the l i t e r a tu r e ,  
such as gross p r o f it s  before ta x  and d ep recia tion , gross p r o f it s  a f ­
te r  tax p lus d ep recia tion  e t c .  We use two d if fe r e n t d e f in it io n s  o f  
p r o f i t s .  According to the f i r s t ,  we defin e  p r o f it s  as gross p r o f it s  
before tax  but exclu d in g  d ep recia tio n  and investm ent allowEinces, 
whereas according to the second, we define th ese as p r o f it s  a f te r  ta x , 
d ep recia tion s and investm ent a llow ances, W@ adopt th ese  d e f in it io n s  
o f p r o f it s  because our purpose i s  to  examine how taxes a f f e c t  the 
appropriation o f  p r o f it s  between re ten tio n  and d ividend, th at i s ,  how 
the tax burden i s  spread upon dividend and r e ten tio n . However, des­
p it e  the fa c t  th a t o th er d e f in it io n s  o f  p r o f it s  may provide a b e tte r  
p ic tu re  o f  the corporate a b i l i t y  to pay dividend our d e f in it io n s  are 
more c lo se  to what we are look ing fo r . Because the r e s u lt s  from u s­
in g  these d e f in it io n s  are s l ig h t l y  d if fe r e n t we report on ly  the r e ­
s u lt  u sing  the second d e f in it io n .
We got dividend payments from the same source. They include  
dividend paid to shareh olders, remuneration and allow ances o f members 
o f  board o f  d irec to rs  and extra payment and allow ances to company 
d irecto rs  and managements. We adopted th is  d e f in it io n  o f dividend be­
cause as we have seen elsew here the Greek corporation are fajiiily-owned 
and fam ily-runhed b u sin ess , th ere fo re , the assumption th at a l l  the d is ­
tr ib u ted  amount o f  p r o f it s  goes to the same persons i s  considered p lau s­
ib le .
D epreciation  fig u res  were taken from the annual rep ort o f  the  
s ta te  o f Greek ind ustry  published by the Federation o f  Greek in d u str­
i a l i s t s ,  These fig u res  concern not only  the corporations but lim ite d  
l i a b i l i t y  companies in  the Greek ind ustry  as w e ll. As i t  was o f f i c ­
i a l l y  v e r if ie d  to  u s , a t l e a s t ,  97 per cent o f  th ese  numbers concern 
the corporations in  th is  s e c to r , i t  seems reasonable to accept these  
f ig u r e s .
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4*2.4  E stim ation Procedures
The estim ation  o f  the reduced form o f  dividend models was made 
u sin g  the Econometric Software package (ESP) and the ICL 2976 comput­
er a v a ila b le  in  the U n iv ersity  o f  Glasgow, Pour d if fe r e n t  methods 
were used to estim ate  th ese  m odels. The ordinary le a s t  square (OLS), 
the Coohrane-Orcutt( CORO), the Prais-W insten gen era lized  le a s t  squ­
ares (GLS) and the Instrum ental v a r ia b le  technique (IV ).
The presence o f  the lagged dependent v a r ia b le  among the
explanatory v a r ia b le s  r a is e s  estim ation  problems which are d iscu ssed  
in  the appendix o f th is  chapter. The use o f the OLS produces para­
meter estim ates which are both b iased  and in c o n s is te n t i f  the d is ­
turbances are a u to rre la ted . The D-W t e s t  i s  asym p rotica lly  b iased  to  
2 and s e r ia l  c o r r e la tio n  i s  evidenced by the h t e s t  ( fo r  large  samp­
l e s ) ,  The presence o f  a d d itio n a l exogenous v a r ia b le s  tends to reduce 
th is  b ia s  whereas OLS may be used i f  there i s  evidence o f  no s e r ia l  
co rre la tio n  in  the d istu rb an ces, s in ce  i t  then regains e f f ic ie n c y .
The CORO method uses an ( in te r n a l)  OLS reg ressio n  to form an 
i n i t i a l  guess o f  p , the f i r s t  order s e r ia l  c o rre la tio n  c o e f f ic ie n t .
A ll data are transformed by p and the reg ression  re-run on the tran s­
formed data, to y ie ld  a new estim ate o f  p in  an i t e r a t iv e  sequence.
That i s ,  our estim ated equations are;
- PDt-1 == Aa^/l-p) + -  Pt_i) +, A«2(-Pt “
+ A a g te ^  -  P 0 t - 2 ^  + Aa^(DEP^ -  pDEP^_^) + Aa g
+ (Al
and,
D* -  PD*_, = Ag (1 - p )  + AB, ( P -  p P . _ . )  + Ag (8 -  p8
A33(DEP^ -  pDEP^_3) + A6^(D^_3 -  pD^_2> + £^(B),
This method g iv es  c o n s is te n t  estim ates by u sin g  the tran s­
form ation matrix to  produce s e r ia l ly  independent d istu rb an ces. The 
parameter estim ates are more e f f i c i e n t  than those produced by OLS 
(J . Johnston, 1972, p .264) .  However, the presence o f  the lagged de­
pendent v a r ia b le  makes th is  method y ie ld  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c s  which are 
not even asym p to tica lly  v a lid  ( in  favour o f  r e je c tin g  the nul hypo­
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th e s is  o f zero c o e f f ic ie n t ,  Cooper, JP.1972). To correct th is  b ias  
we rev ised  the varian ce-coveriance  m atrix. The new output i s  the 
same with th at before the r e v is io n  but the t  -  s t a t i s t i c s  are d i f ­
fe r e n t.
The Prais-W isten  gen era lized  le a s t  squares i s  almost s im ila r  to  
the previous method except th a t the transform ation  matrix  contains  
one more row w ith  the f i r s t  element equal to  \j 1 -  p^. That  i s  
t he f i r s t  values o f  the transformed v a r ia b les  take the form \|1 -p ^ ^ S  ,  
\ / l  -  p^ X 1 whereas the rem aining va lu es t  » 2 ..-T  take the form 
in d ica ted  by (A) and (B ) . Then the OLS estim ation  o f  the parameters 
a-i and P i  i s  equ iva len t to  the GLS estim ator o f  th ese param eters.
This method as the previous one produces c o n s is ten t estim ators and 
there ought to be a p o ss ib le  gain o f e f f ic ie n c y .
F in a lly , the instrum ental v a r ia b le  technique i s  based on the 
L iv ia tan  su ggestion  to regress f i r s t  the lagged dependent v a r iab le  
on the other explanatory v a r ia b le s  and then to use i t s  estim ate  
as regressor in  the reduced equation estim ated by OLS. That
i s ,
D* = ^^Xq^DBP^ +
and,
D* = xe^ + xe^p^ + xg^e^ + xg^DEP^ + xg^D^^^ +
This method does not in volve  the attempt to correct the d is ­
turbance d ir e c t ly  as the previous two methods d id . I t s  n o tiv a tio n  
i s  to obtain  co n sisten cy  u sin g  an exogenous v a r ia b le . T herefore, th is  
method does not lead  to unbiased estim ators and i t  lead s to a lo s s  o f  
e f f ic ie n c y ,
4 .2 .5  R esults
Table 4*1 presents the c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  equation ( 4 .6 ) estim ated  
by OLS, CORC, GLS and IV techn iq ues. The numbers in  parentheses in ­
d ica te  the t - s t a t i s t i c s  and a s ta i(* )o n  these in d ic a te s  that they are 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  a t 10 per cent le v e l  o f  confid ence, o th er-
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T A B L E  4 .1  
B asic Dividend Model,
Eq..4.6:D ■- Aa + Aa P + Aa DEP + Aa 0 +% O .L V  ^ t  j (1-A)D 4 t -1 Aup
Estim ation Method OLS CORC GLS IV
Estim ated Co­
e f f i c i e n t .
1 ,2 7 8 ,3 4 995.27 1 , 277.97 1 , 169.56
(2 .4 7 ) (2 .7 5 ) (2 .5 4 ) (2 .4 5 )
“^ i 0 .50 0 .3 4 0.30 0.50
(3 .8 4 ) ( 5 . 18) (5 .8 4 ) (4 .5 9 )
^“ 2 0 .2 1 0 .1 1 0 .2 1 0.11
(5 .9 2 ) (2 .7 3 ) ( 5 . 92) ( 2 . 75)
Aa 2 0 .0 1 0 .01 0 .01 0 .01
(2 .7 4 ) ( 3 .04) (2 .6 2 ) (1 .4 8 )*
1 -  A 0 .20 0.47 0.20 0.55
( 1 . 39)* ( 3 . 04) ( 1 , 40)* (1 .7 6 )*
(A) 0 .80 0.53 0 .8 0 0 .45
S tru ctu ra l Co­
e f f i c i e n t s .
1 , 597.92 1 ,877 ,86 L,597.48 2 ,597 .77
“ l 0 .3 7
0 .64 0.37 0 .6 6
^2
0 .26 0 .20 0.26 0 .24
0 3 0 .01 0 .01 0 .01 0,01
R2 0.99 0.99 0 .99 0 .99
D.W 2.82 2 .14 2.82 2.73
Note; The numbers in  parth eses are t - s t a t i s t i c s .  Without a s ta r  on 
these numbers the c o - e f f ic ie n t s  are s ig n if ic a n t  a t 5 per cent le v e l  
o f  s ig n if ic a n c e . I f  there i s  a s ta r  on them th ese c o e f f ic ie n t s  are 
s ig n if ic a n t  a t 10 per cent le v e l  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e .
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w ise , the o o e f f ic ia t s  are s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if fe r e n t  from zero a t  5 
per cent confidence l e v e l .
From t h i s  t a b le  a  number o f  conc lus ions  can be drawn from both
econometric and economic poin t o f  v iew . The c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  d e ter -  
2
m ination R t e s t s  whether the reg ress io n  as a whole "explains" the
2
dependent v a r ia b le  s a t is fa c to r y . In our case the R i s  very  high  
"explaining" 9 ^  o f the to t a l  variance o f  Looking a t the t -
r a t io s  given  in  parentheses below each c o e f f ic ie n t  e st im a te , we can 
see  th at in  the most oases th ese  estim ates are s ig n if ic a n t  e ith e r  
a t 5 or 10 per cent l e v e l .  The Rurbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c  used for  
t e s t in g  hyp othesis about au to co rre la tio n  in  r es id u a ls  from a regres­
s io n  equation , seems to be high (apart in  the CORO method) which 
means th a t we have a p o s it iv e  s e r ia l  c o rr e la tio n  in  the erro rs.
From tab le  4 .1  i t  seems th a t thé CORO method provides more r e ­
l ia b le  r e s u lt s .  This i s  concluded from the fa c t  th a t th is  method, 
on average, provides higher t  -  s t a t i s t i c s  va lu es and the b e tte r  
value for  B-W s t a t i s t i c s .  T herefore, we d iscu ss  the r e s u lt s  ob ta in ­
ed by th is  method.
The upper part o f  ta b le  4 .1  shows the estim ated  c o e f f ic ie n t s ,  
A«(i., whereas the low part shows the s tru c tu ra l c o e f f ic ie n t s ,  oCj. .
We see  th at the s ig n s  o f  the c o e f f ic ie n t s  are "correct" i . e .  agree 
with p rior  ex p ecta tio n s . In p a r tic u la r , p r o f it s  are the main d e ter ­
minant o f  dividend p o lic y . They have a p o s it iv e  s tru c tu ra l c o e f f ic ­
ie n t  equal to  64 per cen t, which in d ic a te s  that a u n it  in crease  in  
p r o f it s  r e s u lt s  in  64 per cen t in crease  in  d iv idend , D epreciation  
allow ances have a p o s it iv e  s ig n  equal to 20 per cen t, which seems to  
v e r ify  the B r itta in  su ggestion  th a t firm s take in to  con sid era tion  
cash flow  in  order to determine the le v e l  o f d ividend to be d i s t r i ­
buted. However, some reserv a tio n s  e x is t  concerning th is  in te r p r e t­
a tio n  because th is  c o r r e la tio n  may be spurious. The econometric t e s t  
seems to support the s t a t i s t i c a l  evidence that the tax d iscrim inatory  
v a r ia b le  has a n e g lig ib le  e f f e c t  upon dividend d e c is io n s . This con­
forms w ith  our exp ectation  s in ce  as we argued in  the previous chap­
te r  a c lo se r  look a t  i t s  va lu es shows th at th ese  are not s i g n i f i ­
cant d if fe r e n t  than one, during the whole period under co n sid era t­
io n , I t  i s  true th a t Greek a u th o r it ie s  did not use th is  in cen tiv e
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to  a f f e c t  the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  funds. The changes in  the tax  d iscrim ­
in atory  v a r ia b le  were caused on ly  by the changes o f personal tax  
ra tes  s in ce  during the la s t  twenty years the corporate tax  ra te  was 
s ta b le  fo r  seventeen consecutive yea rs . F in a lly , i f  th ere i s  actu ­
a l ly  a re la t io n sh ip  between d ep recia tion  allow ances and dividend pay­
ments then corporate taxa tion  in d ir e c t ly  in flu en ces dividend d ec is io n s, 
However, as we have seen the absence o f  a c a p ita l gains tax  favours 
reten tio n  o f  p r o f i t s .  Therefore, which in cen tiv e  is  stronger i t  i s  
an em pirical qu estion .
The constant term i s  p o s it iv e  r e f le c t in g  the relu ctan ce o f  the 
Greek management to suspend dividend rather to  r a ise  them.
The adjustment c o e f f ic ie n t  \  , has a medium s iz e  .45 which 
means th at firm s cover alm ost h a lf  o f the gap between optimum and 
a ctu a l le v e l  o f dividend in  the f i r s t  year.
Table 4*2 in d ic a te s  the r e s u lt s  obtained from the a lte r n a tiv e
dividend model, th at i s ,  equation ( 4 . 8) .  As we see  th ese r e s u lt s
2v e r if ie d  our previous co n c lu sio n s. The c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  P i s  sm all 
and n eg a tiv e . The sm all s iz e  may be explained by the fa c t  th a t we 
deal with aggregate data ra th er , w ith firm 's data. The n egative  s ig n  
exp la ins our f e e l in g  th a t a n o n -lin ea r  re la tio n sh ip  e x is t s  between d i­
vidend and p r o f i t s .  In our c a se , the equation which r e la te s  dividend  
and p r o f it s  takes the form,
D. « 2 , 172.46 + 0 , 79p. -  o .oooep fX X t
which has a maximum and i t s  shape appears in  the fig u re  4*2, I t  i s  
obvious that a tendency to n o n -lin e a r ity  e x i s t s ,
%
F ig . 4 .2
We have t r e a t e d  so f a r  th e  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r i a b le  as ob­
se rv ab le  assuming t h a t  th e re  i s  no s h i f t i n g  o f  CIT in  Greece, Since 
6 i s  no t observab le  i t  i s  p la u s ib le  to make v a r io u s  assum ptions about 
the  degree of s h i f t i n g  o f  the  CIT. T he re fo re , we assume z e ro ,  t h i r t y  
p e r  cen t and seven ty  p e r  c en t  s h i f t i n g  and we c o n s t ru c t  th re e  n o t io n -
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T A B L E  4 . 2
An A l te r n a t iv e  Dividend Model
Eq, 4*8 : P-j; P ( l  ^( î—X y  D|-i ^
E s tim a tio n  Method OIS CORC GLS
E stim a ted  Co­
e f f i c i e n t s .
2 , 712.46 2,182 .89 2 , 698.17
( 3 . 25) (2*59) ( 3 . 24)
0 .7 9 0.65 0 .80
(3 .2 1 ) (2 .8 4 ) ( 3 . 23)
A^2 -0 .00008 - 0,00005 -0.00008
( - 205) ( 1*46) ( 2 . 07)
A63 0 .1 8 0 ,15 0 .18
(5*56) (5*21) (3 .62 )
X&4 0.05 0.02 0.05
( 5 *51) (2 .6 2 ) ( 3 . 32)
1 “ A 0.10 0 ,51 0 .11
( 1 . 40) (1 .7 9 ) ( 1 . 42)
A 0.90 0 .59 0 .8 9
S t r u c t u r a l  Co­
e f f i c i e n t s .
@0 5,015*84 5,699 ,81 3 .051.65
@1 0.87 1.10 0 .8 9
h -0 .00008 - 0,00005 -0,00008
h 0 .20 0,22 0.20
64 0.03 0.05 0.03
r2 0.99 0,99 0 ,99
B.W 2,85 2,17 2.85
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a l  va lu es fo r  B aud we t e s t  th ese  u sin g  the same data. Table 4 * 5 
shows the r e s u lt s  obtained from te s t in g  th ese three assum ptions.
From th is  tab le  we see  th at under the three d if fe r e n t  hypotheses our 
r e s u lt s  are the same w ith th ese obtained assuming zero s h if t in g .
These s tr ik in g  r e s u lt s  v e r ify  our previous fin d in g  that the tax d is ­
crim inatory v a r ia b le  was not importmit in  making dividend d ec is io n s  
so th at to be unable to rev ea l i f  the Greek CIT i s  s h if te d  or n o t.
F in a lly , we proceed to d iscu ss  dividend p o lic y  in  the non­
manufacturing sec to r  in  Greece. Two a lte r n a tiv e  models were tested *  
The f i r s t ,  s im ila r  to equation ( 4 . 6)
\  ( l - A ) D t - i  + (4.10)
and the second,
+ B l^ t  ^ ®2®t + BsCPIt + (4.11)
The second model excludes dividend o f  the previous years but in ­
cludes the consumer p r ice  index (C P l), The underlying ra tio n a le  in  
that replacement i s  th a t firm s take in to  con sid eration  the co st o f  
l iv in g  making dividend d ec is io n s  as we argued elsew here. We ex­
cluded from th is  model d ep recia tion  allow ances s in ce  the la t t e r  are 
not so important in  the non-manufacturing se c to r s .
From tab le  4*4 we can see  tha.t both models f i t  q u ite  w e ll.
As in  the models for the manufacturing s e c to r , p r o f it s  have a great 
in flu en ce  upon dividend d e c is io n s , but the in trod uction  o f CPI redu­
ces th is  in flu en ce  and th is  v a r ia b le  i s  more s ig n if ic a n t  than p rof­
i t s ,
4 ,2 ,6  Conclusions
From the above d iscu ssio n  we can say that dividend determ ination  
depends upon a number o f  fa c to r s , many o f  which are in ter lin k ed  as 
they are governed by dom estic a u th o r it ie s  and c a p ita l market. How­
ever, i t  can be sa id  that previous y ea r 's  dividend and current p rof­
i t s  have a great in flu en ce  upon th ese d ec isio n s and there i s  a trend
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T A B L E  4 . 3
Basic Dividend Model: A t e s t  fo r  the S h ift in g  o f  the CIT
Degree o f  S h ift in g
0# 30# 70#
Estimated
C o e ff ic ie n ts .
XOq 995.27 995.14 993.70
(2 .75 ) (2 .75) (2 .75 )
0 .5 4 0 .34 Oo34
(5 .1 6 ) (5 .18) (5 .20 )
A(%2 0 .11 0 .1 1 0 .1 1
(2 .75 ) (2 .77 ) (2 . 76)
0 .01 0 .01 0 .01
(3 .04 ) (3 .04) (3 .000
(.1 -  X ) 0 .4 7 0 .47 0 .47
(3 .04 ) (3 .15 ) ( 3 . 16)
X 0 .5 3 0 .53 0 .53
str u c tu r a l C o e ffic ie n ts
1 , 877,86 1 , 877.62 1 , 874.90
“ l
0 .6 4 0 .6 4 0*64
^ 2
0 .20 0.20 0 .20
«3 0 .0 1 OoOl 0 .0 1
R2 0 .9 9 0 .9 9 0.99
D. iAi. 2 .14 2 .14 2.14
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T A B L E  4. 4
Dividend P o lic y  in  the Non-Manufacturing Sector  
E q, 410* D = Act + Act P + Act„0 + Cl—Ai D - + Au^ O JL t  Z L. t — 1 t
Eg. 411, Dt = gp + +_" ,____________
Impact C o e ffic ie n ts
-801 ,40  3  ^ -4 ,3 8 0 .1 9
( - 1 . 55) ( - 5 . 64)
Xa  ^ 0 .4 1  S, 0 .1 4
(1 0 .9 8 ) ( 2. 97)
X a ^  0 .007 0 .001
( 1 . 56) ( 2 . 32)
(1- A) 0 ,26  83 0 .52
( 3. 55) ( 4 . 55)
4 0 .7 4
Equilibrium  C o e ff ic ie n ts  
1 ,082.92
«2 0 . 009
0.99  0 .95
D.W 1 .94  2 .10
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which fo llo w s the same d ir e c tio n  in  dividend payment and d ep recia tion . 
The discrim inatory v a r ia b le  0 has a very  sm all e f f e c t  upon dividend  
d e c is io n s . This may be due to the fa c t  th at i t s  va lues during the 
period under con sid eration  were not s ig n if ic a n t  d if fe r e n t  than one. 
However, our fin d in gs do not n e c e s sa r ily  imply th at the Greek d is c r i ­
minatory p o lic y  i s  in e f f e c t iv e .  I t  may be e f f e c t iv e  i f  the tax d is ­
crim inatory v a r iab le  takes va lu es  s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if fe r e n t  than one. 
However, i t  i s  very  d i f f i c u l t  to quan tify  the in flu en ce  on dividends 
and re ten tio n s  w ithout tak ing  in to  con sid eration  such fo rces  as auth­
o r i t ie s  or c a p ita l market. So, in  the next se c tio n  we extend our 
a n a ly s is  to include f in a n c ia l and investm ent co n sid era tio n s.
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4 .3  INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN DIVIDEND POLICY
& INVESTMENT FINANCING
4 . 3 .1  Introdu ction
Our fin d in g s in  the previous s e c t io n  in d ica ted  th a t the tax  
discrim inatory  p o lic y  in  Greece was not s ig n if ic a n t  in  e f f e c t  on d iv i ­
dends. The next question  concerns whether the reta in ed  p r o f it s  are used
ans
fo r  investm ent fin a n c in g  or th.eyAkept w ith in  the firm  as a means o f  r e ­
ducing Shareholders' tax l i a b i l i t y  or as a source o f  c rea tin g  c a p ita l  
gains in  the absence o f  a c a p ita l gains ta x . The answer to th at ques­
t io n  has important p o lic y  im p lica tion s fo r  the Greek a u th o r it ie s  as 
fa r  as d iscrim inatory  p o lic y  i s  concerned. That i s , i f  there i s  actu ­
a l ly  a r e la t io n sh ip  between reta in ed  earnings and investm ent fin a n c­
in g  then the Greek a u th o r it ie s  may review  th e ir  p o lic y  regarding taxa­
tio n  o f  reta in ed  and d is tr ib u te d  p r o f i t s .
To examine th is  q u estion  we should f i r s t ,  r e sp e o ify  our d iv i ­
dend equation to include investm ent con sid eration s and second, to  in ­
troduce an investm ent model to t e s t  the interdependence o f  th ese  d e c i­
s io n s . We w i l l  r e sp e o ify  the dividend model to inclu de investm ent and 
ex tern a l fin a n c in g . The determ ination o f  investm ent model req u ires  
more exp lanation .
Theories o f  investm ent behaviour o f fe r  a bew ildering v a r ie ty  
o f  hypotheses; both w ith resp ect to  the rea l fa c to r s  and the fin a n c­
i a l  p o lic y , for  ex p la in in g  the stru ctu re  o f c a p ita l .  One model i s  im­
p o ss ib le  to inclu de a l l  th ese  fa c to rs  which may a f f e c t  th is  s tru c tu re .
In Meyer and Kuh words "the investm ent problem i s  complex and req u ires  
treatm ent o f  many m agnitudes, each w ith a v a r ie ty  o f  dim ension. Bec­
ause the problem i s  in t r in s ic a l ly  so d i f f i c u l t ,  the l it e r a tu r e  on the 
su b ject rep orts a number o f  d if fe r e n t  a n a ly t ic a l approaches many o f  
them complementary but not a few con trad ictory . The b a s is  problems 
a r is e  prim arily  from d if fe r e n t  in terp re ta tio n s  o f  en trerp ren eria l mot­
iv e s  and a d if fe r e n t  emphasis given to  a lte r n a tiv e  co n stra in ts" .
An important c r it ic is m  a g a in st investm ent s tu d ies  i s  th e ir  
frequent n e g le c t o f the problem o f  s im u lta n e ity , p a r t ic u la r ly , the 
f in a n c ia l s id e  i s  ignored. I t  has been argued th at the s c a r c ity  o f
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funds may prevent the d es ira b le  le v e l  o f  c a p ita l stock  from being a- 
ch ieved .
The firm  has a choice e ith e r  to d is tr ib u te  the in te r n a lly  gener­
ated funds as dividends to the shareholders or to  use th ese  for fin an c­
ing  investm ent programmes. This r a ise s  the question  whether dividend  
and investm ent d ec is io n s  are interdependent. I f  dividend p o lic y  i s  de­
termined by fa c to r s  not d ir e c t ly  relevan t to investm ent then th ere is  
not such interdependence between these p o l i c ie s ,  o th erw ise, th ese  dec­
is io n s  should be considered sim ultaneously*
Both s in g le -eq u a tio n  methods (E . Kuh, I96I) and sim ultaneous 
equation techniques have been used to deal w ith th is  qu estion , Bhry- 
mes' and Kurz argue th at the la t t e r  method is  the appropriate for  t e s t ­
in g  the s im u lta n e ity  and interdependence o f investm ent and dividend  
d e c is io n s . They argue th a t any other view  "overlooks the simple in ­
s t i t u t io n a l  fa c t  that the modem corporation i s  a complex organ ization  
w ith a considerab le degree o f  d e c en tr a liza tio n . The d ec is io n s  made by 
one department have an impact on those made by another". (P.Dhrymes and 
M.Kurz, 1967) .
Ve w il l  employ both s in g le  equations and system equation methods 
to  examine, the interdependence between dividend and investm ent d e c i­
s io n s . The fir s t,m eth o d , s in g le  equation, is  u se fu l in  the view  th at  
i t  helps us to s e le c t  the v a r ia b les  whioh should be included in  equa­
tio n s  and estim ated . This method in  estim atin g  each equation uses 
only the inform ation about the r e s tr ic t io n s  on the c o e f f ic ie n t s  o f th at 
p a r ticu la r  equation. Therefore, th is  method i s  unable to explore the 
interdependence between d ividend and investm ent d e c is io n s . Moreover, 
sim ultaneous equations methods are n ecessary  to consider the in te r  -  
aoticn o f  our v a r ia b le s .
In th is  s ec tio n  we e s ta b lish  an investment model tak ing in to  
account f in a n c ia l con sid era tio n s. Then we go on to t e s t  the in te r ­
dependence between dividend and investm ent d e c is io n s .
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4 .3 .2  A Joint P ro fits -A ccelara to r Investment Model
The investm ent model, in  co n tra st to the dividend model, con­
s i s t s  o f  three components. The a d d itio n a l component i s  the rep la ce ­
ment investm ent fu n ctio n . This i s  due to  the fa c t  th a t in  the d iv i ­
dend model we d ea lt with on ly  a flow  v a r ia b le  i . e .  d iv idend , whereas 
in  the investm ent model we deal w ith both a flow  v a r ia b le , investm ent 
expenditures, and a stock  v a r ia b le , the c a p ita l s to ck . F ortu nately , 
as fa r  as the la t t e r  v a r ia b le  i s  concerned there i s  an agreement 
between the researchers o f  investm ent p o lic y  d esp ite  the doubts r a ised  
by some authors (M. F e ls te in  & M. R othsch ild , 1974)*
The f le x ib le  a c ce le ra to r  theory has achieved stron g  em pirical 
support from the r e s u lt s  o f  Kuh, E isn er , and Hickman (D. Jorgenson &
C, S ie b e r t, 1968). This theory emphasizes th at the optimum le v e l  o f
c a p ita l stock  i s  proportional to output. On the o th er hand, i t  has
(y
been a lso  c r i t ic i z e d  fo r  i t s  s im p lic ity  which deprives fa c to r  p r ices  
e s p e c ia lly  the c o st  o f c a p ita l to determ ine investm ent p o lic y . Anoth­
er factor;'Which i s  n eg lected  by the a cce lara tor  p r in c ip le  i s  the a v a i l­
a b i l i t y  o f  funds. Since abundance o f  funds e ith e r  in ter n a l or ex ter ­
n a l i s  not the case f in a n c ia l con sid era tion s may play a considerab le  
r o le  on investm ent d e c is io n s . L iq u id ity  and p r o f it s  th eo r ies  have 
found evidence th a t th ese  fa c to r s  are important determ inants o f  in ­
vestm ent d e c is io n s . These are more c r u c ia l when we deal with sm all 
firm s and im p erfections dominate the c a p ita l market. Therefore, a 
combination o f  a l l  th ese  th eo r ie s  would provide us w ith a b e tte r  
th e o r e t ic a l device to exp la in  inves"kment expenditures. Previous 
s tu d ie s  (Dhrymes and Kurz, Lund and Holden) have found evidence th a t - 
a jo in t  p r o f its -a c c e la r a to r  p r in c ip le  exp la in s a large  part o f  aggre­
gate investm ent. In th is  s'tudy the approach i s  'bo combine various e le ­
ments o f  the main l in e  o f thought, keeping in  view  sp e c ia l character­
i s t i c s  o f  the Greek s itu a t io n . Investm ent d ec isio n s are analysed in  
the con text o f the a cce la ra to r  model whereas the r o le  6 f  f in a n c ia l  
v a r ia b le s  i s  a lso  in v e s t ig a te d .
We assume th at the optimum le v e l  o f  c a p ita l sto ck , denoted K*, 
depends on the le v e l  o f  output and the a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  funds, th a t i s ,
K* -  “ o “ l ^ t  “ ? '® t  " t  (4 .1 2 )
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where, Y i s  the le v e l  o f  output and RE i s  the le v e l  o f  reta in ed  earn­
in g s . Among the f in a n c ia l v a r ia b le s  which are considered in  ex p la in ­
in g  investm ent the most important are p r o f i t s ,  l iq u id i t y  and ex tern a l 
fin a n c e . We introduce p r o f it s  in  our a n a ly s is  v ia  reta in ed  earnings 
because o f  market im p erfection s. As we argued elsew here reta in ed  ear­
n ings p lay  an important r o le  in  fin a n c in g  investm ent programmes because 
the r is k  a sso c ia ted  w ith  ex tern a l fin a n c in g , e ith e r  in  the form o f  debt 
or in  the form o f eq u ity . In ^ a r t ic u la r , the la t t e r  form i s  more im­
portant on account o f  fea r  o f  lo o s in g  con tro l and d ilu t io n  o f  return  
on eq u ity . Money and c a p ita l market in  Greece have a narrow base and 
are im p erfect. E n terp r ises , as we saw in  the previous chapter, are 
fam ily  co n tro lled  and there may fea r  o f  lo s s  o f  con tro l through equ i­
ty  fin a n c in g . In a d d itio n , reta in ed  p r o f it s  rather than p r o f it s  are 
important fo r  th is  a n a ly s is . As we saw, reta in ed  p r o f it s  have been a 
s ig n if ic a n t  source o f  fin a n c in g  investm ent. New se c u r ity  is su e  has 
financed a very sm all amount o f  investm ent.
The response o f  investm ent to changes in  the market con d ition s  
i s  not in stan tan eou s. T ech n o lo g ica l,ex p ec ta tio n a l and in s t i t u t io n a l  
la g s  are involved  in  the adjustment o f  c a p ita l stock  to  changes in  de­
mand. The adjustment process i s  gradual and time consuming p rocess. 
T herefore, current investm ent expenditures have p a r tly  re su lted  from a 
very rapid response to changes in  con d ition s in  the immediate p ast and 
p a r tly  from a delayed response to more d istan ce  changes. To i l lu s t r a t e  
th is  adjustment process we d iscu ss  the fo llo w in g  example. Suppose th at  
there i s  a change in  demand for consumer goods. A time e lap ses between 
th is  change and the f irm 's  knowledge about the chaage. The management 
o f  the firm c o l le c t s  the required inform ation and he d ra fts  a plan fo r  
the proposed c a p ita l  p r o je c t. I f ,  f in a l ly ,  the firm  decides to proceed  
to make th is  plan e f f e c t iv e  i t  can do so e ith e r  by an o u t r i^ t  purchase 
or by p la c in g  an order. I f  the firm  can imm ediately get i t  otherw ise i t  
has to w ait fo r  a p eriod . Suppose th at the firm  g e ts  th is  c a p ita l good, 
then the f in a l  la g  i s  between the time which the firm  r ece iv es  th is  cap­
i t a l  good and the time which the f i r s t  product w i l l  be produced. This 
example c le a r ly  showed how the adjustment process takes- p la ce . There­
fore the second component o f  our investm ent model c o n s is ts  o f a stock  
adjustment mechanism which attem pts to cover the gap between the de­
s ire d  le v e l  o f  c a p ita l s to ck  and the a c tu a l. This mechanism i s  rep-
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resented by equation:
S ’ V l  -  Y(K% -  K t_i •) (4 .1 3 )
In ad d ition  to  equation ( 4 .12) and (4 .1 5 ) we need one more com­
ponent to complete our investm ent model. I t  is  tr a d it io n a lly  accepted  
th at the le v e l  o f  c a p ita l stock  a t  the end o f  period t  i s  equal to  the 
l e v e l  o f  investm ent made in  th a t period plus the c a p ita l stock o f  the 
previous period minus the depreciab le c a p ita l stock  in  the previous  
p eriod , th at i s ,
+ ( 1 -  5 ) ( 4 . 14)
where I^ i s  gross investm ent and ô  i s  the ra te  o f  d ep rec ia tio n .
From equation ( 4 . 12) ,  ( 4 . I 3 ) and (4*14) we obtain  the f in a l  
equation to be estim ated: we su b s titu te  equation (4*12) in to  equation
( 4 . 13) .
-  V l  -  + “ l ^ t  + '"t "
or
■ V  1 * Yoio + + YU^
from the la s t  equation and equations ( 4 . 15) we obtain:
I t  + ( 1 - 5 )  Kt - 1 " -  1 “ + YCI]_Y^  + -  yK^-l
or +
f t  * + Y“ x ^ t -  (Y - + YUj. ( 4 . 15)
The c o e f f ic ie n t s  o f th is  equation is" not id e n t if ie d  but we need an exo­
genous estim ate o f 5 to id e n t ify  them.
The Greek e<3onomy was ch aracterized  during the period under re ­
view  by a rapid demand expansion and f in a n c ia l con sid eration s played a 
s ig n if ic a n t  r o le . However, th is  model inclu d ing  output captures the 
f i r s t  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  the economy, whereas the second provides a 
s ta b i l iz a t io n  d ev ice . T herefore, i t  captures both short-run and lon g-  
run co n sid era tio n s . In a d d itio n , th is  model i s  both demand and supply
- 1 7 1 “
o r ien ted , th a t i s , the in trod u ction  o f  output captures demand con sid er­
a tio n s  whereas the reta in ed  earnings present the supply co n stra in t in  
c a p ita l .
Debt fin ance togeth er  w ith  in tern a l funds were the main sources  
o f  fin a n ce . We d id  not introduce in  the above model debt fin ance fo r  
two reasons. F ir s t ,  as we saw in  the previous chapter, there was no 
quantative r e s t r ic t io n s  on the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  funds in  part o f  the 
banking system and pu b lic  f in a n c ia l in tim a tio n s. Second, debt finance  
has a lim ite d  o b jec tiv e  in  th is  d is s e r ta t io n . However, an a lte r n a tiv e  
model in clu d in g  debt w i l l  be te s te d . A ll the o th er are the same as in  
the previous model exempt from the optimum le v e l  o f c a p ita l stock  
which becomes,
"  Bo + ® lY t +
where DEB^  i s  the sum o f  short and long-term  funds borrowed by the manu­
fa c tu r in g  s e c to r .
The f in a l  equation to be estim ated  i s ,
-  YBq + YBxYt + -  Cy- + U ^(4 .l6 )
4 . 3.5 Data
Our main source o f  data remains the N ational S t a t i s t i c s  S erv ice  
o f  Greece. Gross investm ent f ig u r e s  were obtained from the annual in ­
d u str ia l surveys fo r  the period 1959 to 1975. The data are provided a t  
current p r ic es  and were d e fla ted  by the p r ice  index o f  c a p ita l goods, 
w ith 1970 p r ic es  equal to u n ity , to  obtain  estim ates o f  gross in v e s t ­
ment a t constant p r ic e s . The p r ice  index o f  c a p ita l goods i s  the in ­
vestment d e fla to r  used in  the N ation al Accounts o f Greece.
The con struction  o f c a p ita l stock  s e r ie s  i s  always a problem for  
the researchers o f  the investm ent behaviour. Since i t  i s  u su a l, only  
gross investm ent fig u res  to be pub lished , the c a p ita l stock  s e r ie s  are 
obtained from the recu rsiv e  r e la t io n sh ip ,
K, - I ,  + ( 1 - 5 )
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where K^, ^ a re  th e  c u r re n t  and l a s t  p e r io d  c a p i t a l  s to c k , g ro ss
investm en t and d  th e  r a t e  o f  d e p re c ia t io n .  The above re c u rs iv e  r e l a t ­
io n sh ip  r e q u ire s  f i r s t ,  the ad o p tio n  o f  a  benchmark v a lu e  f o r  ^ and 
second , a  va lue  f o r  th e  r a t e  o f d e p re c ia t io n  . As f a r  as th e  i n i t i a l  
v a lu e  o f  ^ we adopt th e  one c o n s tru c te d  by K in tis  (1 9 7 7 ). The v a lu e  
o f  5 i s  o b ta in ed  by u s in g  th e  r e c u rs iv e  r e la t io n s h ip  and th e  investm en t 
s e r ie s  to  in te r p o la te  betw een two c a p i t a l  s to ck  benchmark f ig u r e s .
(K. W allis  1975). We adop t th e  v a lu e  o f  equal to  O.O41 (K in tis )  which 
im p lie s  u s in g  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  6= 1/g where E i s  the l i f ê  tim e o f  th e  
investm en t goods t h a t  £  i s  eq u a l to  24  y ea rs  which seems reaso n ab le  
f o r  th e  case o f  G reece.
R eta in ed  ea rn in g s  s e r i e s  were d e riv ed  from th e  annual s t a t i s ­
t i c s  o f c o rp o ra te  income p u b lish e d  by N a tio n a l S t a t i s t i c s  S e rv ice  o f 
G reece. These s e r i e s  were d e f la te d  by th e  index  o f  c a p i t a l  goods w ith  
1970 p r ic e s  equal to  u n i ty ,  to  o b ta in  e s tim a te s  o f r e ta in e d  ea rn in g s  
a t  c o n s ta n t p r ic e s .
The o u tp u t (Y) s e r i e s  were d e riv ed  from the  annual i n d u s t r i a l  
su rv ey s . These s e r ie s  were a ls o  d e f la te d .
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4.5*4 E s tim a tio n  - R esu lts
Ve used  OLS, CORC and GLS to  e s tim a te  th e  model whioh excludes 
deb t c o n s id e ra tio n s  whereas th e  CORC method to  e s tim a te  th a t  which in ­
c ludes d e b t. S ince th e  r e s u l t s  o b ta in e d  a re  alm ost th e  same and fo r  
reasons o f  com parison o f  th e  two models we d iscu ss  th e  r e s u l t s  ob­
ta in e d  by the  CORC method.
From ta b le  4*5 we see t h a t  th e  j o i n t  p r o f i t s - a c c e la r a to r  mod­
e l  f i t s  q u ite  w e ll. I t  e x p la in s  .87 p e r  cen t o f the  v a r ia t io n s  o f  in ­
vestm ent e x p e n d itu re s . The t  -  s t a t i s t i c s  a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i ­
can t a t  5 p e r  cen t le v e l  o f  co n fidence  exempt from th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
which i s  s ig n if ic a n c e  a t  10 p e r  cen t le v e l  o f co n fid en ce . The 
v a lu e  o f  D-V s t a t i s t i c s  in d ic a te s  absence o f  f i r s t - o r d e r  a u to c o r r e la t io n  
in  th e  e r r o r  te rm s. From economic p o in t  o f view a l l  th e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  
have th e  expected  s ig n . The c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  r e ta in e d  e a rn in g s  i s  p o s i ­
t iv e  and h igh  which im p lie s  t h a t  th e  r e ta in e d  ea rn in g s  had a s i g n i f i ­
c an t c o n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  in c re a se  o f investm ent e x p e n d itu re s . The 
o u tp u t v a r ia b le  i s  a ls o  s ig n i f i c a n t  whereas the c o e f f ic ie n t
p ro v id es  us w ith  an ad justm en t c o e f f ic ie n t  equal to .15  which im­
p l i e s  th a t  f la c tu a t io n s  in  c a p i t a l  s to ck  do not have much in flu en c e  
on investm ent e x p e n d itu re s . This v a lu e  o f  the ad justm ent c o e f f ic ie n t  
seems to  us as v e ry  low and i t  may be ex p la in ed  by th e  f a c t  th a t  we 
d ea l w ith  ag g reg a te  d a ta .
From th e  same ta b le  we see th a t  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  the  debt
2
v a r ia b le  s l i g h t ly  improved the perform ance o f our model. Both R and 
D -  W s t a t i s t i c s  were im proved. There i s  no s ig n i f ic a n t  d if f e re n c e  in  
the  v a lu e s  o f  th e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  ex cep t from th a t  o f  K^ _<| which p ro ­
v id e s  an ad justm ent c o e f f ic ie n t  equal to ,5 6 . The c o e f f ic ie n t  o f 
deb t v a r ia b le  i s  sm all .12  and i t  i s  s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  10 p e r  cen t 
le v e l  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e .
In  Summary, th e  r e s u l t s  o f  investm ent a n a ly s is  len d  some sup­
p o r t  to  the  a c c e le r a to r  -  p r o f i t s  h y p o th e s is . Both o u tp u t and r e ta in ?  
ed ea rn in g s  have proved to  be o f im portance .
4,5*5 The S im u ltan e ity  H ypothesis
Ve e s ta b lis h e d  two m odels, one fo r  d iv idend  d e c is io n s  and the
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T A B L E  4 . 5
)
A J o in t  P r o f i t s  -  A c c e la ra to r  Investm ent Model
E q .4 .1 5  = 7 %^ + Y ^ i ^ t  * " LY- 6 l K t - i
Eq.4 .1 6  = Ygg + * 7 8 2 * 3 ^ ^ -  c y -  + Yii
E s tim a tio n  Method E quation  4.15 E quation  4 1 6
OLS CORC GLS CORC
C o e ff ic ie n ts
Yc<o - 4 , 820.90 - 4 , 561.90 -4 ,8 4 5 .6 1 Y^ o -4 ,7 9 5 .4 5
( - 2 . 58) ( - 2 . 22) (2 .5 7 ) ( 2 , 24)
Ya^ L 0 .5 4 0 .5 5 0 .3 4 Y h  0 .4 1
( 3 . 2 9 ) ( 5 .10 ( 5 . 2 9 ) (5 .5 4 )
Y«2 0 ,6 8 0 ,7 0 0 ,6 8 y& 0 .60
( 2 . 0 9 ) ( 1 .94 ) (2 , 0 9 ) ( 2 . 26 )
(■Y - 5 ) -0 .1 8 00 .19 -0 .1 8 , 0 .12
(-1 . 60 ) ( 1 .5 5 ) .(-1 . 62 ) (1 .4 5 )
Y 0 .1 4 0 .1 5 0 ,1 4 y*“5 - 0 ,4 2
( - 2 . 10)
y 0 .5 8
“0
3 , 445 ,50 5 , 041 .2 5 , 459.72 % 8 , 268 .01
“ 1
2 ,4 2 2,55 2 ,42 h  0 .7 0
“ 2 4.85 4 .6 6 4.85 h  1 .57
^3 0 .2 0
r 2 0 .8 8 0 ,87 0 .8 8 0 ,89
B.W 2 .1 6 1 .9 4 2 .16 1,98
------ 1—  ------------- -
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o th e r  fo r  investm ent d ec is io n s*  T heir r e s u l t s  a re  c l e a r .  The form er 
model in d ic a te s  th a t  the  ta x  d is c r im in a to ry  p o lic y  in  Greece was n o t 
s ig n i f i c a n t ,  whereas the  l a t t e r  th a t  r e ta in e d  earn in g s  had a s i g n i f i ­
can t e f f e c t  upon investm en t d e c is io n s . We te s te d  th e se  hypotheses u s ­
in g  s in g le  eq u a tio n s  m odels. For th e  reasons m entioned in  th e  i n t r o ­
d u c tio n  o f  th i s  s e c tio n  we p roceed  to  t e s t  the same h y p o th es is  by u s ­
in g  a sim ultaneous eq u a tio n  m odel,
Three hypotheses can be tru e  in  a d is c u s s io n  about d iv idend  
and investm ent d e c is io n s . The f i r s t  h y p o th esis  i s  t h a t  investm en t 
and d iv idend  d e c is io n s  a re  independent whereas the  second concerns 
two ways o f  in te rd ep en d en ce . I f  investm ent and d iv id en d  d e c is io n s  
a re  in te rd ep en d en t th e  q u e s tio n  a r i s e s  w hether d iv idend  d e c is io n s  
a f f e c t  investm ent d e c is io n s  o r v ic e -v e r s a . The M o d ig lia n i-M il1er 
th e o ry  accep ts  t h a t  th e se  d e c is io n s  a re  independent o r investm ent 
d e c is io n s  a f f e c t  d iv idend  d e c is io n s , whereas i t  r u le s  ou t the  case 
which d iv idend  d e c is io n s  a f f e c t  investm en t d e c is io n s . Suppose now.  ^
t h a t ,  in  f a c t ,  th ese  d e c is io n s  a re  in te rd e p e n d e n t. Two p o s s i b i l i t ­
ie s  e x i s t ,  to be r e l a t e d  n e g a tiv e ly  o r  p o s i t iv e ly .  A n e g a tiv e  r e ­
la t io n s h ip  i s  more com plicated  than  th e  p o s i t iv e  one. U n fo rtu n a te ly , 
th i s  r e la t io n s h ip  does n o t le a d  us to any conclusion  concern ing  th e  
d i r e c t io n  o f  th e  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  d iv idend  p o lic y  a f f e c t s  n e g a t i ­
v e ly  the  investm ent p o lic y  o r v ic e - v e r s a .  To the  c o n tra ry , a p o s i­
t iv e  r e la t io n s h ip  i s  an in d ic a t io n  th a t  managements fo re se e  a p ro s ­
perous fu tu r e ,  however, th ey  in c re a s e  bo th  d iv idend  payments and in ­
vestm ent e x p en d itu re s . The q u e s tio n  which a r i s e s  as f a r  as th i s  r e ­
la t io n s h ip  i s  concerned i s  how does the firm  manage to  in c re a se  both? 
Does i t  r e s o r t  to  the  c a p i t a l  m arket o r  th e se  expenses a re  sm all so 
th a t  th e  in te r n a l  funds a re  adequate? I f  th e  form er i s  th e  case  then  
th e  M o d ig lia n i-M ille r  theorem  i s  v a l id ,  i f  the l a t t e r ,  th en  id le  funds 
a re  k ep t w ith in  the  f irm  f o r  fu tu re  p u rposes, bu t anyway, th i s  s i t u a ­
t io n  seems to  be more s im i la r  to  the independent case .
4 . 3*6 T es t-B asic  R esu lts
We assume th a t  firm s fo llo w  a d iv idend  p o lic y  which is  d e s c r i ­
bed by our g e n e ra liz e d  L in tn e r 's  p a r t i a l  adjument model which i s  ex­
tended to  in c lu d e  investm ent c o n s id e ra t io n s . At th e  same tim e firm s
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fo llo w  an investm ent p o lic y  which i s  d e sc rib e d  by a j o i n t  c a p i t a l  
s to ck  ad justm en t and p r o f i t  model which has been a lso  ex tended  to  in ­
clude d iv idend  c o n s id e ra tio n s .
D ealing  w ith  investm ent model we e s ta b lis h e d  two a l te r n a t iv e  
m odels, the  one l e f t  ou r deb t c o n s id e ra tio n s  whereas th e  o th e r  in ­
c ludes th e s e . However, we t e s t  two d i f f e r e n t  s im ultaneous eq u a tio n  
m odels, t h a t  i s ,
Model 1
. Uo + “ 3 ^ ^ t  + “4°t-l + «5^t + "t
I t  -  + " t
and, M o d e l  2
3t  -  " o  + “ l ^ t  + “ 2®t+ “ 3°® ^t  + “ 4 ° t - l  + “ 5 ^ t  + \
h  " - ^ iV l + ^2^t + + BjYt + + "t
Since a l l  the  above eq u a tio n s  a re  o v e r - id e n t i f i e d ,  th e  case  in  
our model i s  th a t  o f  o v e r - id e n t i f i e d ,  and indeed  the  g e n e ra l r u le  in  
r e a l i s t i c  econom etric  models i s  heavy o v e r - id e n t i f i e d  (KLEIN), There­
f o r e ,  th e  a p p ro p ria te  method f o r  e s tim a tin g  th e se  i s  th e  tw o-stage  
l e a s t  sq u ares  p ro ced u re .
T ables ( 4 *6 ) and (4 .7 )  re p re s e n t  th e  r e s u l t s  o b ta in e d  from th e se  
m odels. From ta b le  (4.6) we see  t h a t  the  L in tn e r  model w ith  in v e s t­
ment and w ithou t investm en t f i t s  q u i te  w e ll. The t - s t a t i s t i c s  and 
the  D -  V s t a t i s t i c s  in  b o th , show th a t  the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  s i g n i f i ­
c a n tly  d i f f e r e n t  than  zero  and th e  absence o f  a u to c o r re la t io n  in  the  
e r r o r  te rm s. The investm en t c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  p o s i t iv e  and v e ry  sm all. 
This i s  in  accord  w ith  our p rev io u s  ex p lan a tio n  th a t  in  p rosperous 
y ears  th e  managements in c re a s e  bo th  d iv idend  payments and investm ent 
e x p e n d itu re s . In  a d d it io n , th i s  f in d in g  i s  in  accord  w ith  the M odig- 
l i a n i - M i l l e r  theorem , From the second p a r t  o f the  same ta b le  we see 
th a t  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  the  d iv id en d  v a r ia b le  d id  no t change th e  p e r ­
formance o f th e  model b u t th e  d iv id en d  c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  n e g a tiv e  and 
v e ry  sm a ll. However, the  t - s t a t i s t i c s  i s  v e ry  sm all and th i s  d i c t â t -
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In terdependence  Between Investm ent and D ividend D ec is io n s ,
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................. /i.......
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es us to  accep t the  h y p o th esis  t h a t  th is  c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  equal to z e ro , 
th a t  i s ,  th a t  d iv idend  p o lic y  does n o t a f f e c t  investm en t po licy*  
T h ere fo re , th e  r e s u l t s  o b ta in ed  from model 1 say th a t  th e re  i s  a v e ry  
weak r e la t io n s h ip  between investm en t and d iv idend  d e c is io n s , which 
has the d i r e c t io n  from investm en t to  d iv idend  and th i s  a llow s us to  
conclude th a t  d iv idend  and investm en t d e c is io n s  a re  a lm ost independent* 
We proceed  now to  see  th e  second model.
From the  f i r s t  p a r t  o f ta b le  4*7 we see t h a t  th e  in tro d u c tio n  
o f investm en t v a r ia b le  in  our d iv id en d  model made th e  t - s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  
th e  lagged  d iv idend  v a r ia b le  and th e  investm ent v a r ia b le  v e ry  sm all 
which im p lie s  t h a t  t h i s  model w ithou t the investm ent v a r ia b le  perform s 
b e t t e r  r a th e r  than  w ith  i t .  At th e  same tim e th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  d i v i ­
dend v a r ia b le  in  the  investm en t model make th e  perform ance o f  th i s  mo­
del u n s a t i s f a c to iy .  That i s ,  th e  33EB c o e f f ic ie n t  l o s t  i t s  s ig n if ic a n c e  
and th e  d iv idend  c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  n o t s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f f e r e n t  than  z e ro .
From the  above ta b le s  we see  th a t  the in c lu s io n  o f  th e  in v e s t ­
ment and d iv idend  v a r ia b le s  in to  th e  p rev ious w e ll e s ta b l is h e d  gener­
a l iz e d  L in te r  p a r t i a l  ad ju stm en t model and the  use  o f 2 SLS te c h ­
n ique do«snot p rov ide  us w ith  a  b e t t e r  e x p lan a tio n  o f d iv idend  and in ­
vestm ent d e c is io n s  th an  th e  s in g le -e q u a tio n s  Models,
These r e s u l t s  su g g es t t h a t  th e re  i s  no in te rdependence  b e t ­
ween d iv idend  and investm en t d ec is io n s*  ■ This may be due to  th e  f a c t  
th a t  th e  Greek banking system  p lu s  the  p u b lic  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
fu n c tio n  w e ll e n o u ^  fo r  e x te rn a l  funds to  be a  p e r f e c t  o r  n e a r ly  
p e r f e c t  s u b s t i tu te  f o r  in te r n a l  funds* T h is , o f  co u rse , does n o t im­
p ly  th a t  investm ent and d iv id en d  d e c is io n s  a re  n o t tak en  to g e th e r  by 
th e  Greek management. We should  emphasize th a t  s im u lta n e ity  does n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  imply in te rd ep en d en ce . I f  the  firm s  a re  a b le  to  borrow  
the  n e ce ssa ry  amount o f  funds to supplem ent t h e i r  in te r n a l  funds fo r  
f in a n c in g  investm ent programmes and d i s t r ib u t in g  th e  d e s ire d  amount o f  
d iv idends then  the  two d e c is io n s  a re  independent* Our r e s u l t s  d i f f e r  
from th e se  o b ta in ed  by Dhrymes and Kurz, At l e a s t  two reaso n s  may 
ex p la in  th i s  d if f e r e n c e .  F i r s t ,  the  d i f f e r e n t  f in a n c ia l  c ircum stances 
between the two c o u n tr ie s  (G reece and U.S.A) and second, th ey  argue 
th a t  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  app ly  to  a  modern c o rp o ra tio n  which i s  a complex
-1 7 9 -
TABIÆ 4.7
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-18G-
organ ization  with a considerab le degree o f  d e c en tr a liza tio n , where­
as we deal w ith a corporation whoseA*main c h a r a c te r is t ic  i s  the strong  
r e la t io n sh ip  between ownership and co n tro l.
4 .4  INYESTMT ALIiOWMCES INCENTIVES
4 . 4 .1  In tro d u c tio n
So f a r  we have examined the  e f f e c t  o f  ta x a t io n  on investm ent 
th rough  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  fu n d s . Now we proceed  to  t e s t  th e  e f f e c t  
o f ta x a t io n  on investm ent ex p en d itu res  through the c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .  
T axation  red u c in g  the  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  in c re a se s  the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  
investm en t p r o je c t s ,  th e re fo re ,  i t  makes th e se  more a t t r a c t i v e .  T his 
makes a government which fo llow s such a p o lic y  to  expec t to  s tim u la te  
investm ent ex p en d itu re s .
In  the p rev io u s  c h a p te r  we saw th a t  Greek a u th o r i t i e s  used  
generous d e p re c ia tio n  and investm ent p ro v is io n s  as a  means o f stim u­
l a t i n g  in v estm en t. In  f a c t ,  as we saw th e re ,  investm ent ex p en d itu res  
were s a t i s f a c to r y  d u rin g  th e  p e r io d  under c o n s id e ra tio n . The q u e s tio n  
a r i s e s  w hether th e se  investm ent has as s tim u la n t ta x a t io n  p ro v is io n s  
and i f  so to  what e x te n t -o r  o th e r  f a c to r s  were more s ig n i f i c a n t  in  
making investm ent d e c is io n s  th an  tax  p ro v is io n s . To d isc u ss  th i s  ques­
t io n  we need to  r e l a t e  our p o lic y  in s tru m e n t, which in  q u e s tio n  i s  
ta x  sav in g , to  the  d e s ire d  le v e l  o f  c a p i ta l  s to c k . That i s ,  we should  
examine how a change in  th e  c o s t  o f c a p i t a l ,  coming from ta x  p ro v i­
s io n s , a f f e c t s  th e  le v e l  o f  d e s ire d  c a p i t a l  s to c k . Jo rg e n so n 's  in v e s t ­
ment model p ro v id es  us w ith  a conven ien t d ev ise  to  s tu d y  investm ent 
behav iour ta k in g  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  th e  c o s t o f  c a p i t a l ,  tax  p ro v is io n s  
and the  p r ic e  o f c a p i t a l  goods. T his model r e l a t e s  investm ent behav­
io u r  to  p r o f i t  m aximizing c o n s id e ra tio n s  whereas th e  o th e r  investm ent 
models have a more o r le s s  i n t u i t i v e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o r they  do no t pay 
much a t te n t io n  on the  fa c to d s  m entioned above. In  a d d it io n , as we 
m entioned e a r l i e r ,  the  o b je c t iv e  o f th e  Greek firm  i s  to  maximize p ro ­
f i t s .
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4.4*2 The D esired  C a p ita l S tock
Each investm en t th e o ry  p ro v id es  us w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  s p e c i f i ­
c a t io n  o f  th e  d e s ire d  c a p i t a l  s to c k . This i s  due to  the f a c t  th a t  each 
re s e a rc h e r  p u ts  in  th e  mind o f  the  management a d i f f e r e n t  m otive which 
im p lie s  th a t  the  v a r io u s  f a c to r s  which may a f f e c t  investm en t d e c is io n s  
have a d i f f e r e n t  w e ig h t.
The n e o c la s s ic a l  th e o ry  o f  investm ent beh av io u r developed by 
Jorgenson  assumes th a t  th e  d e s ire d  le v e l  o f  c a p i t a l  s to ck  i s  p ro p o r­
t io n a l  to  the  v a lu e  o f  c u r re n t o u tp u t d e f la te d  by th e  p r ic e  index o f  
c a p i t a l  good, th a t  i s ,
_ t
c, Q + ( 4 . 17)
*
w here, i s  th e  d e s ire d  c a p i t a l  s to c k , (J i s  th e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f sub­
s t i t u t i o n  between la b o u r  and c a p i t a l , i s  th e  u s e r  c o s t  o f c a p i t a l ,  
p^ i s  th e  p r ic e  o f p roduce , Q,^  i s  o u tp u t and jLL i s  the  c o e f f ic ie n t  o f 
c a p i t a l  in  the p ro d u c tio n  fu n c tio n . Jo rgenson assumes a Cobb-Douglas 
p ro d u c tio n  fu n c tio n  which im p lie s  t h a t  0  i s  equal to  one and jU i s  the  
p ro d u c tio n  fu n c tio n  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  o u tp u t w ith  r e s p e c t  to  c a p i t a l .
The u s e r  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  depends on the  p r ic e  o f th e  c a p i t a l  
good C\ , the  r a t e  o f  d e p re c ia tio n  J  , the r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  r  and 
th e  v a rio u s  ta x  and d e p re c ia t io n  a llow ances r e la te d  to  c a p i t a l  goods. 
In  the absence o f  ta x a t io n ,  the  u s e r  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  equal to  C= 
r  q +5C]= q (r + 5 ) ,  We in tro d u c e  now ta x a t io n  in  the  p ic tu r e .  This 
enab les  government changing ta x  p a ram eter to  a f f e c t  th e  c o s t  o f c a p i­
t a l  and th rough  th a t  investm en t d e c is io n s .  I f  to  i s  the  r a t e  o f  c o r­
p o ra te  ta x  and tcA i s  th e  p re s e n t  v a lu e  o f  sav in g  a llow ed f o r  ta x  p u r­
pose the  s tan d a rd  n e o c la s s ic a l  form ula o f  th e  c o s t  o f c a p i t a l  i s  modi­
f ie d  to ,
C = ?,) ( !  -  t ^ )  (4 .1 8 )
(1  -  tç .)
The assum ptions o f  Cobb-Douglas techno logy , c a p i t a l  m a lle a b il -  
i t y  and a p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  m arket have been c r i t i h e d  in  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  
(Arrow, Tobin, E isn e r  and N a d ir i ,  E e ld s te in  and Flemming), P a r t i c u ­
l a r l y ,  i t  has been s a id ,  th a t  th e  o p tim al investm ent d e c is io n  w ith ­
o u t th e  c a p i t a l  m a l le a b i l i ty  and p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  m arket assum ptions
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i s  no lo n g e r myopic. The r e la x a t io n  o f th e se  assum ptions would a llow  
th e  fu tu re  v a lu e  o f o u tp u t, o f  ta x  and d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s ,  o f  c a p i t a l  
and p ro d u c t and o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  to  he taken  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  mak­
in g  investm ent d e c is io n s .
We modify th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  u s e r  c o s t  to be le s s  r e s t r i c ­
t i v e ,  p e rm itt in g  any elem ent o f  u s e r  c o s t  to  have a d i f f e r e n t  w eight 






+ôf^ U -tcA) (4.19)
This g e n e ra l fo rm ation  a llow s to  d i f f e r  from u n i ty  which im­
p l i e s  th a t  th e  u se r  c o s t  responds d i f f e r e n t ly  to  any o f  i t s  components.
To com plete our investm en t model we need th e  o th e r  two f a m il ia r  
components, t h a t  i s ,  th e  s to ck  ad justm en t mechanism and the  re p la c e ­
ment investm en t fu n c tio n . We a lso  assume th a t  a p a r t i a l  s to ck  a d ju s t ­
ment mechanism as we d id  in  th e  p rev io u s  s e c t io n , th a t  i s ,
.  1 = Y ( K*t -  K t- l )  (4 .20 )
and the  rep lacem ent investm en t fu n c tio n ,
Kt  '  ^t *  ^  ^ ^t -  1 ( 4 . 21)
From eq u atio n s  ( 4 . I 7 ) ,  (4 .1 9 )»  (4 .20 ) and ( 4 .21) we o b ta in  the  
f i n a l  eq u atio n  to  be e s tim a te d :
Q 'P t
o r  in  the lo g  form: ( 1 - tc A )  ( 1 - t c )
I t  (^ " ^ ) Kt -  1 -  a 6 ^ 1 o g ( ^ ) - -  a @ ,lo g (r + 5 )
ft I  P t  ^
-  a g ^ d - t c A )  + o g ^ l o g ( l - t c )  + lo g V ^  (4 .23)
4 . 4 .5  Data
The new v a r ia b le s  which a re  in c lu d ed  in  eq u atio n  (4 .2 2 ) a re  
g ross in v estm en t, th e  w holesale  p r ic e  index p^ and the i n t e r e s t
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r a t e  r .  The o th e r  v a r ia b le s  have been d iscu ssed  in  the  p re v io u s  s e c ­
t io n s ,  Gross in v estm en t co rresponds to these  in v estm en t which made 
a f t e r  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f in v estm en t in c e n t iv e s  d isc u sse d  in  th e  p re v ­
io u s  c h a p te r , th a t  i s ,  th e y  in c lu d e  b o th  q u a lify in g  and n o n -q u a lify in g  
in v estm en t. These f ig u re s  a re  n o t p u b lish e d  b u t th e y  were p ro v id ed  to  
us by th e  Greek M in is try  o f  F in an ce ,
The w holesale p r ice  index i s  the one constructed  by the N ation­
a l  S t a t i s t i c s  S erv ice  o f  Greece. The in te r e s t  ra te  i s  the weighted  
average o f  the long-term  debt in t e r e s t  ra te  and th at fo r  working ca p i­
t a l ,  This accords to our previous view  th at Greek firm s use sh ort­
term borrowing for fin a n c in g  investm ent programmes and they renew every  
4-7 months. The data we\R rece ived  from the monthly b u lle t in  published  
by the bank o f  Greece,
4 . 4 .4  E stim a tio n  -  R e su lts
Ve estim ated equation (4 .2 3 ) adopting two d if fe r e n t  va lu es for  
( y -  6 ) i . e ,  we put i t  equal to  ,20 and ,50 and three methods were 
used, the OLS, CORC and GLS. The r e s u lt s  appear in  ta b le  4 . 8 .
From th i s  ta b le  i t  seems t h a t  our model f i t s  th e  d a ta  s a t i s -  
2f a c t o r i l y .  The R i s  h ig h  a lth o u g h  we d id  not ex p ec t h ig h e r  s in c e  c o s t  
and o u tp u t c o n s id e ra tio n s  a re  n o t th e  o n ly  f a c to r s  which a re  taken  in ­
to  c o n s id e ra t io n , m aking investm en t d e c is io n s  as we saw in  th e  p rev ­
io u s  s e c t io n .  The t - s t a t i s t i c s  a re  in  th e  most oases s ig n i f i c a n t .
The v a lu e  o f  D -  W s t a t i s t i c s  l i e s  in  th e  " in d e c is iv e "  range and so 
we cannot say  much about th e  p re sen ce  o r  absence o f  p o s i t iv e  s e r i a l
c o r r e la t io n  in  the  e r r o r s .  The model w ith  (Y“<5) equal to  .50 seems to
2
f i t  b e t t e r  s in c e  R and t - s t a t i s t i c s  a re  b e t t e r  th an  the  co rre sp o n d in g  
w ith  (y -5  ) equal to  ,2 0 , Ve w il l  d isc u ss  then  the  r e s u l t s  o b ta in ed  
from th e  form er model.
Our main i n t e r e s t  l i e s  on th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  ta x  f a c to r s ,  th a t  
i s ,  (1  -  tcA) and ( l  -  t c ) , The f i r s t ,  p ro v id es  the  e f f e c t  o f ta x  
p ro v is io n s  upon in v estm en t e x p en d itu re s  whereas the  l a t t e r  th e  e f f e c t  
o f  ta x  r a t e  upon th e se  e x p e n d itu re s . S ince ou r f i n a l  e q u a tio n  in  lo g -  
l i n e a r  th e se  c o e f f ic ie n t s  a re  e x p la in ed  as th e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  in v e s t ­
ment ex p en d itu re s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e se  f a c to r s .  The e l a s t i c i t y  w ith
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T A B L E 4, 8
Investm ent A llowances Tax In c e n tiv e s ,
+ a 3 ^ 1 o g ( l~ tc )  + lo g v ^
logyaii - o g ^ lo g W  -  ogglogfr+J) -  og (1-^cA)
Model 1: ( Ï  “ 5 ) = .20
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1 ,3 2 1 ,97 1 .3 2 1,97 1 ,32 1 .9 7
1.00 0 .6 7 1 .21 0 .8 1 1.03 0 .6 9
62 2.15 1,44 2 ,54 1 .5 6 2 .2 5 1 .4 9
93 1 .1 2 0 .75 1 .33 0 .8 9 1 .0 6 0 ,7 1
64 5 .3 4 2.24 4 .0 5 2 .71 5.46 2 ,5 1
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respect to tax saving receives values in the range between - 1.41 and
“1.76. These numbers are the product of aBa . I f  a i s  equal to one,
the neoclass ical  case, the value of gg remains in the range - 1.41
and - 1.76, that i s ,  they remain high. ■ I f  a qs higher than one, then
the value of Bs i s  lower. The la t ter  case seems more plausible and
conforms with Llanos' findings that the e l a s t i c i t y  of substitution in
the Greek manufacturing ranges between 1.32 and 1.97. The low part of
table 8 shows the values of B s for  these values of O . However, someI
additional reasons may explain these high values. F irs t ,  because in 
our def in it ion  of gross investment we did not only incorporate quali­
fied investment but realized investment under the tax incentive schemes. 
Second, the small number of observations, twelve, may cause the value 
of the e l a s t i c i t i e s  to be so high. Concluding, we could argue that 
despite a l l  these considerations i t  i s  reasonable to say that invest ­
ment incentives had a s ignif icant  e f fec t  upon investment expenditures.
We could also add to these conclusions that the relaxation of the 
assumption that the various components of the desired capital  stock 
af fec t  i t  d i f ferent ly ,  gave us d ifferent c o e f f ic ien ts  for these fac­
tors which may re f le c t  suboptimal behaviour by firms (M. Feldste in and 
J. Flemming, 1971).
The neoclass ical  model presumes perfect rat ional i ty  on the part of 
firms. However, the p o s s ib i l i t y  of suboptimal behaviour of the Greek 
firms due to the lack of f inancial  expertise in the family owned and 
managed firms induces us to te s t  further whether in making investment 
decisions the Greek corporations appear to act in a fu l ly  rational way 
in considerations of the incidence of CIT. We tes t  the rat ional i ty
of the investment decision in this  regard by introducing three measures 
of cost of capital  to the firm on the assumptions that 100 per cent, 70 
and 30 per cent respectively of the true incidence of GIT are incor­
porated into the firm's ca lculat ions .  We introduce these considerations  
in our analysis through the variables (1 - tcA) and (1 - t c ) . I f  b 
represents the fraction the GIT which the firm incorporates into i t s  
calculations then these forms are modified to J. - btcA  ^ and 1 - btc 
correspondingly. As b i s  reduced below unity the values of btcA and 
btc are reduced which means that tax savings are underestimated by the 
firms.
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T A B L E  4 . 9
Investment Allowances Tax Incentives Under Various Degrees of Rationality
Eq. 423:
log ^^^t-1 -  logoyy logC%) - oB^log(r+8) 
Q i p 2
- 083(1- 104)
+ aB^log(l - tc)  + log
Degree of Rationality
Unity 70 per cent 30 per cent
Coefficients
log YCJU 8.96 2.09 5.22
(2.72) (1.79) (1.59)
erg, 1.60i 0.24 0.51
(2.14) (0.67) (0.72)
oBg 3.09 1.23 2.22
(3.40) (3.73) (2.19)
083 1.76 0.59 1.05




DW 2.17 2.25 1.77
-  187 -
Table 4 .9  shows the  r e s u l t s  ob ta in ed  under th ese  th re e  hy p o th eses .
We see th a t  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  the  b e s t f i t  measure of the  co s t o f c a p i t a l  
fo r  the  ex p lan a tio n  o f investm ent i s  given by the  case  where b = 1 
i . e .  where the  firm  makes f u l l  allow ance fo r the sav ings from CIT. 
T h ere fo re , we may conclude th a t  s in ce  the  p ro v is io n  of the ta x  in cen ­
t iv e s  s tim u la te s  investm ent ex p en d itu res  and i s  no t weakened by inadequate  
r a t i o n a l i t y  in  th e  e s tim a tio n  o f the  c o s t o f c a p i ta l  of the firm  the  
Greek a u th o r i t i e s  may fo llo w  a tax  in c e n tiv e  p o lic y  fo r  s tim u la tin g  
investm ent e x p e n d itu re s .
4 .5  CONCLUSIONS
An em p irica l t e s t  of tax  d is c r im in a to ry  p o lic y  between r e te n t io n  
and d iv idend  showed th a t  such a p o lic y  i s  non e x is te n t  in  G reece.
The sm all m argin of the  tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r ia b le  from one had a 
n e g l ig ib le  e f f e c t  upon th e  a p p ro p r ia tio n  of p r o f i t s .  T h e re fo re , the  
q u e s tio n  w hether such a p o lic y  would be e f f e c t iv e  or no t in  Greece 
rem ains open. This allow s the  Greek a u th o r i t i e s ,  i f  they wish i t ,  to  
experim ent w ith  th i s  k ind  o f p o lic y  as a p o lic y  in s tru m en t. R etained  
p r o f i t s  seem to  have a p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  upon investm ent d e c is io n s .
D ealing w ith  the  q u es tio n  o f d iv idend  and investm ent d e c is io n s  we 
found th a t  s in g le  eq u a tio n  models perform  b e t te r  than  sim ultaneous equa- 
ion  model which support the  h y p o th es is  th a t  th e re  i s  no in terdependence  
between d iv idend  and investm ent d e c is io n s .
Having in  mind a l l  the  re s e rv a t io n s  as fa r  as the  t e s t  of the  
e f fe c t iv e n e s s  of tax  in c e n tiv e s  a re  concerned, our find ings a llow  us 
to  accep t th a t  they  have a p o s i t iv e  c o n tr ib u tio n  upon investm ent 
d e c is io n s .
F in a l ly ,  we used two ways to  t e s t  the  in c id en ce  and s h i f t in g  
h y p o th esis  of the CIT in  G reece. The d iv idend  eq u a tio n  did no t lead  
us to  any c o n c lu s io n . This may be exp la ined  by th e  form o f c o rp o ra te  
ta x  system in  G reece, th a t  i s ,  th e  ta x  i s  le v ie d  only on re ta in e d  
p r o f i t s  and the  in s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t  of tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r ia b le  
upon d iv idend  beh av io u r.
So f a r ,  we have d iscu ssed  the  Greek CIT system  both  from th e o ­
r e t i c a l  and em p irica l p o in ts  o f view . We proceed now to d isc u ss  the  
need to  harm onize c o rp o ra te  tax es  w ith in  an in te g ra te d  a rea  such as 
th e  European Community.
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APPENLIX TO CHAPTER FOUR 
AH ECONOMETRIC FRAMEF/fORK OF DYNAMIC EQUATIONS
I t  i s  v e ry  common in  Economics the  p resence  o f  d i s t r ib u te d  la g ­
ged o r a u to re g re s s iv e  m odels. The form er tak e  the  form:
= " o  + “ l ^ t  + “ 2 V 1  + - "  + " t
whereas th e  l a t t e r ,
(2 )
Economic th e o ry  i s  n o t v e ry  h e lp fu l  in  c o n s tru c tin g  th e se  m odels. 
However, th e re  i s  no un ique p r io r  s p e c i f ic a t io n  o f  th e se  m odels. T h is 
induces the r e s e a rc h e r  in  an ad hoc s p e c i f ic a t io n  o f  a dynamic model.
The re s e a rc h e r  needs to  know two th in g s  b e fo re  c o n s tru c t in g  a dynamic 
model. F i r s t ,  what de term ines the  optimum v a lu e  o f  th e  dependent v a r i ­
ab le  and second, how does th e  economy o r  th e  firm  o r th e  in d iv id u a l  ad­
ju s ts  from th e  a c tu a l  va lue  o f  th e  dependent v a r ia b le  to  i t s  optimum 
v a lu e .
S p e c if ic a t io n  o f a Dynamic Model
The behav iour o f  th e  economic u n i t s  determ ine what f a c to r s
shou ld  be taken  in to  account in  o rd e r  to  determ ine th e  optimum v a lu e  Y*.
The v a rio u s  lo g s  s t r u c tu r e s  which a re  in v e s t ig a te d  should  have s tro n g
2
p r i o r i  back ing  and should  be co n sid e red  and compared by R s t a t i s t i c s  
( G r i l ic h e s ) ,  U n fo r tu n a te ly , we cannot r e a l l y  expect any p re c is e  and 
firm  in d ic a t io n  from th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  type o f  Idg  to  be in c o rp o ra te d  
r a th e r  the  r e s e a rc h e r  hopes to  determ ine the la g  from th e  d a ta  by f i r s t  
f i t t i n g  a  f a i r l y  long  lo g  and u s in g  as  i t s  guide th e  s ig n i f i c a n t  o f  th e  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  lag g ed  v a l lu e s  o f  th e  ex p lan a to ry  v a r ia b le s  (Jo h n sto n ,
p . 293 ) .
A d i s t r ib u te d  lo g  model suoh as the  one p re sen te d  in  e q u a tio n ( l)  
c r e a te s  th re e  types o f  problem s. F i r s t»  th e  g re a t number o f  e x p lan a to ry  
v a r ia b le s  reduces th e  degree o f freedom , second, th e re  i s  a h igh  degree 
o f  m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i ty  between the  e x p lan a to ry  v a r ia b le s  which le a d  to  
in a c c u ra te  e s tim a te s  o f  the a 's  and f i n a l l y ,  we should  e s tim a te  too 
many p a ram ete rs .
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The Kayck method assum ing a r i g i d  r e la t io n s h ip  among th e  co­
e f f i c i e n t  o f  th e  e x p lan a to ry  v a r ia b le s  was th e  f i r s t  s te p  in  a l l e v i a ­
t in g  th e se  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  This method th rough  a number o f  c a lc u la t io n  
tran sfo rm s eq u a tio n  ( l )  in to  eq u a tio n  ( 2 ) ,  That i s ,  we move from a d i s ­
t r ib u te d  lagged model to  an a u to re g re s s iv e  one. However, the r i g i d  
assum ption o f  the  Koyck tra n s fo rm a tio n  made eco n o m etric ian s  to  look  fo r  
a  more f l e x ib le  model. These e f f o r t s  r e s u l te d  in  two developm ents o f 
the  Koyck tra n s fo rm a tio n . The p a r t ia l - a d ju s tm e n t  and th e  a d a p tiv e -e x -  
p e c ta t io n  models were in tro d u ce d  as a means o f  im proving th i s  model 
ad o p tin g  d i f f e r e n t  b eh av io u ra l assum ptions.
The p a r t ia l - a d ju s tm e n t  model assumes th a t  th e  a c tu a l  change o f  
th e  dependent v a r ia b le  i s  on ly  a f r a c t io n  o f  the  d e s ire d  change, th i s  
w i l l  le a d  to  a f i n a l  eq u a tio n  which has th e  form:
where i s  th e  ad justm en t c o e f f i c i e n t .
The second developm ent o f  th e  Koyck model i s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  ad­
a p tiv e  e x p e c ta tio n s  model. The l a t t e r  i s  based on the f a m il ia r  way o f  
fo rm atin g  e x p e c ta tio n s  f o r  th e  fu tu re  based on th e  p a s t  behav iour o f the  
v a r ia b le s .  The e x p e c ta tio n s  a re  re v is e d  based on the  most re c e n t e r r o r .  
These assum ptions le ad  to a f i n a l  eq u a tio n  alm ost s im i la r  to  th a t  o f  
p a r t i a l  ad ju stm en t model. The d if f e r e n c e  between them l i e s  in  the  d i f ­
f e r e n t  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f the  c o e f f ic ie n t  and th e  e r r o r  term :
Y .^ = + Xfij_X^ + ( l - X ) Y t _ i  + {u^ -  d -X )U ^ }  (4)
Both th e se  methods r e s u l te d  in  an a u to re g re s s iv e  model whose 
e s tim a tio n  problem s w i l l  be d iscu ssed  in  the  n ex t s e c t io n .
E s tim a tio n  o f  the A u to reg ress iv e  Models
Suppose th a t  an a u to re g re s s iv e  model tak es  the  form o f  eq u atio n  
( 2 ) .  I t  has been argued th a t  c l a s s i c a l  l e a s t  sq u ares  may n o t be d i r e c ­
t l y  a p p lic a b le  to th i s  model fo r  two re a so n s . F i r s t ,  because th e  p re s ­
ence o f  the  s to c h a s t ic  e x p lan a to ry  v a r ia b le  and second because
the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s e r i a l  c o r r e la t io n .  For th e se  two reaso n s th e  a p p l i -
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o a tio n  o f  o rd in a ry  l e a s t  sq u ares  p ro v id es  b ia s  and in c o n s is te n t  e stim a­
to r s  o f  th e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  th e  e x p lan a to ry  v a r ia b le s .
One o f  the  b a s ic  assum ptions o f  a re g re s s io n  model i s  th a t  the  
e x p lan a to ry  v a r ia b le s  to  be n o n -s to c h a s t ic  v a r ia b le s .  In  our case  one 
o f  the  e x p lan a to ry  v a r ia b le s  (Uj-.-j) i s  dependent Icigged v a r ia b le ,  
which cannot be co n s id e re d  as  n o n s to c h a s tic  v a r ia b le .  T h e re fo re , th e  
p re sen ce  o f  th e  logged dependent v a r ia b le  v io la te s  one b a s ic  assump­
t io n  o f  th e  re g re s s io n  m odel. I f  we assume th a t  th e re  i s  no s e r i a l  
c o r r e la t io n  in  the  d is tu rb a n c e  term  th en  th e re  i s  no c o r r e la t io n  b e t ­
ween o.  ^ and Yt-i e i t h e r  s in c e  u ^ is  independent on p rev io u s  v a lu es  o f  u  
and'Yj^.^is a lso  independent on p rev io u s  v a lu es  o f  u  theyA rndependent 
between them. This g u a ran tee s  th a t  our e s tim a te s  o f  % a re  c o n s is te n t .  
I f  th e  l a t t e r  a re  un b iased  as  w e ll as i t  i s  a m a tte r  o f  th e  s iz e  o f 
the  sam ple. I f  i t  i s  la rg e  th en  our e s tim a to rs  a re  a lso  u n b iased  bu t 
i f  i t  i s  sm all then  th e  e s tim a to rs  a re  b ia se d . This b ia s  may be a lso  
reduced  as more exogenous v a r ia b le s  a re  in c lu d ed  in  the  model.
Suppose now th a t  th e  d is tu rb a n c e  term  i s  s e r i a l l y  c o r r e la te d .  
S ince u ^ is  c o r r e la te d  w ith  and u.^.^i8 c o r re la te d  to  then  th e  l a t ­
t e r  and the  a re  c o r r e la te d .  This v io la te s  an o th er b a s ic  assum ption 
o f  th e  re g re s s io n  model which re q u ire s  th a t  the  e x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le s  
^ d  th e  e r r o r  term  should  n o t  be c o r r e la te d .  The a p p l ic a t io n  then  o f 
th e  o rd in a ry  l e a s t  sq u ares  le a d s  to  in c o n s is te n t  e s t im a to r s ,
G ril ic h e s  has shown th a t  in  th e se  models the D -  W t e s t  i s  in ­
v a l id  and th e  e s tim a te d  a u to c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  s u b s ta n t i a l ly  
b ia se d  tow ards to  2 , D urbin has developed a t e s t  f o r  a u to c o r re la te d  
d is tu rb a n c e s  which i s  a p p lic a b le  to t h i s  kind o f  model. U n fo rtu n a te ly , 






where p ig  an e s tim a te  o f  the  p a ram eter p in  the  f i r s t  o rd e r  scheme 
ULg=pLLt-i + Gi > N i s  th e  number o f o b se rv a tio n s  i s  an e s tim a te
o f  th e  sam pling v a r ia n c e  o f  ^  , th e  OLB e s tim a te  o f  the  c o e f f ic ie n t
^ - 1
F in a l ly ,  th e  v a r io u s  approaches which have been su g g ested  to  
removing a u to c o r re la te d  d is tu rb a n c e s  a re  d ism issed  in  th e  main body o f  
th e  t h e s i s .
CHAPTER FIVE
CORPORATE TAX HARMONIZATION WITHIN THE E.E.C.
5 . 1  INTRODUCTION
Each tax  s t r u c tu r e ,  m ain ly , r e f l e c t s  dom estic p o lic y  is s u e s .  
This s t ru c tu re  i s  a p roduct o f n a t io n a l  h is to ry  and n a t io n a l  
id io sy n c ra sy . The morphology o f the  economy, the le v e l  o f  econ­
omic developm ent, the p o l i t i c a l  c lim a te  and s o c ia l  a sp e c ts  de­
term ine the  s t r u c tu r e  o f the  ta x  system . D ivergencies on th ese  
m a tte rs  cause th e  p a t te r n  o f ta x a t io n  to  d i f f e r  from co u n try  to  
co u n try .
Hut d u rin g  the  l a s t  decades the i n t e r e s t  on ta x a t io n  has been 
extended in  an in te r n a t io n a l  l e v e l .  The reason  why such an in ­
t e r e s t  has appeared  i s  th e  g ra d u a lly  in c re a s in g  economic i n t e r ­
dependence between n a tio n s . This in te rdependence  r e s u l te d  from 
a v a r ie ty  o f  c ircu m stan ces  such as the in c re a s in g  movement o f 
goods and s e r v ic e s ,  and the  in c re a s in g  movement o f  f a c to r s  o f 
p ro d u c tio n , m ain ly , c a p i t a l  th rough d i r e c t  investm ent abroad , 
which made n a tio n a l  economies more open to  each o th e r .  The 
more open the n a t io n a l  economy becomes the  le s s  e f f e c t iv e  n a tio n a l  
in s tru m en ts  o f economic p o lic y  become, s in c e  p o lic y  adopted  f o r  
dom estic purposes may have a  d i r e c t  and s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t  on 
o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .  T h e re fo re , g iven  th is  economic in te rd ep en d en ce , 
government a c t i v i t i e s  based  on ly  on dom estic cov isidevrations 
may r e s u l t  in  in e f f ic ie n c ie s  and in e q u i t ie s  in  an in te r n a t io n a l  
l e v e l .  Then, the  presumed re c ip e  f o r  cu rin g  th i s  s i tu a t io n  i s  
c o -o rd in a tio n  o f n a t io n a l  p o l ic ie s  between the n a t io n s .  The 
aim o f  such c o -o rd in a tio n  i s  to  reduce d if fe re n c e s  in  p o l ic ie s  
between n a tio n s .
The ta sk  o f such c o -o rd in a tio n  i s  n o t sim ple . In  such a 
second b e s t  world where the  n a t io n a l  and the  in te r n a t io n a l  in ­
t e r e s t  may c o n tra d ic t  each o th e r  i t  i s  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  e s ta b ­
l i s h  sim ple and d e f in i t e  r u le s .  The need o f a s u p e rn a tio n a l
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government o r o rg a n is a tio n  i s  obv ious, to  undertake  th e  respon­
s i b i l i t y  o f d e te rm in in g  common ru le s  re g a rd in g  economic p o lic y  
i s s u e s ,  which should  be fo llow ed  by each n a t io n a l  governm ent. 
C hapter two showed th a t  u n i l a t e r a l  o r even b i l a t e r a l  a c t io n s  
a re  inadequate  f o r  a l l e v i a t i n g  d i s to r t io n s  coming from i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  ta x a t io n . This r a i s e s  th e  problem  o f c o -o rd in a tio n  
on a m u l t i l a t e r a l  b a s is .  This ta sk  has been undertaken  by the  
O.E.C.D. and the  E .E .C . The form er o rg a n is a tio n  su ggested  a 
t r e a ty  model in  1963 which has been r e c e n t ly  review ed (O.E.C.D. 
1976) .  This model has been used  as a p ro to ty p e  in  e s ta b l is h in g  
some t r e a t i e s  between c o u n tr ie s  . At th e  same tim e the E.E.C 
a ttem p ts  to  ach ieve  th e  same goal by harm onizing the n a t io n a l  
ta x a t io n  system s o f  i t s  member s t a t e s ,
5 .2  TAX HARMONIZATION
The c o -o rd in a tio n  o f  n a t io n a l  p o l ic ie s  may take two form s, 
e i t h e r  the  form o f h a rm on ization  o r th e  extreme case  o f  eq u a l­
i z a t io n .  The l a t t e r  form o f c o -o rd in a tio n  in v o lves a  com plete 
am algam ation, fo r  example in  the  case  o f  ta x a t io n ,  o f  the  
d i f f e r e n t  tax  system s in  one. This approach no t on ly  i s  im­
p r a c t i c a l ,  a t  l e a s t  as a f i r s t  a tte m p t, due to  the g re a t  d iv e r ­
g en c ies  in  tax  p o l ic ie s  between the  n a tio n s  b u t i t  may be co n sid ­
ered  as u n d e s ira b le  as w e ll. D esp ite  the  f a c t  th a t  th is  approach 
i s  th e o r e t i c a l ly  s u p e r io r  to  the harm onization  approach , p ra c ­
t i c a l l y  in  the  M usgrave's words " th e  baby i s  lo s t  w ith  the  ba th  
w ater" (R.M usgrave, I 969) . On the o th e r  hand, the  concept o f 
harm onization  aims n o t to  make a l l  the  ta x  system s id e n t ic a l  
r a th e r  to  b r in g  them in  harmony. However, the harm onization  
approach , th a t  i s ,  the  c o n so lid a tio n  o f d i f f e r e n t  tax  s t r u c tu r e s ,  
seems to  be a  more c h a lle n g in g  view .
H arm onization in  g e n e ra l and ta x  harm onization  in  p a r t i c ­
u la r  can be d is t in g u is h e d  in  two k in d s , the v e r t i c a l  and the 
h o r iz o n ta l .  Under th e  concept o f v e r t i c a l  ta x  harm onization  we 
mean the  harm onization  o f ta x  system s o f  government which be­
long to  d i f f e r e n t  le v e l s ,  For exam ple, th i s  i s  th e  case  in  a 
f e d e ra l  system where the purpose o f  ta x  harm onization  i s  to
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bring in  harmony the ta x a tio n  system s o f fe d e r a l, s ta te  and lo c a l  
governments. On the other hand, under the concept o f  h o r izon ta l 
harmonisation we put in  harmony tax systems o f  various governments 
which belong to  the same l e v e l ,  th at i s ,  o f  various n a tio n s . The 
la t t e r  concept o f  harmonization i s  r e la t iv e  to our stud y. How­
ever some b asic  problems are common in  both kinds o f  harmoniz­
a t io n , which means th a t some gains may be obtained from the ex­
p erien ce o f  the fed era l system  in  th at area.
Concluding, we would argue th a t tax harmonization in vo lves  
a comprehensive system atic  adjustment o f  the tax o f  the n ation a l 
governments in  an in tegra ted  area w ith a view to  a ch iev in g  cer­
ta in  w e ll defined o b je c t iv e s , such as m inim ization o f  d is to r ­
tio n s  in  resource a llo c a t io n , s ta b i l iz a t io n  o f  p r ice  le v e l  and 
reduction  o f  in ter e g io n a l in e q u a lit ie s  o f  income.
5 .3  ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND TAX HARMONIZATION
D ifferen t view s as to  the exact meaning o f  economic in te ­
gration  have appeared in  the l i t e r a tu r e .  In teg ra tio n , in  the 
Rome T reaty’ s words, means " esta b lish in g  a common market and 
p ro g ress iv e ly  approximating the economic p o l ic ie s  o f  member 
sta tes"  (E.E.C. 1 9 5 8 a r t ic le ,2 j .I n  our words, in teg ra tio n  means 
the s ta te  that a llow s d if fe r e n t  economic u n its  (governments) to 
a l le v ia t e  economic d is to r t io n s  o r ig in a ted  through th e ir  economic 
interdependence described in  the in trod uction  o f  th is  chapter. 
Therefore, tax harmonization i s  one o f  the intruments which may 
be used to  ach ieve th is  g o a l. In p a r tic u la r , the aim o f  tax  
harmonization i s  tw ofold; F ir s t ,  o f  ensuring the fr e e  move­
ment o f  fa c to rs  o f  production and second, o f  ensuring undis­
to rted  com petition w ith in  the in tegra ted  community.
In a process o f  economic in teg ra tio n  four stages may be d is ­
tin gu ish ed . The establishm ent o f a free-tra d e  area between sever­
a l n ation s c o n s titu te s  the f i r s t  s ta te  or the s im p lest form o f  
economic in teg ra tio n .
There are no t a r i f f s  b a rr iers  between these cou n tries  on 
the movement o f  goods. I f  the cou n tries in  question  agree to  
fo llo w  a common extern a l t a r i f f  p o lic y  on goods from ou tsid e
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th e  f r e e  tra d e  a re a  c o u n tr ie s  they  c o n s t i tu te  a custom un io n .
That i s ,  a custom union has th e  a d d i t io n a l  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  th a t  
i t  goes one s te p  f u r th e r  than  the  f r e e - t r a d e  a re a .
The n ex t s tag e  in  th e  p ro cess  en su res  the  f r e e  movement o f 
f a c to r s  o f  p ro d u c tio n . At t h a t  s ta g e  th e  c o u n tr ie s  in  q u e s tio n  
c o n s t i tu te  a common m arket. A ccording to a r t i c l e  5 o f  th e  T rea ty  
o f  Rome, common m arket means the f r e e  movement o f  goods and s e r ­
v ic e s ,  persons and c a p i t a l ,  a common e x te rn a l t a r i f f  and u n d is ­
to r te d  co m p etitio n  w ith in  the  community. The a s p i r a t io n  o f  the 
Rome T r e a ty 's  w rite rs  d id  n o t s to p  h e re . They w ent beyond through 
a r t i c l e  3 to  ex p la in  th a t  approx im ation  o f economic p o l ic ie s  means 
a common commercial p o l ic y ,  a  common a g r ic u l tu r a l  p o lic y , a com­
mon t r a n s p o r t  p o lic y  and c o -o rd in a tio n  o f the rem ain ing  a sp e c ts  
o f  economic p o lic y  in  the  member s t a t e s .  This ex p resses  t h e i r  
d e s ir e  to  c re a te  an economic u n io n . T herefo re , ta x  harm onization  
i s  co n sid e red  as a  v i t a l  in s tru m en t in  ach iev in g  th is  o b je c t iv e .
I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r ly  n e c e ssa ry  in  th e  c o n tex t o f  a  common in d u s­
t r i a l ,  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  and re g io n a l p o lic y . Tax p o lic y  has to  
p la y  a r o le  in  a l l  th e se  c o n te x ts , th rough  two c h a n n e ls ; 
e i th e r  by av o id in g  ta x  o b s ta c le s ,  double ta x a t io n  e tc ,  o r by 
ta k in g  p o s i t iv e  a c tio n s  to  implement one o f  the  o th e r  common 
p o l ic ie s  (H. Sim onet, 1975).
5 ,4  TAX HARMONIZATION WITHIN THE E .E .C .
5 ,4 .1  OBJECTIVES
Two o f  the  o b je c t iv e s  o f the  E .E .C , t r e a ty  a re  f i r s t ,  the  
removal o f  b a r r ie r s  to  the  f r e e  movement o f goods and s e rv ic e s  
and f a c to r s  o f  p ro d u c tio n  and second, the  achievem ent o f  the 
same c o n d itio n s  fo r  co m p etitio n  between th e  member s t a t e s  as f a r  
as f i s c a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  a re  concerned . T h e re fo re , the  i n t e r e s t  
in  tax  harm onization  stem s from th e se  c o n s id e ra tio n s . The t r e a ty  
i t s e l f  does no t p rov ide  guidance re g a rd in g  p o lic y  fo rm u la tio n  
in  the  f i e l d  o f ta x a t io n .  This tab k  was l e f t  to  be done by 
com m ittees. P a r t i c u l a r ly ,  as f a r  as th e  v a rio u s  k inds o f  ta x ­
a t io n  concerned the  t r e a ty  p u ts  d i f f e r e n t  em phasis.
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It e x p l ic i t ly  c a l ls  for harmonization of the indirect taxes 
whereas i t  does so only im p lic it ly  for the direct taxes through 
the general c a l l  for approximation of laws. This point has been 
c r it ic iz e d  in the l i tera tu re .  In our opinion th is  treatment of 
taxation is  consistent from two points of view. F ir s t ,  i t  is  
apparent that i t  i s  not necessary to harmonize a l l  the taxes to 
the same degree and second, tax harmonization, as we defined i t ,  
does not require the creation of identica l tax systems in a l l  
member countries.
The in terest  in indirect taxation was indicated at a very 
early stage in the Tinbergen report. A rticle  99 of the treaty  
e x p l ic i t ly  expresses the E.E.C .’'s intention for indirect tax 
harmonization. It is  accepted by the community that th is  kind 
of tax d irec t ly  enters in the price of goods which involves 
that national d ifferences in these taxes d istort  competition and 
the .choice of industry location within the community. There­
fore the desire to promote the free movement of goods and 
services requires the harmonization of indirect taxes. But, i f  
we take into account the increasing b e l ie f  that at least  part of the 
corporate taxation is  sh ifted  forward through higher prices we have 
similar e f fe c t s  on international trade as in the case of indirect  
taxes. The supporters of th is  view ask for reconsideration of the 
GATT rules to allow the kinds of rebates for CIT that are allowed for 
indirect taxes. On the other hand, those who oppose th is  view argue 
that the CIT is  not sh ifted  since international competition l im its  
the a b i l i ty  of the firm to sh if t  the CIT (P. Musgrave, 1969, D Dosser, 
1'975). This argument draws attention to the fact that most of the
well known studies of corporate tax incidence im p lic it ly  assume closed
economy conditions. The reason for th is  may be that they tend to be
carried out by authors in the U.S. ,  where foreign trade is  le s s
important than in European countries. However, i f  international con­
siderations such as foreign trade, the d is t in c tion  between tradable and 
non-tradable goods and the form of the exchange rate regime are taken 
into account the s itu a tion  changes, Suppose that we have a fixed  
exchange rate regime. The CIT may be passed forwards on the price of 
non-tradable goods. . However, in the case of tradable goods the CIT
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cannot be shifted forwards. So either i t  is  borne by the firm or i t  
i s  shifted backwards via  a cut in the real wage rate or the real return 
to shareholders. Under a f le x ib le  exchange rate regime again in the 
case of non-tradable goods the CIT may be shifted forwards. In the 
case of tradable goods, i f  export prices are raised the balance of 
trade deteriorates and the exchange rate depreciates, which resu lts  in 
a r ise  in import prices. Trade unions may then try to restore their  
standards of l iv in g  and to the extent that they succeed p rofits  w il l  
eventually bear the burden of the CIT. A nominal sh ift in g  of the tax 
may actually resu lt ,  after  a time lag, in the real incidence being 
borne by the firm. The above considerations w il l  have important 
implications for Greece when the la tte r  joins the E.E.C. Since, 
though the European Monetary System at present in operation permits 
limited fluctuations in exchange rates , the ultimate goal of Economic 
and Monetary Union, i f  achieved, would be one of fixed exchange rates.  
It  is  not, however, our purpose to investigate in d eta il  the in ter ­
national ramifications of tax sh ift in g  in the present study. In 
addition to that they point out the administrative d i f f i c u l t i e s  that 
would be involved i f  border adjustments were made. Irrespective of 
these views the community has not indicated intention to deal with 
th is matter so far.
On the other hand, a r t ic le s  100-102 give an im plic it  or by 
implication appeal of the community for d irect tax harmonization.
The harmonization of d irect taxes is  necessary for two reasons.
F ir s t ,  as the harmonization of indirect taxes aimed to ensure
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th e  f r e e  movement o f  goods and s e rv ic e s  so the  harm onization  o f  
d i r e c t  tax es  i s  n e ce ssa ry  to  ensu re  th e  f r e e  movement o f  f a c to r s  
o f  p ro d u c tio n . Second, th e  harm onization  o f  in d i r e c t  tax es  may 
invo lve  re c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between d i r e c t  
tax es  and in d i r e c t  ta x e s . W ithin the  f i e l d  o f d i r e c t  tax es  more 
emphasis i s  g iven  on tax es  on c a p i t a l .  The f r e e  movement o f 
c a p i t a l  has two a s p e c ts .  F i r s t ,  c a p i t a l  should  flow  f r e e  w ith ­
ou t any tax  o b s ta c le s  to  g e n e ra te  p r o f i t s  and second, d iv id en d  
p a id  ou t o f  th e se  p r o f i t s  to  flow  w ithou t any ta x  impediment.
We have seen th a t  th e  c o -e x is te n c e  o f CIT and p e rso n a l income 
ta x  c re a te s  some p ro b lem s,T h e re fo re , the  goal o f f r e e  d iv idend  
flow  in d i r e c t ly  c a l l s  f o r  harm on ization  o f p e rso n a l income tax  
as a means o f  f a c i l i t a t i n g  the  achievem ent o f  f r e e  c a p i t a l  move­
ment.
F in a l ly ,  a r t i c l e  220 c a l l s  fo r  e l im in a tio n  o f in te r n a t io n a l  
double ta x a t io n  whereas a r t i c l e  51 c a l l s  fo r  a common s o c ia l  
in su ran ce  c o n tr ib u tio n  p o l ic y ,
5 ,4 ,2  THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY
In  modem h is to r y ,  th e  f i r s t  im p o s itio n  o f  a  su p e m a tio n a l 
ta x  by a  su p e m a tio n a l body took p la c e  by the  High A u th o rity  o f 
th e  European Coal and S te e l  Community, in  1952. W ithin the 
E .E .C , the f i r s t  s te p  tow ards tru e  in te r n a t io n a l  ta x  law i s  the 
ad op tion  o f th e  two E.E.C d i r e c t iv e s  concern ing  harm onization  
o f  tu rn o v e r ta x  l e g i s l a t i o n  in  I 967 (E .E .C , 1969).
We w il l  judge th e  achievem ents o f  th e  community w ith in  the 
s p i r i t  o f  g iven  d e f i n i t i o n :  o f  in te g r a t io n  as  the  s t a t e  which 
a llow s the  a l l e v i a t i o n  o f d i s to r t io n s  g en era ted  th rough the  
economic in te rdependence  between th e  n a t io n s . The community i s  
in  a p rocess o f  a l l e v i a t i n g  d i s to r t io n s  fo llo w in g  a p redeterm ined  
p rocedure  acco rd in g  to  th e  w eigh ts given in  d i f f e r e n t  f i e l d s ,
'The community seems to  g iv e  p r i o r i t y  on d is to r t io n s  g en era ted  
by tra d e  and t a r i f f s  im pedim ents, in d i r e c t  tax es  and f i n a l l y  
d i r e c t  ta x e s , 'Ih is does n o t mean th a t  the  community does not 
work in  d i f f e r e n t  f ie ld s  a t  th e  same tim e . I t  s t a r t e d  w ith  the 
in tro d u c tio n  o f  a common t a r i f f  p o l ic y ,  a  p ro cess  which was
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comp M at in  1967. 'The re d u c tio n  o f  t a r i f f s  on tra d e  th rough  
v a rio u s  agreem ents re v e a le d  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  n o n - t a r i f f s  
d i s to r t io n s  o f in te r n a t io n a l  c o m p e titio n . Among th e se  a  
prom inent p o s i t io n  i s  h e ld  by d i s to r t io n s  caused by ta x a t io n .
These d i s to r t io n s  ap p ea r in  the  form o f  in tro d u c in g  v a r io u s  mea­
su res  f o r  dom estic p o lic y  c o n s id e ra tio n s  such as im port b a r r ie r s  
o r in c e n t iv e s  g iven  to  v a r io u s  in d u s t r ie s .
The harm onization  o f  in d i r e c t  ta x es  i s  th e  second in  the  
l i s t  o f p r i o r i t i e s .  This p re fe re n c e  may be ex p la in ed  by two 
re a so n s . F i r s t ,  commodity flow i s  more ex ten s iv e  than  f a c to r s  
o f p ro d u c tio n  flow  between c o u n tr ie s  and second, i t  would serve  
l i t t l e  purpose to  remove t a r i f f s  b a r r i e r s  to  tra d e  i f  th e  tax  
o b s tac le s  p re se n te d  by the  in d i r e c t  tax es  were to  rem ain,
A p ro cess  o f in d i r e c t  tax es  harm onization  c o n s is ts  o f th re e  
s ta g e s .  F i r s t ,  the  in t r o d u c t io n > o f  a  common form o f  in d i r e c t  
ta x a t io n ,  second, the  e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  common b a s is  upon which 
the  ta x  i s  le v ie d  and f i n a l l y ,  the  r a t e  o r r a te s  which should  be 
a p p lie d  on th i s  b a s is .  The community by th e  two d i r e c t iv e s  in  
1967 , m entioned e a r l i e r ,  re q u ire d  the member s t a t e s  to s u b s t i ­
tu te  a  v a lu e  added ta x  fo r  th e  e x is t in g  g en e ra l s a le s  tax es  by 
Jan u ary  1 s t  197Ü, This p ro cess  was f i n a l l y  com pleted in  1973-» 
and now the  community has as  a common s a le s  ta x  the  V.A.T.
R ec e n tly , the  s ix th  d i r e c t iv e  was adopted  by the member s t a t e s  
which concerns a un iform  b a s is  o f assessm en t fo r  V.A.T, (R .B urke, 
1979). The purpose o f t h i s  d i r e c t iv e  was tw ofo ld . F i r s t ,  i t  
c o n s t i tu te s  a f u r th e r  s te p  in  th e  p ro cess  o f  V.A.T. harm onization  
and second, to  p ro v id e  a  b a s is  fo r  th e  f in a n c in g  o f th e  community 
b u dget. What rem ains to be done in  th is  a re a  i s  concerned w ith  the 
harm onization  o f  th e  V.A.T, r a t e .  The commission has commenced 
work on th i s  a re a  and th e  main th in k in g  i s  to decide  i f  th e re  
w i l l  be one o r more r a t e s  and which item s w i l l  come w ith in  each 
r a te  band (B urke, 1979).
We d iscu ssed  in  th e  p rev io u s  s e c t io n  the  two reasons which 
c a l l  fo r  harm onization  o f  d i r e c t  ta x e s . The p ro g re ss  which has 
been done in  th a t  f i e l d  so f a r  is  even le s s  s ig n i f ic a n t  than
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th a t  ach ieved  in  the a re a  o f  in d i r e c t  tax es  h a rm on ization . One 
e x p lan a tio n  f o r  th i s  i s  th e  g r e a te r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  harm onizing th i s  
k in d  o f  ta x .  I t  i s  w idely  accep ted  w ith in  the  community th a t  th i s  
ta sk  i s  l e f t  to  be done by a oovergence p ro cess  r a th e r  than  v ia  d i r ­
e c t iv e s  from the  Commission. This p ro cess  in v o lv es  the  n a tio n a l  r e ­
forms o f  th e  tax  system s which tend  towards a European norm. This 
p ro cess  i s  c a l le d  autonomous o r  induced harm onization  (D ,D osser,
1975).
W ithin th e  f i e l d  o f  d i r e c t  tax es  the  i n t e r e s t  o f  the  community 
has co n cen tra ted  on b u s in e ss  ta x e s . I t  i s  n o t the am bition  o f the  
community to  harm onize p e rso n a l income ta x a tio n  in  g e n e ra l a t  th a t  
e a r ly  s tag e  o f  in te g r a t io n  and p re fe r s  to  leav e  i t  in  th e  hands o f 
the  n a t io n a l  government as an in s tru m en t o f  n a t io n a l  p o l ic y .  P e r­
so n a l income ta x a t io n  r e f l e c t s  a t  a g r e a te r  degree the  n a t io n a l  
h is to r y  and n a t io n a l  id io sy n c ra sy  which we accep ted  e a r l i e r  as the 
main d e te rm in an ts  o f a ta x  s t r u c tu r e .  However, a p ro p o sa l concern­
in g  a d i r e c t iv e  in  p e rso n a l income ta x a t io n  i s  expected  e a r ly  in  
1980 ( I n te r ta x  1980), The purpose o f  th i s  p ro p o sa l i s  to  id e n t i f y  
some o b s ta c le s  o r h in d ran ces  which come from ta x a tio n  o f  in d iv i ­
du a ls  who l iv e  in  one co u n try  and work in  a n o th e r . P a r t i c u l a r ly ,  
i t  w i l l  d ea l w ith  tax  r a t e s  and d ed uctions concern ing  t h e s e  in ­
d iv id u a ls .  V arious c o n s id e ra tio n s  c a l l  fo r  a p r i o r i t y  to  be 
g iven by the  community on b u s in ess  ta x e s . F i r s t ,  th e se  tax es  a re  
le v ie d  on a f a c to r  o f  p ro d u c tio n , c a p i t a l ,  which i s  more m obile than 
la b o u r. Second, d e s p ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  b u s in ess  ta x a t io n  i s  n o t 
m ainly used  by th e  member s t a t e s  as a  source  o f c o l le c t in g  revenue 
r a th e r  as an in s tru m en t o f  acom plish ing  th e i r  i n d u s t r i a l ,  s t a b i l i ­
z a tio n  and re g io n a l p o l i c i e s ,  some e x p e r ts  o f  ta x a t io n  would c o n sid e r 
th i s  k ind  o f  tax es  as a source  f o r  f in a n c in g  th e  community budget 
a f t e r  the  use o f  V.A.T, f o r  th e  same purpose . F in a l ly ,  the  u n c e r ta in ­
ty  re g a rd in g  th e  s h i f t i n g  and in c id en ce  q u e s tio n  makes some ta x  ex­
p e r ts  wonder i f  the  CIT should  be used  as a bo rd er tax  ad ju stm en t.
The achievem ents o f  the  community in  the  a re a  o f d i r e c t  tax  
a re  n o t v e ry  c o n s id e ra b le . No a c t i v i t y  took p la ce  re g a rd in g  p e rso n a l 
income tax  and s o c ia l  s e c u r i ty  c o n tr ib u t io n . Only . ,
“199 -
one d i r e c t iv e  concern ing  d i r e c t  ta x a t io n  has been adopted  by the 
c o u n c il , in  December 197® (European 'Taxation, 1979;* T h is d i r ­
e c tiv e  c a l l s  fo r  in c re a se d  c o -o p e ra t io n , in  p a r t i c u l a r  in  the  
exchange o f  in fo rm a tio n , between th e  ta x  a u th o r i ty  o f  the  member 
s t a t e s ,  in  1966, a  com m ittee c h a ire d  by P ro fe s s o r  begre  examined 
th e  o b s ta c le s  p re v e n tin g  th e  developm ent o f a  European C a p ita l  
Market (E .E .C . 1966 ;. The outcome o f  th is  s tu d y  was the two 
d i r e c t iv e s  which a re  concerned w ith  the  p a re n t- s u b s id ia ry  and 
m erger type r e la t io n s h ip s .  As f a r  as th e  system s o f  c o rp o ra te  
ta x a tio n  concerned th re e  d i f f e r e n t  p ro p o sa ls  were made. The 
f i r s t ,  e a r ly  in  1965» by a f i s c a l  and f in a n c ia l  com m ittee, the 
Neumark Committee, proposed th e  tw o -ra te  system as the Common 
c o rp o ra te  ta x  system  f o r  the  member s t a t e s  o f  th e  community 
(Neumark R eport, I 963) . In  1970» th e  Van Den Tempel re p o r t  
suggested  the  c l a s s i c a l  system  (Van den Tempel R ep o rt, 1970). 
F in a l ly ,  in  1975» " th e  commission came ou t in  favour o f  a com­
mon im pu ta tion  system  p a r t ly  r e le iv in g  th e  economic double 
ta x a tio n  o f  d iv idends in  s p i t e  o f the  te c h n ic a l  problem s which 
th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  such a system  g iv es  r i s e  to an in te r n a t io n a l  
tran sac tio n s '*  (E .E .C , 1975). None o f  the  above m entioned sy s­
tems has been made th e  community system  y e t .  The v a rio u s  
su g g es tio n s  in  d i f f e r e n t  time p e rio d s  v e r i f y  th e  view th a t  the 
p ro cess  o f  harm onization  c o n s t i tu te s  an "alm ost c o n tin n u a l 
p ro cess  o f  re th in k in g "  ( C .  S andford , 1978). We proceed  now to  
b r i e f l y  d iscu ss  the  above p ro p o s a ls . However, an ex cep tio n  i s  
made re g a rd in g  th e  l a t t e r  p ro p o sa l concern ing  th e  im p u ta tio n  
system . We w il l  d isc u ss  th i s  p ro p o sa l in  d e t a i l  because i t  i s  
our f e e l in g  th a t  one v a r ia n t  o f  th a t  w i l l  be the  community sy s­
tem, One j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  th i s  f e e l in g  i s  th a t  seven o u t o f  the 
n ine  member s t a t e s  have a lre a d y  in tro d u ce d  the  im p u ta tio n  system .
-200  -
5 ,4 .3  THE FIRST ACTUAL STEP TOWARDS DIRECT TAX HARMONIZATION
The f i r s t  a c tu a l  s te p  tow ards d i r e c t  ta x  harm onization  took 
p la ce  on 16th January  19^9» when th e  commission subm itted  to  the  
co u n c il o f m in is te rs  two d r a f t  d i r e c t iv e s  concern ing  (a) the  com­
mon system  o f  ta x a t io n  a p p lic a b le  to  m ergers, d iv is io n s  and con­
t r ib u t io n s  o f  a s s e ts  ta k in g  p la c e  between c o rp o ra tio n s  o f  d i f ­
f e r e n t  member s t a t e s  and (b) th e  common system  o f ta x a t io n s  
a p p lic a b le  to  p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n s  and s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
member s t a t e s .  Both the  d i r e c t iv e s  were in ten d ed  to  remove ta x ­
a t io n  o b s ta c le s  to  the  prom otion o f  R a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  in d u s try  
and o f  development o f  l a r g e r  e n te r p r is e  w ith in  the  Community,
This d e s ire  was ex p ressed  by th e  Council in  i t s  f i r s t  p rog­
ramme o f  sh o r t- te rm  economic p o lic y  fo r  th e  community (E .E .C , 
1967).
The f i r s t  d i r e c t iv e  co n cern ing  th e  ta x a tio n  tre a tm e n t o f 
c ro ss  f r o n t i e r  m ergers seeks to  remove tax  o b s ta c le s  in v o lv in g  
from tra n s a c tio n s  between th e se  m ergers, when a company w ith in  
the  community absorbs an o th e r company w ith in  th e  community but 
e s ta b lis h e d  in  a n o th e r member s t a t e ,  a c o s t i s  in v o lv ed . This 
co a t i s  th e  ta x  l i a b i l i t y  which r e s u l t s  from the  d if fe re n c e  b e t­
ween th e  book v a lu e  o f  a s s e ts  o f  th e  absorbed  company and i t s  
m arket v a lu e . The q u e s tio n  which a r i s e s  here  i s  w hether th e se  
c a p i t a l  g a in s  should  be co n sid e red  as  r e a l iz e d  a t  th e  moment o f 
o p e ra tio n  o r n o t. However, an o b s ta c le  to  such tra n s a c t io n s  i s  
c re a te d  because th e re  i s  no common p o lic y  re g a rd in g  th i s  m a tte r  
w ith in  the  member s t a t e s .  I t  i s  a lm ost a ru le  th a t  a l l  th e  coun­
t r i e s  t r e a t  c a p i t a l  g a in s  p r e f e r e n t i a l l y  b u t the  commission r e ­
je c te d  th e  id ea  o f  ex ten d in g  th i s  p r e f e r e n t i a l  tre a tm e n t to  the  
community le v e l .  In s te a d , i t  concluded th a t  on ly  a common system  
a p p lie d  by a l l  member s t a t e s  would c o n s t i tu te  a s a t i s f a c to r y  
s o lu t io n .  However, the  community decided  t h a t ,  in  p r in c ip le ,  
a m erger-type tra n s a c t io n  should  n o t ,  as such , g ive  r i s e  to  
any im p o sitio n  o f ta x  and on ly  on a c tu a l  r e a l iz a t io n  would the 
merged company’s a s s e ts  become ta x ab le  by the  member s t a t e  in  
q u e s tio n .
We d iscu ssed  in  c h a p te r  two th e  problem  o f  i n t e r /
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n a tio n a l  double ta x a t io n  c re a te d  by ta x in g  the  income o f  a sub­
s id ia r y  by th e  fo re ig n  and dom estic co rp o ra te  ta x  and by le v y in g  
a w ith h o ld in g  tax  on d iv id en d  p a id  by th e  su b s id ia ry  to  i t s  p a re n t .  
We a ls o  d iscu ssed  how each co u n try  u n i l a t e r a l l y  o r th rough  b i ­
l a t e r a l  agreement a l l e v ia t e s  in te r n a t io n a l  doublé ta x a t io n .
The commission concluded th a t  a common system o f  ta x a t io n  o f  
p a re n t- s u b s id ia ry  r e la t io n s h ip s  a p p lie d  in  a l l  th e  member 
s t a t e s  i s  th e  on ly  s a t i s f a c to r y  s o lu t io n .T h e re fo re , th e  commis­
s io n  c a l le d  f o r  a  c e r ta in  degree o f  l e g i s l a tu r e  harm onization  
making th re e  su g g e s tio n s . F i r s t ,  i t  suggested  the  exemption 
from CIT o f  p r o f i t s  which a p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n  re c e iv e s  from 
i t s  s u b s id ia ry , second, th e  exem ption o f  d iv idend  p a id  by th e  
s u b s id ia ry  to  i t s  p a re n t from w ith h o ld in g  tax es  a t  th e  su b sid ­
ia r y  l e v e l .  The aim o f th e se  p ro p o sa ls  was the  a l l e v i a t i o n  o f 
in te r n a t io n a l  double ta x a t io n .  The th i r d  p ro posa l p ro v id es  the  
p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n  w ith  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  to o p t f o r  th e  system  o f  
c o n so lid a te d  p r o f i t s .  The essence  o f  th i s  system i s  th a t  the  p a r­
e n t c o rp o ra tio n  i s  e n t i t l e d  to  in c lu d e  in  i t s  p r o f i t s  and lo s ­
ses  those  o f i t s  s u b s id ia ry  in  p ro p o r tio n  to th e  c a p i t a l  h e ld  
by i t .  I t  i s  taken  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  th a t  s u b s id ia ry ’ s p r o f i t s  
have a lre a d y  been taxed  a t  th e  s u b s id ia ry  le v e l .
C oncluding, th e  above d e sc rib e d  d i r e c t iv e s  in ten d ed  to  remove 
ta x a t io n  b a r r ie r s  to  th e  c re a t io n  o f  b u s in ess  on a Community 
le v e l .  The main c r i t i c i s m  a g a in s t  th e se  co n ce n tra te d  on the 
f a c t  th a t  we’ re  n o t broad enough to  enab le  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f 
o th e r  a sp e c ts  o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n .  N e ith e r o f  th e se  d i r e c t ­
iv e s  has been approved by the  C ouncil o f M in is te rs  y e t .  How­
e v e r , i t  i s  expected  th a t  the  c o u n c il w i l l  adopt the  m erger p rop­
o sa l in  the  c u rre n t y e a r  (1980) ( I n t e r t a x ,  I9 6 0 ). As f a r  as 
the  p a re n t- s u b s id ia ry  p ro p o sa l i s  concerned i t  has been in c lu d ed  
in  the  l a s t  p ro p o sa l co n cern ing  th e  harm onization  o f  system s o f 
company ta x a tio n s  and o f  w ith h o ld in g  tax es  on d iv id en d s .
5 . 4 .4  nARMONlZATION OF SYSTEMS OF COMPANY TAXATION
5 .4 .4 ,1  THE NEUMARK REPORT
In  A p ril I 96O, th e  E .E .C . Commission s e t  up a f i s c a l  and
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f in a n c ia l  committee* The ta&k o f th e  committee was tw ofo ld .
F i r s t ,  the  d isco v e ry  o f  th o se  d if f e r e n c e s  in  the n a t io n a l  tax  
system s o f th e  member s t a t e s  which c re a te  economic c o n d itio n s  
in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  p ro p e r fu n c tio n in g  o f  th e  common m arket. 
Second, to  propose s o lu t io n s  f o r  e l im in a tin g  th ese  d i f f é r e n c ie s  
which would be in  l in e  w ith  th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  t r e a ty  o f  Rome.
The working groups IV and V o f  th e  committee were con­
cerned  w ith  d i r e c t  ta x e s . Three su g g es tio n s  were made re g a rd ­
in g  th i s  k ind  o f ta x e s . F i r s t ,  a l l  member s t a t e s  should  have 
a s im ila r  co rp o ra te  income ta x  s t r u c tu r e .  As such the  committee 
suggested  the  tw o -ra te  system . Second, the  ta x  r a t e s  should  be 
equal w ith in  th e  member s t a t e s .  As f a r  as the  ta x  r a t e  on un­
d is t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  i s  concerned , a b a s ic  r a t e  o f 50 p e r  c en t 
was su g g es ted , This r a t e  should  n o t be too d i f f e r e n t  from th e  
maximum r a te  o f  p e rso n a l ta x  as a  means o f  p re v e n tin g  b u s in e ss  
f o r  which th e  le g a l  form o f a l im ite d  l i a b i l i t y  company would 
be th e  most a p p ro p r ia te  choosing  a n o th e r form s o le ly  fo r  tax  
re a so n s . F in a lly , the  com m ittee su g g ested  a uniform  w ith h o ld ­
in g  tax  on in d iv id u a l sh a reh o ld e rs  w ith  the  range o f 15 and 
25 p e r  c e n t. The a t t e n t io n  o f  th e  committee was c o n ce n tra te d  
on dom estic im p lic a tio n s  o f  the  p ro p o sa l whereas in te rn a t io n a l . im ­
p l ic a t io n s  appear to  have been g iven  l i t t l e  a t te n t io n .
5 ..4..4 ..2 THE VAN DEN TEMPEL REPORT
Some y ea rs  l a t e r  th e  E.E.C Commission p u b lish ed  th e  
van den Temple re p o r t  in  1979. To the c o n tra ry  to  the  Neumark 
r e p o r t  th i s  re p o r t  fo cu ses  on in te r n a t io n a l  im p lic a tio n s  o f  the 
a l t e r n a t iv e  system s o f company ta x a t io n .  I t  p ro v id es  "a  sugges­
t iv e  and p io n e e r in g  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  a sp e c ts  o f 
a l t e r n a t iv e  system s". The main o b je c t iv e  o f  the r e p o r t  i s  the  
achievem ent o f "equa l f i s c a l  tre a tm e n t" , between dom estic and f o r ­
eign  in v e s to r s .  The t e s t  o f  equal f i s c a l  tre a tm en t im p lie s  two 
a s p e c ts .  F i r s t ,  c a p i ta l - e x p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y ,  th a t  i s ,  the  tax  
system  should  be n e u tr a l  in  r e s p e c t  o f the  investm ent by r e s id ­
en ts  in  t h e i r  co un try  o r  ab road . Second, in te rn a t io n  e q u ity , 
th a t  i s ,  the  ta x  system  does n o t d is c r im in a te  between r e s id e n t  
and n o n -re s id e n t in v e s to r s .  D esp ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  the t e s t  o f 
equal f i s c a l  tre a tm en t in v o lves two a sp e c ts  van den Tempel p u ts
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e^mphasis on ly  in  the  second, nam ely, in te rc o u n try  e q u i ty ,  by 
a rg u in g  fo r  example, th a t  th e  in te g r a te d  system s by p ro v id in g  
th e  d iv id en d  r e l i e f  d i s t o r t  the  e q u a l i ty  o f  tre a tm e n t between 
r e s id e n t  and n o n -re s id e n t in v e s to r s .  He concludes t h a t  th e  
c l a s s i c a l  system  i s  p re fe ra b le  s in c e  th e  l a t t e r  has two im port­
a n t p r o p e r t ie s .  F i r s t , t h e  achievem ent o f in te rc o u n try  e q u ity  
r e q u ire s  le s s  a c t io n s  to  be ach ieved  under the  c l a s s i c a l  sy s ­
tem th an  the o ther*  Second th e  c l a s s i c a l  system  i s  sim ple from 
b o th  dom estic and in te r n a t io n a l  p o in ts  o f  view . The r e p o r t  has 
been c r i t i c i z e d ,  a t  l e a s t ,  on two g rounds. The la rg e  d if fe re n c e  
between the c o rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e  and th e  maximum p e rso n a l tax  r a t e  
as suggested  by van den Tenpel c r e a te s  a  d is c r im in a tio n  a g a in s t  
in c o rp o ra te d  b u s in e s s , a t  l e a s t ,  as f a r  as r e ta in e d  ea rn in g s  a re  
concerned , Second, as we have seen  in  C hapter two th e  c l a s s i c a l  
system  i s  blamed th a t  p re v e n ts  the  w idening of the s to c k  m arket.
5.4.4* 3. THE LAST PROPOSAL; THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM
In  J u ly  1975 th e  Commission o f the European Communities pub­
l is h e d  a p ro p o sa l f o r  a  d i r e c t iv e  o f th e  Council o f  M in is te rs  on 
th e  harm o n isa tio n  o f the system s o f c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n .  IheC om - 
m issio n  suggested  an im p u ta tio n  system  vdiich in  essence  i s  sim­
i l a r  to  th e  im p u ta tio n  system s c u r r e n t ly  employed by most mem­
b e r s t a t e s  o f the  communiiy bu t i t  d i f f e r s  from them on v a rio u s  
te c h n ic a l  a sp e c ts . The purpose o f t h i s  d i r e c t iv e  was tw ofo ld . 
F i r s t ,  to  p ro v id e  a s ta n d a r iz e d  system  as a guide to  th e  member 
s t a t e s  to  t h e i r  im p u ta tio n  system s to  th a t  and second, to  induce 
th e  o th e r  member s t a t e s  which employ o th e r  than im p u ta tio n  system s 
to  in tro d u ce  the  im p u ta tio n  system  as a s te p  towards company tax  
ha rm o n izatio n , we proceed  to  d e sc r ib e  and an alyze  the p ro v is io n s  
o f  th e  p ro p o sa l and f i n a l l y  to  compare th e se  w ith  c u r re n t  l e g l i s -  
l a t i o n  and p r a c t ic e  in  member c o u n tr ie s .
5 .4 ,4 .4 .  ARTICLE 1; A CALL FOR A C0iyD!40N IMPUTATION SYSTEM
A rtic le  1 c a l l s  fo r  a common im p u ta tio n  system . 'The com­
m ission  in  i t s  e x p lan a to ry  memorandum s t a t e s  th a t  two system s
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m erit c o n s id e ra t io n , th e  c l a s s i c a l  and th e  im p u ta tio n  system .
I t  f i n a l l y  chose the  l a t t e r  in  s p i te  o f  i t s  aw areness o f  the  
te c h n ic a l  problems which th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  such a system  g iv es  r i s e  
to  in  in te r n a t io n a l  t r a n s a c t io n s .  The cho ice  o f  th e  Commission 
may be ex p la in ed  by two reasons* F i r s t ,  th e  Commission favou rs  
the  im p u ta tion  system  m ainly  f o r  dom estic reaso n s and second, 
th e  te c h n ic a l  co m p lica tio n s  in  in te r n a t io n a l  r e la t io n s  which th i s  
system  in v o lv es  a re  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  so lved  by th e  p ro p o sa l. The 
Commission s t a t e s  f iv e  reaso n s  j u s t i f y in g  why come ou t in  fa v ­
our o f th i s  system :
1. n e u t r a l i t y  w ith  re g a rd  to  v a r io u s  forms o f  
company f in a n c in g ,
2 , n e u t r a l i t y  w ith  re g a rd  to  v a r io u s  le g a l  forms
o f  u n d e rta k in g .
5, f a i r n e s s  o f  ta x a t io n ,
4 , ta x  avoidance by perso n s w ith  la rg e  ta x  l i a ­
b i l i t i e s .
5* Development o f  th e  sh are  m arke t.
We do not c o n s id e r  i t  n e ce ssa ry  to  develops th e se  argum ents 
s in ce  we have more o r l e s s  d isc u sse d  them in  C hapter two. How­
e v e r , the  main reaso n s fo r  th e  p re fe re n c e  o f the Commission fo r  
the im p u ta tio n  system  i s  n e u t r a l i t y  concern ing  the  methods o f 
f in a n c in g  and the  le g a l  forms o f  u n d e rta k in g  b u s in ess  and e q u ity  
in  ta x a t io n  ach ieved  by a l l e v i a t i n g  economic double ta x a t io n ,  
by ta x in g  under th e  p ro g re s s iv e  p e rso n a l ta x  r a t e  a l a r g e r  amount 
o f c o rp o ra te  income and by red u c in g  ta x  avo idance.
Table 5*1 shows in  a summary way the  main c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  o f 
o f the  tax  system s employed by th e  E.E.G c o u n tr ie s .  Seven o f  th e  
n in e  member s t a t e s  have a lre a d y  in tro d u ced  as t h e i r  n a t io n a l  com­
pany ta x  system  th e  im p u ta tio n . Only th e  N etherlands and Luxem­
bourg have the c l a s s i c a l  system  , Budgetary reasons and the  ex­
pectancy  o f  a fu tu re  E .E .C . s o lu tio n  to  the  ta x  harm onization  
problem have induced th e se  c o u n tr ie s  to  postpone any reform  in  
t h e i r  co rp o ra te  ta x  system s u n t i l  the  E.E.C has found a uniform  
s o lu t io n .  The N e th e rlan d s , in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s t a r te d  d is c u s s in g
- 2 0 5 -
th a t  reform  tw enty y e a rs  ago, idien th e  government proposed to  
in tro d u ce  a s p l i t  r a t e  system .
I t  i s  worth m ention ing  th a t  the  German co rp o ra te  ta x  system  
in tro d u ced  in  Jan u a ry , 1977» i s  n o t a  "pure" im p u ta tio n  system  
b u t i t  combined a s p l i t - r a t e  s t r u c tu r e  w ith  a f u l l  c r e d i t  on 
d i s t r ib u t io n  fo r  c o rp o ra te  tax  p a id  (European T ax a tio n , 1976b 
1976c ) . However, th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  th a t  system  by Germany has 
been c h a ra c te r iz e d  as an a c t io n  n o t in  l in e  w ith  the  c a l l  o f  a r ­
t i c l e  1 o f  th e  p ro p o sa l f o r  an im p u ta tio n  system ,
TABLE 5 .1  
TAX SYSTEMS AND RATES IN 
THE E.E .C .
COUNTRY SYSTEM RATE (S)
Belgium Im pu ta tion 48^
Denmark Im pu ta tion 57
France Im pu ta tion 50
Germany S p l i t - r a t e  
Im p u ta tio n .
56 on re ta in e d  
p ro f ,  56 on 
d is  t r i b u t ed.
I r e la n d Im pu tation 45^
I t a l y Im pu ta tion 56 . 25^
Luxembourg C la s s ic a l 40^ ^
N etherlands C la s s ic a l
U.K. Im pu ta tion 52
N otes:
1. I t  a p p lie s  on income which i s  h ig h e r than  15,000 B fr,
2 . I f  p r o f i t s  a re  l e s s  than  £35,000 th e  r a te  v a r ie s  between
-  4 % .
5 . Local income ta x  p lu s  CIT o f rem ain ing  85^ o f income.
4* I f  p r o f i t s  a re  le s s  than  L f r . 1 , 512,000  the  r a t e  v a r ie s  b e t ­
ween 20^ -  40?(i.
5 . Up to  40,00: D fl th e  r a t e  i s  equal to  4 ^  from 40,001 to  
50,000  i s  60^.
6. I f  income i s  l e s s  than  £50,000 low er r a te s  ap p ly .
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5 .4 .4 .5  ARTICLE 5; A SINGLE RATE QF CORPORATE INCOME TAX
A r tic le  3 p roceeds to  determ ine the  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  o f th e  
im p u ta tio n  system . I t  re q u ire s  t h a t  each member s t a t e  should  
ap p ly  a  s in g le  r a t e  o f  CIT, c a l le d  normal r a t e ,  to  p r o f i t s  
i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  w hether th ey  a re  d is t r ib u te d  o r n o t. This 
normal r a t e  should  n o t be low er than  45 per cen t o r h ig h e r than  
55 p e r  c e n t. The member s t a t e s  a re  p rov ided  w ith  the  p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f ap p ly in g  a d i f f e r e n t  r a t e  than th e  normal f o r  a  l im ite d  p e rio d  
in  p a r t i c u la r  cases  and f o r  w e ll d e fin ed  reaso n s of economic, 
re g io n a l o r s o c ia l  p o lic y .
The p ro p o sa l, however, does n o t r e q u ire  s p e c i f ic  ta x  r a te  
b u t in s te a d , p ro v id es  a range w ith in  which the  normal ta x  r a t e  
should  l i e .  The range i s  co n sid e red  as very  wide. Three 
reaso n s may e x p la in  why th i s  range i s  so wide. F i r s t ,  i t  i t  con­
s i s t e n t  w ith  the  s p i r i t  o f  ta x  harm onization  whose purpose i s  
n o t to  c re a te  id e n t ic a l  system s b u t to  b r in g  them in  harmony.
Second, we have ex p la in ed  th e  c lo se  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e ' CIT 
and the p e rso n a l income ta x , A s t r i c t  approach concern ing  th e  range 
o f  the  CIT r a te  would in vo lve  some n e c e ssa ry  changes f o r  the  perso n ­
a l  income ta x , but th i s  would be c o n tra ry  to  the  am bition  o f  the 
community to  leav e  p e rso n a l income ta x a t io n  to  the d is c r e t io n  o f  
the  member s ta t e s  as we saw e a r l i e r .  F in a lly , we should  tak e  in ­
to  account th a t  th is  i s  the  f i r s t  a c tu a l  s te p  towards tax  r a te  
h a rm on ization . T h ere fo re , as smooth as p o s s ib le  th i s  p ro cess  i s  
so g re a te r  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  a ch iev in g  i t s  g o a l.
The e s tab lish m en t o f  a s in g le  norm al r a te  p ro h ib i ts  a  p rog­
r e s s iv e  CIT r a te  s t r u c tu r e ,  as some E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  c u r re n t ly  
ap p ly . Looking a t  th e  ta b le  5»! th re e  comments can be made as f a r  
as th e  tax  r a te  i s  concerned. F i r s t ,  a l l  the E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s ,  ex­
cep t Germany, have one s in g le  tax  r a t e  which a p p lie s  to  both d is ­
t r ib u te d  and u n d is tr ib u te d  p r o f i t s .  T h e re fo re , a l l  the  c o u n tr ie s  
excep t Germany a re  in  l in e  w ith  th i s  a r t i c l e ,  Germany employs two 
tax  r a t e s ,  a h ig h e r , 56 p e r  c e n t ,  to  u n d is tr ib u te d  p r o f i t s  and a 
low er, 36 p e r  c e n t ,  to  d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s .  Second, Belgium, F rance, 
I r e la n d '; ,  and th e  U.K. have in tro d u ced  tax  r a te s  which a re  w ith in  the 
range d e fin ed  by a r t i c l e  3. To the  c o n tra ry , Denmark and I t a l y  use 
r a te s  f a r  lower than  the su g g ested  ran g e . The D anish
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Tax r a te  i s  57 p e r  c e n t  w hereas the  I t a l i a n  i s  on ly  25 p e r c en t which- 
becomes 56,25 i f  we take in to  account th e  15 p e r  c e n t lo c a l  ta x  r a te  
imposed on c o rp o ra te  income. One e x p lan a tio n  f o r  th e se  low ta x  r a te s  
in  b o th  c o u n tr ie s  may be th e  r e c e n t  sw itch  o f them from a c l a s s i c a l  sy s ­
tem to  the im p u ta tio n  system . The German tax  r a te  to  u n d is t r ib u te d  
p r o f i t s  i s  j u s t  over the  p e rm is s ib le  ra n g e , nam ely, 56 p e r  cent*  F in ­
a l l y ,  excep t Denmark, Germany and I t a l y  a l l  the o th e r  member s t a t e s  
u se  low er ta x  r a t e s  th an  th o se  appear in  the  ta b le  i f  th e  tax ab le  in ­
come i s  low er than  a c e r ta in  amount, 'l*wo reasons may j u s t i f y  the  in ­
tro d u c tio n  a p ro g re s s iv e  CIT r a t e .  F i r s t ,  a p ro g re s s iv e  ta x  r a te  i s  
used as a  means o f  a ch ie v in g  v e r t i c a l  e q u i ty , bu t as we have argued 
elsew here the  a b i l i t y  to  pay approach cannot be a p p lie d  fo r  the CIT as 
i t  i s  a p p lie d  fo r  the  p e rso n a l income ta x . 'This is  so because th e  c o r­
p o ra tio n  has no a b i l i t y  to  pay in  the  same sense as in d iv id u a ls  do and 
the  f i n a l  tax p ay er i s  the  sh a re h o ld e r . In  a d d itio n  to  th a t  i t  cannot be 
argued t h a t  p ro g re s s iv e  ta x a t io n  o f firm s i s  a means to  p ro g re s s iv e  
ta x a t io n  o f sh a reh o ld e rs  (R.Musgrave and P .Musg rav e , 1975). This i s  
so because th e re  i s  no always p o s i t iv e  r e la t io n s h ip  between the s iz e  
o f the c o rp o ra tio n  and the  n e t  income o f  ow ners, Second, an a l t e r ­
n a tiv e  e x p lan a tio n  fo r  the  e x is t in g  p ro g re s s iv e  r a t e s ,  and th i s  seems 
to  be the  case in  the E.E.C* c o u n tr ie s ,  i s  the d e s ir e  to  sup p o rt sm all 
and new f irm s . This i s  p a r t i c u l a r ly  th e  case w ith F rance , where th e  
ta x  r a t e  becomes zero  fo r  th e  one th i r d  o f p r o f i t s  o f  newly c re a te d  
and in d u s t r i a l  companies d u rin g  the  f i r s t  f iv e  y ears  o f t h e i r  o p er­
a t io n ,
5 .4 .4*6  ARTICLES4-15: THE CREDIT PROVISIONS
In  d e sc r ib in g  the  im p u ta tio n  system  in  C hapter two we emphasized th a t  
the  co re  o f th is  system  i s  th e  c r e d i t  p ro v is io n  e i th e r  from the  dom estic 
o r  ftcm th ed n tem atio n a l p o in t of view . 'This i s  the reason  why the  commis­
s io n  devoted the g r e a te r  p a r t  o f the  d i r e c t iv e  on th a t  s u b je c t ,  nam ely, 
a r t i c l e s  4-15  d ea l w ith  the  c r e d i t  p ro v is io n s  whereas a r t i c l e s  18 and 
19 a re  shared  by th e  c r e d i t  and w ith h o ld in g  tax  p ro v is io n s .
article 8; THE SIZE OF THE CREDIT
A rtic le  8 re q u ire s  each member s t a t e  to  f i x  a s in g le  r a te  o f tax  
c r e d i t ,  'ih is  r a te  should  be n e i th e r  le s s  than  45 p e r c en t n o r h ig h e r  
than  55 p e r cen t o f the amount o f GIT a t  the normal r a t e  on a sum re p ­
r e s e n tin g  the  d i s t r ib u te d  d iv id en d  in c re a se d  by such ta x . There i s  no
-209-
ex p lan a tio n  in  th e  ex p lan a to ry  memorandum why th e  c r e d i t  i s  p a r t i a l  
and n o t f u l l .  In  c h a p te r  two we d iscu ssed  some rea so n s  which may 
e x p la in  th e  p re fe re n c e  o f  a  p a r t i a l  th an  a  f u l l  c r e d i t .  Four y ea rs  
a f t e r  th e  d i r e c t iv e ,  in  1979» H .Burke, comm issioner fo r  ta x a t io n ,  
E .E .C , Commission, ex p la in ed  why th e  commission d id n ’ t  go r ig h t  over 
to  f u l l  im p u ta tio n  (R. Burke, 1979). A f u l l  im p u ta tio n  system  would 
in v o lv e  s u b s ta n t ia l  budgetary  lo s se s  in  th ree  c a se s , th a t  i s ,  co u n t­
r i e s  th a t  a t  p re s e n t have th e  c l a s s i c a l  system  o r th ey  have a m ild  
degree o f  im p u ta tio n  o r f i n a l l y  f o r  c o u n tr ie s  which a re  n o t e x p o rte rs  
o f  d iv idends because th e  d iv id en d  c r e d i t  would reduce a g re a t  d e a l 
the GIT, I t  i s  argued th a t  to  th e  c o n tra ry  to  th e  tax  r a t e  the  in ­
tro d u c tio n  o f  a range f o r  th e  c r e d i t  r a th e r  than  a s in g le  r a t e  may 
reduce d if fe re n c e s  in  the  e f f e c t iv e  burden on d iv idends a lthough  
i t  never w il l  in c re a se  such d if f e r e n c e s  (European ta x a t io n ,  1976).
Looking a t  the  ta b le  5»2 we see t h a t  on ly  France l i e  w ith in  th e  
suggested  r a t e  by the  p ro p o sa l. Belgium on ly  l i e s  above th i s  range 
where th e  r e s t  o f the c o u n tr ie s  have in tro d u ced  a  low er ta x  c r e d i t .  
The Banish tax  c r e d i t  i s  f a r  below t h i s  ran g e . This may be ex­
p la in e d  by the f a c t  th a t  th e  c o rp o ra te  tax  r a te  i t s e l f  i s  low, 
however, a g r e a te r  tax  c r e d i t  would reduce the c o rp o ra te  ta x  b u r­
den to  a  very  low r a t e .  The German l e g i s l a t i o n  a llow s a  f u l l  c r e d i t  
a t  th e  sh a reh o ld e r le v e l  fo r  income tax es  p a id  by the  c o rp o ra tio n . 
This i s  the  most rem arkable f e a tu re  o f  th e  new German system .
The I t a l i a n  im p u ta tio n  system  a lso  p ro v id es  a f u l l  d iv idend  c r e d i t  
bîtt on ly  fo r  the c o rp o ra te  income ta x  p a id  by th e  d i s t r ib u t in g  
company (European T axation  1978). No c r e d i t  i s  p rov ided  fo r  the  
lo c a l  income ta x  le v ie d  on c o rp o ra te  income.
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TABLE 5>2 






Belgium 57 0 5^ No No
Denmark 15 No No
France 50 Under a t r e a ty  
p ro v is io n .
Yes
Germany 56 . 25^ P a r t i a l Yes
I re la n d 42.85 Under a  t r e a ty  
p ro v is io n .
No
I t a l y 55.5 No No
Luxembourg - — -
N etherlands - - -
U.K. 42.85 Under a t r e a ty  
p ro v is io n .
Yes
NOTE:
1: P e r  cen t o f  n e t d iv id en d ,
2: 36^  o f the g ross d iv id en d .
SOURCEI Compiled by the au th o r w ith  d a ta  c o l le c te d  from I n te r n a t io n a l  
Bureau o f F is c a l  D ocum entation, Guides to  European T axation , V o l.1 , 11
1 Ï Ï .
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4*4.8  ARTICLE 9: A COMPENSATORY TAX
A r tic le  9 p ro v id es  th e  member s t a t e s  w ith two a l t e r n a t iv e  means 
o f  av o id in g  a d iv idend  ta x  c r e d i t  be in g  g iven  when no c o rp o ra te  ta x  
has in  f a c t  y e t  been charged* However, i f  a c o rp o ra tio n  d i s t r ib u te s  d i ­
v idends d e riv ed  from p r o d i t s  in  r e s p e c t  on which i t  has n o t y e t borne 
GIT o r i f  th ey  have but which have been p laced  to  re s e rv e  f a r  more than  
f iv e  y e a rs , the  member s t a t e s  may u se  our f a m il ia r  te ch n iq u es , nam ely, 
th e  précompté o r  th e  ACT, to  l im i t  the  b e n e f i t  o-f c r e d i t  to  th e se  p ro ­
f i t s .
From ta b le  5*2 we see th a t  on ly  F ran ce , the U.K. and Germany f o l ­
low th i s  p o lic y .
Germany le v ie s  a  ta x  r a t e  equal to  $6 p e r c en t i f  a  d i s t r ib u t io n
ta k es  p lace  out o f  p r o f i t s  which have n o t borne ta x es  o r  i f  th ey  have
been taxed  a t  a low er ta x  r a t e .  On the o th e r  hand, Belgium, I r e la n d , 
and I t a l y  do not p ro v id e  fo r  a com pensatory tax  on d iv idend  d i s t r ib u te d  
by tax-exem pt c o rp o ra tio n s . The purpose o f t h i s  p ro v is io n  i s  to  s tim ­
u la te  investm ent in  c o rp o ra te  s h a re s .
U n fo rtu n a te ly , th e  l im i t a t io n  o f  the b e n e f it  from the  ta x  c r e d i t
to  those  vdio re c e iv e  d iv id en d s from tax ed  p ro f i ts  on ly  i s  ach ieved  a t
the expense o f  the  fo llo w in g  two drawbacks (European T ax a tio n , 1976). 
The f i r s t ,  the r e a l  drawback, i s  concerned w ith  the  fo re ig n  s h a re -  ' 
h o ld e rs  who a re  no t e n t i t l e d  to  th e  ta x  c r e d i t .  The a p p l ic a t io n  o f 
th e  com pensatory ta x  r e s u l t s  in  an amount o f d iv idends le s s  than  in  th e  
absence o f the  com pensatory ta x . T h e re fo re , in  th a t  r e s p e c t  the  com­
p en sa to ry  ta x  c o n s t i tu te s  an a d d i t io n a l  ta x . The second, th e  psycho­
lo g ic a l  drawback, i s  concerned the  r e s id e n t  sh a re h o ld e rs , who a re  en­
t i t l e d  to the  c r e d i t .  I f  th e  c o rp o ra tio n  decides to  d i s t r i b u t e  an a -  
mount o f  p r o f i t s  equal to A and the  co rrespond ing  com pensatory ta x  i s  
equal to  B, th e  c o rp o ra tio n  f i n a l l y  d i s t r ib u te s  to sh a reh o ld e rs  a n e t 
amount equal to  (A -B), under the  assum ption  th a t  B i s  no t p a id  ou t o f  
r e ta in e d  p r o f i t s ,  bu t s in c e  the  sh a re h o ld e r re c e iv e s  n o t on ly  (A-B) but 
th a t  p lu s  the  c r e d i t  which equal to  B he r e a l ly  re c e iv e s  an amount o f 
d iv idend  equal to  A (A-B+BmA). Some sh areh o ld e rs  may th in k  th a t  the 
t o t a l  amount o f  d iv idends re c e iv e d  i s  (A-B) and n o t A, however, the 
c o rp o ra tio n , fo r  c a p i t a l  m arket re a so n s , d i s t r ib u te s  a n e t  amount o f 
d iv idend  equal to  A a t  th e  expense o f  i t s  r e ta in e d  p r o f i t s .
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The p ro p o sa l su g g ests  a  s o lu t io n  to  t h a t  problem  by e s ta b l is h in g  
s p e c ia l  d iv idend  d e r iv a t io n s  ru le s  in  a r t i c l e  15. These ru le s  do n o t 
le a d  to  f u l l  e l im in a tio n  o f  th e  above d e sc rib e d  consequences bu t they  
t r y  to  co n fin e  th e se  in  a r e l a t i v e l y  sm all number o f  c a s e s . In  Addi­
t io n  to a r t i c l e  15 an a l t e r n a t iv e  s o lu t io n  i s  concerned w ith  the  pay­
ment o f  d iv idend  no t in  cash  bu t in  th e  form o f  bonus sh a res  s in c e  the
l a t t e r  a re  excluded from th e  d e f in i t io n  o f the  term  d iv idend  ( a r t i c l e  
2 ) ,  S ince bonus sh ares  do n o t c a r ry  w ith  them a tax  c r e d i t  th e re  i s  
no need f o r  a  com pensatory ta x .  However, the  absence o f  a p u b lic  mar­
k e t  fo r  co rp o ra te  share  f o r  à c o rp o ra tio n  i s  an o b s ta c le  to  t h i s  s o lu ­
t io n ,
5 ,4 ,4 ,9  ARTICLE 4: THE HEART OF THE PROPOSAL
A rtic le  4 may be co n sid e red  as th e  most c r u c ia l  in  th a t  d i r e c t iv e .
I t  p u ts  the c o rn e rs to n e  f o r  a  harm on ization  p ro cess  by e l im in a tin g  any 
ta x  b a r r i e r  to  th e  f r e e  movement o f c a p i t a l  w ith in  the E ,E ,C . The 
c r e d i t  should be a v a i la b le  to  a l l  r e s id e n ts  o f  member s t a t e s .  This 
c r e d i t  i s  g ra n te d  under th e  c o n d itio n s  th a t  the r e s id e n t  person  i s  
s u b je c t to  income o r  p r o f i t s  ta x  on th e  f u l l  amount o f  th e  d iv idend  
p lu s  the CIT in  h is  own ta x  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
A co un try  w ith  an im p u ta tio n  system  faces  the problem  o f  in te g ­
r a t in g  th e  dom estic p e rso n a l ta x  w ith  the  fo re ig n  c o rp o ra te  ta x . The 
d i r e c t iv e  by re q u ir in g  the  e x te n s io n  o f the  c r e d i t  f a c i l i t a t e s  the in ­
te g ra t io n  o f  th ese  two ta x e s . However, th e  ta x a t io n  o f  c o rp o ra te  in ­
come up to  a l a r g e r  e x te n t now i s  based on th e  re s id e n c e  p r in c ip le  th an  
to  th e  o r ig in  one. This a llow s th e  co u n try  o f  r e s id e n t  to  use th i s  
k in d  o f ta x a t io n  as a r e d i s t r i b u t e  ta x .
The ex ten s io n  o f  the c r e d i t  may be done in  two ways. E i th e r  the 
o r ig in  coun try  pays th e  c r e d i t  to  th e  r e s id e n t  co u n try  and the  l a t t e r  
a llow s r e s id e n t  sh a reh o ld e rs  to  c r e d i t  the  fo re ig n  ta x  c r e d i t  a g a in s t  
t h e i r  income ta x  l i a b i l i t y ,  o r  the  o r ig in  coun try  makes a  cash  payment
I
to  th e  sh a re h o ld e r’s which re p re se n t th e  amount o f  th e  sh a reh o ld e rs  ta x  
c r e d i t .  The f i r s t  way, which i s  fo llow ed  on ly  by th e  French-German t r e a ­
ty ,  seems to  be p re fe ra b le  th an  th e  second s in ce  i t  f a c i l i t a t e s  the 
f i g h t  a g a in s t  in te r n a t io n a l  ta x  avoidance and ev as io n .
From ta b le  5.2 we see th a t  Belgium, Denmark and I t a l y  co n fine  the  
p ro v is io n  o f  tax  c r e d i t  o n ly  to  r e s id e n t  sh a reh o ld e rs  whereas F rance , 
I r e la n d  and the  U.K. ex tend  th e  c r e d i t  bu t on ly  under a t r e a ty  p ro v is ­
io n . The German tax  system  p ro v id es  the  fo re ig n  sh a reh o ld e rs  w ith a
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"half-w ay" ta x  c r e d i t .  This i s  so because th e  t o t a l  e lim in a tio n  o f  
economic double ta x a t io n  ta k e s  p la ce  in  two s ta g e s . At th e  f i r s t  s tag e  
th e  e f f e c t iv e  burden o f  German CIT, which amounts to  56 p e r  cen t o f  
ta x ab le  p r o f i t s ,  i s  reduced  a t  d i s t r ib u t io n  to  56 p e r  cen t o f  th e  d i s ­
t r ib u te d  amount b e fo re  ta x .  Both re s id e n t  and n o n -re s id e n t sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  en joy  th i s  re d u c tio n  s in c e  i t  tak es  p la ce  a t  the  c o rp o ra te  
l e v e l .  At th e  second s ta g e  th e  r e s id e n t  sh a reh o ld e r on ly  en joys as 
c r e d i t  the  CIT imposed on d i s t r ib u t io n  a g a in s t  i t s  f i n a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y .  
Therefb.re, fo re ig n  sh a reh o ld e rs  do hot p a r t i c ip a te  a t  the  second s ta g e  o f  ■- 
th e  e lim in a tio n  o f th e  economic double ta x a t io n .
Two p o in ts  may be r a is e d  re g a rd in g  th is  a r t i c l e .  F i r s t ,  th e re  i s  
no m ention i f  dom estic sh a re h o ld e rs  who in v e s t  abroad a re  e n t i t l e d  to  
the  ta x  c r e d i t .  As f a r  as dom estic sh a reh o ld e rs  who re c e iv e  d iv idend  
from c o rp o ra tio n s  e s ta b l is h e d  in  an o th e r member s t a t e  a r t i c l e  21 im­
p l i c i t l y  asks f o r  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  c f e d i t  under th e  c a l l  f o r  the same 
tre a tm e n t between dom estic in d iv id u a ls  who in v e s t  in  r e s id e n t  co rp o r­
a t io n  o r  ab road . However, th e  q u e s tio n  rem ains re g a rd in g  dom estic sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  who in v e s t  in  t h i r d  c o u n tr ie s .  W ithin the  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  on ly  
Belgium g ra n ts  a c r e d i t  to  th e se  s h a re h o ld e rs , and th i s  i s  low er than  
th a t  p rov ided  fo r  B e lg ian -so u rce  d iv id e n d s . Second, the  d i r e c t iv e  does 
n o t d ea l w ith  the consequences o f  th e  ex ten s io n  o f  the  ta x  c r e d i t  i f  th e  
CIT i s  s h i f te d  forw ard to  consum er’ s p r ic e s .  As in  the  dom estic  case  the 
tax  c r e d i t  becomes an unw arranted  su b sid y  to  fo re ig n  sh a reh o ld e rs  and 
should  be n o t p ro v id ed ,
5 . 4 . 4 ,1 0  ARTICLE 1 4 -17 :A COMMON WIiRHOLDING TAX
The o th e r  p a r t  o f the p ro p o sa l d e a ls  w ith  the  in tro d u c tio n  o f a 
common system  o f  w ith h o ld in g  tax  on d iv idend  in  th e  member s ta te s *
A r t ic le  I 4 c a l l s  f o r  a  25 p e r  cen t w ith h o ld in g  ta x  on d iv idend  d i s t r i ­
buted  by c o rp o ra tio n s  no m a tte r  who i s  the  r e c ip ie n t  o f  those  d iv id e n d s . 
However, parag raphs 2 and 3 o f  th i s  a r t i c l e  p rov ide  some exem ptions o f 
the  r u le .  F i r s t ,  no w ith h o ld in g  ta x  on d iv idend  d i s t r ib u te d  by a sub­
s id ia r y  to  i t s  p a re n t i f  bo th  a re  r e s id e n ts  o f the same co u n try  and 
second, no w ith h o ld in g  tax  on d iv id en d  d i s t r ib u te d  to  persons who a re  
id e n t i f i e d .  A r t ic le  16 p ro v id es  th a t  ta x  w ithhe ld  under a r t i c l e  I 4 i s  
s e t  o f f  a g a in s t  the  r e c ip ie n t  f i n a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y .  I f  th e  l a t t e r  i s  
le s s  than  the  tax  w ith h e ld  a  re fund  i s  g iv en . U nless such repaym ent
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i s  incom patib le  w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  ta x  n e u t r a l i t y .  A r t ic le  17 goes 
on re q u ir in g  th e  s t a t e  which c o l le c te d  th e  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  to  refund  i t  
to  th e  co u n try  which th e  r e c ip ie n t  o f d iv idend  i s  r e s id e n t .  But th e se  
c o u n tr ie s  have the  p o s s i b i l i t y  to  ag ree  to  share  the c o s t  o f th e  w ith ­
h o ld in g  tax  as long  as th i s  agreem ent does n o t a f f e c t  the  r ig h t s  o f  the  
r e c ip ie n t  o f  d iv id en d .
The purpose o f th e  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  i s  to  combat in te r n a t io n a l  tax  
e v as io n . The community does n o t c o n s id e r  adequate  th e  ta x  c r e d i t  which i s  
e q u iv a le n t to  a  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  because i t  b e lie v e s  th a t  "many sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  have an a p p re c ia b ly  h ig h e r  p e rso n a l ta x  r a t e " .  However, bo th  
the  tax  c r e d i t  and the  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  should  be used  as a means o f  
f ig h t in g  in te r n a t io n a l  ta x  ev as io n . U n fo rtu n a te ly , the  presumed " f a i r ­
ness  o f ta x a tio n "  ach ieved  th rough  th e  im p o sitio n  o f  th e se  tax es  a t  th e  
expense o f  a  c o s t .  The combined e f f e c t  o f  the c r e d i t  and o f  the  w ith ­
h o ld in g  ta x  r e s u l t s  in  a h ig h e r  ta x  burden fo r  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  who 
a re  n o t E ,E ,C , n a t io n a ls .  T his burden i s  between approx im ate ly  58 and 
66 p e r  c e n tl
The community hopes th a t  a d m in is tra t iv e  ways w i l l  be found which 
w i l l  a llo w  th a t  the sh a re h o ld e r  who i s  e n t i t l e d  to the  c r e d i t  o r  r e ­
fund o f  the  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  g e ts  i t  as soon as p o s s ib le .
An a l te r n a t iv e  s o lu t io n  could  be the  ;diole im p o sitio n  o f the  w ith ­
h o ld in g  ta x  to  be pu t on an o p tio n a l b a s is ,  th a t  i s ,  as a member s ta t e  
i s  p rov ided  w ith  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  to  d ec id e  to  impose o r  no t a w ith ­
h o ld in g  tax  on i t s  r e s id e n ts  th e  same p o lic y  to  be in tro d u ced  fo r  a l l  
i d e n t i f i e d  co m m u n ity 're s id en ts . This would re q u ire  a d d i t io n a l  a c tio n s  
by the  in te r e s t e d  c o u n tr ie s ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e se  c o u n tr ie s  have to exchange 
in fo rm atio n  fo r  sh a reh o ld e rs  who ask fo r  an exemption o f  th e  w ith ­
h o ld ing  tax  on th e i r  d iv id en d s . But as we saw, th e  f i r s t  and on ly  
achievem ent in  the a rea  o f  d i r e c t  ta x a t io n  so f a r  i s  the d i r e c t iv e  on 
m utual a s s is ta n c e  p ro v id in g  fo r  in c re a se d  c o io p e ra tio n , in  p a r t i c u la r  
in  the  exchange o f in fo rm a tio n , between the tax  a u th o r i t i e s  o f  the  mem­
b e r  s t a t e s .
An om ission o f th e se  a r t i c l e s  i s  the d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  ta x ab le  base 
on which the w ithho ld ing  ta x  should  be le v ie d . Two a l te r n a t iv e s  can 
be c o n sid e red . The f i r s t ,  d e fin es  the  ta x  base as the amount o f  p r o f i t s  
which i s  d is t r ib u te d  whereas the second, d e fin e s  i t  as th e  d is t r ib u te d  
amount o f p r o f i t s  . .  . . /
214-
p lu s  the  tax  c r e d i t  g ra n te d . In  the l a t t e r  c a se , the  w ith h o ld in g  tax
can be c a lc u la te d  by ap p ly in g  the fo rm ula E « 25 when E i s  such
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ta x  and r  i s  the c r e d i t  r a t e  exp ressed  as a p e rcen tag e  o f  the  d iv id en d .
The second d e f in i t io n  seems to  be more p la u s ib le  s in c e  th e  f i r s t  in ­
vo lv es  a d is c r im in a to ry  trea tm en t between persons who a re  e n t i t l e d  to 
the  c r e d i t  and th o se  who a re  n o t .
The w ith h o ld in g  ta x  p r a c t ic e s  v a ry  to  d i f f e r e n t  e x te n t from the 
p ro v is io n s  o f a r t i c l e  14« From ta b le  5*5 we see t h a t  the most common 
p ra c t ic e  w ith in  th e  community i s  th e  im p o sitio n  o f  a w ith h o ld in g  ta x  
on b o th  r e s id e n t  and n o n -re s id e n t in d iv id u a ls .  F rance , I r e la n d  and th e  
U.K. do not lev y  th i s  kind o f ta x  on t h e i r  r e s id e n ts  s h a re h o ld e rs , 
I r e la n d  and th e  U.K. fo llo w  the same p o lic y  fo r  n o n -re s id e n t sh a re h o l­
d e rs  as w ell as whereas France imposes a w ith h o ld in g  ta x  on fo re ig n  
s h a re h o ld e rs . The r e s t  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  levy  a w ith h o ld in g  ta x  on 
b o th  re s id e n t  and n o n -re s id e n t sh a re h o ld e rs . The main c h a r a c te r i s t i c  
i s  t h a t  the  w ithho ld ing  ta x  r a t e  i s  the  same i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  th e  n a t io n ­
a l i t y  o f  the r e c ip ie n t .  Denmark o n ly , imposes a h ig h e r  than  25 p e r  
cen t r a t e ,  nam ely, 30 p e r  c en t whereas F rance, Germany and th e  
N etherlands a 25 p e r  cen t r a t e ,  Belgium 20 p e r  c e n t ,  and Luxembourg 15 
p e r c e n t. F in a l ly ,  I t a l y  imposes a  30 p e r  cent r a t e  but i t  can be r e ­
duced up to 10 p e r cen t under c e r ta in  c ircu m stan ces ,
TABLE 5.3 
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SOURCE: Compiled by the a u th o r  w ith  d a ta  c o lle c te d  from
in te r n a t io n a l  F is c a l  D ocum entation.
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5 . 4 . 4 . 1 1  EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSAL
The p ro p o sa l has a t t r a c t e d  coniments on both i t s  su g g es tio n s  and 
on what i t  l e f t  o u t. A sià r  as th e  f i r s t  kind o f  comments i s  concer­
ned the c r i t i c i s m  v a r i e s .  Some c o n s id e r  the p ro p o sa l as s e n s ib le ,  
lo g ic a l ,  workable and as a  welcome s ig n  th a t  the commission now r e ­
cogn izes th a t  harm onization  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  mean r ig i d  uniform ­
i t y  ( J.Chown 1976) .  O thers have q u estio n ed  the achievem ent o f  the 
p rim ary  and c o l l a t e r a l  g o a ls  which have been developed in  th e  e x p la n a t­
ory  memorandum o f  the p ro p o sa l by in tro d u c in g  the im pu ta tion  system  
(Kay and King 1978)* The main q u e s tio n  i s  w hether th e  p ro p o sa l i s  
s u f f i c i e n t  to  so lv e  the  ta x  harm onization  problem . The critifsm  on 
th a t  q u es tio n  has been c o n ce n tra te d  on what th e  p ro p o sa l has l e f t  
o u t. For example, i t  i s  a rg u ed , th a t  the  pco'posal does n o t p ro v id e  any 
g u id e lin e s  as f a r  as the d e te rm in a tio n  o f the  tax  base i s  concerned , 
i t  says n o th in g  f o r  the  c o -e x is te n c e  o f  o th e r  ta x  in  p a r a l l e l  w ith  the 
CIT, o r  i t  says n o th in g  f o r  the le s s  a t t r a c t i v e  a re a s  w ith in  the  
community.
To understand  the  lo g ic  o f  the  p ro p o sa l we must look  a t  th e  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  problem ra is e d  by ta x  h a rm on ization . In  P o o l 's  words, a  mem­
b e r  o f th e  s t a f f  o f  th e  Commission o f  the European Committee, the  
p ro p o sa l " is  more concerned w ith  the problemm and needs o f o rd in a ry  
in v e s to rs  than  w ith  those  o f  companies them selves.
I t s  aim is  to  e lim in a te  as f a r  as p o s s ib le  th e  ta x  b a r r ie r s  th a t  a t  p re s ­
en t d isco u rag e  a r e s id e n t  in  one member s t a t e  from in v e s t in g  in  the 
sh a res  o f a company re s id e n t  in  a n o th e r  member s t a t e  and to  c re a te  con­
d i t io n s  which a llow  such c r o s s - f r o n t i e r  investm ent to tak e  p la ce  in  
c ircum stances o f th e  g r e a te s t  p o s s ib le  ta x a tio n  neutralityf(V J?col 197^There-
thspropGsal does no t t r y  a t  once to  so lv e  the  problem  o f ta x  harm oniz­
a t io n  and those  people a re  r ig h t  to  argue th a t  the p ro p o sa l i s  e n t i r e ly  
d ire c te d  a t  ta x a t io n  o f  d i s t r ib u te d  p r o f i t s  (Kay and King, 1978;.
On the  o th e r  hand, we do not sh are  th e i r  view th a t  ta x  harm onization  i s  
an a l l - o r - n o th in g  b u s in e ss , we do not sh are  th a t  view  because i t  neg­
l e c t s  the  budgetary  consequences invo lved  by an a l l - o r - n o th in g  b u sin ­
e ss  and i t  a lso  n e g le c ts  th a t  economic and s o c ia l  p o l ic ie s  a re  d e l i ­
c a te  and r e a l i s t i c  fu tu re  o f  n a t io n a l  ta x  system s. In  a d d itio n  to  
th a t  to  take such an a t t i t u d e  i s  to  su g g est th a t  n o th in g  should  ev er 
be done u n le ss  p e r fe c t io n  can im m ediately be ach ieved  which r e s u l t s  in  
b lo ck in g  a l l  p ro g re s s .
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The t r e a ty  o f  Rome has no t on ly  a s  aim n e u t r a l i t y  in  the flow  of 
c a p i t a l  between member s t a t e s  bu t i t  a lso  aims to  ach ieve  u n d is to r ­
te d  co m p etitiv e  c o n d itio n s  w ith in  th e  Community, T h e re fo re , th e  sec ­
ond s te p  o f b u s in ess  ta x  harm onization  i s  concerned w ith  th e  harm oni­
z a tio n  o f  th e  ta x  b ase . I t  i s  w orth  m entioning  th a t  the harm onization  
o f  ta x  base i s  n o t an a l t e r n a t iv e  way o f  a ch iev in g  ta x  harm onization  b u t 
i t  i s  the  supplem ent to  the harm onization  o f the system s o f  c o rp o ra te  
ta x a t io n ,  Each p a r t  o f th i s  p ro cess  i s  concerned w ith  th e  c o r r e s ­
ponding goal m entioned above. The second s te p  i s  co n sid e red  as a  long­
term  o b je c t iv e  o f  the  js.E.G, This i s  so because th i s  p a r t  o f  co rp o r­
a te  ta x a t io n ,  the  ta x  b a se , as we argued elsew here fo r  th e  p e rso n a l 
income ta x , r e f l e c t s  the n a tio n a l  h is to r y  and n a t io n a l  id io c y n c ra sy  
re g a rd in g  th i s  type o f  ta x a t io n .  The main p o in t i s  to  decide  how, to  
what e x te n t and to  what s ta g e  th i s  long -term  o b je c t iv e  can be ach iev ed . 
To o u r knowledge th e re  i s  no s im ila r  p ro posa l w ith the  harm onization  
o f th e  c o rp o ra te  ta x  system s, fo r  the  harm onizatiqn  o f the ta x  b a se , 
we proceed  to  th e  n ex t s e c tio n  to d is c u s s  th e  e x is t in g  d if fe re n c e s  
re g a rd in g  the  d e f in i t io n  o f ta x  base between the member s t a t e s  and 
second to  exp ress some th o u g h ts  f o r  t h e i r  harm onization*
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5 .5  TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE TAX
HARMONIZATION
5 ,5 .1  . INTRODUCTION
The complex n a tu re  o f th e  c o rp o ra tio n  income ta x  and the  g re a t  
d iv e rg e n c ie s  between the n a tio n s  w ith  re s p e c t to th i s  k ind  o f  ta x a ­
t io n  make th e  ta sk  o f  harm onization  d i f f i c u l t .  But even i f  the  e x i s t ­
in g  co rp o ra te  tax  system s would have th e  same form , the problem  would be 
n o t much le s s  s ev e re , s in c e  d if f e r e n c e s  between tax  r a te s  and ta x  base 
p lu s  o th e r  c o -e x is te n t  ta x es  in  p a r a l l e l  w ith the CIT d i f f e r e n t i a t e  
th e  ta x  burden .
The p ro cess  o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x  harm onization  i s  more c o n tro v e rs ia l  than 
th a t  o f in d i r e c t  ta x e s . I t  can be a lso  d is tin g u is h e d  in  th re e  s ta g e s , 
th a t  i s ,  harm onization  o f  the  form s, the  ta x  base and the  r a t e ,  bu t 
th e  o rd e r  may be d i f f e r e n t .  Assuming th a t  the p ro cess  o f  harm onization  
i s  n o t once and fo r  a l l  b u s in e s s , fo r  th e  reasons m entioned e a r l i e r ,  th e  
q u e s tio n  i s  where should  we s t a r t  from harm onizing th i s  k ind  o f tax a ­
t io n .  From th e  form o r  from th e  ta x  base? The answer seems to  depend 
on the  s ta te d  g o a ls  o f  ha rm o n izatio n . I f  the  goal i s  n e u t r a l i ty  in  th e  
c o n d itio n  o f  co m p etitio n  th e n , a  uniform  ta x  base and a s in g le  ta x  
r a t e  should  c o n s is t  the f i r s t  s ta ^ e  o f h arm on ization . On th e  o th e r  
hand, i f  the g o a l i s  the achievem ent o f f r e e  movement o f c a p i t a l  then  
th e  harm onization  o f the  form o f company ta x a tio n  and d iv idend  should  
be th e  f i r s t  s ta g e .
B efore p roceed ing  to  d isc u ss  the causes o f the d iv e rg e n c ie s  b e t­
ween th e  ta x ab le  b a s is  o f th e  E .E .C , member s t a t e s  and the v a rio u s  
views about tax  r a t e  harm onization  we should r a i s e  a p o in t .  Every 
e f f o r t  fo r  co rp o ra te  ta x  harm onization  should  s t a r t  from the  s e p a ra tio n  
o f  t h i s  tax  from th e  o th e r  ta x e s , namely, the p e rso n a l income ta x ,  the 
w ealth  ta x  e t c .  U n ti l  r e c e n t ly  a number o f c o u n tr ie s  w ith in  the  E.E.C 
had a c o rp o ra te  income ta x  n o t d i s t i n c t  and se p a ra te  from the  p e rso n a l 
income ta x . The c o -e x is te n c e  o f  o th e r  tax es  to g e th e r  w ith  CIT on com­
pany p r o f i t s  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  th e  ta x  burden and reduces the  tra n sp a ren c y  
o f th e  ta x  system . For th i s  a g e n e ra l  ta x  on p r o f i t s  i s  req u ired *
Once th i s  g e n e ra l ta x  has been e s ta b lis h e d  then  le s s  o b s ta c le s  rem ain 
fo r  harm onizing the  tax  b a se . We proceed f i r s t  to d iscu ss  what o th e r  
tax es  a re  le v ie d  upon c o rp o ra te  income and second, to  d is c u s s  th e  main 
f a c to r s  which c re a te  d iv e rg e n c ie s  in  the  ta x  bases between the  E.E.C, 
c o u n tr ie s .
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5 .5 .2  OTHER DIRECT TAXES ON CORPORATE INCOME
S ev era l member s t a t e s  o f  th e  European Community lev y  o th e r  tax es  
in  a d d it io n  to  th e  c o rp o ra te  income ta x  on b u s in ess  e n te r p r i s e s .  These 
tax es  d e sp ite  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th ey  may be deducted from th e  ta x  base fp r  
c o rp o ra tio n  ta x  purposes c o n s t i tu te ' an a d d i t io n a l  burden on c o rp o ra tio n . 
Table 5*4 shows th a t  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e  E.E .C . c o u n tr ie s  do not impose 
any s ig n i f ic a n t  tax  o th e r  than  CIT on b u s in ess  e n te r p r i s e s .  In  the 
exemption o f  th is  r u le  belong F ran ce , Germany, I t a l y  and Luxembourg, 
F rance , imposes a b u s in ess  tax  on a l l  e n te r p r is e s  doing  b u s in e ss  in  
F rance . A s im ila r  b u s in e ss  ta x  i s  imposed by Germany and Luxembourg,
The l a t t e r  two c o u n tr ie s  impose a  n e t  w orth tax  on companies as w e ll .
The im p o sitio n  o f  th e se  ta x e s , f o r  exam ple, in  Germany, r e s u l t s  to 
r a i s e  the  normal r a t e  o f 56 p e r  c e n t.o n  in d is t r ib u te d  tax es  to  59 p e r  
c e n t. F in a l ly ,  I t a l y  imposes a lo c a l  income tax  on companies whose 
range l i e s  between 8 .9  p e r  cen t and 14.2 p e r  c e n t. This tax  i s  le v ie d  
on b e h a lf  o f  s e v e ra l  lo c a l  com m unities. I t .  is  w orth m en tion ing , the 
combined r a te  o f CIT and lo c a l  tax  in  I t a l y  i s  on ly  36.2 p e r  c e n t ,  
much lower than  the  c o rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e  o f  the  o th e r  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s .
However, the  d i r e c t iv e  i s  concerned only w ith  one k ind  o f  ta x  i . e .  
the  co rp o ra te  income tax  and does n o t cover th e  o th e r  tax es  such as 
b u s in ess  o r  lo c a l  ta x e s . One may wonder i f  t h i s  om ission i s  c r u c ia l  











Belgium - - -
Denmark - - - -
France - - le s -
Germany u ,7 ^ - 5% 0.2%
Ire la n d - - - -
I t a l y - 8 , 99^ -14 . 2% - -
Luxembourg - 15- 20% -
N etherlands - - - -
U.K. - - - -
SOURCE: I n te r n a t io n a l  F is c a l  Docum entation.
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upon a b u s in ess  e n te r p r is e  and i f  they  may co n tin u e  to  e x i s t  des­
p i t e  th e  e f f o r t s  o f c o rp o ra te  ta x  system  h arm on ization . Of c o u rse , th e  
d is c re p a n c ie s  a re  n o t so g re a t  to  cause a worry b u t the  in c o rp o ra tio n  
o f  a l l  th ese  tax es  in to  the  CIT would f a c i l i t a t e  the  p ro cess  tow ards 
to  more tra n s p a re n t  ta x  system s.
5 .5 .3  THE TAX BASE
The ta x  base i s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  p r o f i t s  f ig u re s  shown in  co n v en tio n a l 
acco u n ts . There a re  a  number o f im p o rtan t d if f e re n c e s  in  the  c a lc u l ­
a t io n  o f th o se  p r o f i t s  between th e  c o u n tr ie s .  These d if fe re n c e s  have 
an im portan t im pact upon the  e f f e c t iv e  r a t e  o f tax es  on c o rp o ra te  
p ro f i ts *  However, n o t on ly  th e  nom inal r a te s  bu t a lso  th e  ta x  bases 
should  be compared i f  we want to  approxim ate the ta x  burden on p r o f i t s .
A number o f elem ents may cause d is c re p a n c ie s  in  the c a lc u la t io n  o f  the 
ta x  b ase . The most im portan t a re  the  d e f in i t io n  o f  p r o f i t s  p e r  se: ", 
d e p re c ia tio n  a llo w an ces, in te r c o rp o ra te  d iv id en d s , in v en to ry  v a lu a t io n ,  
ta x - f r e e  re s e rv e s , d i r e c to r s ' fe e s  and d e d u c t ib i l i ty  o f  b u s in e ss  ex­
pen ses .
However, no p ro p o sa ls  fo r  harm onizing  such ru le s  have been subm it­
te d  by the  E .E .C , Commission so f a r .  We proceed to  b r i e f ly  d isc u ss  th e  
ru le s  ap p lie d  by each E .E .C . co u n try  on th e se  m a tte rs  w ith  the  purpose 
to  e s tim a te  th e  d is c re p a n c ie s  g en era ted  by th ese  r u le s  and to  suggest 
ways to reduce th e se  d is c re p a n c ie s  which would f a c i l i t a t e  the p ro cess  
o f harm on ization . We s t a r t  w ith  the  d e f in i t io n  o f p r o f i t s ,
5 * 5 .3 .1  THE DEFINITION OF PROFITS
Two d e f in i t io n s  o f  p r o f i t s  a re  employed in  p r a c t ic e .  The f i r s t  
r e l a t e s  p r o f i t s  to  th e  concept o f n e t  w orth whereas the  second con­
f in e s  p r o f i t s  on tra d in g  p r o f i t s  o n ly .
In  a l l  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s ,  th e  n e t  a s s e t  method o f  computing ta x ab le  
p r o f i t s  has been in tro d u ce d . This method in v o lv es  th a t  ta x ab le  p r o f i t s  
in c lu d e  both  g e n e ra l p r o f i t s  from b u sin ess  a c t i v i t i e s  ( tr a d in g  p r o f i t s )  
and s p e c ia l  p r o f i t s  from s a le  o f  s p e c if ie d  types o f  f ix e d  a s s e t s .  I t  
i s  c a lc u la te d  by s u b tr a c t in g  the  n e t worth a t  the  beg inn ing  from the 
n e t  worth a t  the  end o f th e  accoun ting  y e a r  a d ju s te d  f o r  a d d i t io n a l  
c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  c a p i t a l  and d i s t r ib u t io n s  to  the  owners o f  the  
b u s in e s s .
- 2 2 0 -
The essence o f th a t  method i s  th a t  ga in s o r lo s se s  r e s u l te d  from any 
change in  a s s e ts  and l i a b i l i t i e s  a re  taken in to  accoun t, however, 
on ly  I r e la n d  excludes g a in s  d isp o sa l o f  f ix e d  a s s e ts  from computing 
p r o f i t s  f o r  ta x  p u rp o ses . A ll o th e r  E .E .C , c o u n tr ie s  fo llo w  th e  
g e n e ra l scheme;
Trading  P r o f i t s  + Taxable C ap ita l Gains
le s s D eductib le  expenses and lo s se s  and exempted income, 
equal Net ta x ab le  income.
U n fo rtu n a te ly , th e  g e n e ra l scheme may be the  same f o r  every  E.E.C 
co u n try  bu t the tre a tm e n t o f  each elem ent o f th a t  scheme d i f f e r s  b e t-  
weeh th e se  c o u n tr ie s ,  we proceed  to  d isc u ss  th ese  d if f e r e n c e s  and we 
s t a r t  f i r s t  w ith  th e  tre a tm e n t o f c a p i t a l  gains and lo s s e s .  A d e t a i l  
d is c u s s io n  o f th e se  m a te r ia ls  tak es  p la ce  in  the appendix o f  th i s  
c h a p te r .
5 . 5 .3 .2  CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES TAXATION
Exempt f o r  the N e th e rlan d s , where c a p i t a l  g a in s a fe  s u b je c t to  
ta x  as th ey  accrue  th e  n a t io n a l  tax  system s o f th e  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  
s t i p u l a t e  th a t  c a p i t a l  g a in s  a re  tax ab le  only .upon r e a l i z a t io n .  Two 
reaso n s e x p la in  t h i s  p o l ic y ,  e i t h e r  the d i f f i c u l ty  in  re v a lu in g  a s s e ts  
o r t h i s  p o lic y  is  used  as a means o f p ro v id in g  an a l l e v i a t i o n  to  f u l l  
ta x a t io n  o f c a p i t a l  g a in s  upon r e a l i z a t i o n ,  Belgium, I t a l y  and 
Luxembourg, under c e r ta in  c irc u m stan c es , exempt c a p i t a l  ga ins from 
ta x a t io n .  I r e la n d  has r e c e n t ly  in tro d u ced  an in d e x a tio n  r e l i e f  to  
take  account o f  i n f l a t i o n  d u rin g  the  p e rio d  o f ow nership. F in a l ly ,  
the  U.K. a p p lie s  an e f f e c t iv e  ta x  r a t e  equal to 30 p e r  c en t where the  
normal CIT r a te  i s  52 p e r  c e n t.
As f a r  a s  c a p i t a l  lo s se s  a re  concerned  a l l  the  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  
a llow  t h e i r  d e d u c ta b i l i ty .  Table 5*5 shows the c a r ry  forw ard o r 
backward p e rio d  allow ed in  the  E.E.C. c o u n tr ie s .
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TABLE 5.5,
TREATMENT OP OPERATING LOSSES
COUNTRY CARRY-FORWARD CARRY-BACK
Belgium 5 years not permitted
Denmark 5 ” not permitted
France 5 " not permitted
Germany No time lim it 1 year
Ireland 5 ye&rs 5 years
I ta ly 5 " not permitted
Luxembourg 5 If ft
Netherlands 6 " 1 year
i____
U.K. No time lim it 5 years.
SOURCE: I n te r n a t io n a l  F is c a l  D ocum entation.
5 .5 .5 .5  PROVISIONS FOR TAX-FREE RESERVES
In  a l l  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  p ro v is io n s  fo r  ta x - f r e e  re se rv e s  a re  g ran ­
te d . The purpose and the  imposed l im i ta t io n s  d i f f e r  from one co u n try  
to  a n o th e r . There a re  e s s e n t i a l ly  th re e  types o f re s e rv e s :
(a) S urp lus re s e rv e s  fo r  co v erin g  lo s se s  from u n d ep rec iab le
a s s e ts  such as c la im s, f in a n c ia l  a s s e t s ,  s to ck  e t c . ,
(b) R eserves which a re  used  as a means o f  sp read in g  l i a b i l ­
i t y  over time and,
\ c )  Reserve allow ed as a  pure  ta x - f r e e  revenue which amounts 
to  an u n d e f in i te  postponm ent o f  ta x a t io n .
These p ro v is io n s  a llow  th e  f irm  to  reduce i t s  lo ng -term  tax  l i a ­
b i l i t y  which in v o lv es  a g r e a te r  amount o f  in te r n a l  funds a v a ila b le  fo r  
f in a n c in g  investm ent programmes,
Belgium, I r e la n d , Luxembourg, N etherlands and th e  U.K. have the 
most r e s t r i c t e d  p ro v is io n s  fo r  ta x - f r e e  re s e rv e s . However, a l l  th e  
E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  allow  a p a r t  o f p r o f i t s  to be s e t  up on re s e rv e s , 
t h e i r  d e f in i t io n s  on th ese  p ro v is io n s  a re  more o r le s s  s im ila r  bu t they  
d i f f e r  in  the  degree o f t ig h tn e s s  o f  c o n tro l .  T h e re fo re , th i s  p a r t  o f 
ta x ab le  base does n o t c re a te  p a r t i c u l a r ly  d i f f i c u l t  problem s fo r  h a r­
m onization , however, some g u id e lin e s  p rov ided  by th e  E .E . C. would le a d  
to  a sm a lle r  degree o f  d iv e rg e n c ie s .
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5 ,5 .5 .4 .  TAXATION OF DIRECTORS' FEES
I t  i s  a common p o l ic y ,  w ith in  th e  E.E .C . c o u n tr ie s ,  the  c o s t  o f 
f ix e d  annual rem unara tion  to  o f f i c e r s  o f the  companies fo r  s e rv ic e s  
ren d ered  to  be d e d u c tib le  from the  ta x ab le  base . However, any o th e r  
payments in  excess o f t h a t  a re  f u l l y  ta x ab le  as p r o f i t s  o r as d iv i ­
dends to  r e c ip ie n t s ,  m oreover, the  E .E .C . tax  laws impose some r e s ­
t r i c t i o n s  as a means o f av o id in g  ex cessiv e  rem unera tion . For example,
ip
th e  French ta x  law p a r t i c u l a r ly  s c r u t in iz e s  rem unarat ions p a id  to  d i r e c ­
to r s ,  sh a reh o ld e rs  and r e la te d  persons whereas in  th e  U.K. the c lo se  
company l e g l i s l a t i o n  p ro v id e s  a r e s t r i c t e d  d e f in i t io n  o f  the  term 
D ire c to r .  On the c o n tra ry ,  the I r i s h  tax  law does n o t impose s p e c ia l  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on d i r e c t o r s ’ rem u n ara tio n . F in a l ly ,  the  Luxembourg law 
does no t in  g e n e ra l allow  a company to  deduct from the  ta x ab le  base 
any forms o f com pensation p a id  to  members o f i t s  board  o f d i r e c to r s ,  
i t s  su p e rv iso rs  o r company o f f i c e r  in  s im i la r  p o s i t io n .  However, some 
exem ptions o f th i s  ru le  o ccu r.
5 ,5 .5 ^ 5 . TAXATION OF INTEREST
A ll n ine  E .a .O . c o u n tr ie s  t r e a t  i n t e r e s t  revenue as o rd in a ry  in ­
come and i n t e r e s t  payments æ d e d u c tib le  expenses. The tre a tm e n t o f 
i n t e r e s t  payments i s  p a r t i c u l a r ly  im p o rtan t s in c e  as we have seen , 
a f f e c t s  th e  c o s t  o f c a p i t a l  and th rough  th a t  the method o f f in a n c in g  
investm en t p ro je c ts .  However, a d i s t in c t io n  should  be made between 
i n t e r e s t  payments p a id  to  th i r d  p a r t i e s  and those  p a id  to  sh a reh o ld e rs  
and a f f i l i a t e d  f irm s . The l a t t e r  a t t r a c t  more s c r u t i n i t y  by th e  tax  
law as a means o f p re v e n tin g  hidden p r o f i t s  d i s t r i b u t io n s .  V arious 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  have been in tro d u ced  by the member s ta t e s  fo r  a ch iev in g  
th i s  g o a l. T h e re fo re , a l l  the E .E .C . member s t a t e s  agree  th a t  i n t e r e s t  
payments should  be excluded from the ta x ab le  base as long  as th ey  a re  
n o t ex cessiv e  and a re  no t h idden  p r o f i t s  d i s t r i b u t io n s .  We would 
su g g est two m easures fo r  f a c i l i t a t i n g  the f ig h t  a g a in s t  ta x  avo id ­
ance in  the  form o f  i n t e r e s t  paym ents. F i r s t ,  a l l  the  E .E .C . member 
s t a t e s  should fo llow  the  B elg ian  p o lic y  in  th a t  a re a . That i s ,  to  con­
s id e r  as normal i n t e r e s t  r a t e  th a t  o r a l i t t l e  h ig h e r than  th a t  adopted 
by th e i r  n a tio n a l  banks. T h is , in  the lo n g -ru n , would le ad  to more o r 
le s s  id e n t ic a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  when the  Community w i l l  V^oy.e ach ieved  the  
g o a l o f  m onetary union and th ese  r a te s  w i l l  be determ ined by the Com­
m unity. However, the use o f  a common i n t e r e s t  r a te  may be j u s t i f i e d
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in  th e  l i g h t  o f th e  u n i f ie d  c a p i t a l  m arket toward which the European 
Commun!"ties a re  m oving. The second measure i s  concerned w ith  g re a te r  
c o -o p e ra tio n  between th e  member c o u n tr ie s  to  p rev en t ta x  evasion  
th rough  t r a n s f e r  o f  p r o f i t s  fo r  one coun try  to  a n o th e r as i n t e r e s t  
paym ents.
5 . 5 . 3 .6 .  . TAXATION OF INTERCORPORATE DIVIDENIlS
V arious methods have appeared  in  p ra c t ic e  d e a lin g  w ith  i n t e r ­
co rp o ra te  d iv id e n d s . Almost a l l  th e  c o u n tr ie s  have in tro d u ced  m eâsures 
to  in te g r a te  th e  double ta x a t io n  o f  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  g en era ted  by the 
flow  o f  the  l a t t e r  from one company to  an o th e r . These m easures can be 
c l a s s i f i e d  under th re e  head ings;
FIRST  ^ an exem ption from CIT i s  p rov ided  to  th e  r e c ip ie n t  com­
pany on p r o f i t s  re c e iv e d  from an o th e r company, w ith o u t 
any c o n d itio n  to  be s a t i s f i e d ,
SECOND  ^ th e  ta x  r e l i e f  i s  a fu n c tio n  o f th e  degree o f  p a r t i c i ­
p a tio n  o f  r e c ip ie n t  company in  paying  company and,
THIRD th e  ta x  r e l i e f  i s  a fu n c tio n  o f the  tim e p e rio d  which
the  r e c ip ie n t  company h e ld  sh ares  o f  th e  paying  company.
The in tro d u c tio n  th rough  the im p u ta tio n  system  the d iv idend  ta x  
c r e d i t  and th e  com pensatory ta x  has c re a te d  some problem s. However, 
th e  q u es tio n  o f  th e  r e c ip ie n t  c o rp o ra tio n  r e d i s t r ib u te s  o r  n o t th e  r e ­
ce ived  p r o f i t s  to  i t s  sh a reh o ld e rs  i s  a  s ig n i f ic a n t  q u e s tio n  f o r  th e  
tre a tm e n t o f th e se  p r o f i t s .
We can c l a s s i f y  th e  E.E .C . member s ta t e s  in  th re e  c a te g o r ie s .  
F i r s t ,  the  U .K ., I r i s h ,  German and I t a l i a n  tax  laws p rov ide  f u l l  ex­
em ption from c o rp o ra te  tax  on r e c ip ie n t  o f a l l  d iv idend  re c e iv e d  w ith ­
o u t any s p e c ia l  c o n d itio n  to  be s a t i s f i e d ,  becond, in  Denmark, F rance , 
Luxembourg and the N e th erlan d s exemption a p p lie s  i f  the  re c e iv in g  c o r­
p o ra tio n  owns a s p e c if ie d  p e rcen tag e  o f  the  sh a re s  o f  th e  pay ing  c o r­
p o ra tio n . F in a l ly ,  Belgium i s  th e  only  co un try  between the  E .E .C . 
c o u n tr ie s  which a p p lie s  the  "perm anent p a r t ic ip a t io n "  c r i t e r i o n  in  
ta x in g  in ter-com pany d iv id en d s . A ccording to th a t  c r i t e r io n  the  r e ­
le v a n t sh ares  should be h e ld  by the r e c ip ie n t  c o rp o ra tio n  fo r  the  en­
t i r e  f in a n c ia l  y e a r .
Table 5*9 shows the ta x a t io n  o f in te rc o rp o ra te  d iv idend  in  the 
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r e s u l t s  from the  d iv id en d s p a ss in g  th rough an in te rm e d ia te  c o rp o ra tio n  
in  cases  where th e  p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n  owns a s u b s ta n t ia l  p a r t  o f th e  
sh a re  c a p i t a l  o f the s u b s id ia ry  c o rp o ra tio n  and where i t  m erely ho lds 
a  sm all i n t e r e s t  in  the s u b s id ia ry . In  Germany, I t a l y ,  I r e la n d  and 
th e  U.K. in te rc o rp o ra te  d iv id en d  pass  through the p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n  
w ithou t b e a rin g  any a d d i t io n a l  tax  amount i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  th e ,d e g re e  o f  
ow nership by the p a re n t .  This i s  a ls o  the  case  in  Denmark, Luxembourg 
and the  N e th erlan d s but th e  p a re n t should  own a s u b s ta n t ia l  p a r t  o f  th e  
sh a re  c a p i t a l  o f  the  s u b s id ia ry . Belgium and France s l i g h t l y  p e n a liz e  
in te rc o rp o ra te  d iv idend  i f  th e  p a re n t has a s u b s ta n t ia l  ow nership in  
s u b s id ia ry . F in a l ly ,  Belgium , Denmark, JJYance, Luxembourg and the N eth­
e r la n d s  h e a v ily  p e n a liz e  in te rc o rp o ra te  d iv idends i f  th e  c o rp o ra te  r e ­
la t io n s h ip  i s  n o t one o f  s u b s ta n t ia l  i n t e r e s t .
In  co n c lu s io n , we would sug g est t h a t  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  th e  deg­
re e  o f  ownership t e s t  by a l l  the  E .E .C , c o u n tr ie s  and the ad o p tion  a 
common p o lic y  re g a rd in g  the  two c a s e s , i t  seems to  u s , th a t  i t  would 
reduce the  e x is t in g  d i f f e r e n c e s .
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DEPRECIATION AlLüWMCES
S ev era l elem ents may accoun t fo r  d isc re p a n c ie s  in  th e  com putation 
o f th e  amount which is  a llow ed to  be deducted  from th e  ta x  base as de­
p r e c ia t io n ,  The most im p o rtan t a re  th e  b a s is  o f  d e p re c ia t io n , the  
method o f  d e p re c ia tio n  which combined w ith  the c o s t re co v ery  p e rio d  
i s  th e  c r u c ia l  p o in t  in  the  f i s c a l  tre a tm e n t o f  d e p re c ia t io n , in v e s t ­
ment allow ances and the a s s e t  s t r u c tu r e  o f the  f irm .
5 . 5 . 2 . 7a  BASIS OF DEPRECIATION
A ll the E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  use o r ig in a l  c o s t as the b a s is  o f de­
p r e c ia t io n .  This o r ig in a l  c o s t  in c lu d e s  the  purchase p r ic e  o f the  
a s s e ts  p lu s  o th e r  r e la te d  expenses such as t r a n s p o r ta t io n  and i n s t a l ­
l a t i o n  c o s t e tc .  B efore the in tro d u c tio n  of V.A.T. as a common ta x  
w ith in  th e  Community, in d i r e c t  tax es  le v ie d  were in c lu d ed  in  the  
d e p re c ia b le  base whereas V.A.T. i s  excluded from t h a t .
In  a p e rio d  o f  s ta b le  p r ic e s  the sum o f th e se  ta x - f r e e  a llow ances 
w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  to  re p la c e  th e  a s s e t  a t  the  end o f i t s  u s e fu l  l i f e .  
However, in  a p e rio d  o f a c c e le ra te d  in f l a t i o n ,  the  sum o f the  depre­
c ia t io n  allow ances cannot p rov ide  s u f f i c i e n t  funds to  re p la c e  the  
worn out a s s e t .  There a re  two p o s s ib le  ways o f  d e a lin g  w ith  th i s  
problem . The f i r s t  i s  th e  w idening o f  th e  deprecab le  base through 
re v a lu a tio n  o f  th e  a s s e t .  The second method a llow s a firm  to  w rite  
o f f  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  ex p en d itu re  over a  much s h o r te r  p e rio d  than th e  e s ­
tim a ted  r e a l  economic l i f e  o f the a s s e t  i . e .  a c c e la ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n . 
Both methods have been used  w ith in  th e  '''omraunity, the form er m ainly 
on a tem porary b a s is  whereas the l a t t e r  is  m ainly used  as a means o f 
s t im u la t in g  investm ent r a th e r  to  cope w ith  the above d e sc rib ed  problem,
5 ,5.3 , 7.2 METHODS OF DEPRECIATION
B efo re -th e  second World Vferthe most common p ra c t ic e  was to  charge a 
c o n s ta n t sum each y e a r as d e p re c ia t io n . However, a f t e r  the war a grow­
in g  aw areness appeared on th e  p a r t  o f  econom ists and government p o lic y ­
makers th a t  d e p re c ia tio n  may be a u s e fu l  dev ice fo r  ach iev in g  v a rio u s  
p o lic y  o b je c tiv e d  (J .M e ij ,  I 96I) , The use o f  tax -d e d u c ta b le  d e p re c ia ­
tio n  charges as a means o f  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p o lic y , coping w ith  in f l a t io n
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and s t im u la t in g  growth heoame a common c o n s id e ra tio n . This caused 
a  d e f in i te  s h i f t  in  the  most c o u n tr ie s  from s t r a ig h t - l i n e  d e p re s ia -  
t io n  to  a form o f  d e c lin in g  - b a lance  d e p re c ia tio n .
From ta b le  5.10 we see  th a t  a l l  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  exempt I t a l y  emp­
lo y s  both  s t r a i g h t - l i n e  and d e c lin in g -b a la n c e  m ethods. I t a l y ,  p e rm its  
only  the  use o f s t r a i g h t - l i n e  d e p re c ia tio n  method. The use o f  one 
method o r  the o th e r  i s  n o t always to  th e  d is c r e t io n  o f the  ta x p ay e r, 
b u t i t  i s  determ ined  by governm ental r u le s .  However, the  s t r a i g h t - l i n e  
method i s  alm ost in  a l l  c o u n tr ie s  m andatory fo r  b u ild in g s  whereas the 
d e c lin in g -b a la n c e  method i s  u sed  fo r  p la n t  and m achinery.
Table 5*30 shows th e  ty p ic a l  d e p re c ia tio n  tre a tm e n ts  fo r  new manu­
f a c tu r in g  investm en ts  a p p lie d  in  a  n a t io n a l  b ase . In  p r a c t ic e ,  firm s 
a re  p rov ided  w ith  s p e c ia l  exem ptions as a means o f s t im u la tin g  in v e s t ­
m ent. The most common p ro v is io n  i s  a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n .
BELGIUM g ra n ts  a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia tio n  under th e  form o f  doub ling  
o f  th e  normal d e p re c ia tio n  allow ances fo r  the  f i r s t  th re e  year^ fo r  
c e r ta in  c la s s e s  o f  a s s e t s ,  i . e .  m achinery and in d u s t r ia l  b u ild in g s  in  
s p e c ia l  developm ent regions.
In  DENMARK. an advance d e p re c ia tio n  allow ance i s  allow ed which 
a p p lie s  to  i n d u s t r i a l  b u ild in g s , m achinery and equipm ent. This p ro v i­
s io n  a p p lie s  on ly  to  th a t  p a r t  o f the  t o t a l  c o n tra c te d  c o s t  which ex- 
eeds D Kr 700 ,000. 20 p e r  c en t o f the  excess over D Kr 700,00 may be
w r i t te n  o f f  d u rin g  the  f i r s t  f o u r  y ea rs  fo llo w in g  the  award o f th e  con­
t r a c t ,  s u b je c t  to  a  maximum 15 p er cen t in  any one y e a r .
FRANCE a p p lie s  a c c e la r a te d  d e p re c ia tio n  i f  a case  can be made out 
fo r  s p e c ia l  c ircu m stan ces . P a r t i c u l a r ly ,  a c c e la ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n  a re  
a v a ila b le  fo r  b u ild in g  in  two s p e c i f ic  c a se s . F i r s t ,  as a means o f  p ro ­
m oting re g io n a l developm ent, a  f i r s t  y e a r  25 p e r  c en t allow ance i s  g ran ­
te d  fo r  b u ild in g s  c o n s tru c te d  in  c e r ta in  development a re a s . Second, fo r  
b u ild in g s  acq u ired  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  and te c h n ic a l  re s e a rc h , a f i r s t  y ea r 
allow ance o f  50 p e r  c en t may be claim ed and th e  balance  o f  ex p en d itu re  
i s  w r i t te n  o f f  by th e  normal method.
GERMANY uses  a c c e la ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n  f o r  both  re g io n a l and coun­
te r c y c l i c a l  pu fp o ses. In  g e n e ra l , the  r a te  o f 20 p e r  cen t o f  th e  c o s t  of 
immovable a s s e ts  and 50 p e r  cen t o f  the c o s t o f  movable a s s e t s ,  deduc­
t i b l e  over th e  f i r s t  f iv e  y e a r s .
T h .ITALY a c c e la ra te d  d e p re c ia tio n  may be claim ed fo r  new in v e s t ­
ment as up to  45 p e r  cen t o f  c o s t  sp read  over the  f i r s t  th re e  y ea rs  o f  
o p e ra tin g  s u b je c t to  a  maximum o f 15 p e r  cen t in  any one y e a r .
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TABIiE 5 .1 0  
METHODS OF DEPRECIATION
BELGIUM
S-L: The normal method 
D-B; The o p tio n a l method
DENMARK S-L; Commercial b u ild in g s  
D-B: P la n t and m achinery
FRANCE S-L: M ainly fo r  in d .b u i ld in g s , a s s e ts  hav ing  a l i f e  le s s  than 3 y e a r .
D-B; M achinery and equipm ent.
GERMANY
S-L; A ll f ix e d  a s s e ts  m andatory fo r  immovable fxd
a s s e ts  o th e r  than  b ldnga. The on ly  p e rm iss ib le  
f o r  w r i t in g  o f f  in ta n g ib le  a s s e t s .
D-B: Movable fx d .a s s e ts  o f a ta n g ib le  n a tu re .
IRELAND S-L; B u ild in g s  
D-B; P la n ts
ITALY Only th e  s t r a ig h t  l in e  method i s  p e rm itte d .
LUXEMBOURG S-L; M andatory fo r  b u ild in g s  and in ta n g ib le  a s s e ts  
D-B: O ther a s s e t s .
NETHERLANDS S-L: Mandatory fo r  b u ild in g s
D-B; A ll b u s in ess  a s s e ts  exempt b u ild in g s
U.K. S-L; I n d u s t r ia l  b u ild in g s  and h o te ls .  
D-B:- P la n t  and m achinery.
NOTE:
S -  L =« 
D — B = 
SOURCE;
S t r a ig h t - l in e
D ec lin in g -b a lan c e .
Compiled by the  au th o r w ith  in fo rm atio n  re c e iv e d  from 
In te r n a t io n a l  F is c a l  D ocum entation,
The NETHERLANDS use a c c e la r a to r  d e p re c ia tio n  as a  means o f  re g ­
io n a l p o l ic ie s  and o n ly  in  c e r ta in  areas o u ts id e  the Handstand H olland . 
The p ro v is io n  co n ce rn s /
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on ly  b u ild in g s  and i t  amounts o f  16 and l / 3  p e r  c e n t in  th e  f i r s t  
two y e a rs .
Both th e  UNITED KINGIX3M and IRELAND g ra n t a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c i­
a t io n  allow ances in  th e  form o f  f i r s t  y ea r a llo w an ces. The r a te s  a re  
determ ined  an n u a lly  in  th e  b u d g e t. In  some case s  t h i s  reach es  100 p e r  
c e n t.
Summarizing, we cou ld  argue th a t  i t  i s  n o t th e  norm al d e p re c ia t ­
ion  which c re a te s  th e  d is c re p a n c ie s  between th e  E .E .C , c o u n tr ie s  s in c e  
th ey  a re  more o r l e s s  in  acco rd , a s  f a r  as  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  
s t r a i g h t - l i n e  o r th e  d e c lin in g -b a la n c e  methods f o r  b u ild in g s  and p la n t 
and m achinery a re  concerned . However, the a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n  
p ro v is io n s  can be c o n s id e red  as th e  sou rce  o f  t h e i r  d is c re p a n c ie s ,
5 .5 .5 .7 .3  RATES OF DEPRECIATION
Two ten d en c ie s  e x i s t  among the  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s .  Under the 
f i r s t ,  the government such  as  th e  German, I t a l i a n ,  and Luxembourg, pub­
l i s h e s  ta b le s  w ith  th e  o f f i c i a l  d e p re c ia t io n  r a t e s .  On the  o th e r  hand, 
th e  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  leav e  to  the  d i s c r e t io n  o f tax p ay ers  to  m an ipu la te  
th e  c o s t  reco v ery  p e r io d .
From ta b le  5*11 we wee th a t  d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s  a re  a p p lie d  w ith in  
th e  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  on b u ild in g s  and p la n t  and m a c h in e ry ,T h ese  roues
TABLE 5.11
DEPRECIATION RATES APPLIED IN THE E.E .C .
I n d u s t r i a l  B u ild in g M achinery
Belgium % 10%
Denmark 6% 30%
France % 10 -  20%
Germany 10%
Ir e la n d  l.A iu p  to  5% A.A: up to  50% I  A; up to  10C%. AA:1C% 12 
and 2 ^ .
I t a l y % 10%
Luxembourg. 5% 8 - 1 2 %
N eth erlan d s 10%
U.K. I .A : 50% A.A: ^ I .  A: 100% o r  2 j fo
Note:
I .A : = I n i t i a l  a llow ance
A,A: « Annual a llow ance.
Source: Compiled by the a u th o r  w ith  in fo rm atio n  re c e iv e d  from I n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  f i s c a l  Docum entation.
- 2 3 0 -
 ^ -- I , p ro v id e  a  c o s t  reco v ery
p e rio d  which ranges from 17 y ea rs  ih  Denmark to  66 y ears  in  the N ether­
la n d s . However, th e  main source  o f  d i s p a r i t i e s  as f a r  a s  d e p re c ia tio n  
i s  concerned comes from two co u rces . The a d d it io n a l  to th e  norm al de­
p re c ia t io n  i . e .  a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n  and th e  d i f f e r e n t  a p p lie d  tax  
r a t e s .
5 .5 ^ 3 .7 .4  TWO PRuPQSALS
From th e  above d isc u ss io n  two co n c lu sio n s  can be drawn. F i r s t ,  
as f a r  as th e  normal d e p re c ia tio n  i s  concerned th e re  a re  no la rg e  
d if fe re n c e s  between th e  F.E*C. c o u n tr ie s .  The p resence  o f a c c e le ra te d  
d e p re c ia t io n , as a  means o f  p ro v id in g  in c e n tiv e  to  the  f irm , makes the
t o t a l  p ic tu re  com pletely  d i f f e r e n t .  In  a d d itio n  to  th a t  the v a r io u s
ta x  r a te s  a p p lie d  both  to  th e  normal and a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia tio n  make 
th e se  d if f e r e n c e s  even l a r g e r .  However, a f i r s t  s te p  towards d e p re c i­
a t io n  allow ances harm onization  would re q u ire  the d i s t in c t io n  between 
normal o r a c tu a l  d e p re c ia tio n  and a llow ab le  o r  in c e n tiv e  d e p re c ia t io n .
I f  th i s  d i s t in c t io n  has been made the in c e n tiv e  d e p re c ia tio n  
should  be in c o rp o ra te d  w ith in  the  whole in c e n tiv e  scheme determ ined 
by the  ©ommunity. P a r t i c u l a r ly ,  acceJersted d e p re c ia tio n  aim ing to  p ro ­
mote re g io n a l developm ent should  be in c o rp o ra te d  w ith in  the  co rrespond­
in g  programme whereas a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia tio n  fo r  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p o l­
ic y  would be an aim o f the  community as a whole.
As f a r  as norm al o r a c tu a l  d e p re c ia tio n  i s  concerned , we cou ld  
su g g est two p ro p o sa ls . The f i r s t  i s  concerned w ith  th e  method o f  de­
p re c ia t io n  whereas the  second i s  concerned w ith  the c o s t  recovery  p e r io d . 
H arm onization o f the  d e p re c ia tio n  method would re q u ire  to  use cash flow  
as ta x  base in s te a d  o f p r o f i t s .  This i s  the  case o f  immediate o r f r e e  
d e p re c ia tio n  in  which the firm  w rite s  o f f  i t s  investm ent ex p en d itu re  
as f a s t  as i t  w ishes. This method i s  workable i f  any one o f  the 
fo llo w in g  a l te r n a t iv e  assum ptions h o ld s . F i r s t ,  th e re  a re  always ade­
quate  p r o f i t s  a g a in s t  which ta x  allow ances s e t  o f f .  Second, the tax  
system  p ro v id es  fo r  a "com plete lo s s  o f f s e t"  which im p lie s  th a t  i f  
a llow ances exeed p r o f i t s  the firm  re c e iv e s  a refund  and th i r d ,  the 
firm  i s  allow ed to  c a r ry  lo s se s  fo rw ard . The advantage o f  th i s  meth­
od i s  th a t  the  c o rp o ra te  ta x  system  become n e u tr a l  between d i f f e r e n t
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investm en t as Brown and Musgrave have p o in te d  out (C,Brown, 1948»
R .Musg rav e , 1959). However, th e  c o rp o ra te  ta x  system  would be non- 
d is c r im in a to ry  between investm en t p r o je c ts  i f  i n t e r e s t  payments a re  
n o t d e d u c tib le  fo r  ta x  p u rp o ses . Then, the in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  f r e e  
d e p re c ia tio n  method n o t on ly  would sh o rte n  the  d is c re p a n c ie s  between 
th e  E .E .C , member s t a t e s  bu t i t  would so lv e  th e  problem  o f  i n t e r e s t  
payments harm onization  as w e ll .  The ÏÏ.K, and I r e læ id ,  a s  we saw, 
app ly  th i s  method e i t h e r  in  th e  form of 100 p e r c en t i n i t i a l  a llo w ­
ance on p la n t  and m achinery o r  in  th e  form o f  a  com bination o f  i n i t i a l  
and annual allow ance taken  in  th e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f up to  luO p e r  c en t on 
H o te ls ,
An a l t e r n a t iv e  s o lu tio n  would b e , th e  harm on ization  o f th e  c o s t  
reco v ery  p e r io d . This would be p o s s ib le  by in tro d u c in g  a system  s im i­
l a r  to  th e  U,S. " re se rv e  r a t i o  t e s t " .  The purpose o f  th i s  t e s t  i s  to  
perm it firm s to  g e a r d e p re c ia t io n  allow ances to  a c tu a l  ex p erien ce  in  
re p la c in g  f a c i l i t i e s  (N. T ure, I 965 ) .  The re se rv e  r a t i d ^ i s  th e  r a t i o  
o f d e p re c ia tio n  a c tu a l ly  taken  to  th e  c o s t  o f th e  a s s e t  o r  group o f 
a s s e ts  in  a d e p re c ia tio n  acco u n t. Firms which re p la c e  a s s e ts  more 
f r e q u e n tly  than  i s  im p lied  by th e  g u id lin e s  would f in d  th a t  t h e i r  
re se rv e  r a t i o s  a re  low er than  the  r a t i o  computed by the governm ent.
In  such  c a se s , firm s a re  allow ed to  sh o rte n  the s e rv ic e  l iv e s  o f 
t h e i r  a s s e t s .  On the o th e r  hand, firm s which use a s s e ts  fo r  lo n g e r 
p e rio d s  than  those  im p lied  by th e  g u id lin e  l iv e s  would be re q u ire d  to  
len g th en  s e rv ic e  l i v e s ,
5 .5 * 3 .8 . TAX INCENTIVES
In  a l l  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  both  ta x  and f in a n c ia l  in c e n t iv e s  have 
been a c t iv e ly  used as in s tru m en ts  o f  economic in te r v e n t io n .  These in ­
c e n tiv e s  a re  designed  to  ach iev e  one o r  more o f  the fo llo w in g  o b je c ­
t iv e s :
1. To s t im u la te  economic a c t i v i t y  in  c e r ta in  reg io n s  by c r e a t ­
ing  new o r expanding b u s in e s s , as p a r t  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  
re g io n a l p o l i c i e s .
2 . To a f f e c t  th e  tim in g  o f  in v estm en t, as p a r t  o f  the
n a t io n a l  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p o l ic ie s  and,
5 , To encourage the  a c q u is i t io n  o f  c e r ta in  c a p i t a l  equipment.^
o r  to le a d  investm en t in  s p e c ia l  s e c to rs  o f  the  economy as 
p a r t  o f the n a t io n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  p o lic y ,
Ihe ta x  in c e n t iv e s  may be o f fe re d  in  a v a r ie ty  o f  ty p e s , The most 
common types a re  th e  following^:
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1. T o tal o r p a r t i a l  exemption from co rp o ra te  income ta x ,  p e rso n a l
income ta x  o r lo c a l  income ta x e s . For example, nelgium , France
and I t a l y  have such p ro v is io n s*
2, A cce le ra ted  d e p re c ia t io n , we saw th a t  alm ost a l l  the c o u n tr ie s
use  th i s  k ind  o f  in c e n tiv e  fo r  v a r io u s  purposes*
5. Tax C re d it ,  Denmark, Luxembourg and the N e th erlan d s use tax  
c r e d i t  p ro v is io n ,
4 . Investm ent allow ances*
5. T o ta l o r p a r t i a l  exem ption o f  c a p i t a l  gains from ta x a tio n  i f
th ey  a re  re in v e s te d  in  c e r ta in  a re a s  and fo r  a s p e c if ie d  p e r io d .
The im pact o f  th ese  p ro v is io n s  i s  a  re d u c tio n  o f  the  e f f e c t iv e  tax  
r a t e  e i t h e r  d i r e c t ly  ,o r in d i r e c t ly .
Two q u estio n s  a r i s e  co n cern ing  ta x  in c e n tiv e s  w ith in  the Commun­
i t y ,  The f i r s t  i s  concerned w ith  the e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  th ese  in v e s t ­
ment in c e n tiv e s  to  ach ieve  s ta t e d  o b je c t iv e s  and the second i s  con­
cerned  w ith  the  c o n s is te n c y  o f  th ese  in c e n tiv e s  w ith  n e u t r a l i t y .  For 
exam ple, some c o u n tr ie s  as Denmark and Germany p rov ide  th ese  in c e n tiv e s  
on a n o n -d isc r im in a to ry  b a s is  whereas o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  do not p rov ide  in ­
c e n tiv e s  e q u a lly  to dom estic and fo re ig n  firm s (O.E.O.D, 1978). This 
c a l l s  fo r  c o -o rd in a tio n  a t  the  E .E .C . l e v e l ,  o th e rw ise  i t  would serve  
l i t t l e  purpose fo r  in te r n a t io n a l  co m p etitio n  to  remove t a r i f f s  b a r r i e r s  
and in d i r e c t  ta x es  i f  the o b s tac le s  p re se n te d  by th e  in c e n tiv e s  were to  
rem ain . The E .E .C . i s  p a r t i c u l a r ly  in te r e s te d  in  tendecy  towards 
" au c tio n in g  p ro cess"  in  the  f i e l d  o f in c e n t iv e s .  Such a p o lic y  n o t on­
ly  have se r io u s  e f f e c t s  f o r  th e  Community as a whole bu t a lso  fo r  
each member s t a t e  s in ce  ta x  co m p etitio n  may r e s u l t  in  l e s s  than  e f f i ­
c ie n t  le v e ls  o f o u tp u t o f  s t a t e  p u b lic  s e c to r .
&*5,4 CONCLUSION
In a d d itio n  to  th e  d is c re p a n c ie s  which e x is t  between the E .E .C . 
c o u n tr ie s ,  m entioned can paring the  l a s t  p ro p o sa l w ith  the e x is t in g  sy s­
tem s, the  d is c u s s io n  o f the  ta x  base p o in ted  ou t th a t  the  d isc re p a n ­
c ie s  a re  even more. T herefo re  the  com parison o f  tax  burden in  the  
E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  i s  more com plicated  and the need fo r  tra n sp a ren c y  be­
comes more obvious.
F i r s t  o f a l l  th e re  would be g re a te r  c l a r i t y  i f  each E .E .C , co u n try
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would have on ly  one ta x  on c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s .  The c o -e x is te n c e  o f 
o th e r  ta x es  in  a d d it io n  to  CIT makes the  com parison o f the  ta x  b u r­
den between the  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  le s s  v a l id .
Second, we saw th a t  th e  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  use the same framework fo r  
a s s e s s in g  th e  ta x  base but th ey  d i f f e r  in  th e  tre a tm e n t o f the  elem­
e n ts  which should  be in c lu d ed  in  t h a t .  tJn fo rt-u n a te ly , a l l  th e se  d i s ­
c re p an c ie s  due to  the  d i f f e r e n t  tre a tm e n t o f th ese  e lem ents cannot be 
q u a n t i ta t iv e ly  a s se s se d .
As f a r  as th e  trea tm en t o f c a p i t a l  g a in s  and lo s s e s ,  the  ta x - f r e e  
re s e rv e  p ro v is io n s , th e  ta x a t io n  o f  d ire c to rs *  fe e s  and the  ta x a t io n  
o f i n t e r e s t  payments i s  concerned , c re a te s  d if f e r e n c e s  which cannot be 
q u a n t i t a t iv e ly  a sse sse d . We su g gested  as i n t e r e s t  r a t e  to  be co n sid ­
e red  as normal r a t e  th a t  o r  a l i t t l e  h ig h e r  than th a t  adopted by the  
n a t io n a l  bank o f each member s t a t e .
D ep rec ia tio n  allow ances and investm ent in c e n tiv e s  c o n s t i tu te  the  
most im p o rtan t e x c lu s io n  from th e  ta x  base . F o r tu n a te ly , th e se  ex­
c lu s io n s  can be q u a n t i t a t iv e ly  a sse sse d  by c a lc u la t in g  th e  p re s e n t 
v a lu e  o f th e se  p ro v is io n s . T h e re fo re , tran sp aren cy  in  th i s  f i e l d  can 
be o b ta in ed  by fo llo w in g  a common s e t  o f  g u id e lin e s .  We suggested  two 
a l t e r n a t iv e s .  E i th e r  the  in tro d u c tio n  o f  f r e e  d e p re c ia tio n  method o r 
the  in tro d u c tio n  o f  the  re s e rv e  r a t i o  t e s t .
F in a l ly ,  as f a r  as in te rc o rp o ra te  d iv idend  ta x a t io n  i s  concerned 
ad o p tio n  o f a  common s e t  w ith  g u id e lin e s  would be h e lp f u l l .  We sug­
g e s te d  th a t  a l l  the E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  shou ld  in tro d u ce  the  degree o f  
ownership t e s t  as a guide to  ta x  in te rc o rp o ra te  d iv id en d .
5 . 5 .5  THE TAX RATE
INTRODUCTION
In  th e  case  o f  in d i r e c t  ta x  harm onization  th e  common form was 
s e t t l e d  w ithou t g re a t  d i f f i c u l t y  whereas the tax  r a t e  has been a more 
d eb a tab le  is s u e . The c o n tra ry  happens w ith  the company ta x  harm oni­
z a t io n .  The form i s  the  most d i f f i c u l t  p a r t  to  be s e t t l e d  whereas 
the  r a t e  i s  a  le s s  d is p u ta b le  to p ic . This i s  so because in  the case 
o f  b u s in e ss  tax es  the  tax  r a t e  i s  no t so v a l id  i f  the ta x  base leav e  
room fo r  m anoeuvres. However, a harm onized tax  base p ro v id es  the 
com parison o f  the  ta x  r a t e s  w ith  g re a te r  v a l id i t y .
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B efore d is c u s s in g  the  v a r io u s  view s concern ing  ta x  r a te  harm oni­
z a tio n  we co n sid e r h e lp fu l  to  d isc u ss  some o th e r  p o in ts  r e la te d  to  
ta x  r a t e ,  we can c l a s s i f y  the ta x  r a t e  under th re e  d i f f e r e n t  grounds. 
F i r s t ,  we may d is t in g u is h  th e  case  o f  hav ing  one s in g le  o r  tw o -ra te s  f o r  
c o rp o ra te  income, second, we may have a p ro p o r tio n a l o r p ro g re s s iv e  tax  
r a t e  and f i n a l l y ,  we should  make a d i s t in c t io n  between nom inal, e f f e c ­
t iv e  and in c id en ce  ta x  r a t e t  We have a lre a d y  d iscu ssed  the  f i r s t  two 
c a s e s , however, we proceed to d isc u ss  th e  th i r d .
5 ,3 . 5 .2 .  NOMINAL. j^FFECTIVE AND INCIDENCE TAX RATE
Although the  l e g i s l a t i o n  determ ines one tax  r a t e ,  the nominal or
5
s ta tu to r y ,  in  p r a c t ic e  th re e  ta x  r a te s  may e x is t '.  The f i r s t ,  the 
nom inal, i s  what th e  company law s e ts  f o r th .  U n fo rtu n a te ly , t h i s  r a t e  
cannot i t s e l f  p rov ide  an a c c u ra te  p ic tu re  o f the r e a l  tax  burden on 
c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s .  I t  i s  s e v e re ly  in flu en c ed  by th e  v a rio u s  p ro v is io n s  
which a re  g iven  th e  f irm s. These p ro v is io n s  make th e  firm  to  b e a r  no t 
the  nom inal ta x  r a t e  b u t a n o th e r one, more c ru c ia l  and , o f c o u rse , low- 
e r^ th e  nom inal, the  e f f e c t iv e  ta x  r a t e .  T herefore , the  l a t t e r  i s  a fun­
c t io n  o f  the  nom inal tax  r a t e  and the  v a rio u s  p ro v is io n s  p rov ided  the 
f irm .
The e f f e c t iv e  ta x  r a t e  i s  d e fin e d  as the  p e rcen tag e  re d u c tio n  in  
va lu e  o f a s s e ts  due to  ta x . This can be shown as fo llo w s: We assume 
th a t  a firm  buys, fo r  example, a machine whose the v a lu e  i s  equal to  
C. T his machine p ro v id es  the  f irm  w ith an an n u a lly  income stream  whose 
p re s e n t va lu e  i s  equal to  R. In  the absence o f ta x a t io n  the  firm  would 
buy th e  machine i f  i t s  p r ic e  C would be equal to  the p re s e n t v a lu e  o f 
the income stream  it, bu t i t  i s  n o t the case  in  r e a l  l i f e .  A firm  pays 
ta x es  le v ie d  on i t s  income, i f  th e  nom inal tax  r a te  i s  equal to  t  
then  the p re se n t va lue  o f  ta x es  p a id  by th e  firm  i s  eq u al to  tR , In  
a d d it io n  to  t h a t ,  firm s a re  allow ed some ta x  p ro v is io n s  which aim to  
reduce the amount o f  tax es  which a re  p a id  by th e  firm . These p ro v is io n s
b e
may''given in  the  form o f  e x c lu s io n  from the tax  base an amount o f 
p r o f i t s  which i s  equal to  a f r a c t io n  o f the va lue  o f the m achine, 
th a t  i s ,  suppose p i s  the p re s e n t va lue  o f the stream  o f  tax  p ro v i­
s io n s  on one cu rren cy  u n i t  o f  investm en t. Then, the  f i n a l  tax  l i a ­
b i l i t y  o f  th e  firm  i s  equal to
T = t  \R -  pC; (5 .1 )  
where T i s  th e  p re s e n t va lue  o f taX' a c tu a l ly  p a id  by th e  firm .
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The ta x  p ro v is io n s  have an e f f e c t  e q u iv a len t to  a  re d u c tio n  in  
the  p r ic e  o f  the machine. However, the  p r ic e  o f machine i s  equal to
C ■ S -  tR + tpC
o r  C = h(1  -  t ) (5 .2 ;
(1 - tp )
Prom eq u atio n  (5 .2 ;  two co n c lu sio n s  can be drawn* F i r s t ,  the p re s ­
ence o f  ta x a tio n  reduces the p r ic e  o f machine and second the  p ro v is io n  
o f  ta x  a llow ances m itig a te s  th e  ta x  burden and b rin g s  the p r ic e  o f  the 
machine c lo s e r  to  i t s  p re - ta x  l e v e l .
The firm  would buy the machine i f  the  fo llo w in g  r e la t io n s h ip  h e ld :
R -  C + teR (5 .3 )
where te  i s  the e f f e c t iv e  r a t e  o f  CIT and the p roduct teR i s  th e  a c tu a l  
ta x  p a id , th a t  i s ,  T. In  a th e r  w o rd s ,th e  firm  would in v e s t  i f  th e  p re s e n t 
v a lu e  o f income stream  g en era ted  by the  p ro je c t  would be equal to  the  
p r ic e  o f the  machine p lu s  tax  p a id . E quation (5 .3 )  can be r e - w r i t te n  
as fo llo w s:
te  = R -  C (5 .4 )
R
which says t h a t  th e  e f f e c t iv e  CIT r a t e  i s  equal to  the  p e rcen tag e  red u c­
t io n  in  the v a lu e  o f the  m achine.
From eq u atio n s  (5 .2 )  and (5 .4 )  we o b ta in :
te  = t  U  -  p) (5 .5 )
(1 -  tp )
Equation (5 .5 )  says th a t  the  system  o f v a rio u s  ta x  p ro v is io n s  has 
a s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t  on th e  e f f e c t iv e  tax  r a t e .
So f a r ,  we have im p l ic i t ly  assumed one o f  the fo llo w in g  two assump­
t io n s .  E i th e r  the CIT i s  no t s h i f te d  forw ard o r backward o r in  the  case 
o f s h i f t i n g  th e re  i s  no in te r - c o u n try  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r o f i t s  tax  in c id e n c e . 
The t e s t in g  o f  th e  sym m etrical tax  s h i f t in g  h y p o thesis  in  the  E .E .C . has 
im p o rtan t im p lic a tio n s  fo r b u s in ess  ta x  harm onization  and E .E .C . c a p i t a l  
m arket. A s im p lif ie d  a ttem p t has been made to  t e s t  t h i s  h y p o th esis  
which argues t h a t  th e re  i s  s tro n g  in d ic a t io n  th a t  ta x  s h i f t i n g  asymmet­
ry  i s  the case (G. A gap ito s, 1974). T h ere fo re , i f  t h i s  i s  so , th e  in ­
c idence  ta x  r a t e  should  be taken  in to  accoun t.
C ontinuing our example, we assume th a t  the GIT i s  s h i f te d  by a
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degree equal to  b p e r  cen t of t .  To f in d  the new e f f e c t iv e  tax  r a te  
( th e  inc idence  tax  r a te )  we fo llo w  th e  same p ro cess  as b e fo re .
E quations (5 .1 )  (5 ,2 )  and (5 .4 )  now a re  w r i t te n  as co rre sp o n d in g ly :
T = (1 -  b) t  (R -  pC) (5.1')
C = R ^ /l -  ( l - b T ^  (5.2')
1 -  ( l - b ) t p
te  = R -  C (5 .4 )
R
where te  i s  the new e f f e c t iv e  ta x  r a t e .
Prom eq u a tio n s  (5 .2 )  and (5.4 ') we o b ta in :
te  « ( l - b ) t  (1 -p ) (5.5 ')
1 -  ( l - b ) t p
Comparing (5 .5 )  and ( 5 .5 ')  we see th a t  t e ' i s  sm a lle r  than  te  
(s in c e  a  sm a lle r  number, (1 -b ) t  ( l - p ) , i s  d iv id ed  by a g r e a te r  number 
1 - ( l - b ) t p ,  s in ce  b i s  a  p o s i t iv e  number sm a lle r  them o n e).
Assuming now th a t  a harm onization  p ro cess  has le d  to  s im ila r  ta x  
bases and s im ila r  c o n d itio n s  o f in c id en ce  and s h i f t i n g  o f  the CIT, the 
q u e s tio n  i s  how th e  nom inal ta x  r a te s  should be harmonized? Three 
schoo ls  have developed th re e  approaches reg a rd in g  th i s  issu ed
5 .5 .5 .3  THREE APPROACHES FOR TAX RATE HARI40NIZATI0N
The q u estio n  o f  w hether d iv e rg e n t r a te s  o f tax es  upon the same fa c ­
to r  o r p ro d u c tio n  w ith in  an economy or w ith in  an economic union  a re  
com patib le  w ith  an optimum a l lo c a t io n  o f th a t  f a c to r  has been debated  
fo r  a long  tim e. P a r t i c u l a r ly ,  the  d i f f e r e n t  tax  r a t e s  a p p lie d  on in ­
come from the c o rp o ra te  s e c to r  and th a t  from the noncorpora te  s e c to r ,  
i t  has been argued , c re a te s  a flow  o f  c a p i t a l  from the  form er s e c to r  
to  the l a t t e r  (H arbeger type flow) o r d i f f e r e n t  r a te s  o f co rp o ra te  
tax es  between in te g ra te d  c o u n tr ie s  may c re a te  a c a p i t a l  flow from one 
Country to  a n o th e r . M oreover, from optinum a l lo c a t io n  p o in t o f  view 
how should th ese  r a te s  be harmonized? In  the th eo ry  o f  tax  harmoni­
z a tio n  th re e  approaches have been developed re g a rd in g  th i s  m a tte r .
The e q u a liz a t io n , the  s tan d a rd s  and th e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  approach .
The e q u a liz a tio n  approach i d e n t i f i e s  ta x  harm onization  w ith  eq u a l­
iz in g  ta x  • 'ra tes  o f  the  in te g ra te d  c o u n tr ie s ,  th ereby  l im i t in g  i t s
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scope to  on ly  ta x a t io n  p o lic y  ( t h i s  approach is  s im i la r  to  th e  presumed 
s o lu t io n  fo r  the H arberger type flow  d iscu ssed  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  i s ,  equa­
l i z a t i o n  o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e  and n o n -co rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e ) .  I t s  p u r­
pose i s  to  e s ta b l i s h ,  w ith in  the  in te g ra te d  a re a ,  c o n d itio n s  analogous 
to  th ese  o f an in te r n a l  m arket. In  D o sse r 's  in te r p r e ta t io n  th i s  means 
th a t  any f a c to r  o f  p ro d u c tio n  shou ld  be s u b je c t to  the same ta x  sche­
dule i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  the lo c a t io n  o f  p ro d u c tio n  (D ,D osser, I 966) .
This approach has been su g gested  by th e  Neumark Committee as a  means 
o f  avo id ing  a l lo c a t iv e  d i s to r t io n s  w ith in  the E.E.C, However, some
iy
o th e r s ,  fo r  example, Tinbergen,M eade and Soup have taken  the  o p p o s ite  
view  (M, K raus, I 968 ) . This approach has been o r ity ^ e d  as an "empty 
form ula developed s o le ly  f o r  a d m in is tra tiv e  co n sid e ra tio n s" (M .K rau s , 
1968) .  On the o th e r  hand, the  p roponents o f  th i s  approach argue th a t  
th e  e q u a liz a tio n  o f ta x  r a t e  f i r s t ,  w i l l  enhance co m p etitio n  and se ­
cond, i t  c o n s t i tu te s  a  s te p  towards p o l i t i c a l  un io n . To our know­
le d g e , nobody has p o in te d  ou t the  m e rit  o f th i s  approach concern ing  
the  achievem ent o f  c a p i t a l  ex p o rt n e u t r a l i ty  as we saw in  C hapter two. 
U n fo rtu n a te ly , th i s  can be ach ieved  a t  th e  expense o f  economic manage­
ment and f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  tax  system s. The v a l i d i t y  o f  th a t  
method depends on th e  degree o f  h a rm o n iza tio n -o f the  ta x  b a se , i t  i s  
m eaningless i f  tax  bases a re  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by g re a t  d is c re p a n c ie s .
The S tandards apnroaoh r e f e r s  to the s e t t i n g  up o f  c e r ta in  id e a l  
s tan d a rd s  and the purpose o f harm onization  i s  the g e a rin g  o f  the  tax  
s t r u c tu r e s  o f  the  member s t a t e s  to  ach ieve  th e se  s ta n d a rd s . Such 
s tan d a rd s  may be g en e ra l p r in c ip le s  o f  ta x a tio n  such as the  in tro d u c ­
t io n  o f  tax es  w ithou t "excess burden” , th e  equal tre a tm e n t o f equal e t c .
F in a l ly ,  the d i f f e r e n t i a l  annroach r e f e r s  to  a  harmonious move­
ment o f  ta x  s t r u c tu r e s  o f member s t a t e s  from un sy stem atic  d if f e r e n c e s  
to  sy s te m a tic  d if f e re n c e s  w ith  a view to ach iev in g  c e r ta in  d e fin ed  
o b je c t iv e s  o f  the in te g ra te d  a re a . Under th i s  approach the  ta x  sy s­
tem p lay s  a more a c t iv e  r o le  as a means o f tax  p o lic y  through th e  d i f f e r ­
e n t i a l  im pact upon the  p r iv a te  s e c to r .  This approach i s  in  l in e  w ith  
th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f harm onization  d e sc rib ed  e a r l i e r .  As i t  has 
o f f i c i a l l y  been exp ressed  by the E .E .C .,ta x  harm onization  should  no t 
l im i t  the p ro v is io n  o f  in s tru m en ts  f o r  common an d /o r n a tio n a l economic 
management. There i s ,  indeed  a p o s i t iv e  need fo r  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  in  tax  
r a te s  fo r  both s t r u c tu r a l  and c o n ju n c tu ra l p o l i c i e s .
Summarizing, in  D o sse r 's  words the d i f f e r e n t i a l  approach i s  the
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" im p o rtan t"  th e  "fundam ental" approach . I t  i s  t ru e  t h a t  i s  th e  g ener­
a l l y  accep ted  method. I t s  g r e a te s t  advantage i s  the  f l e x i b i l i t y  in  
reg a rd  to  the re q u ire d  m o d if ic a tio n s  to  s u i t  any p a r t i c u l a r  s i tu a t io n  
w ith in  the in te g ra te d  area* I t  i s  accep ted  because i s  r e a l i s t i c  and 
p ra c t ic a b le  d e sp ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  i s  sub -op tim al o r seco n d -b es t.
The o th e r  two methods may be co n sid e red  as s p e c ia l  cases  o f t h i s  
approach . In  our o p in io n  th e re  i s  no d if fe re n c e  between the  e q u a liz ­
a t io n  and th e  s tan d a rd s  approach . I f  th i s  i s  so then  the e q u a liz a t io n  
approach i s  a p a r t i a l  case  o f  the  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  approach where the  
r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a re  equal to  z e ro .
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5.6  SUMMARY AND OONGLUSIQNS
In  th a t  c h a p te r  we t r i e d  to  answer in  the  fo llow ing  th re e  q u e s tio n s :
1 To what e x te n t i s  c o rp o ra te  tax  harm onization  n e ce ssa ry  
to  make c a p i ta l  flow s in s tru m e n ta l in  ach iev in g  the  aims 
o f I r e a ty  o f Rome,
2 To what e x te n t a c t io n s  which have been taken by the  E.E .C . 
toward to  th i s  g o a ls  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  and
3 What a d d it io n a l  a c t io n s  a re  re q u ire d  to  supplem ent those  
which have been tak en .
We found f i r s t ,  th a t  c o rp o ra te  ta x e s  in  th e  E .E .C , c o u n tr ie s  v a ry  
n o t on ly  in  system s and r a te s  b u t a lso  in  c a lc u la t in g  the  tax  b ase .
Seven o f  the  n in e  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s  have an im pu ta tion  system  bu t each 
o f  th e se  d i f f e r s  from th e  o th e rs  on v a rio u s  te c h n ic a l p o in ts .  The tax  
r a te s  v a ry  from 56 p e r  c en t to  $6 p e r  c e n t, whereas d iv e rg in g  p ro v is io n s  
a f f e c t in g  the  ta x  bases make i t  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  compare in  a  meaning­
f u l  way the  e f f e c t iv e  tax  burden on investm ent income.
Second, in  a d d itio n  to  th a t  in e f f ic ie n c ie s  and in e q u i t ie s  a r i s e  
a t  an in te r n a t io n a l  le v e l  due to  v a r io u s  k inds o f  n o n - n e u r a l i t ie s .
To remedy th ese  two a sp e c ts  o f  th e  p re se n t s i tu a t io n ,  a s t r a te g y
o f harm onization  o f  c o rp o ra te  tax es  in  the E.E .C , could move s im u ltan e ­
o u s ly  a long  the  fo llo w in g  l in e s :
F i r s t ,  i t  i s  v e ry  im portan t f o r  the  s t r a te g y  o f harm onization  to  
make th e  c o rp o ra te  ta x  system  com parable. We have seen th a t  th i s  goal 
would in v o lv e  v a rio u s  s te p s  such as th e  e lim in a tio n  o f  the  c o -e x is t in g  
tax es  w ith  the CIT on c o rp o ra te  income and the harm onization  o f the v a r ­
ious elem ents o f the  ta x  b a se .
To make p ro g ress  in  th i s  f i e l d ,  the  community has made th re e  
p ro p o sa ls  as the system s o f  company ta x a tio n *  On the  o th e r  hand, th e re  
i s  no p roposa l fo r  the  harm onization  o f  th e  tax  b a se . In  a d d itio n  to  
th a t  th e  E .E .C , c o u n tr ie s  them selves have done v e ry  l i t t l e  in  the  p a s t  
to  c o -o rd in a te  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  in  th ese  m a tte rs .
Second, as we saw in  C hapter two, c a p i t a l  ex p o rt n e u t r a l i ty  and in ­
t e r  coun try  eq u ity  c r i t e r i a  may e lim in a te  in e f f ic ie n c ie s  and in e q u i t ie s  
in  the E .E .C . These c r i t e r i a  in vo lve  n e u t r a l i t y  w ith two re s p e c ts .  
F i r s t ,  between r e s id e n t  and n o n -re s id e n t in v e s to rs  and second, between
“ 2 4 0 -
investm ent a t  home and investm ent abroad.
To make p ro g ress  in  th i s  f i e l d  the  oommunity has produced th re e  
d i r e c t iv e s .  The f i r s t  i s  concerned w ith  p a re n t- s u b s id ia ry  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip s  the  second w ith m erger-type  tra n s a c t io n s  and th e  t h i r d ,  w ith  
c o rp o ra te  ta x  system s. The f i r s t  two d i r e c t iv e s  p lu s  a r t i c l e s  4» 10 
and 11 o f  the  th i r d  aim to ach ieve  n e u t r a l i t y  between r e s id e n t  and 
n o n -re s id e n t sh a reh o ld e rs  whereas a r t i c l e  5 and 8 o f  the  t h i r d  d i r e c ­
t iv e  aim to ach ieve  n e u t r a l i t y  between investm en t a t  home and in v e s t ­
ment abroad .
S ince the  l a t t e r  p ro p o sa l has been r e je c te d  by th e  C ouncil of 
M in is te rs  because "d e a ls  w ith  on ly  h a l f  o f the problem" the  commission 
should  extend th a t  to cover th e  o th e r  h a l f  o f  the problem , th a t  i s ,  
th e  ta x  base ( I n t e r t a x ,  1979 /10). In  a d d itio n  to th a t  a l l  the  p ro p o s a ls , 
co n cern in g  the  system s o f c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n , su g g es t one common system  
fd rv a ll th é tm e m b e i s t a t e s .  I t  would n o t be u n r e a l i s t i c  to  say  th a t  i f  
the  commission fa c e s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  in tro d u c in g  a common system , an 
a l t e r n a t iv e  s o lu t io n  could  be to  t r y  to  o b ta in  n e u t r a l i t y  th rough  the 
r u le s  which we e s ta b l is h e d  in  c h a p te r  two *
So f a r  we have been accum ula ting  the n ecessa ry  in fo rm a tio n  f o r  
d is c u s s in g  the  second and the  th i r d  aims o f th is  d i s s e r t a t i o n .  We have 
c o n tra s te d  from a th e o r e t i c a l  p o in t o f  view , the im p u ta tio n  and the  
d iv idend  p a id  ded u ctio n  system . In  a d d itio n  to  th a t  we have d iscu ssed  
how the l a t t e r  a p p lie s  to  G reece. The E.E .C . p ro p o sa l p ro v id es  the 
te c h n ic a l  form o f  the im p u ta tio n  system . T herefo re  we proceed  to  d i s ­
cuss the  rep lacem ent o f  th e  e x is t in g  Greek system  w ith  th e  im p u ta tio n  
system  and to  c o n s id e r  th e  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  rep lacem ent upon some a re a s  
o f  th e  Greek economy.
- 2 4 1 -
NOTES; CHAPTER FIVE
1 . o k 3  +  ( .2 5  X .55) = .45  + 13*75 = 58 .75 .
-55  + ( .2 5  X .45) = .55  + 11.25  = 66*25.
2 . Amount o f w ith h e ld  ta x : w = nd (1) where th e  amount o f
such ta x  and i s  th e  nom inal w ith h o ld in g  ta x  r a t e  and
d i s  th e  amount o f  d iv id e n d . A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  w = r  (d+cd)
(2) w h e re .r  i s  th e  e f f e c t iv e  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  r a t e  and c 
i s  th e  c r e d i t  r a t e .  From ( l )  and (2) we g e t w = nd =
(d+cd) o r r  = / ( I  + c) and s in ce  = 0 .2 5  we g e t r  = 25/ l + c .
See fo r  t h i s  p ro o f in  E .T . 19?6 p . 129.
5 . See fo r  th e  d e r iv a t io n  o f  t h i s  r a t i o  in  N.T. Ture (1964).
4 . See s e c t io n  5 * 4 .4 .5 .
5 . See fo r  à  d is c u s s io n  D .D osser, 1975*
6 . See fo r  a  d is c u s s io n  D. D osser, 1966.
— — — o o O o o  — ——
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FIVE
CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
In BELGIUM rea lized  ca p ita l gains are those, which accrue to a 
company from the d isposal o f i t s  a s se ts . They are considered p ro fits  
and therefore subject to taxation . However, some exemptions are pro­
vided i f  certa in  conditions are f u l f i l l e d .  Realized cap ita l gains 
owing to damages, expropriations or sim ilar events which are related  
to tangible and intangib le a sse ts  are exempt from taxation , ihey are 
also exempt i f  they are reinvested in  development areas within a speci­
f ie d  period.
The above exemptions to both rea lized  and non-realized ca p ita l 
gains are provided i f  the follow ing two conditions are f u l f i l l e d .
First* they are (and remain; included in one or more separate accounts 
on the l i a b i l i t i e s ’ side and second, they are not used for the creation  
or increase o f the lega l reserve or for any kind o f reward or bonus.
Under the DANISH tax law rea lized  cap ita l gains are included in  
the taxable income o f the company. As cap ita l gains from the sa le  of 
se cu r itie s  are considered those which were held for two years and not 
due to the ordinary course of business. They are calcu lated  on the 
difference between the purchase and sa le  p rice.
In FRANCE, the tax law d istin gu ish es the cap ita l gain between 
short-term and long-term. Both short-term and long-term cap ita l gains 
could be netted from short-term and long-term ca p ita l lo sse s  at the 
end of the year. An exemption is  made for long-term ca p ita l gains 
attributab le to bu ild ings. In the case of short-term ca p ita l gains 
and lo sse s  i f  the balance i s  net gain i t  i s  taxable at the f u l l  CIT 
ra te . I f  i t  is  a lo ss  i t  i s  deducted from the current's year's taxable 
income. On the other hand, i f  they are net long-term ca p ita l gains 
may f i r s t  be used to absorb operating lo sses  of the firm. The balance 
over the lo sses  is  taxed a t reduced tax rates 25% on ca p ita l gains re­
su lted  from the sa le s  of bu ild ings, s i t e s ,  and 15 per cent on those re­
su lted  from other a sse ts .
The GERMAN tax law considers a l l  tax gains from sa le  or other d is ­
p osition  o f business property as normal business income and taxes them 
at normal ra tes.
In IRELAND ca p ita l gains resu ltin g  from the disposal of a ssets  are 
considered as p ro fits  of the company and they are taxed at a specia l
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r a t e  o f 30 p e r c e n t .  In  a d d i t io n  to  th a t  th e  c a p i ta l  g a in s  ta x  a c t  
1978, in tro d u ced  an in d e x a tio n  r e l i e f ,  to  take account o f  i n f l a t i o n  
d u rin g  the  p e rio d  o f  ow nership o f  a s s e t s .
The ITALIAN ta x  law c o n s id e rs  th e  s a le  o f c a p i t a l  a s s e ts  as a 
normal b u s in ess  a c t i v i t y ,  th e r e f o r e ,  g a in s  r e s u l te d  from th e se  a c t i ­
v i t i e s  c o n s t i tu te  a p a r t  o f  th e  b u s in e ss  p r o f i t s .
There i s  n o t any d is o t in c t io n  between g a in s  r e s u l te d  from s a le  o f 
c a p i t a l  a s s e ts  and th o se  r e s u l te d  from th e  s a le  o f  n o n -c a p i ta l  a s s e ts  
under the  LUXEMBOURG ta x  law . I f  c e r ta in  c o n d itio n s  a re  f u l f i l l e d  the
ta x a t io n  o f  c a p i ta l  g a in s  may be postponed o r  n o t tax ed  a t  a l l .
In  th e  NETHERLMI36, c a p i t a l  g a in s  a re  co n sid e red  as o rd in a ry  in ­
come, as th ey  a cc ru e , and a re  tax ed  a t  norm al r a t e s .
The UNITED KXNGDOM ta x  law  co n sid e rs  c a p i t a l  g a in s  as p a r t  o f  the 
company's t o t a l  p r o f i t s  b u t i t  ta x es  them a t  a low er ta x  r a t e .  Under 
c e r ta in  c o n d itio n s  th e  ta x a t io n  o f c a p i ta l  ga ins may be d e fe r re d .
ÜAPITAL LOSSES
In  BELQUIM. c a p i t a l  lo s s e s  a re  s e t  o f f  a g a in s t  c a p i t a l  g a in s  and 
th e  l a t t e r  a re  tax ed  a t  a reduced  r a t e  on ly  fo r  t h a t  p a r t  which exeeds 
c a p i t a l  lo s s e s .  I f  th ey  a re  no c a p i t a l  g a in s  then  th e se  lo s se s  a re  s e t  
o f f  a g a in s t  o th e r  income o f  the 5 fo llo w in g  ta x a b le  p e r io d s . "C arry ­
back" i s  n o t p e rm itte d  in  Belgium.
In  FRANCE, as we saw b o th  s h o r t- te rm  and lo n g -te rm  c a p i t a l  g a in s  and 
lo s s e s  should  be n e t te d  a t  the  end o f  the  y e a r . I f  th e  b a lan ce  i s  
s h o r t- te rm  c a p i t a l  lo s s e s ,  i t  i s  d e d u c tib le  from c u rre n t y e a r 's  ta x ­
a b le  income.
In  GERMANY c a p i t a l  lo s s e s  a re  f u l l y  d e d ic t ib le .  One y e a r  c a r ry
back i s  allow ed and th e  amount i s  l im ite d  to  5•COO.000 UN. This c a r ry  
back i s  com pulsory. I f  th e re  i s  any excess o f lo s s e s  then  a c a r ry  
forw ard i s  c a l le d  fo r  th e  5 fo llo w in g  y e a rs .
In  IRELAND c a p i t a l  lo s s e s  a re  f u l l y  d e d u c tib le  and the  b a lan ce  i f  
i t  i s  a g a in , i s  ta x a b le . I f  i t  i s  a lo s s  i s  allow ed to  be c a r r ie d  
forw ard w ith o u t time l im i t  a g a in s t  fu tu re  income.
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In  ITALY a lo s s  fo r  any ta x  p e rio d  can be c a r r ie d  forw ard to r e ­
duce income o f  the  fo llo w in g  5 y e a r s .  No c a r ry  back o f  lo s s e s  i s  p e r­
m itte d  n e i th e r  f o r  c o rp o ra te  income ta x  nor fo r  lo c a l  income ta x  p u r­
p o ses .
In  LUXEMBOURG, a company i s  e n t i t l e d  to  deduct as expenses, c a p i­
t a l  lo s s e s  in  one o f  th e  fo llo w in g  5 y ea rs  under c e r t a in  c o n d itio n s . 
These c o n d itio n s  im ply th a t  i f  the  company f a i l s  to  deduct lo s s e s  which 
a re  c a r r ie d  forw ard in  th e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s ib le  y e a r i t  lo s e s  i t s  r i g h t  
to  do so in  subdequent y e a rs .
In  th e  NETBERLANDS a company i s  allow ed to c a r ry  back lo s s e s  in  
one y e a r o r  to  c a r ry  forw ard them in  the  fo llo w in g  6 y e a rs .
In  the  UNITED KINGIDM th e  ta x  tre a tm e n t o f  lo s s e s  v a r ie s  a cco rd ­
in g  to  th e  ca te g o ry  o f  income which the  lo s s  r e l a t e d .  They may be 
c a r r ie d  forw ard w ith o u t time l im i t  bu t they may be c a r r ie d  backward 
fo r  th e  5 p roceed ing  y e a r s ,
PROVISIONS FOR TAX-FREE RESERVES
BELGIAN ta x  law does n o t p e rm it the  g e n e ra l c re a t io n  and use  o f  
ta x - f r e e  re s e rv e s ;  the B elg ian  ta x  law o r th e  a d m in is tr a t iv e  law de- 
c r ib e  c e r ta in  c o n d itio n s  which must be f u l f i l l e d  in  o rd e r  f o r  a firm  
to  be e n t i t l e d  to  p u t a s id e  ta x - f r e e  r e s e rv e s .
The IRISH ta x  law does n o t a llo w  re se rv e s  s e t  a s id e  a g a in s t  an­
t i c ip a te d  fu tu re  e x p e n d itu re s , u n in su red  r i s k s  o r  rep lacem ent re s e rv e s  
to  be deducted . On the o th e r  hand, in su ran ce  premiums p a id  to  p r o te c t  
the company a g a in s t  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  i t s  b u s in ess  a re  d e d u c tib le .
The LUXEMBOURG law p e rm its  any k in d  o f re s e rv e  and a company 
may c re a te  v a r io u s  Funds to  which p o r tio n s  o f i t s  p r o f i t s  a re  a l lo c a te d
bu t th e  g e n e ra l r u le  i s  t h a t  th e se  a l lo c a t io n s  a re  n o t d e d u c tib le  from
b u s in ess  income fo r  ta x  p u rp o ses.
The DUTCH ta x  law a llow s re se rv e s  to  be c a r r ie d  ta x - f r e e  f o r  f u t ­
u re  ex p en d itu re s  e ,g ,  p en sio n  paym ents, p rov ided  th e se  ex p en d itu res  
a re  in  accordance w ith  "sound b u s in e ss  p r a c t ic e " .  On th e  o th e r  hand, 
ta x - f r e e  re se rv e s  a re  n o t a llow ed  to  be c re a te d  fo r  g en e ra l p u rp o ses . 
However, some exem ptions o f  th i s  ru le  appear.
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The UNITED KINGDOM ta x  law does n o t g e n e ra lly  a llow  re s e rv e s  and 
p ro v is io n s  to  be d e d u c tib le .  Tax d e d u c t ib i l i ty  depends p r im a r i ly  f i r s t ,  
on w hether a reaso n ab ly  a c c u ra te  e s tim a te  o f  th e  fu tu r e  expenses can 
be made, second, on i t s  degree o f  the  con tingency  and f i n a l l y ,  on the 
absence o f  any s ta tu to r y  p ro h ib itio n *
The FRENCH tax  law a llow s more l i b e r a l  p ro v is io n s  and i t  p ro v id es  
th e  most p ré c is e  d e f in i t io n  o f  p ro v is io n s , P ro v is io n s  may s e t  up fo r  
any purpose bu t fo r  p r o f i t s  to  be d e d u c tib le  as ta x - f r e e  re s e rv e s  th re e  
req u irem en ts  should  be s a t i s f i e d ;  f i r s t ,  they  should  be made in  a n t i ­
c ip a t io n  o f expenses o r lo s s e s  which a re  them selves d e d u c tib le ;  second, 
they  have to  be concerned the c u r re n t  f i s c a l  y ea r and th i r d ,  they  should  
be r e la te d  to  the  expenses o r  lo s se s  th a t  a re  both  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e te r ­
mined and made p robab le  by c u r re n t  e v e n ts .
The DANISH tax  law a llow s a re s e rv e  50 p e rcen t o f  the in v en to ry  
on hand a t  th e  f i n a l  day o f  the acco u n tin g  y ea r to be d e d u c tib le  from 
ta x ab le  income.
The GERMAN ta x  law d is t in g u is h e s  two types o f re s e rv e s . Those which 
a re  formed out o f p r o f i t s  a f t e r  ta x es  (su rp lu s  re s e rv e s ;  and those  f o r ­
med out o f p r o f i t s  b e fo re  ta x a t io n  bu t on which ta x a tio n  i s  d e fe rre d  
( ta x  allow ed re se rv e s  and to  a  c e r ta in  e x te n t s e c r e t  r e s e r v e s ; .  The 
purpose o f su rp lu s  re s e rv e s  i s  to  c o v e r fu tu re  lo s s e s ,  d iv idends o r 
o th e r  c la im s. The tax -a llo w ed  re s e rv e s  in te n d  to  p ro v id e  firm s w ith  
an in c e n tiv e  f o r  c e r ta in  ty p es  o f  in v estm en t. F in a l ly ,  the s e c re t  r e ­
se rv e s  a re  d e fin ed  as th e  amount by which the book v a lu e  o f  an a s s e t  
i s  l e s s  than  the a c tu a l  v a lu e  r e a l i z a b le  should t h a t  a s s e t  be s o ld .
TAXATION OF DIRECTORS' FEES
The BELGIAN tax  law d is t in g u is h e s  between “a c tiv e "  and " in a c tiv e "  
d i r e c to r s  and fees  g ran ted  to  d i r e c to r s  a c t iv e ly  engaged in  th e  manage­
ment o f the company a re  d e d u c tib le  on ly  to  the  e x ten t they  exeed the  
rem uneration  o f  the  h ig h e s t  p a id  in a c t iv e  d i r e c to r s .
The DANISH ta x  law a llow s th e  d e d u c t ib i l i ty  o f  d i r e c to r s ' fe e s
i f  th ey  a re  in  l in e  w ith  fe e s  p a id  to  d i r e c to r s  o f  comparable com panies.
The FRENCH tax  law p a r t i c u l a r ly  s c r u t in iz e s  rem unera tions p a id  to
d i r e c to r s ,  sh a reh o ld e rs  and r e la te d  p e rso n s. Fees p a id  to  d i r e c to r s  
and o f f ic e r s  a re  on ly  d e d u c tib le  i f  they  perform  s p e c ia l  assignm ent 
on b e h a lf  o f  the  company and i f  c e r ta in  co n d itio n s  a re  s a t i s f i e d .
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D irec to rs*  a tten d an ce  fe e s  a re  d e d u c tib le  from tax ab le  base bu t t h e i r  
bonuses a re  n o t. e x c e ss iv e  rem unara tions a re  not a lso  d e d u c ta b le ,
'The t e s t  fo r  "ex cessive"  rem unera tion  i s  made by comparing th a t  o f 
D ire c to rs  o f s im i la r  com panies, th e n , the ex cessiv e  p a r t  i s  taxed  as 
d iv id en d .
Under the  new GERMAN law o n e -h a lf  o f any com pensation p a id  to 
members of the  su p e rv iso ry  board  or o th e r  in d iv id u a ls  fo r  s e rv ic e s  
ren d ered  in  connec tion  w ith  su p e rv is io n  o f the company's management, 
i s  d e d u c tib le , A n o n -sh a reh o ld in g  d i r e c t o r ’s o th e r  com pensation i s  
a f u l l y  d e d u c tib le  expense fo r  CIT p u rp o ses.
The I r i s h  ta x  law does no t impose sp e c ia l r e s t r i c t i o n s  on d i r e c ­
t o r s '  re rau n ara tio n , b u t a  ded u ctio n  fo r th e  f u l l  amount charged in  
the  company’s account could  be ch a llen g ed  in  c e r ta in  c ircu m stan ces .
The ITALIAN tax  laws d is t in g u is h e s  four forms o f com pensation 
payable  to  d i r e c to r s .  F ees, p r o f i t s  p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  a tten d an ce  a llow ­
ance and f ix e d  t r a v e l l in g  a llow ances. D ire c to r ’s fe e s  a re  deduct­
ib le  up to  th e  e x te n t th a t  th e y  a re  deemed to  be re a so n a b le .
The LUXEMBOURG law does n o t in  g en e ra l allow  a company to  de­
duct from th e  tax ab le  base any forms o f com pensation p a id  to  members 
o f  i t s  board of d i r e c to r s ,  i t s  su p e rv iso rs  or company o f f i c e r  in  
s im i la r  p o s i t io n ,  but an exem ption o f t h i s  ru le  occurs i f  the r e -  
m unaration i s  pa id  in  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  e x e rc ise  o f m anageria l fu n c tio n s , 
such rem uneration  i s  then  d e d u c tib le . The g en e ra l employment c o n d it­
io n s  w il l  determ ine the amount o f  the  a p p ro p r ia te  s a la r y .
The NETHERLANDS tax  law a llow s a company to  deduct f o r  co rp o ra te  
income ta x  purposes any com pensation p a id  to  i t s  su p e rv iso ry  board , 
o th e r  in d iv id u a ls  fo r  s e rv ic e s  ren d ered  in  connection  w ith  the su p er­
v is io n  o f co rp o ra te  management o r  com pensation p a id  to  g en e ra l manag­
e rs  fo r  s e rv ic e s  ren d ered . But i f  he i s  a lso  a sh a re h o ld e r , ex cessiv e  
com pensation may be deemed as a h idden p r o f i t s  d i s t r ib u t io n  and not 
be d e d u c tib le . The t e s t  f o r  ex cessiv e  payment i s  b a s ic a l ly  made by 
comparing th a t  w ith  th a t  p a id  to  n o n -sh a reh o ld in g  persons fo r  s im ila r  
s e rv ic e s .
F in a l ly ,  the  UNITED KINGDOM law allow s companies to deduct as
-2 4 7 -
expenses both  fe e s  and s a l a r i e s  p a id  to  i t s  d i r e c to r s ,  i r r e s p e c t iv e  
o f  w hether the l a t t e r  a re  a lso  sh a re h o ld e rs . However, in  th e  case  o f  
a c lo se  company the  l e g i s l a t i o n  d e fin e s  the  term  d i r e c to r  f i r s t ,  as 
any person  who a c tu a l ly  ho ldes the p o s i t io n  o f a d i r e c to r ,  w hatever 
he i s  c a l le d ,  second, any manager employed by the  company who w ith 
h is  a s s o c ia te s  ownes o r c o n t r o l l s  20 p e r  cen t o r more o f  th e  o rd in a ry  
sh are  and f i n a l l y  any person  in  accordance w ith whose in s t r u c t io n s  th e  
d i r e c to r s  a re  accustomed w ith .
TAXATION OF INTEREST
TheBELGIAN ta x  law co n sid e rs  as ex cessiv e  i n t e r e s t  charge and th e re ­
fo re  no t d e d u c tib le , the  p a r t  o f  th e  i n t e r e s t  exceeding  the  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  o f  the B elg ian  N a tio n a l Bank in c re a se d  by 5 p o in ts  o r  exceeds 9 
p e r  c en t i f  the N a tio n a l Bank r a t e  i s  under 6 p e r c e n t .
The BANISH tax  law excludes from th e  ta x a b le  base i n t e r e s t  payments 
p a id  on a long -term  and s h o r t- te rm  b u s in ess  deb ts  b u t i f  p a id  to  sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  th ey  may be co n sid e red  as h idden p r o f i t s  d i s t r i b u t io n ,  espec­
i a l l y  where the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  h ig h e r than  norm al.
The FRENCH ta x  law a llow s the  d e d u c t ib i l i t y  o f i n t e r e s t  payments 
p a id  to  th i r d  p a r t i e s  i f  th e  d eb t i s  in c u rre d  in  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f and 
fo r  b u s in ess  purposes o f the company. A presum ption e x is t s  th a t  loans 
o r  advances d i r e c t l y  o r i n d i r e c t ly  made to  sh a reh o ld e rs  a re  c o n s tru c tiv e  
(h idden ; d iv id e n d s , however, the  excess i n t e r e s t  i s  added back to  ta x ­
ab le  income and is  t r e a te d  as d iv idend  d i s t r ib u t io n s  to  the  sh a reh o ld ­
e r s .
The GERMAN and the LUXEMBOURG tax  law follow  th e  same p o lic y , in  
g e n e ra l , they  a llow  d e d u c t ib i l i ty  o f  i n t e r e s t  payments p a id  to  th i r d  
p a r t i e s  fo r  b u s in ess  purposes but e x c e ss iv e ly  h igh  r a te s  pa id  to 
sh a reh o ld e rs  o r a f f i l i a t e d  companies may be deemed "h idden” p r o f i t s  
d i s t r ib u t io n .
The IRISH ta x  law imposes more severe  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i n t e r e s t  
paym ents. The F inance Act 1974 in tro d u ced  p ro v is io n s  in tended  to  r e ­
s t r i c t  tax  r e l i e f  to  i n t e r e s t  no t exeeding £2,000 in  a tax  y e a r . The 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  d o n 't  app ly  i f  th e  firm  can show th a t  the i n t e r e s t  i s  a 
b u s in ess  expense.
The UNITED KINGDOM tax law allow s the d e d u c t ib i l i ty  o f " sh o r t"
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i ï i t e r e s t ,  th a t  i s ,  i n t e r e s t  in  a  f l a c tu a t in g  c u rre n t account such as 
a bank o v e rd ra f t ,  as opposed to  i n t e r e s t  on a term  lo an  by a tra d in g  
company in  com puting tra d in g  incom e.
TAXATION OF INTERCORPORATE DIVIDENDS
The U.K. and the  I r i s h  ta x  laws p rov ide  f u l l  ta x  exemption from 
c o rp o ra te  ta x  on r e c ip ie n t  company o f a l l  d iv idend  re c e iv e d  w ithou t 
any s p e c ia l  c o n d itio n  to  be s a t i s f i e d ,  in  I r e la n d , under the  fo llo w ­
in g  two c o n d itio n s  th ese  p r o f i t s  a re  a lso  exempt from income ta x  w ith ­
h e ld  by the  d i s t r ib u t in g  company: f i r s t ,  both the p a re n t and the  sub­
s id ia r y  company to  be r e s id e n t  in  I r e la n d ,  and second, the  p a re n t com­
pany to  own a t  l e a s t  75 p e r c en t o f  th e  is su e d  sh are  c a p i t a l  o f  the 
s u b s id ia ry  company. Under the  U.K. im p u ta tio n  system  i n t e r  company 
d iv idend  a re  s u b je c t to  the advance payment o f  c o rp o ra tio n  ta x  when 
a re  i n i t i a l l y  d i s t r ib u te d  by the s u b s id ia ry  company to  the  p a re n t.
The form er deducts th i s  payment from i t s  f in a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  whereas 
the  l a t t e r  i s  n o t re q u ire d  to pay a new advance c o rp o ra tio n  tax  when 
i t  r e - d i s t r i b u t e s  th ese  to i t s  s h a re h o ld e rs . However, the i n i t i a l  
advance c o rp o ra tio n  ta x  payment and the  b e n e f i t  o f  c r e d i t  a re  passed  
on to  the  u lt im a te  sh a re h o ld e r .
Under the  new GERMAN system  in te rc o p o ra te  d iv idend  a re  exempt 
from co rp o ra te  tax es  b u t through a d i f f e r e n t  p ro cess  than  th a t  d es­
c r ib e d  above. D is tr ib u t io n s  to th e  p a re n t from a s u b s id ia ry  c a r ry  a 
c r e d i t  56 p e r  cen t o f the  tax  p a id  by the s u b s id ia ry . In  a d d it io n  to 
th a t  a 25 p e r  cen t w ith h o ld in g  ta x  i s  le v ie d . The r e c ip ie n t  c o rp o ra ­
t io n  may s e t  a g a in s t  i t s  f in a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  both the  im puted d iv idend  
ta x  c r e d i t  and th e  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  p a id  by the  d i s t r ib u t in g  company.
The ITALIAN tax  law a lso  r e s u l t s  in  an exemption o f  dom estic in ­
te rc o rp o ra te  d iv idend  from the  GIT. This is  so because under the im­
p u ta t io n  system  in tro d u ced  in  one th i r d  o f  d iv idends re c e iv e d  from 
r e s id e n t  companies may be c re d ite d  a g a in s t  th e  company income ta x  due 
on the  ag g reg a te  o f  the d iv idend  and the  a tta c h e d  ta x  c r e d i t .  The r e ­
c ip ie n t  company may a lso  c r e d i t  the  ta x  w ithheld  a g a in s t  i t s  company 
income tax  assessm en t.
The DANISH tax  law a llow s fo r  a c o n so lid a te d  balance  s h e e t ,  th a t  
i s ,  fo r  j o in t  ta x a tio n  o f  p a r e n t ’s and s u b s id ia ry s ' p r o f i t s  under the 
c o n d itio n  th a t  th e  p a re n t owns 100 p e r  cen t o f the  s u b s id ia r y 's  sh a res ,
- 2 4 9 -
o th e rw ise  two cases may be d is t in g u is h e d . F i r s t ,  i f  the  p a re n t company- 
owns a t  l e a s t  25 p e r  c en t o f th e  sh a res  o f the s u b s id ia ry , th en  income 
re c e iv e d  by th e  form er i s  exempt from ta x a tio n  in  i t s  hands. Second, 
i f  a  p a re n t owns le s s  th an  25 p e r cen t o f the p a id - in  c a p i t a l  o f th e  
s u b s id ia ry  the  p a re n t in c lu d ed  115 p e r  cen t o f th e  d iv idend  d e c la re d  
i% i t s  income bu t i t  i s  e n t i t l e d  to  a tax  c r e d i t  o f 15 p e r cen t o f  
the  d iv idend  d e c la re d .
Under th e  FRENCH tax  law companies may e le c t  to be su b je c t to  
CIT on th e i r  c o n s o l i ta te d  income. I f  a p a re n t company owns a t  l e a s t  
10 p e r  c en t o f the  sh ares  o f  th e  s u b s id ia ry , i s  exempt from CIT on 
95 p e r c en t o f the g ross amount o f  d iv idend  re c e iv e d  from the  sub­
s id ia r y .  The 5 p e r  c en t p o r tio n  i s  a lump-sum d ed uction  which r e p re s ­
e n ts  deemed expenses r e la te d  to  the c o l le c t io n  o f th e  d iv id en d  r e ­
ce iv e d , This income i s  a lso  exempt from w ith h o ld in g  ta x . I f  th e  p a r­
e n t company r e - d i s t r ib u t e d  th i s  exempt d iv idend  to  i t s  sh a reh o ld e rs  
as advance c o rp o ra te  tax  i s  due on ly  i f  the  a v o ir  f i s c a l  a p p l ie s .  I f  
th e  p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n  owns le s s  than  10 p e r  c en t o f the sh are  o f  the 
s u b s id ia ry , d iv idend  re c e iv e d  by th e  p a re n t a re  s u b je c t to f u l l  c o rp o r­
a te  income ta x  b u t a p a r t i a l  double ta x a t io n  r e l i e f  i s  g iven  fo r  the 
d iv id e n d -re c e iv e d - ta x  c r e d i t  ( a v o ir  f i s c a l )  equal to  50 p e r  cen t o f 
the  d iv idend  re c e iv e d .
In  LUXEMBOURG. the p a re n t company i s  exempt from c o rp o ra te  tax es  
in  d iv idend  re c e iv e d  from i t s  s u b s id ia ry  i f  the  form er owns a t  l e a s t  
25 p e r c en t o f  the  sh a res  o f  the  l a t t e r ,  p rov ided  th a t  i t  h e ld  them 
. from th e  beg inn ing  o f th e  f in a n c ia l  y e a r  and a t  l e a s t  du ring  the 
tw elve months p roceed ing  th e  end o f  the f in a n c ia l  y e a r . These d iv i ­
dend d is t r ib u te d  to  companies which do not f u l f i l  th e se  c o n d itio n s  a 
15 p e r  c en t w ith h o ld in g  ta x  i s  imposed on d iv idends which may be 
c re d i te d  a g a in s t  th e  company ta x  payable  by the p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n .
In  the NETHERLANDS d iv id en d s re c e iv e d  by a p a re n t company a re  
exempt, i f  the  r e c ip ie n t  owns a t  l e a s t  5 p e r  c en t o f  the p a id - in  
c a p i t a l  o f  the d i s t r i b u t i n g  company. I f  the p a ren t company has no 
s u b s ta n t ia l  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  th e  p a id - in  c a p i t a l  o f  the  s u b s id ia ry , 
th a t  i s ,  owns le s s  than  5 p e r  c e n t, d iv id en d s re c e iv e d  by h e r a re  
taxed  as o rd in a ry  b u s in ess  income. In  a d d itio n  to  th a t  a w ith h o ld in g  
tax  equal to 25 p e r  c en t i s  le v ie d  upon th e se  d iv idend  which i s
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c r e d ite d  a g a in s t  the f in a l  income tax  o f  the r e c ip ie n t .
In  BELGIUM. i f  a  p a re n t c o rp o ra tio n  i s  co n sid e red  as q u a l i f ie d  
under "perm ant p a r t i c ip a t io n "  c r i t e r i o r  i s  exempt fo r  95 p e r cen t 
o f th e  d iv id en d  re c e iv e d  from i t s  s u b s id ia ry .  These d iv id en d s  d o n 't  
c a r ry  w ith  them any ta x  c r e d i t .  I f  th e  p a re n t company f a i l s  to  s a t i s ­
fy  th e  above m entioned c o n d itio n  then  i t  i s  taxed  on th e  d iv id en d  r e ­
ce iv ed  from i t s  s u b s id ia ry  bu t a s p e c ia l  c r e d i t  o f 57*5 p e r  c en t o f  
th e  n e t  d iv id en d s  re c e iv e d  i s  g iv en . In  a d d itio n  to  t h a t  a w ith h o ld ­
in g  ta x  o f  20 p e r  c en t i s  le v ie d  which i s  g e n e ra l ly  c r e d i te d  a g a in s t  
the company income ta x .
ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION
Belgium g ra n ts  a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n  under th e  form o f  doub­
l in g  o f  th e  normal d e p re c ia t io n  a llow ances fo r  th e  f i r s t  th re e  y e a r s ,  
f o r  c e r ta in  c la s s e s  o f  a s s e t s ,  i . e .  m achinery and in d u s t r i a l  b u ild in g s  
in  s p e c ia l  developm ent re g io n s .
In  DENMARK, an advance d e p re c ia t io n  allow ance i s  allow ed which 
a p p lie s  to  i n d u s t r i a l  b u ild in g s , m achinery and equipm ent. This p ro v is ­
ion  a p p lie s  on ly  to  th a t  p a r t  o f th e  t o t a l  c o n tra c te d  c o s t  which ex­
eeds DKr, J Q O j O O O ,  30 p e r  c en t o f  th e  excess over DKr 700,000 may be 
w r i t te n  o f f  d u rin g  th e  f i r s t  fo u r y e a rs  fo llo w in g  the  award o f  the  
c o n tra c t  s u b je c t  to  a  maximum 15 p e r  c en t in  any one y e a r ,
FRANCE a p p lie s  a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n  i f  a case  can be made o u t 
fo r  s p e c ia l  c ircu m stan ces . P a r t i c u l a r l y ,  a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n  a re  
a v a i la b le  fo r  b u ild in g s  in  two s p e c i f ic  u s e s . F i r s t ,  as a means to  
prom ote re g io n a l developm ent, a  f i r s t  y ea r 25 per c e n t allow ance i s  
g ran ted  fo r  b u ild in g s  c o n s tru c te d  in  c e r ta in  developm ent a re a s .  Sec­
ond, f o r  b u ild in g s  a cq u ired  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  and te c h n ic a l  r e s e a rc h , a 
f i r s t  y e a r  allow ance o f  50 p e r  cen t may be claim ed and th e  ba lan ce  o f 
ex p en d itu re  i s  w r i t te n  o f f  by th e  normal m ethods.
GERMANY u ses  a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia tio n  fo r  bo th  re g io n a l  and 
c o u n te r  c y c l i c a l  p o lic y  p u rp o se s . Exem ptional a c c e le r a te d  d e p re c ia t io n  
allow ance i s  a p p lic a b le  f o r  investm en t in  c e r ta in  re g io n s . In  gen­
e r a l ,  th e  r a te  o f  30 p e r  c en t o f the c o s t  o f immovable a s s e ts  and 50 
p e r  c e n t o f  the  c o s t  o f  movable a s s e ts  i s  deducted  o v e r th e  f i r s t  f iv e  
y e a r s . . R ecen tly  a 40 p e r c e n t a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia tio n  was in tro d u ce d
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for new ships or a ir c r a ft  reg istered  in Germany.
In ITALY, despite the fa c t  that only the s tr a ig h t-lin e  method of 
depreciation is  allowed, accelerated  depreciation may be claimed for  
new investment on up to 45 por cent o f cost spread over the f i r s t  
three years of operation subject to a maximum of 15 per cent in any 
one year.
The NETHERLANDS use accelerated  depreciation only as a means for 
regional p o lic ie s  and only in certa in  areas outside the Randstad H oll­
and. The provision i s  concerned only with buildings and i t  amounts o f  
16 and 1/3 per cent in  the f i r s t  two years.
Both the U.K. and IRELAND grant accelerated depreciation in the form 
of f i r s t  year allowances. The rates are determined annually in the bud­
g et, In some cases these rates reach lUO per cent.
rates of DEPRECIATION
The GERMAN and LUXEMBOURG governments publish tax rate applied to 
s tr a ig h t-lin e  method whereas the rate of declining-balance method must 
not exceed 20 per cent o f the book value of the a ssets  or twice the 
whichever i s  lower.
The ITALIAN government has a long h istory in  using o f f ic ia l  tables  
for regulating the co st recovery period. Depreciation may not be c a l­
culated for f is c a l  purposes i f  the rates exceed those which have been 
approved by the M inistry o f Finance.
Under the BELGIAN tax law the rates are usually  agreed between the 
taxpayer and the tax a u th o r itie s .
The FRENCH government does not lay down fixed  rates of depreciation .
However, the  firm  proposes fo r  each d e p re c ia b le  a g iven  c o s t  reco v ery  
p e r io d , and i t  c o r r e c ts  i t  i f  i t  i s  too l i b e r a l .  The same l in e  i s  
fo llow ed  by th e ;
NETHERLANDS government, there are no o f f ic ia l  gu idelines and the 
rates of depreciation are agreed between the tax a u th or ities  and the 
taxpayer. Depreciation may be calcu lated  on any basis which is  con­
s is te n t  with souAd commercial p ractice .
The DANISH system provides rates for depreciation of build ing. 
Whereas depreciation in respect o f plant and machinery the taxpayer 
has the option to determine the deductible amount subject to an annual
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c e i l in g  o f  30 p e r  c en t o f the  t o t a l  opening w r it te n  down v a lu e .
The UNITED KINGDOM and IRELAND have d i f f e r e n t  system s o f dep rec­
ia t io n  than  the  o th e r  E .E .C . c o u n tr ie s .  I t  i s  c o n s is te d  o f  i n i t i a l  o r 
f i r s t  y e a r  and annual a llow ances. The r a te s  o f the  i n i t i a l  a llow ances 
a re  more or l e s s  f ix e d  whereas the  r a te s  o f  an annual allow ance i s  de­
term ined  from time to time in  the budget.
CHAPTER S I X 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE' GREEK CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM
6.1  In t ro d u c t io n
The purpose o f  th is  c h a p te r  i s  to  o u t l in e  the  main changes which 
membership o f  the E.E.C, i s  l i k e l y  to  invo lve  in  the  Greek co rp o r­
a te  tax  system, e v a lu a t in g  t h e i r  l i k e l y  e f f e c t s  upon the Greek econ­
omy in  terms o f  e q u i ty ,  e f f i c i e n c y  and growth.
Greece a p p l ie d  f o r  a s s o c ia t i o n  w ith  the E.E.C. in  J u ly ,  1959 and 
became an a s s o c ia te  member by the  Athens Agreement o f  J u ly ,  I 96I .
In  1975» Greece req u e s te d  f u l l  community membership. A f te r  a marathon 
o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  Greece and the E .E .C . s igned  the T rea ty  o f  A ccession 
in  1979 . Thus, Greece w i l l  become the  10th  member o f  the  E.E .C. on 
Jan u a ry ,  1 s t  1981.
In  the  p rev io u s  c h a p te r  we d iscu ssed  the need to  harmonize the  
ta x a t io n  systems w ith in  an in te g r a te d  a re a .  I t  seems re a so n a b le  fo r  
Greece to make some changes in  i t s  tax  system towards the  Common 
M arket’s s ta n d a r iz e d  one. The l a s t  p roposa l o f  the  E.E .C , concerning  
b u s in ess  tax  ha rm onization  c a l l s  fo r  a  common im pu ta tion  system w ith ­
in  the Community. D esp ite  the v a r i a t i o n s  and d i s p a r i t i e s  j u s t  des­
c r ib e d ,  i t  seems rea so n ab le  to conclude t h a t  im p u ta tion  systems f o r  
co rp o ra te  t a x a t io n  a re  going to  be th e  genera l  r u l e  in  Europe, a t  
l e a s t  w ith in  the E.E.C, fo r  some time to come, Seven o f  the  n ine  
member c o u n tr ie s  o f  the Community have a l re a d y  in tro d u ced  t h i s  system, 
d e s p i te  the f a c t  t h a t  the  Council o f M in is te r s  have r e j e c t e d  th e  d i r ­
e c t iv e  as d e a l in g  w ith  only  h a l f  o f  the  problem. I f  t h i s  i s  so the  
changes r e q u ire d  f o r  con fo rm ity  o f  the  Greek b u s in ess  tax  system to 
t h a t  of the E.E.C, c o n s t i t u t e  a  s t r a i g h t  forward e x e r c is e .  Thus, 
th e  burden of our e f f o r t s  w i l l  be co n cen tra ted  on the  impact o f  th ese  
changes upon th e  Greek economy.
6 .2  What Has Been Done During the  A sso c ia t io n  P e rio d
Under the Athens Agreement, Greece and E.E.C, undertook  the  respon­
s i b i l i t y  f o r  ta k in g  s te p s  in  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  harm onization , A t r a n ­
s i t i o n a l  p e r io d  o f  twenty-two y ears  was des ig n a ted  to p rep a re  Greece
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f o r  f u l l  membership. The Agreement emphasized th e  commitment o f  
b o th  p a r t i e s  to  pursue  c o -o rd in a te d  economic p o l i c i e s  aimed a t  b a l ­
ance o f  payments e q u i l ib r iu m , ba lance  growth and p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y .
Since J u ly  1 s t .  1968, Greek i n d u s t r i a l  p roduc ts  have e n te re d  the 
Community w ithout any q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and s in ce  November, 
1 s t ,  1968 , w ithout any t a r i f f s .  Most Greek a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c ts  
have en te red  the Community f r e e  o f  t a r i f f s  and q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  s in c e  January  1 s t ,  1970. On the  o th e r  hand, Greece has a b o l i ­
shed t a r i f f s  f o r  two th i r d s  o f  p roduc ts  imported from the a . E . U . , 
while f o r  th e  rem aining one t h i r d  they  have been le sse n ed  by s i x t y  
p e r  c e n t .  I t  i s  expected t h a t  t h i s  p rocess  w i l l  have f in i s h e d  by 
1984 when the  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p e r io d  ex p ire s  .
In  the f i e l d  o f  t a x a t io n ,  Greece i s  in  the p re p a ra to ry  s ta g e .  I t
■tVio*
has been r e c e n t ly  r e p o r te d ^ th e  Greek government has p rep a red  a d r a f t  
B i l l  f o r  in t r o d u c t in g  a v a lu e  added ta x ,  a cc o rd in g ly  to  the  E.E.C. 
p ro v is io n s .  The in t r o d u c t io n  o f  V.A.T. which w i l l  r e p la c e  a  maze of 
i n d i r e c t  ta x e s ,  w i l l  s im p l i fy  tax  a d m in is t r a t io n  and w i l l  put Greek 
i n d i r e c t  t a x a t io n  in  accord  w ith  E.E.C. p ro v is io n s .  In  the  f i e l d  o f  
d i r e c t  t a x a t io n  n o th in g  s i g n i f i c a n t  has been done to put t h i s  k ind of 
t a x a t io n  in  harmony w ith  the E.E .C. p ro v is io n s .  However, th e  system 
o f  in c e n t iv e s  in c lu d in g  tax  in c e n t iv e s  i s  under review .
Under the  Act o f  A ccession a g e n e ra l  f iv e  y ear  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p e r io d  
was p rovided  w ith in  which the  bulk o f  the ad ju stm en ts  would be com­
p le te d ,  Greece w i l l  be ab le  to d e fe r  u n t i l  51st December, 1985 the 
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  investm ent and u n t i l  51s t  December, 1985, 
the  l i b e l i z a t i o n  o f  t r a n s f e r s  o f  the  proceeds of d i r e c t  investm ent in  
Greece made befo re  12th Jan u a ry ,  1975, by persons r e s id e n t  in  the  
Community. In  the  f i e l d  o f  t a x a t io n  a  p re l im in a ry  exam ination made 
by the  Community re v e a le d  a s e r i e s  of qu es t io n s  which w i l l  have to be 
s tu d ie d  f u r t h e r  be fo re  i t  can be e s ta b l i s h e d  w hether and to what ex­
t e n t  the a p p l i c a t io n  to  Greece o f  Community r u le s  w i l l  c r e a te  problems 
(E.E.C 1976a ) ,  T h e re fo re ,  Greece has been g ran ted  a th ree  y ea r  g race 
p e r io d  fo r  f u l l  im plem entation of the s ix th  D ire c t iv e  r e l a t i n g  to the  
common system o f  V.A.T,
6 .5  Company Tax Conformity to  the E .E .C ,
Since tax  harm onization  does no t aim to  produce i d e n t i c a l  tax  
systems bu t  only  to  b r in g  them in  accord , Greece has two o p t io n s ;
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e i t h e r  to  make th e  n e c e s sa ry  changes in  the  e x i s t i n g  system to  b r in g  
i t  in  harmony w ith  the E.E.C p ro p o s a l ,  o r  to  r e p la c e  i t  by th e  propo­
s a l ,  I f  th e  f i r s t  o p t io n  i s  chosen, then  Greece has to in tro d u ce  the
n e c e ssa ry  changes d e sc r ib e d  in  C hapter Two fo r  o b ta in in g  c a p i t a l  ex­
p o r t  n e u t r a l i t y  and in te r c o u n t r y  e q u i ty  where one co u n try  employs the 
im p u ta tion  system and a n o th e r  th e  d iv id e n d 'p a id  d eduction  system .
Under th e  second o p t io n  the  q u e s t io n  a r i s e s  which type o f  im p u ta t io n  
system Greece should  in tro d u ce  s in c e  th e  e x i s t i n g  im p u ta t io n  system s, 
w i th in  th e  E.E.C, d if fe r . . .  from each o th e r  on v a r io u s  te c h n ic a l  a s ­
p e c t s ,  ¥e b e l ie v e  t h a t  the  second o p t io n  i s  more probable* f o r  two
rea so n s .  F i r s t ,  th e  r e q u i re d  changes in  the  tax  system under the  
f i r s t  o p tio n  would face: the  same r e a c t io n s  as Germany faced when i t  
used the  s p l i t - r a t e  system  and second, the second o p tio n  would b r in g  
the  Greek tax  system  c lo se  to  the  e x i s t i n g  systems in  Europe, A fte r  
a l l ,  Greece i s  the  on ly  co u n try  which has th i s  system , and i t  has had 
i t  f o r  a  p e r io d  o f  twenty-two y e a r s .
In  a develop ing  and g ro w th -o r ie n te d  economy such as the Greek, 
the  need to  take the  maximum o f  c a p i t a l  f o r  development p u ts  a d i f f e r ­
en t emphasis on the  c o rp o ra te  income ta x  developments.
In  Chapter Two we compared the Greek c o rp o ra te  ta x  system w ith  the 
im pu ta tion  system a t  a t h e o r e t i c a l  l e v e l .  Now, we proceed to  d is c u s s  
a more p r a c t i c a l  e x e r c i s e ,  namely, th e  rep lacem ent o f  the  e x i s t i n g  
Greek system by the  proposed im pu ta tion  system by the E.E .C.
6 .4  Changes in  the Tax S t r u c tu re
6 ,4 .1 .
I n t r o d u c t io n
H is to ry  su g g es ts  t h a t  whenever i t  i s  proposed  to  change e s t a b l i s h e d  
ta x  system, l i k e  th e  Greek one, the shape and th e  e x te n t  of th e  tax  
reform  should  be based on a number o f c o n s id e r a t io n s .  I f  t h i s  i s  
no t done th e  consequences a re  o f te n  unexpected and un in tended  h a rd ­
sh ip s  and b e n e f i t s  ensue. T h e re fo re ,  Greek tax  reform  should  be based 
on the  fo l lo w in g  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,
1. The s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  Greek econ­
omy may c o n s t i t u t e  a  c o n s t r a i n t  to  any k in d  o f 
change. The E.E.C. Commission in  i t s  r e p o r t  on 
Greek a p p l i c a t i o n  fo r  membership emphasises th a t  
" c e r t a in  of the  s t r u c t u r a l  f e a tu r e s  o f  the Greek 
economy should be g iven  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  in
—256“
so f a r  as th ey  may l i m i t  the Greek governm ent's  
a b i l i t y  to  conform to th e se  p ro v is io n s  upon a c -  
cPèssion. Thus the  c o u n t r y 's  f i s c a l  s t r u c t u r e  
(v e ry  low p ro p o r t io n  o f  d i r e c t  t a x e s ) ,  i t s  bank­
ing  system , e t c .  do no t appear to be s u f f i c i e n t l y  
developed to meet Community requ irem ents  as they 
a re  s e t  out in  th e  C o u n c i l 's  D ire c t iv e  d a ted  18th 
February 1974 on s t a b i l i t y ,  growth and f u l l  em­
ployment" (E .E .C .1976a ) ,
2 ,  The reform in  q u e s t io n  should  not be a -o n ce-
a n d - f o r - a l l  b u s in e s s  b u t  i t  must c o n s t i t u t e  th e  
b a s is  f o r  f u r t h e r  f u tu r e  reform s when th e  f i n a l  
s o lu t io n  has been given to the  bus iness  ta x  h a r ­
m onization  problem.
5* At t h a t  s tag e  th e  reform  should be confined
to  the system o f CIT and f u r t h e r  reform concern ing  
the v a r io u s  e lem ents o f  the  tax  base w i l l  take  
p lace  when the E.E.C Commission p rov ides  the  mem­
ber s t a t e s  w ith  a  p ro p o sa l  in  t h a t  a re a .
4 . The a p p ro p r ia te  new r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p e r ­
sona l income ta x  and c o rp o ra te  income tax  and the 
r e l a t i v e  weight to be p laced  on each, shou ld  take 
in to  account th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of ta x  burden , growth 
and o th e r  f i s c a l  and s o c i a l  a s p e c t s .
In  o rd e r  to save space we have p repa red  a t a b l e  o u t l i n in g  what 
we th in k  to be th e  most im portan t changes in  the  E .a .C  p ro p o sa l .
To prov ide  a more complete b a s i s  fo r  comparison, the  t a b l e  a lso  
mentions some o f  th e  f e a tu r e s  o f  the p re sen t  system  ( t a b l e  6 .1 ) .
6 . 4 .2  Tax Base
Under th e  e x i s t i n g  Greek system CIT i s  l e v ie d  on t h a t  p a r t  o f  
p r o f i t s  which remains in  the c o rp o ra t io n  on ly , whereas th e  d i s t r i b u ­
te d  p a r t  i s  taxed  under the  p e rso n a l  income ta x  r u l e s .  The E.E.C,
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T A B L E  6:1
A COMPARISON BETWEEN PRESENT AND PROPOSED CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM
PRESENT SYSTEM PROPOSED SYSTEM REQUIRED CHANGE
1, Tax Base U n d is t r ib u te d
P r o f i t s
U n d is t r ib u te d  &
d i s t r i b u t e d
P r o f i t s
E x ten s io n  o f 
the  tax  base to  
in c lude  d i s t r i b ­
u te d  p r o f i t s .




o f  Corpor­
a te  Source 
Income in  
the  hands of 
i n d i v i d u a l s .
100 p e r  cen t 
o f  d iv idend  
r e c e iv e d  a re  
in c lu d ed  in  
income. A 
s p e c i f i c  a -  
mount i s  ex­
empt from 
sh ares  quoted 
w ith  A .S.E .
An im puta tion  
c r e d i t  must be 
g ra n te d  o f  b e t ­
ween 45%-5 5% 
o f  the  Corpor­
a te  l e v e l  tax  
a p p l ic a b le  to 
the  income d i s ­




ory  Tax — — — Equal to  the 
amount of im­
p u ta t io n  
c r e d i t  a p p l i ­
cab le  l e s s  any 
amount of CIT 




ho ld ing  
ta x .
38%-47# Reduction by 
13%-22% .
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p roposa l re q u ire s  the  ex ten s io n  of GIT to  p r o f i t s  which a re  d i s t r i ­
bu ted ,  Thus, l i k e  th e  e x i s t i n g  system , the new system would achieve  
p a r t i a l  i n t e g r a t io n  f o r  d i s t r i b u t e d  co rp o ra te  p r o f i t s ,  but th e  n eces­
sa ry  ad justm en ts  would be made a t  the  in d iv id u a l ,  r a t h e r  th an  the  
c o rp o ra t io n  l e v e l .  This c o n s t i t u t e s  th e  prim ary o p e r a t io n a l  d i f f e r ­
ence between the  two system s. However, the  prim ary  mai-yj d i f f e r e n c e  
between im pu ta tion  system and the  d iv idend  d eduction  system 
i s  the  ex ten s io n  o f  GIT on d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  as w e l l .
The s tu d y  o f  the  t re a tm en t o f  v a r io u s  e lem ents which c o n s t i t ­
u te  the  tax  base i s  beyond th e  purpose of t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  f o r  two 
re a so n s ,  i f ' i r s t ,  th e re  i s  no p ro p o sa l  from the E.E.G fo r  tax  base 
harm onization  and second, th e re  a r e ,  as we saw, d is c re p a n c ie s  between 
the E.E.C member s t a t e s  on the  s u b je c t  w ithout any c l e a r  tendency fo r  
the E.E.C c o u n tr ie s  them selves to  reduce  th e se  d is c re p a n c ie s  as th e re  
a re  f o r  the system of GIT, However, we expressed  some p re l im in a ry  
id eas  how th ese  d is c re p a n c ie s  could  be le ssen ed  in  the  p rev ious  
c h a p te r .
6 . 4 .5  Tax Rate and Tax G red it
Under a system o f g ro ss in g -u p  th e  d iv idend  and of a llow ing  a 
c r e d i t  fo r  the GIT, the  s e l e c t i o n  o f  GIT r a t e  and o f  GIT r a t e  e l i g ­
i b l e  f o r  th e  c r e d i t  i s  o b v io u s ly  o f  im portance.
The p roposa l sugges ts  a  ta x  r a t e  on t o t a l  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  
no t l e s s  than  45 p e r  c en t  and n o t  h ig h e r  than 55 p e r  c e n t .  There­
f o r e ,  th e  in c re a s e  o f  the  Greek tax  r a t e  should n o t be l e s s  than  
5 p e r  cen t and n o t  h ig h e r  than  15 p e r  c en t .  In  a d d i t io n  to th e  c re d ­
i t  r a t e  some o th e r  c o n s id e ra t io n s  should  a lso  be taken  in to  accoun t,  
such as the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  the in c re a se  in  ta x  r a t e  may lead  to g r e a t ­
e r  e f f o r t  f o r  evasion  and avo idance , to econom ically  u n j u s t i f i e d  (.but 
d e d u c t ib le )  expenses. The new tax  r a t e  appears l i k e l y  to  be equal 
to o r  l e s s  th a n  50 p e r  c e n t .  A GIT r a t e  equal to 55 p e r  cen t com­
bined  w ith  a r e d u c t io n  o f  top m arginal pe rso n a l ta x  r a t e  from 60 per 
c en t  to 55 p e r  c e n t  would p rec lude  the postponement of tax  on r e ­
ta in e d  ea rn in g s  s in c e  th e re  i s  no c a p i t a l  ga in s  tax  in  Greece.
The s e l e c t i o n  of GIT r a t e  elil^^ible f o r  the c r e d i t  i s  a more d i f ­
f i c u l t  and p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n t r o v e r s ia l  s u b je c t .  The q u es t io n  i s :
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f u l l  o r  p a r t i a l  c r e d i t ?  The answer is  r e l a t e d  to  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
such as the  purpose of th e  c r e d i t ,  namely, a l l e v i a t i o n  o f  economic 
double t a x a t io n ,  encouragement, o f  in d iv id u a l  investm ent e t c . ,  the  
inc idence  and s h i f t i n g  o f  Greek GIT. As we saw, the E.E.C propos­
a l  r e q u i re s  a p a r t i a l  c r e d i t  w ithou t j u s t i f y i n g  i t s  p re fe re n c e  fo r  
p a r t i a l  and no t f u l l  c r e d i t .  The purpose of th i s  c r e d i t  i s  th e  
a l l e v i a t i o n  o f  economic d o u b le . t a x a t io n .  Greece, s in c e  1958» f u l l y  
a l l e v i a t e s  economic double t a x a t io n .  T h e re fo re ,  i f  Greece wants to 
con tinue  to  do s o ,  i t  shou ld  j o in  Germany and I t a l y ,  in t ro d u c in g  a 
f u l l  im pu ta tion  and n o t  a  p a r t i a l  im pu ta tion  system . However, i f  
Greece would l i k e  to be in  l i n e  w ith  the E.E.G. p ro p o sa l  i t  should 
in tro d u ce  a p a r t i a l  im p u ta t io n  system which would imply a new 
trea tm en t o f  economic double t a x a t io n  in  Greece,
The in t ro d u c t io n  o f  a  compensatory tax  i s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  p u r­
pose o f  the c r e d i t .  That i s ,  i f  th e  c r e d i t  i s  in ten d ed  to a l l e v ­
i a t e  economic double t a x a t io n  o f  co rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  then  the. i n t r o d ­
u c t io n  o f  a compensatory tax  i s  n e ce ssa ry  to safeguard  the  GIT, How­
e v e r ,  i f  th e  c r e d i t  i s  in ten d ed  to encourage in d iv id u a l  investm ent 
in  e q u i t i e s  then the  c r e d i t  should  be provided r e g a rd le s s  o f  whether 
o r  n o t  Greek GIT had been p a id  o r  n o t and th e re  i s  no need fo r  a 
compensatory tax .
We b e l ie v e  th a t  Greece should  in tro d u ce  a f u l l  im pu ta tion  s y s ­
tem as a f i r s t  s tep  towards harm onization  f o r  two re a so n s .
E i r s t ,  the f u l l  im pu ta tion  system i s  c lo s e r  than  the 
p a r t i a l  im pu ta tion  to  the  e x i s t i n g  system, th e r e f o r e ,  
the  e f f e c t s  from th e  reform would be e a s ie r  to p r e d ic t .
Table 6 ,2  shows t h a t  the economic e f f e c t s  f o r  the c o r ­
p o ra t io n  can be s im i l a r  under e i t h e r  th e  d iv idend-ded -  
u c t io n  system o r  the  f u l l  im pu ta tion  system , because 
both  systems le a d ,  fo r  a  g iven revenue, to  s im i l a r  red u ­
c t io n s  in  the  o v e r a l l  ta x  b ia s  a g a in s t  c o rp o ra te  source 
income. Second, as we p o in te d  o u t e lsewhere Greece 
needs c a p i t a l  fo r  i t s  development, which means i n v e s t ­
ment in  e q u i t i e s  should  be encouraged.
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T A B L E  6 . 2
Gompariosn Between Dividend Deduction System and F u l l  im p u ta t io n  System,
P resen t System F u l l  im p u ta t io n
1. CORPORATION '
2 Tax Computation
3 Income 1000 1000
4 Dividend Pa id  D eduction 500 -
5 Taxable income 500 1000
6 Tax a t  50% 250 _ 500
7 Cash E f fe c t
8 Dividends Pa id 500 250
9 Net Cash R eta ined 250 250
10 SHAREHOLDER
11 Tax Computation
12 Dividend Cash 500 250
13 Gross-up - 250
14 Taxable Income 500 500
15 Tax a t  40% 200 200
l6  Tax G red it - 250
17 Cash E f fe c t
18 Dividend Received 500 250
19 Tax Pa id  o r  (Refund) 200 (50)
20 Net Cash Dividend 300 300
21 Total Tax 450 450
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6 . 4 . 4  W ithholding Tax
The purpose o f  a  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  i s  tw ofo ld . F i r s t ,  to f i g h t  
tax  evasion  a t  domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  le v e l  and second, to  a c t  
as a proxy f o r  p e rsona l income tax  on income o f  f o r e ig n e r s .  Under 
the  d iv idend  p a id  dedu c tio n  system the ro le  o f  th e  w ithho ld ing  t a x  i s  
c r u c i a l  from both  p o in ts  o f  v iew s. Greece, to ach ieve  th e se  p u rp o se s ,  
l e v ie s  a h ig h  r a t e  o f  w ith h o ld in g  ta x ,  namely, from 58 p e r  c e n t  to  
47 p e r  c e n t ,  depending on the  n a tu re  of th e  sh a res  which produce 
th e se  d iv id en d s ; t h a t  i s ,  accord ing  to whether they  a r e  quoted  with 
th e  Athens S tock  Exchange o r  n o t  and whether they  a re  r e g i s t e r e d  o r  
b e a r e r  s h a re s .  -A r t ic le  14 o f  the  E.E.C p roposa l g e n e r a l ly  p ro v id es  
f o r  a  25 p e r  cent w ith h o ld in g  ta x  on d iv idend  no m a t te r  who i s  the 
r e c i p i e n t .
At f i r s t  g l a n c e , i t  seems th a t  the w ith h o ld in g  tax  r a t e  i s  r e ­
duced by 13 p e r  c e n t  to  22 p e r  c e n t .  This i s  ifee uominal leducfcion since 
as we have seen under th e  im p u ta tion  system both c r e d i t  and w ith ­
h o ld in g  tax  a c t  in  the  same way. Table 6,3  e x p la in s  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  
In  th e  l e f t - h a n d  s id e  of the  ta b le  the v a r io u s  w ith ho ld ing  ta x  r a t e s  
under the  p re se n t  system a re  shown, in  the  r ig h t -h a n d  s id e  the new 
t o t a l  w ithho ld ing  tax  r a t e s  a re  shown under c o rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e s  equal 
to 45 p e r  cen t and 50 p e r  c e n t ,  we see t h a t  the  new w ith h o ld in g  tax  
r a t e  may be 5 0 , 55 o r  40 p e r  cen t depending on the co rp o ra te  tax  r a t e  
and th e  co rresponden t c r e d i t  r a t e ,  uoncluding , we would argue t h a t  
the  t h e o r e t i c a l  argument concern ing  th e  im pu ta tion  system t h a t  i t  
might improve compliance because the  sh a reh o ld e r  has to r e p o r t  d i v i ­
dends in  o rd e r  to r e c e iv e  th e  c r e d i t ,  i t  i s  not v a l i d  in  our case  
s in ce  under th e  new system the w ithhe ld  ta x  i s  lower than  under the 
p re sen t  system.
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T A B L E  6 . 5
W ithheld Taxes Under the Two Systems
P r e s e n t Proposed
Tax Tax C re d i t W ithholding TOTALRate Tax
A, From sh a res  quoted w ith
A.S.E. 16.25 l?i^75 30.00
a .  R e g is te re d  Shares 38% 20.25 13.75 55.00
b. B earer  Shares 41%
50/o 22.50 12.50 35.00
B, From Shares no t 27.50 12 .50 40.00
quoted w ith  A,S.E.
a .  R e g is te re d  sh ares  4 ^
b . B earer  Shares 47%
i------------------------------------------
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6 .4 .5  A d m in is tra t iv e  S im p l ic i ty
A d m in is tra t iv e  s im p l ic i ty  i s  more im portan t in  l e s s  developed 
c o u n tr ie s  r a t h e r  in  advanced economies, because bureaucracy  and the 
m o ra l i ty  o f  the  taxpayers  a re  no t a t  th e  same s ta n d a rd s  as in  develop­
ed economies. The d iv idend  deduction  system i s  a d m in i s t r a t iv e ly  un­
com plicated  and i t  i s  no t ha rd  to u n d e rs tan d  how i t  works. The im­
p u ta t io n  system, on the  o th e r  hand, because o f  th e  g ro ss in g -u p  
p rocess  a p p l ie d  to i t ,  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to grasp  and sometimes u n i n t e l ­
l i g i b l e  to the  simple s h a r e h o l d e r . , This system could be made simple 
to  him i f  th e  c o rp o ra t io n  would make the  n ecessa ry  c a l c u l a t i o n  f o r  
him and he would be informed on ly  o f  the  amount o f  d iv idends which 
he has to  inc lude  in  h i s  p e rs o n a l  tax  d e c la ra t io n  and the  amount of 
h is  c r e d i t .  However, in  p r a c t i c e  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  two 
system s, from a s im p l i c i t y  p o in t  o f  view, is  not so g r e a t .  In
Greece, f o r  example, th e re  is  a  w ith h o ld in g  tax  w ith h e ld  by the  c o r ­
p o ra t io n  on b e h a lf  o f  the  government. T here fo re , th e  sh a reh o ld e rs  
r e p o r t  in  t h e i r  income ta x  d e c la r a t io n  not the n e t  amount which they 
re c e iv e  from the c o rp o ra t io n  but the  g ross amount which in c lu d e s  the 
w ithhe ld  tax  and they  re c e iv e  a c r e d i t  a g a in s t  t h e i r  f i n a l  tax  l i a ­
b i l i t y  equal to the w ithhe ld  amount.
6 .5  The E f f e c t s  Upon The Greek Economy
6 .5 .1  In t ro d u c t io n
We are  now ready  to tu rn  to  the  t h i r d  and more s i g n i f i c a n t  ob­
j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n ;  the e s t im a te s  o f  th e  impact t h a t  th e
tax  reform would have on the  Greek Economy.
A c l a s s i c  example of an economic change i s  the  case  of f r e e  
t r a d e .  The a b o l i t i o n  o f  t a r i f f s  c r e a te s  a new s i t u a t i o n  f o r  firm s 
and in d iv id u a l s .  Both p a r t i e s  have to a d ju s t  to the new s i t u a t i o n .  
New com petit ion  i s  c re a te d  from abroad. This change re q u i r e s  new 
investm ent in  v a r io u s  f a c i l i t i e s  and equipment fo r  f irm s and a new 
o r i e n ta t io n  fo r  a  group o f  in d iv id u a ls ,
A case r e l a t e d  to the f r e e  t ra d e  case i s  th a t  of tax  harmoni­
z a t io n  in  a common m arket. The f r e e  movement o f  goods and f a c to r s
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o f  p ro d u c tio n  have s im i l a r  bu t w ider impacts than th o se  of the f r e e  
tra d e  case . The t h e o r e t i c a l  s tu d y  o f tax  harm onization  re q u i r e s  the  
ov e rlap p in g  o f  two d i f f e r e n t  f i e l d s  o f  economics: the th eo ry  o f
P u b l ic  Finance and the th eo ry  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  Trade, The s tu d y  o f 
the impact o f  ta x  harm onization  i s  no t con fined , as in  th e  case o f  
f r e e  t r a d e ,  to the  re so u rce  a l l o c a t io n  a sp e c ts  bu t i t  i s  extended to 
cover some o th e r  a sp e c ts  o f  P u b l ic  Finance such a s  revenue, income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  ba lance  of payments and growth.
The macroecoraomic e f f e c t s  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  can be s e n s ib ly  a s s e s ­
sed by ta k in g  in to  account the v a r io u s  feedback r e l a t i o n s h ip s  among 
the c o u n tr ie s  which c o n s t i t u t e  the i n t e g r a t e d  a rea .  This r e q u i r e s  the 
development o f  a  m u lt ic o u n try  model which c ap tu re s  th e  s im ultaneous 
feedbacks among the  member c o u n t r i e s .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  the  develop­
ment o f  such a model r e q u i r e s  c e r t a i n  compromises because of th e  lack  
o f  s u i t a b l e  t im e - s e r ie s  d a ta  o r  the  lack  of c o m p arab i l i ty  in  t im e- 
s e r i e s  da ta  fo r  th e  c o u n t r ie s  in  q u e s t io n .  In  a d d i t io n  to  t h a t  the 
system in e v i t a b ly  becomes q u i t e  la rg e  because i t  c o n s i s t s  of s e v e ra l  
sub-system s which a re  l in k e d  t i g h t l y  to g e th e r .  T h e re fo re ,  th e  deve­
lopment o f  such a model i s  a d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  w ithout p ro v id in g  r e l i a b l e  
r e s u l t s  due to  the many compromises which a re  n e c e s sa ry .  I t  has been 
p o in te d  out t h a t  “ the d is ta n c e  which s t i l l  had to be t r a v e l l e d  
in  o rd e r  to c lo se  the  gap between the p u b l ic  f inance  p u n d its  i n t e r e s ­
ted  in  the  in f lu e n c e  o f  budgetary  t r a n s a c t io n s  @n im portan t macro-
p o l ic y  v a r i a b le s  and the m o d e l -b u i ld e r^ i , w h o  have co n ce n tra te d
l i t t l e  e f f o r t  on s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  r o l e  of the  p u b l ic  s e c to r  in  
t h e i r  c o n s t ru c t io n s"  (A Peacock and M, R ic k e t t s ,  1975). On the o th e r  
hand, the  use  of a  ty p ic a l  eoonanetric model of one co u n try  would no t 
be r e a l i s t i c  s in ce  i t  n e g le c ts  the  economic in te r-dependence  between 
the  member s t a t e s  of the i n te g r a te d  a r e a .
This study makes no attempt to determine the f u l l  equilibrium  
e f fe c t  of changing the CIT system, i t  presents a d eta iled  an alysis  
of the immediate impact of the tax change upon Greek companies and 
the way in which they would, respond to th eir  changed circumstances.
A corporation tr ie s  to avoid the CIT through changes in dividend 
pay-out r a t io , in debt-equity financing or switching to the unincor­
porated sector. Unfortunately, many studies in the liter a tu re  (for
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example, H arberger) assume t h a t  th e re  i s  no f i n a n c i a l  re sponse  o f  the 
c o rp o ra t io n  to  a ta x  change. T h e re fo re ,  we assume t h a t  a tax  reform  
tak es  p la ce  in  Greece n e g le c t in g  t h i s  cause o f  t h i s  re fo rm . The e s t i ­
mates o f  the economic e f f e c t s  r e s u l t i n g  from th i s  re form  r e q u i r e  the 
fo l lo w in g  c o n s id e ra t io n s  to  be taken in to  acco u n t.  F i r s t ,  some o f 
the  main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of th e  Greek co rp o ra te  s e c to r  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
and o f  the  Greek economy in  g en e ra l  d esc r ib ed  in  the  t h i r d  and fo u r th  
c h a p te r s .  Second, th e  degree o f  th e  p re s e n t  economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
between Greece and the  E.E .C . w i l l  determ ine to  some e x te n t  th e  even­
tu a l  economic impact o f  f u l l  membership,
Tvo im portan t and c lo s e ly  i n t e r - r e l a t e d  e f f e c t s  of any change in  
tax  r a t e s  or in  the system o f  t a x a t io n  a re  those  on th e  l e v e l  o f  c o r ­
p o ra te  investm ent and those  on the  r e l a t i o n  o f  d iv id en d  payments to 
a f t e r - t a x  p r o f i t s .  We w i l l  u se  the  econometric pa ram eter  e s t im a te s  
d e sc r ib ed  in  c h a p te r  four to  e s t im a te  th e se  e f f e c t s  e v a lu a t in g  t h e i r  
consequences f o r  income d i s t r i b u t i o n  and growth.
6 . 5*2 Tax Revenue
We saw in  c h ap te r  th r e e  th a t  ta x  revenue from CIT is  un im port­
a n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  we do not expec t the e f f e c t  o f  the  ta x  reform  to be 
s i g n i f i c a n t  in  th a t  a r e a .  In  a d d i t io n ,  as we have a rgued , t h i s  e f f e c t  
may be n e u t r a l i z e d  by choosing the a p p ro p r ia te  ta x  b a se ,  tax  r a t e  and 
the d iv idend  tax  c r e d i t .  A change, i f  any, in  c o rp o ra te  tax  revenue 
w i l l  have an  e f f e c t  upon the  t o t a l  com position of ta x  revenue. In  
f a c t ,  i f  i t  i s  p o s i t i v e  the Greek government could improve the r e l a t ­
ion between d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  tax es  by reduc ing  the  l a t t e r  by the  
co rresponden t amount.
We have made an exam ination  o f  the  tax  revenue which would have 
been r a i s e d  in  1975 had the  proposed system been in  f u l l  e f f e c t  f o r  
a l l  t h a t  y e a r ,  1975 be ing  th e  most re c e n t  year f o r  which we could 
o b ta in  s u f f i c i e n t  d a ta  f o r  d e t a i l e d  e s t im a te s !  Assuming th e  new tax  
r a t e  to be 45 p e r  cen t we ex p ec t  the  reform  to in c re a s e  revenue by 
511.575  thousand DrJ. th a t  i s ,  by 20 pe r  c e n t .  Table 6 .4  shows the  
expected  changes in  revenue f o r  GIT and from p e rso n a l  income t a x .
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T A B L E  6 o 4
The E f f e c t  o f  the  P ro p o sa l  on 1975 Revenue from 
Taxes A ffec ted  by the  Reform
P re s e n t  System Proposed System Change
C orporation  
income ta x .
P e rso n a l  
income tax .










In  our e s t im a te s ,  the ta x  revenue c o l l e c te d  from c o rp o ra t io n  
would be in c re a se d  as a r e s u l t  o f  two types o f  reform s which a re  r e ­
commended, F i r s t ,  the  in c re a s e  in  ta x  r a t e  and second, the  widening 
o f  the tax  base to  in c lu d e  d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s .
The changes in  tax  l i a b i l i t i e s  im plied  by the  p ro p o sa l depend 
cru  d a l l y  on the  response  o f  d iv idends to the tax  change. We t h e r e ­
fo re  analyse  two q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  assum ptions about the  change in  d i v i ­
dends, The f i r s t  assum ption , which we r e f e r  to as " d i r e c t  d iv id en d s  
h e ld  c o n s ta n t"  i s  t h a t  companies co n tinue  to  pay th e  same d iv idends to 
t h e i r  s h a reh o ld e rs ,  t h a t  i s ,  th ey  w r i te  the  same d iv idend  checks t h a t  
they  would i f  th e re  had been no change in  the ta x  law. The second 
assum ption, which we r e f e r  to as "n e t  cash  d iv idends h e ld  co n s ta n t"  
i s  t h a t  sh a reh o ld e rs  r e c e iv e  the same amount of d iv idends  a f t e r  p e r ­
so n a l income ta x  as they  would i f  th e re  had been no change in  the 
tax  law.
Table 6,5 shows how the  tax  l i a b i l i t y  and cash  of both  co rp o r­
a t io n  and sh areh o ld e r  under the  " d i r e c t  d ividends h e ld  co n s tan t"  
h y p o th e s is .  We assume v a r io u s  c o rp o ra te  tax  r a t e s  w ith  the c o r r e s ­
pondent tax  c r e d i t  r a t e s .  Column 1 shows the o p e ra t io n  of the  e x i s ­
t in g  system assuming th a t  f irm s e a rn  l,uOO Drs, and th ey  d i s t r i b u t e  
400 Drs, We see t h a t  the  f i r m 's  tax  l i a b i l i t y  in c re a s e s  from 240 Drs,
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under the  e x i s t i n g  system to 4OO Drs. i f  the  c o rp o ra te  tax  r a t e  
remains equal to  40 p e r  c e n t ,  as i t  i s  now, and to 550 Drs, i f  the 
tax  r a t e  in c re a s e s  to 55 p e r  c e n t  ( l i n e  6 ) ,  The n e t  cash r e t a in e d  
by the f irm  d ecreases  trem endously from 56O Drs, to 50 Drs. ( l i n e  9 ) .  
The sh a reh o ld e r  con tinues  to  re c e iv e  4OO Drs, as p re v io u s ly :  however,
h is  p e rso n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  i s  lower ( l i n e  19). T h e re fo re ,  th e  n e t  
cash d iv idends a re  h ig h e r  u nder  the  new system ( l i n e  2 0 ) ,  This i n ­
c re a se  r e f l e c t s  the  decrease  in  the n e t  cash r e t a in e d  by the co rp o r­
a t io n ,  F in a l ly ,  the  t o t a l  ta x  l i a b i l i t y ,  th a t  i s ,  t h a t  of c o rp o ra t ­
ion b lu s  th a t  o f  th e  sh a reh o ld e r  in c re a s e s  under the  new system 
( l i n e  21 ) ,  I t  i s  worth n o t in g  t h a t  a l l  th e  above d e sc r ib ed  e f f e c t s  
r e s u l t  n o t  on ly  from the change of ta x  systems bu t from th e  in c re a se  
o f  tax  r a t e ,  too .
Table 6 ,6  shows the  e f f e c t s  of the  new system upon tax  l i a b i l i t y  
and cash under the  " n e t  cash d iv idends h e ld  c o n s ta n t"  assum ption .
We see  t h a t  the  c o rp o ra t io n  continues to  pay the same amount o f  t a x  
as under the  p rev ious  assumption ( l i n e  6 ) .  However, the  amount o f  
d iv idends  p a id  d i f f e r s  now depending on th e  co rp o ra te  ta x  r a t e  and 
the c r e d i t  ta x  r a t e .  I t  i s  $10 Drs. under a CIT r a t e  equal to  40 
p e r  cen t and i t  i s  reduced  to  24O D rs, under a CIT r a t e  equal to  55 
p e r  cen t ( l i n e  8 ) ,  The combined e f f e c t  o f  the  same c o rp o ra te  tax  
l i a b i l i t y  and th e  lower d iv idend  payments r e s u l t s  to h ig h e r  n e t  cash 
r e t a in e d  under t h i s  assum ption th an  under the p re v io u s .  Namely, the  
n e t  cash r e t a in e d  f a l l s  b u t  n o t  so d r a s t i c a l l y  a s  under the  p rev ious  
assum ption. The s h a re h o ld e r  re c e iv e s  a  sm a l le r  cash amount o f  d i v i ­
dend now bu t the  g ross  amount o f  d iv id e n d ,  t h a t  i s ,  cash  dividend 
p lus  the c r e d i t  i s  equal to  the amount d i s t r i b u t e d  under the c u r r e n t  
system, 'H is  f i n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  i s  l e s s ,  th e r e f o r e ,  he f i n a l l y  r e ­
ce iv es  the same n e t  cash d iv id e n d  as under the  c u r r e n t  system ( l i n e  
20 ) ,  The t o t a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y  i s  a g a in  h ig h e r  than under the  p re s e n t  
system.
6 .5 .3  D i s t r i b u t io n a l  E f f e c t s
The major d i s t r i b u t i v e  consequences of implementing the E.E.C 
p ro p o s a l ' s recommendations a re  to be found in  : -
a) the  impact o f  the  new system upon d iv idend  p o l ic y .
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b) the  impact on the sh are  p r i c e s ,
0) the  s h i f t i n g  and in c id en ce  o f  the Greek CIT.
dj the  removal o f  the  e x i s t i n g  ta x  i n e q u i t i e s ,
6 ,5 ,3 .1  Dividend P o l ic y
There a r i s e s  the q u e s t io n  o f  how d iv idend p o l ic y  would be a f f e c ­
ted  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  the  im p u ta t io n  system fo r  the  d iv idend  paid  ded­
u c t io n  system, A number o f  e f f e c t s  o f  opposing d i r e c t i o n  might be 
g en era ted  which make any p r e d ic t io n  d i f f i c u l t .  The e f f e c t s  whose 
s ig n i f ic a n c e  seems most r e l i a b l e  a re :  -
a) the  value o f  d i s c r im in a to ry  v a r ia b le  a g a in s t  o r  in  favour 
o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  d e sc r ib e d  in  c h a p te r  th r e e ,
b) the  s h e l t e r  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  i s ,  the  in c e n t iv e  u t i l i z e d  by h igh 
income sh a reh o ld e rs  to r e t a i n  c o rp o ra te  p r o f i t s  in  o rd e r  to 
reduce p e rso n a l  tax  l i a b i l i t i e s ,
c) s h a reh o ld e r  p re fe re n c e s  re g a rd in g  gross  d iv idend  o r n e t  cash 
d ividend and,
d) the  tre a tm en t of e q u i ty  and debt f in a n c in g ,
6 .5 ,3*2  The Tax D isc r im in a to ry  V a r iab le
We found in  c h a p te r  th re e  t h a t  the value of th e  tax  d i s c r im in a t ­
o ry  v a r i a b le  under the e x i s t i n g  system  i s  g iven by the form ula,
0 -  1 -  tp
* " l  - t c  (3 .4 , )
Under the  new system t h i s  formula becomes as fo l lo w s ;  -
0  -  i —l —
'  1 -  S (6 .1  ;
where tp  and to  i s  the  r a t e  o f  p e rso n a l and co rp o ra te  tax  and S i s  
the  r a t e  o f  c r e d i t  u nder  th e  new system. I t  i s  worth n o tin g  t h a t  
under the new system the v a lu e  of the  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r ia b le  does 
no t depend on the  c o rp o ra te  tax  r a t e  d i r e c t l y ,  but on ly  i n d i r e c t l y  
th rough  the r a t e  o f  tax  c r e d i t .  Since the  num erators in  both equa­
t io n s  are  the  same t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  s iz e  depends on the r a t e  of co rp o r­
a te  tax  and o f  the c r e d i t .  Therefore  th re e  cases may be d i s t i n g u i ­
"271 -
shed: “
a) i f  sz> tc  —» 1 -  s c l  -  to  =►
b) i f  8 » t c - * l  -  8 = 1 -  to ^  = 0,
c j  i f  s c t c  "♦ 1 -  s > l  -  to = # @ q < 8 i
From equation  (6 .1 )  we re c e iv e  v a r io u s  v a lu e s  f o r  0 j  g iv ing  
v a r io u s  v a lu es  to s .  According to the E.E.C, p roposa l s takes  
va lu es  in  the range between 45 p e r  c en t  and 55 p e r  c e n t .  As we saw 
in  c h a p te r  th re e  the  most r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  v a lu e  o f  tp  i s  55 p e r  c e n t .  
T here fo re  t a b le  6 ,7  shows the  v a lu es  which the tax  d is c r im in a to ry  v a r ­
ia b le  may take  under the  new system,
T A B L E  6. 7
Tax D isc r im in a to ry  V ariab le s Values
■ 1
E x is t in g  System New System
tp to  9.0. S e ,  .
.55 .40  1 ,08
.55 .45 1.18
.55 .50 1 .50
.55 .55 1.44
From the  above ta b le  we see th a t  th e  most r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  value 
o f  0 under the  e x i s t i n g  system i s  1 ,08 whereas under the  new system 
i t  would be h ig h e r .  This insplies t h a t  th e  c o s t  o f  r e t a in e d  ea rn in g s  
i s  h ighe r  under the  proposed system , which induces co rp o ra t io n s  to 
d i s t r i b u t e  h ig h e r  amount of p r o f i t s  than under th e  e x i s t i n g  system,
5 . 5 .5  The S h e l t e r  E f f e c t
In  c o u n tr ie s  where in d iv id u a l  income tax  r a t e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
exceed the r a t e  o f  co rp o ra te  ta x ,  a  company would p rov ide  a s h e l t e r  
f o r  in d iv id u a ls  whose m arginal r a t e  o f  income tax  exceeds the  CIT 
r a t e  on p r o f i t s  r e t a in e d  by the company. This i s  the  case  o f Greece
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where the top  va lu e  of the  m arginal p e rso n a l ta x  r a t e  i s  equal to 
60 p e r  cen t  whereas the c o rp o ra te  tax  r a t e  i s  equal to 4-^ p e r  c e n t .
In  a d d i t io n ,  the  absence of a  c a p i t a l  ga ins  ta x  makes t h i s  in c e n t iv e  
even s t ro n g e r .  We e x p ec t ,  under th e  new system , t h i s  in c e n t iv e  to 
be a l l e v i a t e d  s in c e  th e  c o rp o ra te  tax  r a t e  should  be in c re a se d  a t  
l e a s t  by 5 p e r  c en t  a cco rd ing  to the  E.E.C p ro p o sa l .  The in t ro d u c ­
t io n  of a c a p i t a l  ga in s  ta x  on g a in s  from sh ares  does no t seem l i k ­
e ly ,  a t  l e a s t  in  th e  n e a r  f u t u r e ,  fo r  two rea so n s .  F i r s t  i t  would 
r e q u i r e  the annual v a lu a t io n  o f  sh a re s .  However, in  the case of 
a c t i v e ly  t ra d e d  sh a res  t h i s  would be r e l a t i v e l y  easy , but in  th e  case  
o f  c lo s e ly  held  fam ily  c o rp o ra t io n s ,  as th e  Greek ones, no a c t iv e  
market e x i s t s  and the  v a lu a t io n  o f  shares  o f  such c o rp o ra t io n s  would 
r a i s e  g re a t  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Second, e q u i ty  c o n s id e ra t io n s  would r e ­
q u ire  the in t r o d u c t io n  o f  ta x  on c a p i t a l  g a in s  on o th e r  a s s e t s ,  f o r  ' 
example, lan d  which seems v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  a t  the  p re s e n t  time f o r  te c h ­
n i c a l  re a so n s .
On the  o th e r  hand, under th e  new system s, c o rp o ra t io n s  would 
no t have a d i r e c t  in c e n t iv e  to in c re a s e  d iv idends out o f  any given 
amount o f  p r o f i t s  because as we have seen t h e i r  tax  l i a b i l i t i e s  do 
no t change by changing  the  d i s t r i b u t e d  amount. However, the e x i s t ­
ing  system, where c o rp o ra t io n s  a r e  taxed  only  on r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s ,  
p rov ides  such an in c e n t iv e  because an in c re a se  in  d iv id en d s  reduces  
the  amount o f  c o rp o ra te  income t a x e s .  This re a so n in g  i s  based on 
the assumption t h a t  management i s  concerned w ith  th e  co rp o ra te  tax  
l i a b i l i t y  only and not w ith  the  t o t a l  tax  l i a b i l i t y .  I t  does not 
seem to  be a r e a l i s t i c  assum ption p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  f o r  Greece, where the 
m a jo r i ty  o f  the c o rp o ra t io n s  a re  c o n t ro l le d  and ru le d  by f a m i l i e s ,
6 .5 .5 .4  Debt and Equity  f in a n c in g
The new system o f  p a r t i a l  im pu ta tion  by in t ro d u c in g  economic 
double ta x a t io n  o f  d iv idends  in c re a s e s  the d is c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  
e q u i ty  f in a n c in g  and in  favour o f  debt f in a n c in g .  As a consequence 
o f  th i s  b ia s  one would expect p a r t  o f  t h i s  s t im u lu s  to take th e  
form of h ig h e r  d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s ,
6 . 5 . 5 .5 Im p l ica t io n s  From Higher Payout R atio s
From the above d is c u s s io n  we may p r e d ic t  t h a t  under the new
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system the payout r a t i o s  would in c re a s e .  I f  t h i s  i s  so then  we have 
v a r io u s  im p l ic a t io n s  concern ing  e q u i ty  c o n s id e ra t io n s .
Higher payout r a t i o s  mean a l a r g e r  p ro p o r t io n  of income can 
he c lo s e ly  a d ju s te d  to the t a x a b le  c a p a c i ty  of th e  in d iv id u a l  sh a re ­
h o ld e r s ,  T h e re fo re ,  the  new system would r e s u l t  in  a f a i r e r  tax  
s t r u c t u r e  in  which d i f f e r e n t  types  o f  income a re  taxed  more n e a r ly  
on uniform  base ,
in  a d d i t io n ,  in  the  absence o f  a c a p i t a l  ga ins  t a x ,  as in  Greece, 
h ig h e r  payout r a t i o s  means fewer c a p i t a l  ga in s  a re  c r e a te d ,  which de ­
c rease  s h a re h o ld e r s '  w ea lth .
From ta b le  6 ,8  we see t h a t  u nder  th e  new system the  r e d u c t io n  
o f  the tax  l i a b i l i t y  i s  h ig h e r  f o r  sh a reh o ld e rs  who belong to low 
income c la s s e s  than those  who be long  to h igh income c la s s e s  ( l in e s  10, 
1 5 ) ,  At th e  same time the  in c re a s e  in  the  n e t  cash  d iv idends  i s  h ig h ­
e r  in  the  f i r s t  ca teg o ry  o f  the  sh a reh o ld e rs  than in  the second ( l in es  
11, 16).
On the  o th e r  hand, h ig h e r  payout r a t i o s  imply l e s s  a v a i l a b le  
funds to th e  company f o r  f in a n c in g  investm ent programmes and assum­
ing  t h a t  more investm ent means more growth whose b e n e f i t  is  spread  
over the community as  a whole, the new system might be more r e g r e s ­
s iv e  than the p re s e n t  one assuming t h a t  the  r e c i p i e n t  o f  d iv idends  
a re  in  the  t o p - h a l f  of th e  income b ra c k e t  s c a l e .  However, two r e ­
s e r v a t io n s  e x i s t  re g a rd in g  th i s  view. F i r s t ,  we have seen  in  chap­
t e r  fo u r  t h a t  th e r e  i s  no s t ro n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between investm ent and 
d iv idend  d e c is io n s .  T h e re fo re ,  the  new system does n o t seem to 
have a  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  upon investm ent in  t h a t  r e s p e c t .  Second, 
g r e a t e r  d iv idend does n o t  on ly  a f f e c t  n a t io n a l  income through in ­
vestm ent d e c is io n s  bu t i t  a lso  a f f e c t s  i t  through consumption and 
tax  revenue. Thus, an in c re a s e  in  d iv idends may l e a d - t o  a decrease  
in  investm en t,  which w i l l  tend to  lower the  n a t io n a l  income; but in  
the  p e rso n a l  s e c to r  one may expec t an in c re a se  in  consumption, 
which tends to r a i s e  n a t io n a l  income. Furtherm ore , the  in c re a se  in  
th e  tax  revenues may le ad  to a d d i t i o n a l  government spending , which 
w i l l  a lso  tend  to r a i s e  the  n a t io n a l  income. Thus, the f i n a l  e f f e c t  
on n a t io n a l  income may be e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t iv e  depending on
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T A B L E  6 . 0
TAX CON^qUENSES FOR SHAREHOLDERS WITH DIFFERENT PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX RATES




1 Corporate  P ro f i t 's 1000 1000 1000 1000
2 C orpora tion  Tax 375 285 500 500
5 A f te r  Tax P r o f i t s 625 714 500 500
4 R eta ined  Earnings 375 286 300 200
5 Dividendes 250 428 200 500
6 P lu s  Tax C re d i t - - 100 150
7 Gross Dividends 250 428 500 450
6 P e rso n a l  Income 100 171 120 180
Tax a t  40%
9 Less Tax C red it - - 100 150
10 Net P e rso n a l  Tax 100 171 20 30
11 Net Dividend 150 257 180 270
12 T o ta l  Gov’ t 475 456 520 530
Revenue
15 P e rso n a l  Income 150 257 180 270
tax  a t  60%
14 Less Tax c r e d i t - - 100 150
15 Net p e rso n a l  Tax 150 257 80 120
16 Net Dividend 100 171 120 180
17 T o ta l  G ov 't 525 542 560 620
Revenue
Note : 1, Corporate tax  r a t e  $U p e r  cen t
2, The form ulas x«k(P-D) and D* g(P-T) were used 
r e s p e c t iv e ly  to  c a l c u l a t e  amount of tax es  and d iv idends 
under the  c u r r e n t  system , where K denotes  the  CIT r a t e  
g  the payout r a t i o ,  P p r o f i t s .
5. The ta x  c r e d i t  under the  proposed system was assumed 
50 p e r  c en t  o f  the  cash d iv id en d s .
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the spending p r o p e n s i t i e s  o f  consumption, of in d iv id u a l s  and govern­
ment,
6 . 5 .3*6 Inc idence  and S h i f t in g  o f  the  CIT
The d is c u s s io n  o f tax  s h i f t i n g  i s  r e l a t e d  to the assum ptions 
one makes re g a rd in g  th e  ta x  r a t e s  a p p l ie d ,  the management behaviour 
and the re v e rse  s h i f t i n g  h y p o th e s is .
We saw in  c h a p te r  two comparing the two systems a t  a t h e o r e t i c ­
a l  le v e l  t h a t  f o r  a g iven  amount o f  revenue th e  d iv id en d -d ed u c t io n  
system re q u i r e s  a  h ig h e r  ta x  r a t e  than the  p a r t i a l  im pu ta tion  sy s ­
tem. However, the  tax  reform in  q u es t io n  r e q u i r e s  th e  tax  r a t e  under 
the  new system ( p a r t i a l  im pu ta tion )  to be h ig h e r  than  the  c u r r e n t  ta x  
r a t e  under the  d iv id en d -d ed u c t io n  system . The h ig h e r  ta x  r a t e  under 
th e  new system p ro v id es  the  c o rp o ra t io n  w ith  a  g r e a t e r  in c e n t iv e  to 
s h i f t  th e  ta x .  I f  t h i s  happens then  the d iv idend  ta x  c r e d i t  p ro v i ­
s io n  i s  conside red  as an "unwarranted" aubsidy .
Under the p re s e n t  system the d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  a re  no t taxed 
a t  the co rp o ra te  l e v e l ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  the chances o f  s h i f t i n g  the  ta x  
on to d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s ,  and t h a t  o f  an "unwarranted" bonus to 
s h a re h o ld e rs ,  a re  e l im in a te d .  On the o th e r  hand, i f  we assume th a t  
the management takes  in to  account the le v e l  o f  tax  on d i s t r i b u t i o n  
and s h i f t s  i t ,  then the  sh a reh o ld e rs  re c e iv e  a t a x - f r e e  income.
ITom ta b le  6 .8  we see t h a t  tax  i s  imposed to  a g r e a t e r  ex­
t e n t  on the  c o rp o ra t io n  ( l i n e  2 ) and to a l e s s e r  e x te n t  on the  sh a re ­
h o ld e r  ( l i n e s  8 and 15) under the  im puta tion  system as compared w ith  
the p re sen t  Greek system. This im p lies  th a t  the  new system would 
give l i t t l e  inducement to re v e rse  s h i f t i n g ,  un the o th e r  hand, the 
p re sen t  system by red u c in g  ta x  c o l l e c t i o n s  a t  the  c o rp o ra te  l e v e l  
would encourage re v e rse  s h i f t i n g ?
A sim p lified  attempt was made in the present study to te s t  the 
sh ift in g  hypothesis in Greece, uf course our purpose here i s  not 
to solve the problem but simply to give some evidence about the in ­
d ications o f tax sh ift in g  in Greece, The evidence seems to support 
the hypothesis o f no sh ift in g  in Greece.
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6*5.3*7 Removal of E x i s t in g  Tax U n n e u t r a l i t i e s
C r i t i c i s i n g  the p re s e n t  t a x a t io n  o f  d iv idends  in  Greece we 
argued th a t  th e re  a re  two k inds  o f  i n e q u i t i e s ;
a) The 15,uOO Drs o r  6 0 ,U00 Drs exemption from d i v i ­
dend income c r e a te s  i n e q u i t i e s .  F i r s t  between sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  who re c e iv e  d iv idends  from shares  quoted w ith  
Athens S tock • , Exchange and those  who re c e iv e  d i v i ­
dends from sh ares  not quoted w ith Athens s to c k  Exchange, 
Second, between h i ^  and low income sh areh o ld e rs  who 
re c e iv e  d iv idend  from sh a res  quoted with Athens Stock 
Exchange s in ce  the  exemption g ran ted  i s  the  same f o r  
bo th  c l a s s e s  of sh a re h o ld e rs .
b) Shareho lders  who re c e iv e  d iv idends from b e a r e r  sh a res  
n o t quoted with Athens otock Exchange a re  taxed  a t
47 p e r  cen t tax  r a t e  and are  n o t  allowed to in c lu d e  
t h e i r  income from d iv idends  with t h e i r  o th e r  income.
This trea tm en t in v o lv es  two kinds o f  in e q u i ty .  F i r s t ,  
i t  v i o l a t e s  the p r i n c i p l e  of g lo b a l t a x a t io n  s in ce  i t  
dep rives  the r i g h t  o f  a c a te g o ry  of s h a reh o ld e rs  o f  
in c lu d in g  t h e i r  income from d iv idend  along  w ith  the 
r e s t  o f  t h e i r  income and a t  the same time i t  p ro v i ­
des o th e r  sh a reh o ld e rs  w ith  the o p tio n  to decide  to  
inc lude  or no t t h e i r  income from d iv idends along with 
the r e s t  o f  t h e i r  income. This may have as a consequence 
t h e i r  low income sh a reh o ld e rs  a re  o v e rtaxed .
A r t i c l e  1(2) o f  the E.E.G p roposa l p rov ides  t h a t  member s t a t e s  
s h a l l  no t m ain ta in  o r  in tro d u ce  a  re d u c t io n  in  the t a x a t io n  o f  d i v i ­
dends a lone , a p a r t  from th e  re d u c t io n  r e s u l t i n g  from the  c r e d i t  mech­
anism o f  the  proposed im p u ta t io n .  Thus, the a p p l ic a t io n  o f  s p e c ia l  
exemptions or r a t e s  to d iv idend income only  i s  p r o h ib i te d .  However, 
the  wording o f  a r t i c l e l ( 2 )  seems to  in d ic a te  t h a t  s p e c i f i c  ( r a t h e r  
than  g en e ra l)  tax  re d u c t io n s ,  even when a p p l ie d  to d iv id en d s  and not 
to o th e r  income c a te g o r ie s ,  a re  a llow ed. T h e re fo re ,  i t  depends on 
the  w i l l in g n e s s  of Greece to g ive  up i t s  r i g h t  to g ra n t  tax  incen ­
t iv e s  fo r  in v e s t in g  in  s h a re s .  I f  Greece were to  g ive  up the p ro v i-
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s io n  o f  t h i s  in c e n t iv e  then  the  above d e sc r ib e d  in e q u i t i e s  would be 
e l im in a te d .  However, th e  e x te n t  o f  the reform  in  t h i s  a re a  i s  t h a t  
the r e g r e s s i v i t y  o f  the e x i s t i n g  exemptions w i l l  be p a r t i a l l y  coun t­
e red  by b r in g in g  th e  d iv id en d  ta x  c r e d i t  in to  ta x ab le  income b e fo re  
computation o f  tax  and c re d i t*
6 . 5 .3 .8  P r ic e  o f  Shares
Ve f i n a l l y  c lo se  our d is c u s s io n  about th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  
o f  the  ta x  reform  by in c lu d in g  th e  e f f e c t  which th e  reform  would 
have upon th e  p r i c e  o f  s h a re s .  S ince shares  r e f l e c t ,  to  some e x te n t ,  
the  w ealth  o f  th e  owner, the  change in  t h e i r  p r ic e s  have an e f f e c t  
upon t h e i r  t o t a l  w ea lth .
Two e f f e c t s  o f  opposing d i r e c t io n s  may w e ll  be generated* The 
f i r s t  i s  concerned w ith  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the l e v e l  o f  d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  and the  p f i c e  o f  s h a re s .  I t  i s  argued t h a t  sh a reh o ld e rs  
who p r e f e r  more d iv id en d  r a t h e r  than  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  a re  w i l l i n g  to 
pay a h ig h e r  p r i c e  f o r  such s h a r e s .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  th e re  i s  no w ell  
e s ta b l i s h e d  s tu d y  d e a l in g  w ith  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h ip  in  Greece, How­
e v e r ,  two s im p l i f i e d  ones e x i s t .  The e a r l i e r ,  concerning  th e  y ears  
1962 -  6 6 , reaches  the  co n c lu s io n  t h a t  a p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t s  
between share  p r ic e s  and the  l e v e l  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  (G .P ap o u lia s ,  1971)- 
The r e c e n t  one, concern ing  the  y ea rs  1975-78» concludes t h a t  the  
main cau se ,  t h a t  i s ,  83 p e r  c e n t ,  o f  the f a l l  in  the  p r i c e  o f  
sh a res  d u r in g  the p e r io d  in  q u e s t io n ,  was the  absence o f  any d iv i ­
dend d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  whereas on the  o th e r  hand, th e  main cause o f  the  
r i s e ,  t h a t  i s  70%, was a h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  c u r r e n t  o r ,  p ro s p e c t iv e  
d iv id e n d s ( (A, N ic o lo p o u lo s , 1978). Thus, in  the  l i g h t  o f  these
fin d in g s  we may be a llow ed  to conclude th a t  h ig h e r  payout r a t i o n  
have a p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  upon share  p r i c e s .  S ince the  new system 
favours  d i s t r i b u t i o n  to a g r e a t e r  degree than  the  e x i s t i n g  system i t  
would have a p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  upon share  p r i c e s .  Assuming f irm s  
w ith  i d e n t i c a l  edpected fu tu r e  p r o f i t s  we accep t  th a t  the  p r i c e s  
o f  sh a res  w ith  c u r r e n t ly  h igh  payout r a t i o s  r i s i n g  more than  those  
w ith  c u r r e n t ly  payout r a t i o s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  i t  i s  re aso n ab le
to  assume th a t  sh areh o ld e rs  who pu t more en^hasis  in  the  income 
through d iv idends  r a t h e r  than  c a p i t a l  gains belong to  low income 
c la s s e s  r a t h e r  to h igh  income c l a s s e s .  T h e re fo re ,  th e  change o f  
the  ta x  system w i l l  p rov ide  low income sh areh o ld e rs  w ith  a b e n e f i t
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g r e a t e r  than  t h a t  o f  h i ^  income s h a reh o ld e r .
On the o th e r  hand, i t  can be argued t h a t  th e  rep lacem ent o f  the  
d iv idend  p a id  deduction  system by the  im pu ta tion  system would de­
c rease  the  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  company s to ck  r e l a t i v e  to  o th e r  sav ings me­
d ia  by in t r o d u c t in g  a d i s c r im in a to ry  tax  on the  r e t u r n  o f  co rp o ra te  
e q u i ty .  Consequently, the a t t r a c t i v n e s s  o f  s to c k s  r e l a t i v e  to  o th e r  
sav ings media would f a l l  d ec rea s in g  the  p r ic e  o f  s h a re s .  This  a rgu­
ment lo s e s  i t s  v a l i d i t y  i f  we tak e  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  t h a t  f i r s t ,  
the  y ie ld  from sh a res  i s  u s u a l ly  h ig h e r  than t h a t  from o th e r  sav ing  
media and s e c o n d , . th e  ta x  in c e n t iv e s  prov ided  f o r  in v e s t in g  in  
e q u i t i e s .
2 7 9 -
6 , 5 . 4  ECONOMIC GROWTH
6 . 5 . 4 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
The purpose o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  i s  to analyze  th e  p o s s ib le  e f f e c t s  
o f  the new system upon Greek economic growth. The e f f e c t s  o f  th e  
proposed change on the le v e l  of economic growth might o p e ra te  v ia
a) the more e f f i c i e n t  use  o f  s ca rc e  c a p i t a l  re so u rce s  which 
i s  a p r e - r e q u i s i t e  f o r  economic growth.
b) the  agg rega te  amount of sav ings  and, 
c} the r a t e  o f  f ix e d  c a p i t a l  fo rm ation .
6 . 5 . 4 .2  E f f ic ie n c y  Gains
The c o rp o ra te  ta x  reform would a f f e c t  e f f i c i e n c y ,  a t  l e a s t ,  
through i t s  e f f e c t  upon the  c h o ice ,
aj between d iv idends  and r e t a in e d  e a rn in g s ,
b ) between co rp o ra te  and noncorpora te  a c t i v i t i e s  and, 
cj between e q u i ty  f in an ce  and deb t f in an ce .
The h ig h e r  payout r a t i o  w i l l  p rov ide  more funds to the c a p i t a l  
market and in c re a se  the  tendency fo r  f irm s to go to  the market f o r  
t h e i r  funds. This in c re a s e s  the m o b il i ty  o f  c a p i t a l  and may r e s u l t  
in  h ig h e r  q u a l i t y  o f  in ves tm en t.  T h e re fo re ,  an in c re a s e  in  the  d i v i ­
dend payout r a t i o  would encourage investm ent by new companies and im­
prove the a l l o c a t i o n  of c a p i t a l  w ith in  the co rp o ra te  s e c to r .  However, 
as we have seen th i s  argument i s  no t  u n d eb a tab le .  The h ig h e r  payout 
r a t i o  would decrease  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r n a l  funds . This would 
f u r t h e r  in c re a se  the  dependence of new firm s on ® k te m a l  sources  of 
funds which makes the  problem o f  f in a n c in g  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  new f i rm s .
On b a lan ce ,  i t  seems u n l ik e ly  th a t  th i s  approach would s e r io u s ly  
a f f e c t  the  r a t e  o f  Greek economic growth, e s p e c ia l l y  i f  p ro v is io n s
q
were made fo r  t a x - p r e f e r r e d  d e te n t io n s  o f  ea rn in g s  by c o rp o ra t io n s !
I t  has been a s p e c ia l  a sp e c t  o f  th e  Greek economy t h a t  even 
some o f the  most im portan t b u s in e s se s  a re  u n in co rp o ra te d .  Table 6 ,9  
i l l u s t r a t e s  the in f lu e n c e  o f  tax  arrangem ents on th e  choice between 
c o rp o ra te  and n o n -co rp o ra te  a c t i v i t i e s .  In v e s to rs  d iv id e  the  a v a i l ­
ab le  c a p i t a l  s to ck  between co rp o ra te  and noncorpora te  a c t i v i t i e s  u n t i l
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th e  n e t  o f  tax  r a t e s  o f  r e tu r n  a re  e q u a l iz e d .  From the ta b le  we see t h a t  
uhder th e  p re s e n t  system o f  c o rp o ra te  ta x a t io n  the in v e s to r  i s  i n d i f f e r ­
en t in  choosing th e  one form o f  making b u s in ess  o r  th e  o th e r  i f  h i s  p e r ­
so n a l ta x  r a t e  i s  lower . than  40 p e r  c e n t .  I f  h i s  r a t e  i s  h i ^ e r  than  40 
p e r  c en t  he may W ean  advantage i n  in c o rp o ra t io n  s in c e  he may en joy  a 
lower r a t e  o f  co rp o ra te  ta x  on u n d i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s .  Under the  new sy s ­
tem th e  in v e s to r  has an advantage in  in c o rp o ra t io n  i f  h i s  p e rso n a l  ta x  
r a t e  i s  now h ig h e r  than 45 p e r  c e n t .  This im p lie s  t h a t  in v e s to r s  whose 
p e rso n a l  ta x  r a t e  i s  between 40 p e r  c e n t  and 45 p e r  c en t  and has chosen 
the  c o rp o ra te  form o f  making b u s in ess  have now an advantage to  sw itch  to  
the  noncorpora te  s e c to r  in  o rd e r  to  en joy  a  lower than  45 p e r  c e n t  tax  
r a t e .  In  a d d i t io n  t h i s  w i l l  i n h i b i t  l a r g e  e n t e r p r i s e s  to  move from the  
u n co rp o ra te  s e c to r  to  th e  c o rp o ra te  s e c t o r .  I f  t h i s  i s  so we w i l l  have 
an u n d e s i ra b le  e f f e c t  upon the  growth p ro c e ss .  Greek a u t h o r i t i e s  t r y  to 
indpce e n te r p r i s e s  to tak e  th e  c o rp o ra te  form s in ce  i t  i s  accepted, t h a t  
the  e a s in e ss  o f  r a i s i n g  c a p i t a l  and the l im i te d  l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  sh a re ­
h o ld e rs  c o n s i s t  the  main advantages o f  a  c o rp o ra t io n  in  comparison w ith  
an u n in co rp o ra ted  e n t e r p r i s e .
F in a l ly ,  under the  new system th e  b ia s  in  favour o f  deb t f in a n c in g  
r a t h e r  than  e q u i ty  f in a n c in g  i s  h i ^ e r .  The d isadvan tage  o f  such a h igh  
r a t i o  o f  debt to  e q u i ty  i s  th e  in c re a se d  r i s k  o f  bank rup tcy . P a r t i c u l a r ­
l y  f o r  Greece, t h i s  i s  most im p o rtan t s in c e  as we have seen t h i s  r a t i o  
has a l r e a d y  been h igh  e n o u ^ .
From the  above d is c u s s io n  we could conclude t h a t  the  new system 
would achieve  the  f i r s t  goal bu t n o t  the  l a s t  two.
6 . 5 . 4 .5  Saving
The q u es t io n  whether th e  new system w i l l  a f f e c t  the  l e v e l  o f  sav ­
ing  in  the Gasek economy depends on th e  e f f e c t s  upon th e  c o rp o ra te ,  p e r ­
s o n a l ,  and government sav in g .
E a r l i e r  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  we d is c u s se d  the p o s s ib le  impact t h a t  adop­
t io n  o f  the  proposed ta x  system would have on b u s in ess  sav in g .  I t  was 
p o in te d  out t h a t  we expect a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  o f  the in c re a se d  taxes  
borne by c o rp o ra t io n s  to  be r e f l e c t e d  in  reduced cash  dividends r a t h e r  
than  in  reduced c o rp o ra te  r e t e n t i o n  ( n e t  d iv idend h e ld  c o n s ta n t  hypothesis)"^ 
P ï i v a t e  sav ing  in  the  form o f  c o rp o ra te  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s  i s  l i k e l y  to 
d e c l in e .  However, we expect t h i s  d e c l in e  n o t  to  be /
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s i g n i f i c a n t .
whether o r  no t the  new system would a f f e c t  t o t a l  sav ing  depend 
upon w hether the  drop in  co rp o ra te  sav in g  was matched by an in c re a s e  
in  sav ing  by in d iv id u a l s .  That i s ,  i t  depends upon whether the  r e s ­
ponse o f  consumption to  changes in  d iv idends  d i f f e r s  from th a t  f o r  
change in  r e t a in e d  p r o f i t s .  Since d iv idend  payout in c re a s e s  and 
g iven a m arg ina l p ro p e n s i ty  to  save f o r  d iv idend  r e c i p i e n t  t h a t  i s  
l e s s  than u n i ty ,  the lo s s  in co rpora te  saving  w i l l  n o t be o f f s e t  by a 
r i s e  in  p e rso n a l  s av in g .  Assuming th a t  the sh a reh o ld e r  belongs to 
h igh  income c la s s e s  we accep t a  h igh  m arginal p ro p e n s i ty  to save , 
th e r e f o r e ,  t h i s  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a  s l i g h t l y  re d u c t io n  in  t o t a l  p r i v ­
a te  saving? G enera lly  speak ing , the  ta x  changes a t  the  s h a reh o ld e r  
l e v e l  and the  changes in  cash d iv idends  would be complementary.
This i s  enhanced by th e  f a c t  th a t  Greek c o rp o ra t io n s  a re  owned and 
ru le d  by f a m i l i e s .  T h e re fo re ,  i t  i s  reasonab le  to expect t h a t
sh a reh o ld e rs  w i l l  s u b s t i t u t e  the c o rp o ra t io n  in  sav ing  of the  d i s ­
t r i b u t e d  p a r t .  Two e m p ir ic a l  s tu d ie s  f o r  the U.S.A.  and the  U.K. 
have reached the  same r e s u l t  (M. F e ld s t e in ,  1975, M. F e ld s te in  and 
G.Fane, 1975j.
6 , 5 . 4 .4  Investm ent
The e f f e c t  of the  ta x  reform upon investm ent might o p e ra te
v i a ,
a) a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  funds and c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  and,
bj v ia  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  investm ent through a change o f  tax  r a t e
and ta x  i n c e n t iv e s .
6 . 5 ,4*4.1  A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  Funds and Cost of C a p i ta l
There i s  a connec tion  between th e se  two channels  which a f f e c t  
the  co rp o ra te  investm ent d e c i s io n s .  As we saw, the  p re sen t  system 
leav es  more funds in  c o rp o ra te  t r e a s u r i e s  than- the im pu ta tion  system 
would le av e .  Higher payout r a t i o  may induce sh a reh o ld e rs  to spend 
more on consumption. The i s s u e  h ere  i s  whether the  g en es is  of ec­
onomic growth i s  in  the  c o rp o ra t io n  o r  in  the  in d iv id u a l  s a v e r .
Actual r e s u l t s  would depend upon s p e c i f i c  f e a tu r e s  o f  the Greek ec­
onomy, but i t  seems reaso n ab le  to  say th a t  r e l i e f  from double t a x a t ­
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io n  i n  the  form which encourages d iv idend  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i l l  reduce 
somewhat the amount used  f o r  c a p i t a l  fo rm ation  as compared w ith  the  
p re s e n t  system which p ro v id es  the  r e l i e f  a t  th e  c o rp o ra te  l e v e l .  
However, i f  the c a p i t a l  m arket fu n c t io n s  p e r f e c t l y ,  payout r a t i o s  
and r a t e s  o f  re in v es tm en t o f  d iv id en d s  could e v e n tu a l ly  be a d ju s te d  
in  th e  two cases  so t h a t  the  two ways o f  r e l i e v i n g  double t a x a t io n  
o f  d iv idends  would in  f a c t  have i d e n t i c a l  r e s u l t s .  I f  n o t ,  th e  two 
approaches might have somewhat d i f f e r e n t  im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  th e  ag g re ­
g a te  r a t e  o f  sav ings  and economic growth.
Under th e  new system the  g r e a t e r  payout r a t i o  may lead  to h ig h ­
e r  share  p r i c e s  which encourage investm en t by d ec rea s in g  th e  c o s t  o f  
e q u i ty  c a p i t a l  in  the  sense  t h a t  fewer new shares  must be is su e d  in
o rd e r  to r a i s e  a g iven amount o f  money. However, the  p a r t i a l  .m it i­
g a t io n  of economic double t a x a t io n  under th e  new system would de­
c re a se  the  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  company s to c k  r e l a t i v e  to o th e r  s av in g  media. 
Consequently , th e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  s to ck s  r e l a t i v e  to o th e r  sav ing  
media would d e c l in e ,  d is co u rag in g  investm ent by in c r e a s in g  the  c o s t  
o f  e q u i ty  c a p i t a l ,  in  the  s e n se ,  now, t h a t  more s h a re s  must be is su e d  
in  o rd e r  a g iven  amount o f  money to be r a is e d ,
6 , 5 .4*4.2  P r o f i t a b i l i t y
The e f f e c t  on the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  investm ent depends on the 
fo l lo w in g  th re e  changesî
aj The change in  tax  system p e r  se .
bj The change in  tax  r a t e ,
0 } 'The change in  the system o f  ta x  in c e n t iv e s .
I f  the  c o rp o ra te  managers c o n s id e r  t o t a l  ta x e s  on c o rp o ra te  in ­
come, the two systems may no t be d i f f e r e n t  in  t h e i r  e f f e c t  upon the  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of in v e s tm en t ,  as long as equal revenue is  r a i s e d  from 
tax es  on c o rp o ra te  source  income under each system . However, the new | 
system i s  l i k e l y  to r a i s e  tax  revenue from c o rp o ra te  income and in  \ 
t h a t  r e s p e c t  w i l l  d isco u rag e  investm en t.  In  a d d i t i o n ,  to th e  e x te n t  
th a t  d e c is io n s  a re  made by the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  and t h a t  c o rp o ra t io n s  do 
n o t  take account o f  p e rs o n a l  income t a x ,  in c e n t iv e s  should  be given 
a t  the c o rp o ra te  l e v e l .  In  t h a t  r e s p e c t  the new system w i l l  d is c o u r ­
age investm ent by p ro v id in g  the  r e l i e f  a t  the s h a re h o ld e r  l e v e l .
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We now co n sid e r  th e  economic e f f e c t s  o f  a s h i f t  i n  the  ev a lu ­
a t i o n  o f  c o rp o ra te  investm ent p r o j e c t s  from th e  e x i s t i n g  40 p e r  c en t  
c o rp o ra t io n s  ta x  r a t e  to  the proposed 45 p e r  c e n t .  In  the f i r s t  
p l a c e ,  th e re  would be some d i r e c t  d i s in c e n t iv e  to investm ent from 
such a ta x  r a t e  in c r e a s e ,  and i t  would a c t  to  r e in f o r c e  the  c o s t - o f -  
c a p i t a l  e f f e c t  a l r e a d y  no ted  in  the  p rev io u s  s e c t io n .  The s t r e n g th  
o f  t h i s  d i r e c t  s t im u lu s  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to p r e d i c t .  However, we found 
e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  t h a t  the  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  investm ent w ith 
r e s p e c t  to the  ta x  r a t e  i s  between 2 .2 4  and 2 .5 1 ,  D esp ite  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  these  v a lu e s  a re  co n s id e red  v e ry  h igh  they  may allow  us to  con­
clude t h a t  a change in  tax  r a t e  has a d i r e c t  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  upon 
in v es tm en t.  In  the  second p la c e ,  th e  v a lu e  o f c a p i t a l  a llow ances to 
a company v a r i e s  d i r e c t l y  w ith  the  r a t e  o f  GIT. T heprospec tive  i n ­
c re a se  in  GIT r a t e  from 40 p e r  cen t  to  45 p e r  c en t  or h ig h e r  forms 
p a r t  o f  a fundam ental change in  th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  company t a x a t io n .
Tax in c e n t iv e s  would be more e f f e c t i v e  p o l ic y  in s tru m en ts  under a 
h ig h e r  tax  r a t e  s in ce  as we saw the  e l a s t i c i t y  of investm ent w ith  
r e s p e c t  to them was found to  take v a lu e s  between 0.7r and 1%35 
from the  above d is c u s s io n  i t  seems th a t  the  f i r s t  e f f e c t  of the  in ­
c re a se  o f  ta x  r a t e  upon investm ent i s  s t ro n g e r  s in c e  th e  e l a s t i c i t y  
o f  investm ent i s  h ig h e r  w ith  re s p e c t  to tax  r a t e  than w ith  r e s p e c t  
to  tax  a llow ances .
The p ro s p e c t iv e  in c re a s e  in  th e  ta x  r a t e  may a f f e c t  investm ent 
through d i f f e r e n t  channels  to o .  That i s ,  the  in c re a s e  o f  the  tax  
r a t e  may in tro d u ce  an in c e n t iv e  f o r  companies to 'p o s tp o n e  investm ent 
u n t i l  l a t e r  accoun ting  p e r io d s .
We now tu rn  to  the q u e s t io n  o f  c o m p a t ib i l i ty  o f  the Greek sy s ­
tem o f  tax  in c e n t iv e s  to  in d u s t r y  w ith  th a t  o f  the Community, We a re  
o f  the op in ion  t h a t  t h i s  a re a  i s  the  most c r u c i a l  in  the  ta x  reform  
p ro c e ss .  Greece, as we saw, a p p l ie s  to i t s  i n d u s t r i e s  an e x ten s iv e  
system of a id s .  The l e a d e r  o f  the Greek team opening the n e g o t i a t ­
ions  between Greece and E.E .C, in  1976, emphasized t h a t  " s in ce  Greece 
s t i l l  has a long  way to go in  terms o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  and moderni­
z a t io n  to o a th  up with th e  r e s t  o f  the Community, i t  i s  im portan t t h a t  
i t  should be accommodated under both  re g io n a l  and s o c i a l  p o l i c y  and 
t h e i r  in s tru m en ts  . Greece would l i k e  to  be
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recogn ized  as a s p e c ia l  development a re a  and so q u a l i f y  fo r  maxi­
mum development a id ,  and i t  wanted s p e c ia l  arrangem ents to  enable  
i t  to  m ain ta in  c e r t a i n  tax  concessions  fo r  i t s  i n d u s t r i e s . ( P .P a p a l ig o u r a s ,
1976) .
The e x te n t  to which the  e x i s t i n g  system o f  ta x  in c e n t iv e s  i s  
com patible w ith  Community r e g u la t io n s  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to determ ine f o r  
two rea so n s .  F i r s t ,  th e re  i s  no d r a f t  document on the Community’s 
p a r t  to  d ea l  w ith  th e se  in c e n t iv e s  and second, as we saw in  the  
p rev ious  c h ap te r  the  e x i s t i n g  ta x  in c e n t iv e  systems in  the  E.E.C 
c o u n t r ie s  are  c h a r a c te r iz e d  by the  absence o f  t ran sp a ren c y .  How­
e v e r ,  one obvious c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Greece p r a c t i c e  i s  th e  absence 
o f  investm ent g ra n ts ,  c o n t r a ry  to the Community's p r a c t i c e .  I t  
i s  re p o r te d  t h a t  the whole s t r u c t u r e  o f  investm ent in c e n t iv e s  and 
re g io n a l  p o l ic y  in  Greece i s  under review  and major changes a re  ex­
pec ted  to be announced. The purpose o f  th i s  rev iew  i s  to  make in ­
vestm ent in c e n t iv e s  more e f f e c t i v e  and to pu t th e se  in  l in e  w ith  
the  e x i s t in g  in  the E.E .C , I t  i s  argued t h a t  the  a d a p ta t io n  w i l l  
be f a i r l y  easy p rov ided  t h a t  the in c e n t iv e s  a lre a d y  o f f e re d  are  
guaran teed  to con tinue  to  s t a y  u n t i l  the  end o f  I 98I ,
CONCLUSIONS
The E.E.C Commission has developed a p lan  f o r  the  harmoniz­
a t io n  o f  the  GIT w ith in  th e  E.E.C. A nalysis  o f  the  p la n  in  the p r e ­
ceding  s e c t io n s  has i d e n t i f i e d  a number of im portan t p o t e n t i a l  econ­
omic e f f e c t s  upon the  Greek economy, some fav o u ra b le  and some unfav­
o u ra b le ,  On the favou rab le  s id e  we have: -
1. The new system w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a f a i r e r  tax  s t r u c tu r e  in  
which d i f f e r e n t  types of income a re  taxed  more n e a r ly  on 
uniform base . However, th i s  improvement i s  no t expected to  
be s i g n i f i c a n t  s in c e  the  r i s e  o f  d iv idends is  no t expected  
to  be s i g n i f i c a n t  as w e l l ,
2. The r e g r e s s i v i t y  o f  the e x i s t i n g  exemption fo r  income from 
d iv idends  w i l l  be p a r t i a l l y  countered  by b r in g in g  the  d i v i ­
dend tax  c r e d i t  i n to  tax ab le  income b e fo re  computation o f  
tax  and c r e d i t .
5 , The in c re a se  o f  c a p i t a l  m o b il i ty  may r e s u l t  in  h ig h e r  q u a l­
i t y  o f  investm en t.
4 . For reasons  given above, i t  seems l i k e l y  th a t  the in c re a s e  
in  the tax  r a t e  would in c re a s e  the  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  such 
government p o l i c y  to o ls  as a c c e le r a te d  d e p r e c ia t io n ,  c a p i -
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t a l  a llow ances , and s im i l a r  d ev ice s .
5 . I t  i s  expected  t h a t  th e  adop tion  o f  th e  new system w i l l  r e ­
s u l t  in  a revenue g a in .
On the unfa V ou r ah 1 e s id e  we hav e :
1. Some in c re a s e  in  a d m in is t r a t iv e  and compliance c o s ts  i s  
p robab le  s in c e  th e  new system i s  more complex than  the  ex­
i s t i n g  system and the t o t a l  w ith h o ld in g  ta x  r a t e  i s  l e s s  
under th e  new system than  under the  p re s e n t ,
2 . The new system w i l l  g ive  l i t t l e  inducement to re v e rs e  s h i f t ­
ing ,
5, M arginal in v e s to r s  w i l l  be induced to sw itch  to the  noncor­
p o ra te  s e c to r s ,
4, The b ia s  in  favour o f  deb t f in a n c in g  w i l l  in c re a s e ,
5, We expect a  s l i g h t  re d u c t io n  in  t o t a l  p r i v a t e  sav ing  which 
w i l l  reduce somewhat the  amount used f o r  c a p i t a l  fo rm ation  
as compared under the  p re s e n t  system ,
6, The g r e a te r  c o rp o ra te  ta x  burden may le ad  to lower i n v e s t ­
ment.
The in t r o d u c t io n  o f  the  im p u ta t io n  system fo r  the  ta x a t io n  o f  
d iv idend  w i l l  pu t Greece on the  same l e v e l  as o th e r  more advanced 
c o u n t r i e s .  I n v e s to r s  w i l l  s u r e ly  be fo rced  to modify and adap t t h e i r  
p lan s  to the  new system; which has more than  a minor impact on th e  
e n t i r e  Greek economy; c a r e f u l  tax  p lann ing  both on the  p a r t  o f  r e s ­
id e n t  and n o n - re s id e n t  in v e s to r s  i s  th e re fo re  of the  utm ost im port­
ance .
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6 .7  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS OP THE PINUINGS,RELEVANCE 
OP THE FINDINGS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
In th is  f in a l  s e c t io n  we r e c a p itu la te  the main fin d in gs and 
methods fo llow ed by the t h e s is ,  we d iscu ss  the im p lica tio n s o f  the 
fin d in g s and in d ica te  d ir e c tio n s  fo r  fu rth er  research .
The p r in c ip a l aim o f  the th e s is  was to estim ate the impact upon the  
Greek economy from corporate tax changes r e s u lt in g  from Greek member­
ship  o f the E.E.C. This estim ate required the appropriate th e o r e t i­
c a l and te c h n ic a l background fo r  the CIT system s in vo lved . Chapter 
two, th erefore  provided us w ith the th e o r e t ic a l inform ation about the 
im putation and dividend deduction system , whereas chapters th ree , 
four and f iv e  d iscu ssed  the te c h n ic a l c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  th ese  system s.
The comparison on th e o r e t ic a l grounds o f the dividend deduction  
system  w ith the im putation system showed the fo llo w in g ; -
1. The im putation system  i s  more complex than the dividend deduct­
ion  system due to  the presence o f  grossing-up and c r e d it  p ro cess .
We argued th a t t h is  system could be made sim ple to the share­
holder i f  the corporation  would make the n ecessary  c a lc u la tio n s  
fo r  him and he would be informed only  o f the amount o f  d ividends  
which he has to inclu de in  h is  personal tax d ec la ra tio n  and the 
amount o f  h is  c r e d it ,
2 , For a g iven  amount o f  revenue the dividend deduction system  r e ­
quires a h igher tax ra te  than the im putation system  does, where­
as fo r  a given  tax ra te  the la t t e r  system provides the govern­
ment w ith grea ter  amount o f  tax revenue ( ta b le s  2 .1  and 2 ,2 ) ,
5 . The im putation system imposes a degree o f  economic double taxa­
tio n  o f  d ividends whereas under the dividend deduction system  
th is  degree i s  zero ,
4 . Both system s provide the corporation  w ith a p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  d eter­
mining d is tr ib u tio n  according to  the marginal personal tax  ra te
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o f the shareholders. From Table 2 ,1  we saw th at fo r  g iven  tax  
l i a b i l i t y  the dividend deduction system  induces firm s to d is ­
tr ib u te  a la rg er  amount o f  p r o f it s  than the im putation system  
does. The two system would be eq u iva len t regarding th e ir  e f ­
f e c t  upon d is tr ib u tio n  o f  p r o f it s  i f  the tax ra te  under the 
dividend deduction system  would be equal to  the ra te  o f  d iv i­
dend tax c r e d it  under the im putation system . The presence o f  
a c a p ita l ga in s tax  makes both systems to favour d is tr ib u tio n ,
5 . The dividend deduction system  i s  n eu tra l between equ ity  and 
debt fin ance whereas fo r  the im putation system to be n e u tra l,  
in te r e s t  payments should be d ed u ctib le  not a g a in st the tax  
rate  but aga in st the ra te  o f  im putation,
6, Both system s conform w ith  v e r t ic a l  and h o r izo n ta l eq u ity  prin­
c ip le s  but on ly  fo r  the d is tr ib u te d  part o f  p r o f i t s .  The d iv i ­
dend deduction system  would improve eq u ity  i f  a l l  p r o f it s  were 
d is tr ib u te d  and taxed under the personal income tax r a te ,
7 . As fa r  as the a llo c a t io n  o f c a p ita l w ith in  the economy i s  con­
cerned both system s d iscrim in ate  aga in st the corporate s e c to r .  
However, again , the dividend deduction system would be n eutral 
w ith th at resp ect in  the th e o r e t ic a l case where a l l  p r o f it s  
were d is tr ib u te d ,
8 , From the in tern a tio n a l poin t o f view the im putation system pro­
v id es  the country which employs th at w ith stronger bargaining  
power than the dividend deduction system does, due to the fa c t  
th at i t  i s  e a s ie r  to deny the p rov ision  o f dividend tax c re d it  
to  the fo re ign  shareholders under the former than to  impose a 
tax on d is tr ib u te d  p r o f it s  under the la t t e r  because o f  the r e c i ­
p r o c ity  ru le s  hold ing on in tern a tio n a l ta x a tio n .
On the other hand, the p r a c t ic a l ex erc ise  o f  rep lacin g  o f the 
dividend deduction system , as i t  i s  app lied  to Greece, by the im­
putation  system , with the tech n ica l c h a r a c te r is t ic s  suggested  by
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l a s t  E.E.C proposa l, showed the fo llo w in g  im p lica tio n s fo r  the
Greek economy:
1 , An a p p lic a tio n  o f  the im putation system to Greece fo r  the year  
1975» assuming th a t firm s would fo llo w  the same dividend p o lic y  
as they d id  under the e x is t in g  system , showed th a t the imputat­
ion  system would r e s u lt  in  a tax  revenue g a in .
2 . The new system would g iv e  l i t t l e  inducement to reverse  s h i f t in g ,  
i f  the Greek CIT i s  ahiAed, s in ce  the tax paid a t  the corporate  
le v e l  i s  g rea ter  under th is  system than under the current,
5* The r e g r e s s iv ity  o f  the e x is t in g  exemptions fo r  income from
dividends w i l l  be p a r t ia l ly  countered by bring the dividend tax  
c r e d it  in to  taxable income before computation o f  tax  and c r e d it ,
4. D espite the th e o r e t ic a l con clu sion  that the dividend deduction  
system induces firm s to d is tr ib u te  a la rg er  amount o f  p r o f it s  
than the im putation system  does, in  p r a c tic e , the la t t e r  sy s ­
tem favours la rg er  d is tr ib u  . t io n .  Under th is  system the tax  
discrim inatory  v a r ia b le  w il l  be la rg er  than i t s  current v a lu e . 
This i s  due to the fa c t  th at the ra te  o f im putation under the 
new system is  expected to be h igher than the current tax  r a te .  
This r e s u lt  w i l l  have three im p lica tio n s .
F ir s t ,  the tax stru ctu re  w i l l  become fa ir e r  s in ce  a la rg er  a-  
mount o f  income w i l l  be taxed under the personal tax r a te .  
However, th is  improvement i s  not expected to be s ig n if ic a n t  
sin ce  the r i s e  o f  dividends i s  not expected to  be s ig n if ic a n t  
as w e ll. Second, the g rea ter  amount o f  d ividend under the im­
putation  system  im p lies th at more funds are passed the t e s t  o f  
c a p ita l market which may r e s u lt  to higher q u a lity  o f in v e s t ­
ment, Third, i t  seems more reasonable to expect a s l ig h t  re ­
duction in  to t a l  p r iv a te  saving s in ce  the marginal p rosp en sity  
to save o f  the dividend r e c ip ie n ts  i s  a t l e a s t  l e s s  than one. 
This i s  expected to reduce somewhat the amount used for  ca p i­
ta l  form ation,
5, The in crease  o f  tax ra te  w i l l  r a is e  tax  saving from a cce lera ted
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d ep recia tion  and investm ent a llow ances. However, th is  in ­
crease w i l l  induce marginal in v esto rs  to sw itch to the non­
corporate ra te  o f  the economy.
6, The in trod u ction  o f  economic double taxa tion  o f  dividends un­
der the new system  w i l l  e lim in ate  the n e u tr a lity  between debt 
finance and eq u ity  fin ance under the current system . Debt 
finance w i l l  become a more a t tr a c t iv e  method o f  fin an ce.
To reach the above mentioned r e s u lt s  we had a long  way to walk. 
In chapter three and four we a ssessed  the dividend deduction system  
as i t  i s  app lied  to Greece. We began th is  assessm ent d isc u ss in g  the 
Greek tax  stru ctu re  whose main c h a r a c te r is t ic s  are the predominance 
o f  indirect" ta x es , the absence o f  c a p ita l ga in s ta x , the minor con­
tr ib u tio n  o f  w ealth  taxes and f in a l ly ,  the corporation  income tax  
fo llow ed by a p leth ora  o f  tax in c e n tiv e s .
A ssessin g  the CIT system  we d iscu ssed  the e x is t in g  n on -neu tra l­
i t i e s  on dividend taxa tion  \diose purpose i s  to support the c a p ita l  
market. We introduced a new technique to c a lc u la te  the tax d is c r i ­
minatory v a r ia b le  between dividend and r e ten tio n . I t s  va lu e was not 
s ig n if ic a n t  d if fe r e n t  from one, which supports the view  th at not 
such a p o licy  was fo llow ed  by the Greek a u th o r it ie s  during the per­
iod under co n sid era tio n . Having e sta b lish ed  th is  v a r ia b le  we went 
on in  chapter four to t e s t  économet r ic a l ly  how ta x a tio n  a f f e c t s  the 
appropriation o f p r o f i t s .  To the contrary to the e x is t in g  em piric­
a l  s tu d ies  on dividend behaviour we esta b lish ed  a dividend model 
w ith a p r io r i economic j u s t i f i c a t io n  based on the Greek economic 
circum stances. The model a lso  v e r if ie d  the s t a t i s t i c a l  in feren ce  
th at tax d iscrim in atory  p o lic y  does not e x is t  in  Greece, The im p li­
ca tio n  from t h is  fin d in g  i s  th at the Greek a u th o r it ie s  may wish to  
use th is  p o lic y  instrum ent fo r  a f f e c t in g  the appropriation  o f  p rof­
i t s .  However, the appropriate use o f such a p o lic y  i s  by no means 
obvious. In the f i r s t  p la c e , there are many v a lid  pros and cons 
with resp ect to  the a d v is a b i l ity  o f  encouraging corporate sav in g , 
and there i s  no consensus on how they balance, as we have d iscu ssed . 
The investm ent argument in  favour o f increased  corporate saving  
depends on the assumption th at th ese  savings would a c tu a lly  r e s u lt
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in  new investm ent rather than moving in to  other a s s e t s .  Our d iv i ­
dend model revea led  th a t the tax .system  a lso  a f f e c t s ,  in d ir e c t ly  now, 
the appropriation o f  p r o f it s  th r o n g  d ep reciation  a llow ances. I t  
showed th at firm s take in to  aocount cash flow  and not n et p r o f it s  in  
determ ining th e ir  d ividend p o lic y .
As fa r  as the method o f  fin a n c in g  investm ent programmes i s  con­
cerned we found that the Greek firm s h e a v ily  r e l ie d  on debt finance  
rath er  than eq u ity  fin a n ce . Tax p o lic y  to a ttr a c t  eq u ity  fin ance was 
alm ost in e f f e c t iv e  s in ce  i t  f a i l e d  to  bring both demandera and supp­
l i e r s  o f shares in  the Athens Stock Exchange. The banking system  
and the pu b lic  f in a n c ia l in s t i t u t io n s  provided firm s w ith adequate 
funds fo r  fin a n c in g  investm ent programmes. We argued, in  l in e  with  
fin d in g s by oth er s tu d ie s , th a t p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and not fin an ce was 
the co n stra in t fa c to r  to  new c a p ita l  form ation. This exp la in s our 
fin d in g  th a t investm ent and dividend d ec isio n s are independent. To 
reach th is  conclusion  we f i r s t  e sta b lish e d  a jo in t  p r o f it s -a c c e la -  
ra to r  model r e f le c t in g  the demand-oriented Greek economy and the  
government f in a n c ia l p o lic y  fo r  the period  under co n sid era tio n .
This model showed th at reta in ed  p r o f it s  had a s a t is fa c to r y  c o n tr i­
bution  to  fin a n c in g  investm ent. We used both s in g le  equation and 
sim ultaneous equations model to t e s t  the interdependence assump­
tio n  between dividend and investm ent d e c is io n s .
D epreciation allow ances and investm ent allow ances were gener­
ous during the p er io d  under review . We introduced a more r e a l i s t i c  
v ers io n  o f  the Jorgenson’s model to t e s t  the r e la t io n sh ip  between 
tax sav ing  and investm ent in  the Greek manufacturing. The r e s u l t s ,  
d esp ite  the econom etric l im ita t io n s ,  seems to support the view  th at  
investm ent in c e n tiv e s  had a s a t is fa c to r y  con trib u tion  to c a p ita l  
form ation. However, a q u a lita t iv e  d iscu ssio n  in  chapter th ree , 
showed th a t the q u a lity  and d is tr ib u tio n  o f  investm ent were n ot s a t ­
is fa c to r y , The im p lica tio n  o f  th is  f in d in g  i s  th a t the Greek autho­
r i t i e s  should reconsider the structure o f tax in c e n tiv es  in  or­
der to make th ese  more e f f e c t iv e .
We should r e a l iz e  th a t the study o f  tax in c e n tiv e s  did not go 
deeply enough. We did so fo r  two reasons; f i r s t ,  because the main
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ooncem  o f  th is  th e s is  was to cover the e x is t in g  gap from the la ck  
o f  background s tu d ies  in  t h is  area and second, the qu estion  o f  tax  
in c e n tiv e s  i s  not so urgent s in ce  Greece has requested to  be allow ed  
to reta in  th ese  in c e n tiv e s  fo r  a tr a n s it io n a l p eriod . However, the 
need fo r  fu rth er  research in  th is  area i s  very  obvious because we 
b e lie v e  th at the grea ter  impact from tax harmonization w i l l  come 
through the change o f  tax in c e n tiv e s .
This th e s is  made a s im p lif ie d  attempt to study the incid en ce  
and s h if t in g  question  in  Greece, I t  i s  the f i r s t  time in  the l i t e r ­
ature where th is  problem i s  d e a lt  by u sin g  a dividend and in v e s t ­
ment model. We incorporated the tax  s h i f t in g  c o e f f ic ie n t  in  our 
tax  d iscrim inatory  v a r ia b le  6  and u sin g  the dividend model we 
te s te d  th is  h y p o th esis . This model was inadequate to  provide us 
w ith any in d ic a tio n  about the s h i f t in g  hyp othesis due to the fa c t  
th at the d iscrim in atory  v a r ia b le  0 had a n e g lib le  e f f e c t  upon d iv i ­
dend d e c is io n s . Moreover, we used the investm ent model to t e s t  
th is  h yp oth esis. The evidence from th is  t e s t  seems to support the 
hypothesis o f  zero s h i f t in g  in  Greece. However, the need fo r  r e ­
search in  th is  area through a more so p h is tic a te d  model in c lu d in g  a 
dividend, equation i s  very  obvious.
F in a lly , in  chapter f iv e  we d e a lt  w ith the problem o f  tax har­
m onization w ith in  the E.E.C, We argued th a t corporate tax harmoni­
za tion  i s  n ecessary  to make c a p ita l  flow s instrum ental in  ach iev in g  
the aims o f  Treaty o f  Rome d esp ite  the ex isten ce  o f other in te r n a t­
io n a l economic b a r r ie r s . Comparison o f  the e x is t in g  CIT systems in  
the E.E.C, showed that seven out o f  the nine member cou n tries  em­
p loy  the same system , however, each o f  th ese d if fe r s  from the oth er  
in  many tech n ica l r e s p e c ts . We accepted  th a t the l a s t  E.E.C, pro­
p osa l for  CIT harm onization i s  a good s ta r t in g  point but i t  goes 
h a lf  way to so lv e  the problem. Therefore, we proceeded to d iscu ss  
the d ifferen ces  in  the tax bases w ith in  the E.E.C, co u n tr ie s . We 
found no c lea r  tendency fo r  the E.E.C, coun tries them selves to r e ­
duce th ese d iscrep an cies as there i s  fo r  the system o f CIT, We 
took the opportunity to make some prelim inary ideas for  tax base 
harm onization. We suggested  ways fo r  harmonization o f the main e l e ­
ments o f the tax base. For example, d ep recia tion  allow ances may be 
harmonized e ith e r  by Introducing the "reserve ra tio"  t e s t  or by in -
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troducing fr e e  d ep recia tion  a llow ances. In a d d itio n , in te r e s t  
ra te  may be harmonized by a s so c ia t in g  the in te r e s t  ra te  paid  on 
p riv a te  tran sa ctio n s to th a t adopted by each member c o u n tr ie s ’ 
cen tra l bank.
There are very  few s tu d ie s  in  estim atin g  the impact o f  tax  
harm onization. This study fo llow ed a p a r t ia l equ ilibrium  a n a ly s is  
to estim ate the impact upon the Greek economy. We adopted th is  
a n a ly s is  fo r  two reasons: f i r s t ,  a general equ ilibrium  a n a ly s is ,  
which would be more ap p rop riate, would require data which ewe not 
a v a ila b le  fo r  the Greek economy. The absence o f  r e la te d  s tu d ie s  
was a p a r ticu la r  co n stra in t to th is  study, for  example, the absence 
o f  a w ell e s ta b lish e d  study d ea lin g  w ith dividend p o lic y  and share 
p r ices  o f  the absence o f  any evidence about the ra te  o f  return in  
corporate and uncorporate sec to r s  o f  the economy, deprived th is  
study from d ea lin g  w ith the impact o f  the reform more deeply.
Second, the lack  o f  the appropriate econometric model to cap­
ture the sim ultaneous feedbacks among the member co u n tr ie s . How­
ever , we share the b e l i e f  o f Peacock and R ick etts  th at "public  
f in a n c ie r s , p a r t ic u la r ly  those who make part in  policy-m aking  
in crea s in g ly  have to  understand the ro le  o f  models in  help ing p o l i ­
cy-makers to trace  the movements in  important m acro-variab les, 
(1975) .
F in a lly , the a s so c ia tio n  o f  Greece w ith the E.E.C. w i l l  stim u­
la t e  Greece to review  i t s  taxa tion  system in  general and the cor­
poration  tax system in  p a r tic u la r . Both Greece and the E.E.C, have 
r e a liz e d  the need fo r  c la r i f ic a t io n  in  th at area . T herefore, our 
hope th at th is  study w i l l  provide both Greece and the E.E.C. with  
a necessary  background study, provides us with the s a t is fa c t io n  




1. Assuming no change in  dividend behaviour.
2 . See s e c t io n  2.4o3*
3 .  Assuming th at Greece w i l l  be allowed to r e ta in  th e se .
4.  See ta b le s  6 .3  and 6 .6 ,  p a r tic u la r ly  l in e  9*
3# For example in  1975i the  68 p e r  cen t o f  div idend  was
rece ived  by shareholders who were above 4o per cent in ­
come tax  r a te .
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